EARL BRYNA PEEL, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
February 26, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
1997-CA-001621-MR
EARL BRYNA PEEL, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-679
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE:
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DYCHE, EMBERTON and JOHNSON, Judges.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Earl Bryna Peel, Jr. (Peel) appeals from an
order of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on June 19, 1997, that
denied his RCr 11.42 motion to vacate judgment.
Pursuant to a
plea agreement with the Commonwealth, Peel pled guilty to one
count of kidnapping, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 509.040, one
count of escape in the second degree, KRS 520.030, and one count
of robbery in the second degree, KRS 515.030.
The trial court
sentenced Peel to ten years for the kidnapping conviction, five
years for the escape conviction to be served concurrently, and
ten years for the robbery conviction to be served consecutively
for a total of twenty years.
Peel argued in his Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion that he was prejudiced
by his counsel’s ineffective assistance in the entry of his
guilty plea to the kidnapping charge.
motion without a hearing.
The trial court denied the
After reviewing the record, the RCr
11.42 motion, the briefs, and the applicable law, we vacate the
order of the Fayette Circuit Court and remand for an evidentiary
hearing.
On June 23, 1995, Peel was arrested at his residence
pursuant to arrest warrants and charged with several crimes as a
result of his actions the previous day.
On June 22, 1995, while
en route to a community service project during a period of
incarceration, Peel forced the driver of the van out of the
vehicle, took the van, and proceeded to his wife’s home.
point, Peel threatened the driver with a rock.
At one
According to
Peel, he had recently learned that his wife had apparently been
involved in an extramarital affair and that she had begun divorce
proceedings against him seeking custody of their two children.
He said that he went to the residence to discuss saving the
marriage.
Once there, Peel attempted to force his wife, his six-
year-old daughter, and her visiting friend into a vehicle, with
little success.
As he would get one person into the car, the
others would get out.
Peel then drove his wife’s car to his
mother-in-law’s residence and talked to her and to another person
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on the telephone.
He took a shotgun from his mother-in-law’s
house, and later returned to his home.
to use the shotgun to commit suicide.
He stated that he planned
The next morning, before
he was able to accomplish this, police arrived and arrested him.
The police charged Peel with escape in the second
degree, robbery in the second degree, two counts of wanton
endangerment in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree,
theft by unlawful taking, three counts of kidnapping, burglary in
the first degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree.
Peel’s court-appointed counsel moved the trial court for a
competency evaluation, which was granted.
According to the
evaluation report dated October 4, 1995, Peel was competent to
stand trial.
The grand jury returned an indictment on July 31,
1995, charging Peel with three counts of kidnapping, one count of
escape in the second degree, and one count of robbery in the
first degree for taking the van.
On December 1, 1995, and on
advice of counsel, Peel pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
with the Commonwealth to one count of kidnapping, one count of
escape, and one count of the reduced charge of robbery in the
second degree.
The proposed penalties for the charges to which
he pled guilty were ten, five, and ten years, respectively.
The
trial judge accepted Peel’s guilty plea after questioning him as
to the events underlying the charged offenses, his understanding
of the charges and his plea, and his representation.
Peel then
signed a guilty plea form waiving various constitutional rights.
On January 2, 1996, the trial judge sentenced Peel to ten years
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on each of the kidnapping and robbery convictions, to be served
consecutively, and to five years on the escape conviction, to be
served concurrently, for a total of twenty years.
Peel filed a motion for shock probation on April 29,
1996, stating that he intended to remarry his ex-wife.
motion was denied on May 6, 1996.
The
On March 21, 1997, Peel,
through appointed counsel, filed an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate
judgment alleging that his counsel had failed to provide
effective assistance in the guilty plea.
In his motion, Peel
argued that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his
offenses and to consider the defenses available to him on the
kidnapping charges.
More specifically, he contended that the
intent to terrorize element of KRS 509.040(1)(c) was absent, and
that a jury probably would only have convicted him of unlawful
imprisonment in the second degree.
Alternatively, he argued that
even if the element of intent could have been established, that
the charged offense was never completed.
In its response, the Commonwealth argued that Peel’s
motion should be denied because he never stated what was wrong
with his counsel’s advice.
Additionally, the Commonwealth argued
that Peel acknowledged at the guilty plea hearing that he had no
complaints about his attorney, that he had gone over the guilty
plea form with his attorney, and that they had discussed the
elements of the charges and that Peel had signed the form.
In
response, Peel argued that the record did not contain the
complete factual circumstances surrounding the plea, and that at
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a minimum an evidentiary hearing should be held.
The trial court
denied Peel’s RCr 11.42 motion without a hearing on June 19,
1997, finding that the plea had been entered voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly, and that there was no indication
that counsel was ineffective.
This appeal followed.
Peel contends that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in advising him to plead guilty to the kidnapping
charge, and that the guilty plea was not entered knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently.
Additionally, he contends that
the record does not refute the allegations in his RCr 11.42
motion that his counsel failed to adequately investigate the
circumstances surrounding the charged offenses or to advise him
as to the defenses available to the kidnapping charge.
Having reviewed the guilty plea hearing, we conclude
that it clearly demonstrates the lack of communication between
counsel and Peel as well as Peel’s lack of understanding of his
rights and the defenses.
Specifically, Peel never admitted the
intent to terrorize which is an element necessary for a jury to
convict him of kidnapping, and furthermore, the record on its
face does not establish this element.
In order to establish an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, a movant must meet the requirements of a two-prong
test.
A movant must establish (1) that counsel’s performance was
deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord, Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702
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S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92
L.Ed.2d 724 (1986).
Pursuant to Strickland, the standard for
attorney performance is reasonable, effective assistance.
A
movant must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, or under the prevailing
professional norms.
The movant bears the burden of proof, and
must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was
adequate.
Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 878, 879-880
(1969); McKinney v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 874, 878
(1969).
An evidentiary hearing on the merits of allegations
raised in an RCr 11.42 motion is not required if the allegations
can be refuted on the face of the record.
Sparks v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (1986).
To challenge a guilty plea based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel, the appellant must establish that he was
unable to intelligently weigh his legal alternatives in deciding
to plead guilty.
This test has two parts:
(1) that counsel’s
errors were so serious that his performance fell outside the
range of professionally competent service, and (2) that this
deficient performance so seriously affected the guilty plea
process that there is a reasonable probability that the appellant
would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial.
Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed. 203 (1985);
accord, Sparks, supra.
In order to be valid, a guilty plea must
represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative
courses of action open to the movant.
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North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Kiser v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d 432, 434 (1992).
Peel has argued that his counsel did not render
effective assistance of counsel in advising him to plead guilty
to the one count of kidnapping.
Kidnapping, a Class B Felony, is
defined in KRS 509.040(1)(c) (emphasis added) in pertinent part
as follows:
“A person is guilty of kidnapping when he unlawfully
restrains another person and when his intent is:
. . . (c) To
inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or another[.]”
It is Peel’s position that a jury would not have convicted him of
any of the three counts of kidnapping because the charged
offenses were never completed, and because his conduct did not
rise to the level addressed by the statute since the Commonwealth
could not have established the necessary element of intent to
terrorize.
At most, Peel argued, he could have been convicted of
unlawful imprisonment, second or first degree.
“A person is
guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree when he
knowingly and unlawfully restrains another person under
circumstances which expose that person to a risk of serious
physical injury.”
KRS 509.020(1).
Unlawful imprisonment in the
first degree is a Class D felony, which provides for a term of
imprisonment of one to five years.
KRS 532.020(1)(c).
The only
elements necessary to establish unlawful imprisonment in the
second degree, a Class A misdemeanor, are that a person
“knowingly and unlawfully restrains another person.”
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KRS
509.030(1).
A Class A misdemeanor has a term of imprisonment of
ninety days to twelve months.
KRS 532.020(2).
The record contains varying accounts of what transpired on
June 22, 1995.
In addition, Peel’s statements at the guilty plea
hearing as to whether he intended to terrorize his wife, his
daughter, and her friend muddled the situation.
Because the
trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, there is not
enough evidence in the record to refute what Peel claims in his
RCr 11.42 motion.
With the record before us, we cannot find the
evidence necessary to establish the element of intent to
terrorize for a conviction on the kidnapping charge.
It appears
that Peel most likely would have been convicted of unlawful
imprisonment in the second degree.
Additionally, based upon the
little evidence of record, Peel’s counsel may very well have been
ineffective in advising him to plead guilty to kidnapping without
having advised Peel of the defenses that existed.
Because of
this colorable failure to properly advise his client as to the
defenses available to the charge of kidnapping, counsel’s
performance may very well have fallen outside of the range of
professionally competent representation.
As Peel’s allegations
cannot be refuted on the face of the record, we must remand for
an evidentiary hearing to allow the development of the factual
circumstances surrounding the plea to be made a part of the
record.
Sparks, supra.
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Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the trial court
and remand for an evidentiary hearing in accordance with this
Opinion.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Brian Thomas Ruff
LaGrange, KY
Hon. A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Hon. Joseph R. Johnson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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