PAUL DANIEL JACKSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: February 12, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001688-MR
PAUL DANIEL JACKSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1996-CR-000129
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
By judgment entered July 3, 1997, the Shelby
Circuit Court convicted Paul Daniel Jackson of trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine) (KRS
218A.1412) and sentenced him to seven (7) years in prison.
Jackson contends on appeal that the trial court erred by denying
his motions for a directed verdict of acquittal.
We disagree and
so affirm the judgment of the Shelby Circuit Court.
The Shelby Grand Jury indicted Jackson on December 20,
1996.
The indictment alleged that on September 18, 1995, Jackson
had sold crack cocaine to a Kentucky State Police confidential
informant.
At Jackson’s trial, on April 16, 1997, Kentucky State
Police Trooper Mark Moore testified that in the fall of 1995 he
had been assigned to narcotics investigation in Shelby County.
Pursuant to that assignment, he had hired Gary Morgan as a
confidential informant.
In exchange for $100.00 per transaction,
Morgan had agreed to make “felony” drug purchases in areas
designated by Moore and to testify in court, if necessary,
against the sellers.
had used cocaine.
Moore knew when he hired him that Morgan
Confidential informants are often drug users,
Moore testified, because people with that sort of experience are
best able to allay the suspicions of drug dealers and thus to
witness the dealers’ criminal acts.
Moore conceded that police
use of informants involves certain risks and that informants are
not to be blindly trusted, but he explained that Morgan, who was
the brother of one of Moore’s friends, had proved to be reliable
on other occasions.
On September 18, 1995, Moore had equipped Morgan with a
recording device and had given him $200.00 with which to purchase
drugs.
He had searched him to ensure that Morgan was not in
possession of any drugs, and he had instructed Morgan to pass
through a particular Shelbyville neighborhood where he was to
attempt to buy drugs.
Less than ten (10) minutes after parting
from Moore, Morgan had rejoined him with $200.00 worth of “crack”
cocaine.
He informed Moore that he had purchased the cocaine
from Jackson, an acquaintance from his high-school days whom he
knew as “Filmore.”
shortly thereafter.
Moore testified that he questioned Jackson
However, because Moore did not want to
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expose his on-going investigations, he did not seek Jackson’s
arrest until December of the next year.
The Commonwealth also called the informant Gary Morgan
to testify.
Morgan corroborated Moore’s description of the
September 18 transaction and identified Jackson as the person
from whom he had bought the cocaine.
On cross-examination, Jackson sought to impeach
Morgan’s credibility by showing that since September 1995 Morgan
had been convicted of numerous drug and theft-related felonies.
He also attempted to show that Morgan’s identification of him as
the seller was unreliable.
He challenged Morgan’s memory of the
event, and he challenged Morgan’s claim of acquaintance pointing
out: that he and Morgan had graduated from high school several
years ago, in 1982; that Morgan was unaware that Jackson had
played football for their school; and that Morgan was unaware
that Jackson had not lived in the neighborhood where the sale
took place since shortly after high-school graduation.
Also during cross-examination, Jackson insisted that
the tape recording of the transaction be played for the jury.
The recording was very unclear.
Morgan could be heard saying the
name “Filmore,” but the other voice on the recording could not
categorically be said to be Jackson’s.
Jackson contends that
Moore’s and Morgan’s testimonies were insufficient to establish
his guilt and thus that he was entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal. We disagree.
As our Supreme Court has explained,
[o]n motion for directed verdict, the trial
court must draw all fair and reasonable
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inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a
directed verdict is, if under the evidence as
a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for
a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant
is entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
To
establish a defendant’s guilt, the Commonwealth “must have more
than a mere scintilla of evidence and . . . it must be evidence
of substance.”
(1994).
Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 951, 953
Jackson insists, in effect, that Morgan’s testimony was
so unreliable as to be without legal substance.
As noted in Benham, however, in ruling on a directed
verdict motion or in reviewing such a ruling, both the trial
court and this Court must assume that the Commonwealth’s evidence
is true (absent some compelling reason not to do so) and leave to
the jury the estimation of that evidence’s reliability.
Here,
Morgan positively identified Jackson as the person who sold him
$200.00 worth of “crack” cocaine.
In response, Jackson attempted
to establish that Morgan could have misidentified him and that he
had a motive and perhaps the willingness to claim to be more sure
of the identification than he may actually have been.
Jackson
did not show, however, that Morgan’s testimony had to be untrue
or even, in this instance, that it was likely to be untrue.
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Because it would not clearly be unreasonable for a juror to
believe Morgan’s testimony, the trial court did not err by
deeming the Commonwealth’s case against Jackson sufficient to go
to the jury.
Nor is this result altered by the evidence Jackson
presented in defense.
Jackson testified that he did not sell
drugs to Morgan and that he recognized the other voice on the
tape recording as that of one of his relatives.
He also denied
having ever been known as “Filmore” or knowing anyone by that
name.
On rebuttal, a Shelby County Sheriff testified that
Jackson was indeed known as “Filmore.”
Jackson’s testimony did
not render Morgan’s evidence unreliable as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Shelby Circuit Court did not err by
denying either Jackson’s original or his renewed motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal.
We therefore affirm its July 3,
1997, judgment of conviction.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Courtney A. Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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