JAMES R. CAMERON v. BRENDA CAMERON
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RENDERED: February 19, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001204-MR
JAMES R. CAMERON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CI-000172
v.
BRENDA CAMERON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GARDNER, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This case concerns some of the vexatious problems
inherent in the interstate enforcement of child support orders.
James and Brenda Cameron were divorced in Hillsborough County,
Florida, by decree entered November 15, 1979.
Brenda was awarded
custody of the parties’ three (3) minor children, and James was
ordered to pay child support of $26.67 per child per week ($80
per week).
He was also ordered to pay a portion of the
childrens’ medical expenses.
Not long thereafter, James became a
resident of Kentucky; Brenda and the children remained in
Florida.
In June 1991, after two (2) of the children had reached
the age of majority and the youngest child was about fourteen
(14) months from doing so, Brenda petitioned the Florida Circuit
Court for an order declaring James more than $7,000.00 in arrears
in his child support and medical expense obligations.
She also
sought a modification of the divorce decree increasing James’
support obligation for the youngest child.
In January 1992, the
Florida court entered a default judgment granting Brenda this
relief.
A year later, in February 1993, Brenda sought
enforcement of her Florida support and arrearage judgment by
registering that judgment in the Kenton Circuit Court, pursuant
to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), KRS
407.010 et seq.
James was duly notified of the registration, and
he filed a timely objection.
An assistant Kenton County attorney
represented Brenda’s claim, and at a hearing on the matter in
March or early April 1993, James, through counsel, successfully
argued that the Florida judgment overstated his arrearage.
The
court found that James’s total outstanding obligation was
$602.02.
When James agreed to pay that amount, the trial court
summarily dismissed the remainder of Brenda’s claim.
There ensued, apparently, informal attempts by both
Brenda and the Florida office of child-support enforcement to
obtain clarification of the Kentucky court’s order and
reconsideration of Brenda’s claim, but these attempts were
unavailing.
Then, on October 31, 1995, Brenda filed a motion
pursuant to CR 60.02(f) asking the Kenton Circuit Court to vacate
its April 1993 order and reopen her claim for enforcement of the
Florida judgment.
By order entered May 10, 1996, the circuit
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court agreed to reopen the case.
Then, on April 17, 1997,
following the dismissal of James’ appeal of the May 10th ruling
and after a hearing on the merits of Brenda’s motion, the trial
court reversed its prior decision.
It ruled that the Florida
judgment of January 1992 was entitled to “full faith and credit”
and accordingly ordered James to satisfy that judgment with
interest.
It is from that April 17, 1997, order that James now
appeals.
As James correctly notes, CR 60.02 is not meant to
provide an alternative to an appeal, but is applicable only in
cases of serious error not otherwise subject to review.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 979 S.W.2d 98 (1998).
Barnett
Application of the
rule is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Two (2) factors important to the exercise of that discretion are
“whether the movant had a fair opportunity to present his claim
at the trial on the merits and whether the granting of the relief
sought would be inequitable to other parties.”
Fortney v. Mahan,
Ky., 302 S.W.2d 842, 843 (1957); Schott v. Citizens Fidelity Bank
and Trust Co., Ky. App. 692 S.W.2d 810 (1985).
James maintains
that CR 60.02 relief is inappropriate in this case because the
error Brenda alleges—that the trial court misconstrued both
Kentucky’s version of URESA and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause—was amenable to review by direct appeal.
merit to this contention.
There is some
For the reasons that follow, however,
we are persuaded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by reopening and reconsidering this case.
We must begin with a brief recapitulation of the case
as it originally came to the Kentucky court.
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At that point,
Brenda had obtained a money judgment in Florida for alleged child
support arrears and an order increasing James’s support
obligation.
She registered both the judgment and the modified
support order in Kenton County pursuant to former KRS 407.450 –
407.480: Registration of Foreign Support Orders.1
The effect of
that registration, according to KRS 407.480, was as follows:
Upon registration a foreign support order
shall be treated in the same manner as a
support order issued by a court of this
state. It has the same effect and is subject
to the same procedures, defenses, and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, or
staying as a support order of this state and
may be enforced and satisfied in a like
manner.
This registration procedure, provided nonresident
claimants with a means of, in effect, converting foreign child
support orders to Kentucky orders and thus conferring
jurisdiction on Kentucky courts to modify them.
Commonwealth ex.
rel. Ball v. Musiak, Ky. App., 775 S.W.2d 524 (1989); Cordie v.
Tank, 538 N.W.2d 214 (N.D. 1995).
An obligor’s means of
challenging such a registered order were limited to an attack
upon the validity of the foreign order, KRS 407.470(4), and to
those actions referred to in KRS 407.480, supra, which were
available against comparable Kentucky judgments.
Cf. Cordie v.
Tank, supra (discussing the URESA registration procedure), and
Cowan v. Moreno, 903 S.W.2d 119 (Tx. 1995) (discussing the
similar defenses available under the Uniform Interstate Family
1
Pursuant to federal mandate (see 42 U.S.C. § 666), the General Assembly repealed Kentucky’s
URESA as of January 1, 1998, and replaced it with the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA),
KRS 407.5101 - 407.5902.
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Support Act).
Because Brenda was seeking enforcement, not
modification, of her Florida judgment, James could challenge the
judgment only by showing that the Florida order was void or that
there was some other reason, sufficient under Kentucky law, to
reject it.
Cf. Sunrise Turquoise, Inc. v. Chemical Design Co.,
Inc., Ky. App., 899 S.W.2d 856 (1995) (construing the similar
provisions of KRS 426.955, the “Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act”).
In his brief to this Court, James argues that the
January 1992 Florida judgment is void because the Florida court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
He has failed to specify,
however, where in the record this argument was preserved.
On the
contrary, at the end of the merits hearing, the trial court
expressed regret that this issue had not been addressed.
Nor is
there any suggestion that Kenton Circuit Court’s April 1993
dismissal of Brenda’s claim was based on this ground.
This
argument, therefore, is not properly before us, and we must
decline to consider it.
CR 59.06; CR 76.12(iv); Kaplon v. Chase,
Ky. App., 690 S.W.2d 761 (1985).
Instead of attacking Brenda’s Florida judgment as void,
James has, from the beginning, insisted that that judgment is
based on an erroneous determination of his support obligation and
arrearage.
He claims to have paid all the child support he was
obliged to pay.
found.
In 1993, the Kenton Circuit Court agreed and so
The first question before us, therefore, is whether that
ruling, or the procedure leading to it, was so improper as to
justify reopening Brenda’s case.
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In granting Brenda’s CR 60.02 motion, the trial court
seems to have assumed that under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the only possible basis for refusing to enforce the
January 2, 1992, Florida judgment would be a finding that the
judgment was void.
The court’s apparent reliance in 1993 on
another ground for refusing to enforce it was thus deemed a
palpable error of sufficient magnitude to warrant CR 60.02
relief.
We do not share this reasoning.
Pursuant to Article IV, Section I, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Kentucky courts
must give full faith and credit to the judgments of sister states
so long as the foreign court had jurisdiction to enter the
judgment and no procedural defect rendered the judgment void.
Furthermore, “[a] foreign judgment is presumptively valid and the
party attacking it has the burden to demonstrate its invalidity.”
Waddell v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 893 S.W.2d 376, 379 (1995).
As the trial court noted, “[e]scape from obedience to a judgment
of a sister-state can be had only if said judgment is void and
entitled to no standing even in that state.”
Morrel & West, Inc.
v. Yazel, Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 501, 502 (1986).
On the other hand, even valid foreign judgments are
entitled to no more faith and credit in Kentucky than they would
enjoy in the rendering state.
[T]he judgment of a state court should have
the same credit, validity, and effect, in
every other court in the United States, which
it had in the state in which it was
pronounced.
Hampton v. M’Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235, 4 L. Ed. 378,
379 (1818) (Marshall, C. J.).
In other words, even if a judgment
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is entitled to full faith and credit, if that judgment is subject
to collateral attack where rendered, it is subject to collateral
attack here.
If there is a viable defense to enforcement in the
rendering state, our courts may consider that defense.
Even if
Brenda’s Florida judgment is valid, therefore, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not necessarily imply that the April 1993
order of Kenton Circuit Court was erroneous.
Moreover, KRS 407.480 the registration provision upon
which Brenda relied, expressly subjected validly registered
foreign support orders to any defense available against a
comparable Kentucky order.
See Cowan v. Moreno, supra
(distinguishing, in the similar context of the UIFSA, between
defenses to the existence of foreign support orders and defenses
to such orders’ enforceability, neither of which, if properly
raised, are precluded by the Full Faith and Credit Clause); and
cf. KRS 426.955, the similar provision of the Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments act; and Sunrise Turquoise, supra
(construing that act).
We must ask, therefore, whether in April
1993 the Kenton Circuit Court could properly have determined that
Brenda’s Florida judgment was unenforceable for some reason other
than invalidity.
We believe that it could have so determined.
CR 55.02 embodies this state’s policy disfavoring
default judgments.
That rule provides that, “[f]or good cause
shown the court may set aside a judgment by default in accordance
with Rule 60.02.”
As with CR 60.02 rulings, rulings under CR
55.02 are entrusted to the discretion of the trial court.
Green
Seed Co. v. Harrison Tobacco Storage Whse., Inc., Ky. App., 663
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S.W.2d 755 (1984).
In exercising that discretion, the trial
court is to consider whether the party seeking relief from the
judgment has a valid excuse for the default and a meritorious
defense to the claim, and whether the non-defaulting party would
be unduly prejudiced were the judgment set aside.
We believe
that this rule gave Kenton Circuit Court authority, in 1993, to
deny enforcement of Brenda’s claim even if the foreign judgment
underlying her claim was valid.
We are persuaded, nevertheless,
that in this instance that authority was so seriously misapplied
as to require that the April 1993 order be reconsidered
There is no dispute that James did not participate in
the 1992 Florida proceeding or that the Florida judgment was
entered against him by default.
The record on its face,
therefore, raises a serious question concerning the
enforceability of Brenda’s judgment.
The deference we ordinarily
owe to the trial court with respect to such questions could thus
have led us to uphold the April 1993 order of Kenton Circuit
Court.
At the preliminary hearing on Brenda’s CR 60.02 motion,
however, the Kenton County official who in April 1993 represented
Brenda’s claim under the URESA program testified that at no time
during that proceeding--not when James asserted his defense to
Brenda’s claim nor even when the court upheld James’ defense--did
she communicate with Brenda.
Brenda herself testified that she
was afforded no opportunity to participate in that proceeding and
was not even apprised of the Kentucky result until after the
appeal period had expired.
This lack of notice was likely a
denial of due process, and certainly it violated the procedural
mandates of URESA.
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Among the principal purposes of that act was the
fashioning of a system whereby parties separated by large
distances and subject to different state jurisdictions might
nevertheless be afforded a full and fair opportunity to assert
and defend claims for familial support.
The system devised for
this purpose employed limited representation by forum state
officials and relied for its success upon those officials’
facilitating communications between absent foreign claimants and
the local court.
KRS 407.470.2
Upon notice that a support
obligor objected to a registered foreign support order, URESA
required that the obligee be informed and afforded an
opportunity, by affidavit, tele-conference, or some similar
method, to present evidence in support of her claim.
KRS
407.380; Carlson v. Eassa, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 884 (1997) (holding
that a prosecutor’s settlement of an out-of-state URESA claim
without the consent of the petitioner was void); and cf.
KRS
407.5316 and 407.5606 (the similar provisions of the UIFSA).
The Kenton court’s failure in 1993 to recognize and
abide by this notice requirement violated URESA and denied Brenda
her right thereunder to a hearing.
This was a serious enough
error to justify recourse to CR 60.02.
Relief under that rule is
not precluded by Brenda’s failure to appeal, moreover, because
she was denied a fair opportunity to do so.
We thus affirm,
although for different reasons, the trial court’s decision to
2
The system does not create an agency or fiduciary relationship between the obligee and the forum
state official who presents the obligee’s claim. That official, rather, represents the forum state in its efforts
to further the purposes of the interstate enforcement act. Cf. KRS 407.5307(3). There is thus no merit to
James’ contention that Brenda should be bound by the acts of her Kenton County representative as she would
have been by the acts of a private attorney.
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vacate its April 1993 order and to reconsider James’s opposition
to Brenda’s Florida support judgment.
Finally, James contends that even if the trial court’s
April 1993 decision was so procedurally flawed as to justify a
reopening, on its merits that decision was correct and should be
upheld.
We disagree.
At the hearing on the merits of Brenda’s CR 60.02
motion, Brenda presented the Florida child support agency’s
records of James’s payment history.
She also presented records
of her out-of-pocket expenditures for her youngest daughter’s
medical expenses.
Apparently the trial court did not consider
this evidence in 1993.
This was evidence of substance supporting
Brenda’s claim, and it was not so clearly refuted by James’
contentions to the contrary as to compel a finding in James’
favor.
Indeed, the evidence convincingly contradicted James’
assertion, which he relied upon both in 1993 and in 1997, that
the Florida support agency had over-charged him by failing to
adjust his support obligation as his children came of age.
James
admitted at the hearing, moreover, that he had refused to
contribute to his youngest daughter’s medical bills.
We review the trial court’s fact-finding for clear
error, CR 52.01, and we review its conclusions for mistakes of
law and abuses of discretion:
In reviewing the decision of a trial court
the test is not whether the appellate court
would have decided it differently, but
whether the findings of the trial judge were
clearly erroneous or that he abused his
discretion.
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Cherry v. Cherry, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 423, (1982).
As discussed
above, absent an attack on the jurisdiction of the Florida court,
to be entitled to relief from the Florida default judgment, James
was obliged to satisfy the requirements of CR 55.02, including
the requirement that he proffer a sufficiently meritorious
defense.
The decision by the trial court, upon reconsideration,
that James failed to meet that requirement neither was clearly
erroneous nor was it an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, we
affirm the April 17, 1997, order of the Kenton Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William I. Bubenzer
Covington, Kentucky
Suzanne Cassidy
O’Hara, Ruberg, Taylor, Sloan
& Sergent
Covington, Kentucky
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