DAMON SMITH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: March 5, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1997-CA-001785-MR
DAMON SMITH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-000125
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND KNOX, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
Damon Smith appeals from a judgment of the Kenton
Circuit Court convicting him of the offenses of first-degree
possession of a controlled substance and second-degree persistent
felony offender.
He was sentenced to five (5) years, as enhanced
by the persistent felony offender charge.
Appellant’s
convictions result from his pleas of guilty to those charges.
appeals from the ruling of the Kenton Circuit Court denying his
He
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
In March 1997, appellant was indicted by a Kenton
County grand jury for the offenses of first-degree trafficking in
a controlled substance and second-degree persistent felony
offender.
His attorney, Hon. Gwen Pollard, proceeded to file
motions for discovery on his behalf.
Appellant was arraigned on
March 31, 1997, and entered pleas of guilty.
At appellant’s
status conference on April 7, 1997, Ms. Pollard reported to the
court that she had been given a plea offer from the Commonwealth,
but had not discussed it with appellant.
She requested
additional time within which to do so.
At a second status conference, held on April 14, 1997,
Ms. Pollard reported to the court that appellant had accepted the
Commonwealth’s plea offer of an amendment of the trafficking
charge to first-degree possession of a controlled substance with
a sentence of five (5) years.
Further, the Commonwealth
recommended an enhanced sentence of five (5) years based upon
appellant’s plea of guilty to the offense of second-degree
persistent felony offender.
On that date, appellant entered his
pleas of guilty to those charges.
Preparatory to accepting his
pleas of guilty, the court fully canvassed appellant with respect
to his constitutional rights.
Appellant acknowledged that he
understood his rights, and that his plea was entered voluntarily
and intelligently.
Appellant further acknowledged to the court
that he had, in fact, possessed a “small amount” of cocaine.
trial court then scheduled sentencing for June 2, 1997.
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The
As the sentencing hearing commenced, Ms. Pollard
informed the court that appellant was expressing the desire to
withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial.
In order to
extend additional time to counsel to discuss the matter with
appellant, the court continued the matter until June 9, 1997.
Just prior to that date, Ms. Pollard filed a written motion to
withdraw appellant’s guilty plea.
That motion stated that
because appellant had not reviewed the discovery submitted by the
Commonwealth prior to entering his guilty plea, he had not
knowingly and voluntarily entered the plea.
In response, the
court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s motion.
On June 19, 1997, appellant appeared before the court,
with Ms. Pollard representing him, for an evidentiary hearing
upon his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
At that hearing,
appellant testified he did not review the discovery the
Commonwealth submitted to his counsel until after he entered his
guilty plea.
He testified he did not believe the Commonwealth
had any basis to charge him with trafficking in a controlled
substance, and had no evidence to prosecute a trafficking case.
Thus, he wished to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charge of
possession of a controlled substance.
The trial court overruled
appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, on July 7,
1997, appellant was sentenced based upon the Commonwealth’s
recommendation.
At his sentencing hearing, appellant orally
moved the court for permission to withdraw his guilty plea on
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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The trial court
denied appellant’s motion, and final judgment in the matter was
entered on July 9, 1997.
On appeal, appellant argues: (1) the trial court denied
him his right to effective assistance of conflict-free counsel
when it allowed him to proceed with his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea while represented by an attorney (Ms. Pollard) who
had an actual conflict of interest; and, (2) the trial court
erred in overruling his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
While the parties have briefed this case as if the
central issue was whether appellant’s counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in some fashion prior to the entry of his
plea, we believe the pivotal question is whether the trial court
erred in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
We do not believe the trial court erred.
The record reflects that the trial court carefully
canvassed appellant with respect to his plea and the consequences
of his plea, in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969).
Appellant acknowledged:
(1) he understood his rights; (2) he had competent counsel; and,
(3) he had, in fact, possessed a “small amount” of cocaine, thus
admitting on the record his guilt to the amended offense of
possession of a controlled substance which the Commonwealth had
recommended.
Under these circumstances, appellant’s plea was
voluntarily and intelligently made.
RCr 8.10 appears to give a trial judge some discretion
in whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea.
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That
rule states, in part: “At any time before judgment the court may
permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill, to be
withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.”
added).
(Emphasis
See also Anderson v. Commonwealth, Ky. 507 S.W.2d 187,
188 (1974) (Whether the defendant may withdraw a guilty plea
pursuant to RCr 8.10 is “a matter within the sound discretion of
the trial court”).
In this case, the trial court fully accepted
and implemented the recommendation of the Commonwealth to amend
the trafficking charge to a possession charge, and to impose an
enhanced sentence of five (5) years.
Further, as noted, the
record fully reflects the voluntary nature of appellant’s plea.
We do not believe appellant’s contention that he could not have
been convicted on a trafficking charge is a sufficient basis to
set aside his guilty plea, where the Commonwealth recommended an
amendment of that charge to possession.
Further, we believe
appellant’s admission of his guilt to the offense of possession
confirms our opinion that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.
See Hurt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 333 S.W.2d 951 (1960).
While appellant claims he received ineffective
assistance of counsel in some unspecified fashion prior to the
entry of his plea, and was not properly represented by counsel
during the evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, we believe RCr 11.42 affords a better process for
hearing those claims.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Kenton Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kathleen K. Schmidt
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Shawn C. Goodpaster
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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