RICKY LEE HOBBS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1996-CA-003359-MR
RICKY LEE HOBBS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CR-136
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Ricky Lee Hobbs (Hobbs) appeals from a judgment
entered by the Hopkins Circuit Court on December 6, 1996, which
denied Hobbs relief pursuant to a Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his
prison sentence.
While Hobbs’ RCr 11.42 motion made numerous
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, he limits his
arguments on appeal to two issues: (1) “defense counsel’s
unauthorized waiver of the defendant’s presence at the competency
hearing amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel as the
defendant was denied his constitutional right to confrontation at
a critical stage of the proceeding”; and (2) “failure of the
defense counsel to prepare properly for the sentencing phase of
the defendant’s capital murder conviction amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel resulting in prejudice to the defendant”.
Finding no error, we affirm.
The standard which must be met in order to prevail
under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is well
established.
First, a defendant must show that his counsel’s
performance was deficient and that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed to
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Strickland v. Washington, Ky.,
446 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense so as to deprive him of a fair trial.
Id.
As was noted
by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
836 S.W.2d 872, 878-79 (1992):
A court deciding an actual
ineffectiveness claim must judge the
reasonableness of counsel’s challenged
conduct on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.
A convicted defendant making a claim of
ineffective assistance must identify the acts
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not
to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. The court must then
determine whether, in light of all the
circumstances, the identified acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance. In
making that determination, the court should
keep in mind that counsel’s function, as
elaborated in prevailing professional norms,
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is to make the adversarial testing process
work in the particular case. At the same
time, the court should recognize that counsel
is strongly presumed to have rendered
adequate assistance and make all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable
judgment. [Strickland] 466 U.S. at 690, 104
S.Ct. at 2066. Any deficiencies in counsel’s
performance must be prejudicial to the
defense in order to constitute ineffective
assistance under the Constitution. [Id.] 466
U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067.
Hobbs was indicted on November 9, 1990, for the
November 1, 1990, murder of Jane Ann Robinson.
Hobbs was convicted by a jury of murder.
In March 1992,
On May 11, 1992, the
trial court followed the recommendation of the jury and sentenced
Hobbs to prison for life without the benefit of probation or
parole for twenty-five years.
Hobbs appealed directly to the
Supreme Court, case number 92-SC-362-MR, alleging several errors,
but the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.
We adopt the Supreme Court’s brief statement of the
facts of the case as our own:
The victim was a 56-year-old white
female who was in the city park in
Madisonville just prior to Noon [sic] when
she was beaten, robbed and stabbed to death.
The accused was a mentally retarded man with
an I.Q. of 63. He was examined at the
Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center
[KCPC]1 and the report indicated that his
score was within the mild mental retardation
range. The report gave the opinion that
Hobbs was competent to stand trial and there
was no further hearing on the question of his
1
The record indicates that Hobbs was actually evaluated by
the Pennyroyal Comprehensive Care Center at the request of the
KCPC.
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competency to stand trial.
followed his conviction.
This appeal
When Hobbs was first questioned by
police, he gave several conflicting
statements. Initially, he denied ever being
in the park but later, through a series of
statements, admitted that he was in the park
on the day of the murder but he accused
another person of being the killer. The
defendant’s version of where different things
occurred changed as the police informed him
that his story was inconsistent with what
their investigation had already developed.
Hobbs testified at trial and denied the
killing and accused another person of the
crime.
Hobbs filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion on May 26, 1995,
and a supplemental motion by counsel was filed later.
We will
first address Hobbs’ claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to provide for
his presence at an alleged competency hearing.
While trial
counsel did file a motion on January 16, 1992, asking that a
psychiatric examination be performed on Hobbs, a competency
hearing was never held.
Rather, on January 21, 1992, the trial
court ordered that Hobbs undergo a psychiatric examination by the
KCPC.
The psychological evaluation report revealed that Hobbs
had an I.Q. of 63.2
Thus, on March 9, 1992, counsel filed a
motion pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.140 to
2
The Supreme Court noted that “[t]he report also concluded
that Hobbs seemed to be quite capable of participating
constructively in his defense and that he understood the charges
against him and appreciated the gravity of those charges.”
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exclude the death penalty as a sentencing option.3
After the
trial court conducted hearings on March 10 and 12, it entered an
order on March 12, 1992, that based upon the psychological
evaluation, granted the motion to exclude the death penalty.
While Hobbs continues to claim that he was denied his
right to confront witnesses at his competency hearing, the fact
remains that a competency hearing was never held.
Trial counsel
never requested a competency hearing and the trial court did not
sua sponte order one.
In fact, in his direct appeal Hobbs raised
the issue of whether the trial court erred in not holding a
competency hearing.
In affirming the trial court, the Supreme
Court stated as follows:
Here the initial examination by the
psychologist found Hobbs was competent to
stand trial. The trial judge had ample
opportunity to observe Hobbs during the trial
and apparently he found no reason from his
observation to require further investigation.
There was no evidence produced by Hobbs
during the trial which demonstrated that he
was unable to appreciate the nature and
consequences of the proceedings or to
participate rationally in them.
A complete hearing for the purpose of
determining mental capacity is necessary only
when there are reasonable grounds to believe
the defendant is not mentally competent or
that there may be reasonable grounds for such
belief which must be called to the attention
of the trial judge by the defendant or must
be so obvious that the trial judge cannot
3
Subsection (1) of the statute states as follows: “KRS
532.010, 532.025, and 532.030 to the contrary notwithstanding, no
offender who has been determined to be a seriously mentally
retarded offender under the provisions of KRS 532.135, shall be
subject to execution.”
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fail to observe them. Pate v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 769 S.W.2d 46 (1989).
The trial judge must have wide latitude
to determine in the first instance whether to
require the accused to be examined. Cf.
Conley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 569 S.W.2d
682 (1978).
United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973 (8th
Cir. 1991), noted in part that when there is
a sufficient doubt about the defendant’s
competency, a trial judge must either on
motion or sua sponte conduct a hearing to
determine whether the defendant is capable of
proceeding. The key words are “sufficient
doubt.” In this case, there was no doubt in
the mind of the trial judge relative to the
defendant’s competency to stand trial.
Conley v. Commonwealth, supra, was
decided before the enactment of K.R.S.
504.100. An earlier version of RCr 8.06, as
well as Conley, uses the word “sanity” as
distinguished from “competency.” This Court
fully recognizes the difference between
insanity as defined by K.R.S. 504.060 and
incompetency to stand trial as defined by
K.R.S. 504.070. Clearly these concepts are
not interchangeable. They are separate and
applicable to different circumstances.
However, the rationale of Conley is
still valid. There is no need for a full
evidentiary hearing to be held in every case
where a defendant has been examined by a
psychologist on the ability to stand trial
especially when the result of the examination
is negative and no additional request is made
for further examination and no additional
request is made for a hearing.
The failure of the trial court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing into the
competency of Hobbs to stand trial after the
filing of a negative report was not
reversible error.
Following a hearing on October 28, 1996, on Hobbs’ RCr
11.42 motion, the trial court on December 6, 1996, entered an
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order with extensive findings that denied the motion.
The trial
court stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
At the evidentiary hearing, Hobbs
protested his attorney’s waiver of his
presence at a hearing on a motion to exclude
the death penalty as a sentence in Hobbs’
case. Perhaps in retrospect it would have
been good for the Defendant to have been at
the hearing, although counsel have given
reasons why they didn’t want Hobbs there,
such as the possibility of him being
disruptive, or perhaps hurting his case for
exclusion of the death penalty. (TH 9:479:51). Whether these reasons are valid or
not, this Court does not know. As the
Commonwealth has pointed out, the Defendant
won that motion. The Court granted the
Defendant the relief that he sought.
Therefore, his not being there did not hurt
him in any way.
Hobbs’ present counsel has attempted to
say that the hearing was really a hearing on
competency. This Court does not agree. The
Supreme Court opinion in this case shows that
no competency hearing was ever held, as it
was argued in that Court that the trial
[c]ourt should have ordered a competency
hearing. 92-SC-362MR at 3-5. The Supreme
Court of Kentucky found that the lack of a
competency hearing was not error.
Hobbs’ arguments on appeal (1) that trial counsel was
ineffective when he allowed the competency hearing to be
conducted without him being present; (2) that he was unable to
dispute the psychologist’s findings; and (3) that his right to
confront witnesses at a critical proceeding was violated, are all
without merit.
The Supreme Court’s basic underlying presumption
in its Opinion was that no competency hearing was held. The trial
court in its order denying the RCr 11.42 motion also concluded
that the hearing at issue was a hearing on the exclusion of the
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death penalty and not a competency hearing.
Our review of the
record supports these conclusions, i.e., that there was no
competency hearing.
Obviously, Hobbs cannot show that he
suffered prejudice from not attending a competency hearing which
was never held.
Additionally, trial counsel testified at the RCr
11.42 hearing that he had discussed the death penalty hearing
with Hobbs prior to that hearing and that Hobbs did not want to
be present for a discussion of his lack of intelligence.
Furthermore, trial counsel testified that there were no adverse
witnesses at the death penalty hearing.
adverse witnesses for Hobbs
to confront.
Thus, there were no
Furthermore, since the
trial court granted Hobbs’ motion to exclude the death penalty,
Hobbs’ absence at that hearing obviously did not prejudice his
defense.
Hobbs second claim of ineffective assistance is that
his trial counsel failed to introduce any mitigating evidence
during the penalty phase of the trial. The trial court found that
this claim lacked merit, and stated as follows:
Hobbs claims that Counsel were wholly
unprepared for this sentencing phase, as they
presented no mitigating evidence on Hobbs’
behalf. This case is similar in many
respects to Strickland v. Washington
[citation omitted], in Washington alleged
that his counsel was ineffective at his
capital sentencing phase. Washington’s
counsel presented no mitigating evidence at
this phase. The murders in that case were
particularly gruesome in nature. Washington
asserted that his attorney should have
presented the sentencer in that case with
psychological evidence as to his state of
mind at the time of the crimes, as well as
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other testimony from his family, friends and
co-workers to the effect that Washington was
a good person and did not deserve the death
penalty. The United States Supreme Court
found that none of this evidence would have
been reasonably likely to change the outcome
of his sentence.
One important distinction between this
case and Strickland is that in the present
case Hobbs has presented no testimony of any
witness who would have testified on Hobbs
behalf at the sentencing phase. Although
there may have been some family members,
teachers, churchmembers [sic], or anyone
else, who may have testified as to Hobbs’
good character, Hobbs has not produced any of
them for this proceeding. Without this
evidence, Hobbs can not show that he was
prejudiced in any way by his counsel’s
failure to present any mitigating evidence
during the sentencing phase of his trial.
Hobbs also has not shown that his
counsel were unreasonable in their decision
not to present mitigating evidence and
instead rely on the “lingering doubt”
defense. Hobbs’ counsel as this phase did
not wish to maintain a separate defense at
the sentencing phase after they had
maintained that Hobbs did not commit the
murder. (TH 11:25:30, 11:19:50). Mr.
Ruschell also felt that they would be
compromising Hobbs’ chances if they went into
any other are than lingering doubt. (TH
11:30:55). Defense Counsel could see
Hobbs[’] background as harmful, and thus the
jury could treat Hobbs more severely than it
might otherwise. No one really knows that.
The presentation of the lingering doubt
defense was a tactical decision that trial
counsel made. The record is not clear that
they actually had a lot of mitigating
evidence to present. Perhaps there was some
psychological evidence, or evidence of mental
retardation, or of Hobbs’ level of education.
However, there was evidence in opposition to
that which would have adversely affected the
defendant, such as conversations he had in
the jail before trial concerning plans for
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robbing middle-aged women. (TH 11:22:00)
The whole prospect of getting less than the
maximum was a long-shot due to the facts of
the case.
In his brief, Hobbs states that “[t]he appellant had a
severely substandard I.Q. of 63 which placed him in the retarded
range.
The Defense Counsel had such evidence readily available
for the sentencing phase, as it had already been entered into
evidence during the guilt phase of the trial.”
The record of
Hobbs’ murder trial was not made part of this record, therefore,
we can only assume that Hobbs is correct in stating that evidence
of his low I.Q. had been admitted during the guilt phase.
Since
the jury was instructed in the penalty phase to consider any
evidence which had been admitted during the guilt phase, if such
evidence had been presented a second time in the penalty phase,
it would only have been cumulative evidence.
Also, when Hobbs
was asked by trial counsel to name any witnesses who would have
testified in mitigation, he failed to do so.
In his brief, Hobbs again fails to name any potential
mitigation witnesses or indicate what their testimony would have
been.
An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel does
not state grounds for relief under a RCr 11.42 motion unless the
petition alleges sufficient facts to show that counsel’s
representation was inadequate.
Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 459
S.W.2d 72 (1970); Evans v. Commonweatlh, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 601
(1970); McCarthy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 50 (1968).
Furthermore, Hobbs’ theory of the case was that another
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person committed the murder.
Trial counsel testified that in an
effort to get a lighter sentence, he decided at the penalty phase
to stay with Hobbs’ defense from the guilt phase that Hobbs did
not commit the murder.
He testified that he hoped that any juror
who still had any "lingering doubt" as to the identity of the
killer might have favored a lesser sentence.
"Effective
assistance of counsel does not guarantee error-free
representation, nor does it deny to counsel freedom of discretion
in determining the means of presenting his client's case."
Ramsey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 399 S.W.2d 473, 475 (1966).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Hopkins Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Suzanne A. Hopf
New Salisbury, IN
Hon. A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Hon. Paul D. Gilbert
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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