CHRISTY STONE HALLORAN v. ROGER T. RIGNEY
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RENDERED: March 5, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001830-MR
CHRISTY STONE HALLORAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY RAIKES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1985-CI-001359
v.
ROGER T. RIGNEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Christy Halloran appeals pro se from a November
20, 1996, order of the Hardin Circuit Court apportioning between
her and her former husband, Roger Rigney, some of the costs of
their child-custody dispute, namely fees owing to a guardian ad
litem and an expert witness.
Halloran maintains that the trial
court erred or abused its discretion in assigning any of these
costs to her either because she is shielded from liability by a
prior bankruptcy or because the disparity between her resources
and Rigney’s dictates that the entire liability be assigned to
him.
Rigney has chosen not to respond to Halloran’s appeal.
We
believe that there is some merit to Halloran’s criticism of the
trial court’s bankruptcy rulings.
We are persuaded, however, for
reasons explained below, that the result the trial court reached
was not unfair to Halloran and thus that she is not entitled to
relief.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Hardin Circuit
Court.
Halloran and Rigney were married in October 1984.
They
had one child together, Taylor Rigney, who was born in September
1985.
In December 1985, Rigney petitioned for divorce.
A final
decree of dissolution was entered the following November.
Initially, the parties agreed to Halloran having custody of
Taylor, but in 1987 that agreement gave way to an emotionally
wrenching dispute that was not resolved until 1995 when this
Court affirmed a trial-court ruling that transferred custody to
Rigney.1
During the course of that dispute, the trial court
appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) on behalf of Taylor.
The
trial court also ordered on a number of occasions that Taylor be
interviewed by a psychologist, who then served as an expert
witness.
In May 1996, in conjunction with a motion by Halloran
to increase her visitation with Taylor, the trial court ordered
the parties to address the fee apportionment questions at issue
here.
At a preliminary hearing on the matter in August 1996, the
parties agreed to the reasonableness of the bill for fees and
1
1992-CA-002962-MR (03/17/95) (discretionary review denied
(1995-SC-310 (08/16/95)).
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costs submitted by the GAL.2
$24,000.00.
That bill totaled nearly
The psychologist’s bill could not be determined, so
it was agreed that the trial court would write to him for a final
statement of his charges.
Halloran introduced evidence of her
1992 bankruptcy and argued that her liability for any portion of
either the GAL’s fee or the psychologist’s had been discharged.
At most, she claimed, her liability was limited to fees accruing
after the termination of the bankruptcy case.
Both parties
disavowed responsibility for the GAL’s involvement.
It was
agreed, finally, that after hearing from the psychologist the
trial court
would issue a tentative ruling to which the parties
would be given an opportunity to except.
Accordingly, the trial court issued an order on
November 20, 1996, which apportioned the two (2) bills as
follows: Rigney was made liable for that portion of the GAL’s
bill which had accrued prior to Halloran’s bankruptcy petition
(approximately $7,300.00).
The court divided the remainder of
the GAL’s bill evenly (about $8,200.00 apiece).
The court also
charged Rigney with the amount of the psychologist’s bill
Halloran had listed on her bankruptcy petition (about $1,400.00),
and assigned to Halloran the balance (about $400.00).
Both
parties were ordered to pay these amounts within six (6) months
2
We are mindful of Halloran’s failure to name either the GAL or the psychologist as
parties to this appeal. As we understand the case, however, Halloran does not contest in any way
the propriety of the fees awarded. She maintains only that the fees were improperly apportioned
between Rigney and herself. Rigney is thus the only other real party in interest, and Halloran’s
appeal is not invalid for failing to include the other two. Knott v. Crown Colony Farm, Inc., Ky.,
865 S.W.2d 326 (1993).
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of the order and to pay interest on any balance left outstanding
thereafter.
Halloran filed exceptions to this tentative order, in
the form of a motion to vacate or modify.
motion on March 17, 1997.
The court heard the
Halloran argued that given the marked
disparity in the parties’ resources--Rigney having a
significantly greater ability to pay--the court had assigned an
unjust portion of the bills to her.
She also argued that the
payment schedule ordered by the court imposed an unjust and
unrealistic burden.
By order entered June 26, 1997, the court reaffirmed
its apportionment of the GAL’s and psychologist’s bills, but
modified the manner in which they are to be payed.
It ordered
that Halloran’s portion of the psychologist’s bill was due by
August 1, 1997, and that commencing September 1, 1997, she was to
pay her portion of the GAL’s bill at a rate of $200.00 per month,
plus eight percent (8%) interest on any principal balance
outstanding after December 26, 1997 (six months from the date of
the ruling).
Halloran appeals from this modified November 20,
1996, order.
Halloran first argues that the trial court misconstrued
the protection accorded her by her bankruptcy.
She petitioned
for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § §
701 et seq.) on March 9, 1992.
By that date, the GAL had been
appointed, and the psychologist had rendered all of his services.
Indeed, by that date, the court had ordered Halloran to pay the
psychologist’s entire fee.
Halloran claims that her bankruptcy
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discharge on September 8, 1992, relieved her not only from having
to pay any fees accrued by March 9, 1992, but was also meant to
apply to the GAL’s fees subsequently accruing.
rejected this claim.
The trial court
Not only was Halloran liable for post-
petition fees, the court ruled, relying on In re Cox, 33 F.Supp.
796 (1940), a pre-Reform Act case, but she was liable as well for
any pre-petition fee, or any portion of a pre-petition fee, she
failed to list on her bankruptcy petition.
Halloran insists that
the trial court misinterpreted the bankruptcy law.
Despite a
major caveat, we agree.
To give individual debtors a fresh start, “a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,” a
principal feature of the Bankruptcy Code is its provision for a
discharge of the debtor’s preexisting debts.
Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637, 648, 91 S. Ct. 1704, 29 L. Ed. 2d 233, 241 (1971)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
As summarized by the 4th
Circuit Court of Appeals,
[a] discharge in bankruptcy relieves the
debtor of personal liability for all prepetition debts but those excepted under the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 727.
The Code
defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” 11
U.S.C. § 101(12). A “claim” is defined as a
“right to payment, whether or not such right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured or unsecured. . . .” 11
U.S.C. § 101(5). Consequently, any right to
payment which arises prior to the bankruptcy
constitutes pre-petition debt and is
discharged, absent an applicable exception.
The discharge operates to permanently stay
any attempt to hold the debtor personally
liable for discharged debts. 11 U.S.C. §
524(a)(2).
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In re Rosenfeld, 23 F.3d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1994).
Thus, in
resolving Halloran’s contention that she may not be held
personally liable for the psychologist’s or the GAL’s fees, a
court must address two (2) issues: (1) whether the fees are prepetition “claims” or “debts” under the Bankruptcy Code such that
they are subject to the general discharge provided for under
Chapter 7; and (2) whether they are subject to any of the Code’s
exceptions to discharge.
Halloran bears the burden of
establishing the first condition, that the fees are pre-petition
claims or debts.
In re Surface, 133 B.R. 411 (1991).
The
creditor, however, Rigney in this case, must carry the burden of
raising and proving the debt’s nondischargeability under a
statutory exception.
In re Robinson, 193 B.R. 367 (1996).
With respect to the first question, we note that under
the Code a debtor’s fresh start is to be as unhampered as
possible and to that end, Congress adopted “the broadest
available definition of ‘claim.’”
Johnson v. Home State Bank,
501 U.S. 78, 83, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 115 L. Ed. 2d 66, 74 (1991)
(citations omitted).
That definition extends to obligations that
do not ripen until after the bankruptcy petition was filed,
provided that the operative facts giving rise to the obligation
occurred prior to filing.
The phrase “operative facts” has been
understood to refer to acts by the debtor, not other, subsequent
contingencies affecting the debtor’s liability.
Co., Inc. v. Angier, 84 B.R. 274 (1988).
Rothschild &
In general, “bankruptcy
was intended to protect the debtor from the continuing costs of
pre-bankruptcy acts but not to insulate the debtor from the costs
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of post-bankruptcy acts.”
In re Hadden, 57 B.R. 187, 190 (1986).
A distinction may be made, therefore, between claims arising from
pre-bankruptcy acts “the costs of which continue to accrue after
filing,” which are subject to discharge, and claims arising from
post-bankruptcy acts, which are not.
Id.; In re Sure-Snap Corp.,
983 F.2d 1015 (11th Cir. 1993).
As is clear from the record and as the trial court
found, all the psychologist’s fees and some $7,000.00 of the
GAL’s fees accrued prior to Halloran’s March 9, 1992, bankruptcy
petition.
Enforcement of her liability for any of those fees was
thus presumptively barred by her discharge.
Halloran argues,
further, that she should not be held liable for any of the GAL’s
fees because they all accrued pursuant to the pre-bankruptcy
appointment of the GAL.
The trial court, on the other hand,
deemed Halloran potentially liable for any of the GAL’s fees that
accrued post-petition.
In light of the cases cited above, it is
likely that Halloran is correct to the extent that bankruptcy
would presumptively shield her from having to pay for any of the
GAL’s fees that accrued independently of her post-bankruptcy
acts.
Post-petition fees for the GAL’s routine administration,
therefore, or for his responses to matters raised by Rigney,
would likely be subject to Halloran’s discharge.
Her bankruptcy,
however, did not give her a free hand to impose additional costs
upon Rigney.
To the extent that the GAL’s post-petition fees
arose as a result of proceedings initiated by Halloran, such as
her motions for modified visitation, they are post-petition
claims unaffected by Halloran’s bankruptcy.
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Even assuming, however, that Halloran’s bankruptcy
applied to more of the GAL’s fees than the trial court believed,
it is necessary to consider next whether any of the amounts
presumptively discharged are subject to statutory exceptions.
The trial court excepted a portion of the psychologist’s fee on
the ground that Halloran had failed to list the entire amount on
her petition.
In so ruling, the trial court misconstrued the new
Bankruptcy Code’s notice requirement.
Under the former
Bankruptcy Act, debtors were required, at their peril, to
schedule debts and creditors fully and accurately.
Under the
current Code, however, this requirement has been significantly
lessened.
Commenting on the persistence of the old idea despite
the change in the statute, one bankruptcy court said,
[T]he Bankruptcy Code does not require that a
debt necessarily be scheduled in order to be
discharged. Although the listing of a debt
has lost the talismanic status it may have
had under the former Bankruptcy Act, old
habits die hard.
. . .
Generally, unlisted debts are discharged
unless the creditor did not learn of the
bankruptcy in time to file a timely proof of
claim . . . . 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3).
In re Costa, 172 B.R. 954, 959 (1994).
Under the Code, it is the
creditor’s opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy
proceeding that matters, not the debtor’s commitment to a
specific amount of alleged debt: “Importantly, the statute [11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)] does not require actual knowledge of the
specifics of a claim; rather, a debt may be discharged if the
creditor is informed of the ‘case’, i.e., the bankruptcy
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proceeding as a whole.”
at 278 nt. 3.
Rothschild & Co., Inc. v. Angier, supra,
There is no suggestion here that Halloran failed
to notify the psychologist of her bankruptcy case.
The trial
court erred, therefore, by excepting a portion of the
psychologist’s fee from discharge on the ground that the notice
Halloran provided was insufficient.
This is the bankruptcy portion of this case as it was
presented to and addressed by the trial court.
As just
explained, the trial court relied upon incorrect grounds for
apportioning any of the psychologist’s fees to Halloran and very
likely was incorrect as well in its reasons for apportioning the
GAL’s fee as it did.
If this were the end of the matter,
Halloran would be entitled to relief; but this is not the end.
11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5) excepts from bankruptcy discharge
any debts in the nature of child or spousal support.
Guardian ad
Litem fees and witness fees for custody proceedings have been
held subject to this exception.
In re Constantine, 183 B.R. 335
(1995); In re Holdenried, 178 B.R. 782 (1995); In re Jones, 9
F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Trembley, 162 B.R. 60 (1993); In
re Smith, 207 B.R. 289 (1997); In re Strickland, 90 F.3d 444
(11th Cir. 1996).
The trial court likely erred, therefore, by
deeming Halloran’s bankruptcy a bar to her having to pay any of
the fees at issue here.
Of course, as noted above, the creditor
has the burden of raising this issue.
Rigney and the Guardian ad
Litem, both of whom are attorneys, participated in the hearings
on this matter and had every opportunity to call this statutory
provision to the court’s attention.
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We are obliged to interpret
their failure to do so as a waiver, to the extent that this error
may not now provide a basis for modifying the trial court’s order
in a manner disadvantageous to Halloran.
Ferrell, Ky.,
937 S.W.2d 713 (1997).
CR 52.04; Eiland v.
That waiver, however, does
not preclude our noting that the errors by the trial court
benefitted Halloran more than they cost her, nor does it require
us to ignore the actual merits of Halloran’s claim.
Vega v.
Kosair Charities Committee, Inc., Ky. App., 832 S.W.2d 895
(1992); Entwistle v. Carrier Conveyor Corporation, Ky., 284
S.W.2d 820 (1955). We conclude, therefore, that
Halloran’s
bankruptcy does not entitle her to relief.
Halloran also contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by apportioning the psychologist’s and GAL’s fees in
apparent disregard of Rigney’s much greater ability to afford
them.
Halloran’s contention has two (2) parts.
She maintains
that the trial court violated a procedural requirement by not
considering the evidence of the parties’ disparate financial
circumstances.
She also maintains that on its merits the trial
court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion.
Rigney’s greater
wealth, she claims, should make him completely responsible for
the fees at issue.
With respect to her procedural complaint, we agree with
Halloran that, when apportioning costs in a domestic relations
action, the trial court is obliged to consider the relative
wealth and earning capacities of the parties.
KRS 403.220.
We
are satisfied, however, that in this case the trial court did so.
Indeed, in its response to Halloran’s motion to reconsider, the
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trial court expressly noted Halloran’s limited financial
situation and Rigney’s greater earning capacity.
Halloran
complains that the trial court did not make detailed findings on
these matters, but CR 52 requires only that the trial court’s
findings be specific enough to permit meaningful review.
Underwood v. Underwood, Ky. App., 836 S.W.2d 439 (1992).
requirement was satisfied here.
That
Halloran is thus not entitled to
relief on procedural grounds.
On the merits of this issue, Halloran presented
evidence showing that her gross income as a state employee was
approximately $30,000.00 per year.
She testified that this
amount was barely enough to pay taxes, child support, and other
mandatory expenses, and she claimed that the additional burden of
the psychologist’s and GAL’s fees would impose on her an undue
hardship.
This was especially so, she claimed, in light of the
fact that Rigney derives a substantial income from work as both
an attorney and a pharmacist as well as from investments, and
from the fact that Rigney’s net assets amount to several
thousands of dollars.
The trial court acknowledged the
differences in the parties’ financial situations, but ruled that
Halloran’s income was sufficient to enable her to make payments
toward her fee obligation.
Her obligation should be for a
substantial portion of the fees, the trial court explained,
because she bore a substantial portion of the responsibility for
them.
Cost apportionment under KRS 403.220 is a matter left
to the sound discretion of the trial court.
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Wilhoit v. Wilhoit,
Ky., 521 S.W.2d 512 (1975).
This discretion is not unlimited,3
but as long as the trial court gives due consideration to the
parties’ financial circumstances, does not impose a grossly
unfair burden on either party, and indicates in its findings and
conclusions the basis of its decision, this Court may not disturb
its ruling.
Poe v. Poe, Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 849 (1986).
It is
certainly not required that costs be apportioned strictly
according to the parties’ relative resources.
Underwood, supra.
Underwood v.
We are not persuaded that the trial court
abused its discretion in this case.
We note, first, that of the total costs apportioned,
about $25,500.00, Halloran was ordered to pay only about
$8,600.00, or approximately one-third.
Given the trial court’s
findings that Halloran was at least as responsible as Rigney for
incurring these costs and that Halloran’s income, though modest,
is sufficient to permit a meaningful payment--findings that are
not clearly erroneous--we believe that this apportionment
adequately reflects Rigney’s greater resources.
In light of the
results obtained in these proceedings, moreover, results by-andlarge in Rigney’s favor, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by deciding that Rigney should bear no more of the
costs than Halloran’s circumstances necessitated.
The trial
court’s apportionment order thus satisfies the requirements of
Poe v. Poe, supra, and so affords Halloran no grounds for relief.
3
See Becker v. Becker, Ky. App., 903 S.W.2d 528 (1995) (holding that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to award attorney fees to an unemployed wife who had no income
producing assets and whose ex-husband earned $45,000 per year).
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In sum, although Halloran has identified flaws in the
trial court’s handling of her case, she has failed to identify
any errors that would justify changing the result.
The trial
court’s application of bankruptcy law, always a daunting task,
was not as well informed as it might have been, but on balance
its errors were harmless with respect to Halloran.
Nor was
Halloran aggrieved by the trial court’s apportionment of costs.
Her former husband’s greater ability to pay those costs is only
one of the factors bearing on the trial court’s decision.
In
light of Halloran’s equal benefit from and equal responsibility
for the GAL’s and psychologist’s services, the trial court’s
apportionment of one-third of the costs of those services to her
is not unreasonable or an abuse of discretion.
For these
reasons, we affirm the modified November 22, 1996, order of the
Hardin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
No brief for appellee
Christy Stone Halloran, pro se
Frankfort, Kentucky
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