TODERICK L. MOORE-BAKER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: January 15, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001691-MR
TODERICK L. MOORE-BAKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CR-001927
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Toderick L. Moore-Baker (Moore-Baker) brings this
pro se appeal from a June 17, 1997 order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court.
We affirm.
On January 27, 1993, Moore-Baker entered guilty pleas
to two counts of murder (Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 507.020), one count
of kidnapping (KRS 509.040), and one count of receiving stolen
property over $100 (KRS 514.110).
In addition, Moore-Baker
entered guilty pleas pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), to one count of
murder and one count of criminal facilitation to commit robbery
in the first degree (KRS 506.080 and 515.020).
In exchange for
Moore-Baker’s plea, the Commonwealth recommended a sentence of
life without parole on two of the murder charges and the
kidnapping charge.
It recommended 20 years' imprisonment on the
remaining murder charge, 5 years on the charge of criminal
facilitation to commit robbery, and 5 years on the charge of
receiving stolen property.
In a June 1, 1993 judgment, the
circuit court imposed the sentence recommended by the
Commonwealth.
On June 17, 1997, Moore-Baker filed a Ky. R. Crim.
P. (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate said judgment.
denied same on June 18, 1997.
The circuit court
This appeal followed.
Moore-Baker first contends that it was unconstitutional
to use charges contained within the indictment as aggravating
factors to enhance the penalty on other charges within the same
indictment.
This same issue was addressed by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 872
(1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 1034, 113 S. Ct. 1857, 123 L. Ed.
2d 479 (1993), wherein the Court held that rape and robbery
convictions at the guilt phase could be used at the penalty phase
to prove aggravating circumstances for murder and kidnapping.
The Court determined that the defendant was not thereby subjected
to double jeopardy or multiple punishments for the same crime.1
Likewise, we do not believe Moore-Baker’s constitutional rights
were violated in this respect.
1
Although Moore-Baker articulates this problem to be a
violation of his due process rights, we perceive this to be an
issue of double jeopardy.
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Moore-Baker next avers that the circuit court failed to
sentence him in accordance with KRS 532.025.
He complains that
he was denied the right to a separate penalty phase and to have
the circuit court make a specific finding of aggravating
circumstances.
Additionally, he alleges that he was denied the
right to be indicted by a properly empaneled grand jury.
We
believe Moore-Baker waived the above defenses when he pled
guilty.
See Hughes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 99 (1994);
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 885 S.W.2d 318 (1994); and
Toppass v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 587 (1990).
Alternatively, Moore-Baker argues that “no indictment
has been returned by a Jefferson County Grand Jury on any offense
under the judgment.”
He bases this claim on his allegation that
there is no record of the grand jury convening to return same.
This charge is without merit as the indictment and grand jury's
transcript of proceedings are contained within the record.
Moore-Baker further asserts that his guilty plea was
not made knowingly and voluntarily and is thus invalid.
Specifically, he charges that he pled guilty under the false
impression that he was eligible to receive an enhanced penalty
under KRS 532.030.
As he now believes he was misinformed about
the law, he contends his guilty plea was not made knowingly.
disagree.
We
As stated earlier in this opinion, Moore-Baker was
eligible under KRS 532.025 for the enhanced punishment of life
without parole for 25 years.
He therefore was not acting under a
misconception of the law when he pled guilty.
Moreover, Moore-
Baker signed a Motion to Enter Guilty Plea reflecting that his
plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.
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As such, we are of the
opinion that Moore-Baker’s guilty plea was, indeed, made
knowingly and voluntarily.
Last, Moore-Baker maintains that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel as provided by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
He argues that his
counsel failed to inform him that the indictment was void and
that he was not eligible for the sentence of life without parole
for 25 years.
ineffective.
Thus, he concludes that his counsel was
We disagree.
herein to be without merit.
The aforesaid arguments were held
Hence, Moore-Baker has failed to
prove that his trial counsel was ineffective.
Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985).
In sum, we perceive no error by the circuit court in
denying Moore-Baker’s RCr 11.42 motion to vacate judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Toderick L. Moore-Baker
LaGrange, KY
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
and
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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