LOIS SUMMERS PRICE v. ELNA KAY TOLSON PRITCHARD
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RENDERED: JULY 9, 1999; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1996-CA-002736-MR
LOIS SUMMERS PRICE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-803
ELNA KAY TOLSON PRITCHARD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Lois Summers Price (Price) appeals from a
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on June 25, 1996,
which adjudged a quitclaim deed for certain property from Elna
Kay Tolson Pritchard (Pritchard) to Price void, ordered Price to
execute a deed conveying title to that property to Pritchard and
to pay Pritchard as punitive damages a sum of money equal to the
balance due on a land contract, not to exceed $35,000.
Price
claims various errors regarding the punitive damages award.
We
affirm.
On August 6, 1975, Pritchard and her former husband,
Jack W. Tolson, executed a land contract to Price for the sum of
$15,000 payable at 8.5% interest, with monthly payments of $135
per month.
Pritchard and Tolson divorced;1 however, Pritchard
remarried and continued to make payments on the land contract
until June 1989.
According to Price, beginning in June 1989,
Pritchard did not make a payment for five months.
Then, in
October 1989, Pritchard tendered five checks of $135 each to
Price.
Price claims she was told that these checks could not be
cashed at that time, and she claims that she never cashed them.2
Price concedes that from October 1989 to December 1990, she did
not demand payment or make any attempt to collect any payments
from Pritchard.
However, Price claims that in December 1990, she
went to Pritchard’s house, presented her with the uncashed checks
and asked her why no payments had been made.
She claims
Pritchard told her that she could not pay the arrearage on the
contract.
Pritchard claims that Price notified her that she was
going out of town in October 1989, and told her to suspend
payments until she contacted her.3 Pritchard claims that Price
did not contact her until December 1990, at which time Price
1
The record does not disclose when they divorced.
2
Price does not state why the checks could not be cashed.
3
Pritchard claims that Price would periodically disappear
without leaving an address where she could be reached.
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agreed to allow her to pay off the $6,000 balance due on the land
contract.
Pritchard claims she made arrangements to obtain
financing assistance and had the title to the property examined.
In January 1990, Price sought legal advice concerning
Pritchard’s delinquency.
She claims that an attorney informed
her that she could either foreclose or obtain a deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure.
After a quitclaim deed was prepared, Price told
Pritchard that, in order to refinance the land contract and in
order for Price to convey the property to her, all parties,
including her ex-husband, would have to execute the quitclaim
deed.
To obtain her ex-husband’s signature, Pritchard was forced
to release him from a judgment lien for child support arrearage
he owed in the amount of $10,000.
On January 3, 1991, Pritchard
delivered the executed quitclaim deed to Price.
The title
examination had disclosed an unreleased mortgage lien for which
Pritchard obtained a release.
Price claims that after obtaining
the quitclaim deed she agreed to lease the property to Pritchard
for $135 per month, but that Pritchard never paid any rent.
Price never informed Pritchard that the quitclaim deed was going
to be used as a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.
Pritchard claims
that as of February 11, 1990, Price led her to believe that
everything was ready for a closing.
Prichard claims, however,
that Price informed Pritchard’s closing attorney that she was not
going to allow Pritchard to pay off the land contract and that
she was not going to convey the property to Pritchard.
then recorded the quitclaim deed as a deed-in-lieu of
-3-
Price
foreclosure, which effectively eliminated any equity Pritchard
had acquired in the property.4
On February 28, 1991, Price filed a forcible detainer
action against Pritchard in Fayette District Court.
On March 4,
1991, Pritchard brought suit in Fayette Circuit Court against
Price claiming fraud in the inducement in the signing of the
quitclaim deed.
Price’s answer claimed that after the quitclaim
deed was executed, she agreed to lease the property to Pritchard
for $135 per month, that Pritchard never paid under this oral
lease and that Pritchard’s complaint should be dismissed.
The
action lay dormant from 1991 until 1996.
On April 22, 1996, Price filed a motion for partial
summary judgment stating that Price’s 1992 discharge in
bankruptcy extinguished Pritchard’s claim for punitive damages5
and that there being no genuine issue of material fact, summary
judgment was proper.
Pritchard filed a response to the motion
arguing that mutual claims were involved in that Pritchard owed
Price money on the balance of the land contract and Price owed a
monetary claim to Pritchard for punitive damages.
Pritchard
argued that this was a setoff6 and that a discharge in bankruptcy
does not affect a right of setoff.
Pritchard stated that any
4
Both parties have agreed that the value of the property was
$30,000 and since $6,000 was owed on the land contract, Pritchard
lost approximately $24,000 in equity.
5
United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and (12).
6
United States Bankruptcy Code, 11. U.S.C. § 553(a).
-4-
punitive damages award should be limited to the amount needed to
pay off the balance on the land contract.
The matter went to a jury trial on May 13, 1996.
Prior
to the conclusion of the trial, the trial court denied Price’s
motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim; however, the trial
court limited the award of punitive damages to an amount equal to
the balance owed on the land contract.
At trial, the jury found
for Pritchard on her fraud claim and returned a verdict awarding
Pritchard $35,000 in punitive damages.
The jury was not
instructed on any limit to a punitive damages award.
was entered on June 25, 1996.
Judgment
Price filed a motion for a new
trial which was denied on September 4, 1996.
This appeal
followed.
Price first argues that “[t]he jury disregarded the
law, the facts, and the court’s instruction.”
We understand this
argument to mean that the jury did not follow the instructions
and the jury disregarded uncontroverted facts.
“Where a verdict
is ambiguous, irregular or defective in form or in substance, a
trial court has the power, indeed, the duty when its attention is
called to the verdict, to require the jury to reconsider and
change its verdict whether or not the court is requested to do
so.”
Anderson’s Executrix v. Hockensmith, Ky., 322 S.W.2d 489,
490 (1959).
In Davis v. Graviss, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 928 (1984), the
Court stated as follows:
[T]he trial court is charged with the
responsibility of deciding whether the jury’s
award appears “to have been given under the
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influence of passion or prejudice or in
disregard of the evidence or the instructions
of the court.” CR 59.01(d). This is a
discretionary function assigned to the trial
judge who has heard the witnesses firsthand
and viewed their demeanor and who has
observed the jury throughout the trial.
Id. at 932.
On the other hand, an appellate court reviews the
trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial to determine
“‘whether the trial judge abused his discretion.
the trial judge is presumptively correct.’”
The decision of
Shortridge v. Rice,
Ky.App., 929 S.W.2d 194, 196 (1996), quoting McVey v. Berman,
Ky.App., 836 S.W.2d 445, 448 (1992).
After some deliberation, the jury returned to the
courtroom.
The trial court noticed that rather than specifying a
dollar amount, the jury had written a narrative in the margin in
response to a punitive damages amount.
Instruction No. 4 and the
jury narrative stated as follows:
You have found under Interrogatory No. 2
that the Defendant acted to defraud the
Plaintiff intentionally, or with reckless
disregard, you may now, in your discretion,
award punitive damages against the Defendant
in addition to any other relief awarded.
We[,] the jury[,] unanimously find that the
plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages
equal to the plaintiff’s court costs &
attorney fees as well as the voiding of the
quitclaim deed to allow the plaintiff to pay
off the remaining balance of the land
contract within 30 days. If the plaintiff
does so, she is entitled to the deed to the
house.
The trial court conferred with counsel, who both agreed
that the trial court should instruct the jury that the verdict
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could not be accepted in this form and that they should redeliberate and fill in the blank with a dollar amount.
did so by writing “$35,000” in the blank.
The jury
Price argues that the
original narrative response should void the verdict because it
was irregular.
Pritchard responds by noting that counsel for
both parties agreed to instruct the jury to fill in the blank
with a dollar amount; and that the jury did so.
The jury’s original notation on the verdict form
clearly indicated an intent to award punitive damages equal to
the amount required to pay off the balance owed on the land
contract, court costs, and attorney’s fees, even though it failed
to state a specific dollar amount.
When the jury deliberated
again, it followed the trial court’s instructions and provided a
dollar amount for the punitive damages.
We conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the jury,
with the agreement of both parties, to deliberate again, and in
accepting the second verdict.
As stated in Callis v. Owensboro-
Ashland Company, Ky.App., 551 S.W.2d 806, 808 (1977), “the
inconsistency was one of form rather than substance and a jury
may be returned to correct the form of its verdict at any time.”
Price also argues that the verdict was incomplete and
should not have been accepted because the jury completely ignored
Interrogatory No. 3 following Instruction No. 5.
Pritchard
contends that the jury was correct in skipping Interrogatory No.
3 based on their answers to previous questions.
We agree with
Pritchard that Price’s argument completely ignores the simple
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language of the instructions since the only way the jury would
have even reached Instruction No. 5 would have been if they had
answered in the negative to Interrogatory No. 1.
Instead, the
jury answered in the affirmative to Interrogatory No. 1, and
went, as the instructions directed, to Instruction No. 2.
The
jury answered in the affirmative to Interrogatory No. 2 which
stated that they were to proceed to Instruction No. 4.
At the
end of Instruction No. 4 was the admonition, “Please return to
the Courtroom.”
Instruction No. 5 represented an alternative
theory of relief which the jury did not award.
A finding of
fraud based on Instruction No. 1 voided the quitclaim deed, thus
there was no purpose in the jury considering any alternative
claim that the deed constituted a mortgage.
jury followed the instructions.
It is clear that the
Thus, there was no error in the
jury not answering Interrogatory No. 3.
Price alleges the following additional errors: (1)
Pritchard presented no evidence of bad faith as is required for a
punitive damages award; (2) the jury did not award compensatory
damages, therefore, the punitive damages award cannot stand; (3)
the trial court did not correctly instruct the jury on punitive
damages; and (4) the jury should have been instructed to limit
the punitive damages award in accordance with court orders.
Since the jury found that Price committed fraud, the
question of punitive damages was properly before it.
Punitive
damages are “the product of numerous, and sometimes intangible,
factors; a jury imposing a punitive damage award must make a
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qualitative assessment based on a host of facts and circumstances
unique to the particular case before it.”
Hanson v. American
National Bank & Trust Company, Ky., 865 S.W.2d 302, 311 (1993),
quoting TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509
U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993).
The evidence
of Price’s failure to disclose to Pritchard the actual purpose of
the quitclaim deed was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to
determine that Price acted with bad faith.
Price next argues that the punitive damages award cannot
stand because no compensatory damages were awarded.
that is not the law in Kentucky.
However,
In Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912), the jury returned a
verdict for punitive damages only and the appellant argued that
since there had been no finding of compensatory damages, any
punitive damages award was improper.
When presented with the
question of whether an actual damage award was an essential
predicate to a punitive damages award, the Court stated as
follows:
It is true that there are respectable
authorities which appear to hold that
punitive damages cannot be awarded when the
actual injury is merely nominal. Stacy v.
Publishing Company, 68 Me. 287. In our
opinion, however, this view is not correct,
and does not agree with the great weight of
authority. The correct rule, we think, is
that if a right of action exists—that is, if
the plaintiff has suffered an injury for
which compensatory damages might be awarded,
although nominal in amount—he may in a proper
case recover punitive damages. Sedgwick on
Damages, (8th Ed) vol. 1, § 361; Alabama
Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Sellers, 93
-9-
Ala. 9, 9 South. 375, 30 Am. St. Rep. 17;
Hefley v. Baker, 19 Kan. 11; Dosker v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 77 S.C. 56, 57
S.E. 671.
Id. 147 S.W. at 414.
Accord Estep v. Werner, Ky., 780 S.W.2d
604, 607 (1989); Lawrence v. Risen, Ky.App., 598 S.W.2d 474, 475476 (1980); and Brink v. Kennedy, 286 Ky. 566, 571, 151 S.W.2d
58, 61 (1941).7
Clearly, the jury determined that a right of
action for fraud existed.
This finding of fraud included a
finding of injury; therefore, there was a basis for a punitive
damages award.
Price argues that the trial court did not correctly instruct
the jury on punitive damages when it failed to instruct according
to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 411.184 and 411.186.
Pritchard claims that Price failed to preserve this issue for
appellate review.
CR 51(3) states as follows:
No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless he
has fairly and adequately presented his
position by an offered instruction or by
motion, or unless he makes objection before
the court instructs the jury, stating
specifically the matter to which he objects
and the ground or grounds of his objection.
Price did not offer a punitive damages instruction or make a
motion regarding the instructions; however, Price as well as
7
A survey of the other states reveals that 30 states require
an award of compensatory damages before punitive damages can be
awarded and 15 do not require that a compensatory damage award be
made, but they do require an injury for which compensatory
damages might be awarded.
-10-
Pritchard objected to the common law form of the instruction,
thus preserving the error for our review.
The instructions given by the trial court required the
jury to find that “based on clear and convincing evidence, that
the Defendant, Lois Summers Price, acted intentionally or with
reckless disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff, Elna Kay
Pritchard.”
KRS 411.184(2) states that punitive damages are
recoverable when “the defendant from whom such damages are sought
acted toward the plaintiff with oppression, fraud or malice.”
KRS 411.186 lists five factors for the fact-finder to consider in
determining the amount of punitive damages to award.
In this
case, the trial court gave common law instructions to the jury,
which did not list the five statutory factors or note the
statutory requirement of oppression, fraud, or malice.
The trial
court stated that it gave this common law instruction rather than
the statutory instruction because it had previously been held in
Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260 (1998), that KRS 411.184
and 411.186 were unconstitutional and that Williams v. Wilson was
then on appeal to this Court.
This Court affirmed the circuit
court, and subsequently, the Supreme Court granted discretionary
review.
The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that KRS
411.184(1)(c)8 was a violation of the jural rights doctrine, and
8
KRS 411.184(1)(c) states that “‘Malice’ means either
conduct which is specifically intended by the defendant to cause
tangible or intangible injury to the plaintiff or conduct that is
carried out by the defendant both with a flagrant indifference to
the rights of the plaintiff and with a subjective awareness that
(continued...)
-11-
therefore unconstitutional.
However, the Court determined that
the question of the constitutionality of KRS 411.184(2) was not
properly before the Court, and it declared that it would express
no opinion as to the constitutionality of that statute.
The
Supreme Court stated as follows:
In 1988 the Kentucky General Assembly
considered broad tort reform legislation
embodied in HB 551. From among the
proposals, the Legislature enacted a statute
codified at KRS 411.184 intended to modify
Kentucky law with respect to punitive
damages. In general, the intent of the
Legislature was to redefine the circumstances
in which punitive damages were recoverable,
and toward that end a new legal standard was
established. Departing from the traditional
common law standard which permitted a jury to
impose punitive damages upon a finding of
gross negligence as measured by an objective
standard, the new statutory standard, here
under review, requires a determination that
the defendant acted with “flagrant
indifference to the rights of the plaintiff
and with a subjective awareness that such
conduct will result in human death or bodily
harm.” It also requires proof by clear and
convincing evidence. The Fayette Circuit
Court and the Court of Appeals decided the
constitutional question and invalidated the
statute on the view that it offends Sections
14, 54 and 241 of the Constitution of
Kentucky. Both courts below held that the
statute effectively destroyed the common law
8
(...continued)
such conduct will result in human death or bodily harm.” The
Supreme Court in Williams stated that this section impinged on
the jural rights doctrine because it departed from the
traditional common law standard which permitted a jury to impose
punitive damages upon a finding of gross negligence as measured
by an objective standard, whereas the new statutory standard
required a determination that the defendant acted with “flagrant
indifference to the rights of the plaintiff and with a subjective
awareness that such conduct will result in human death or bodily
harm.”
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right of action for punitive damages and that
such was precluded by the doctrine of jural
rights.
Id. at 261 (citation omitted).
Even though the Court ruled that KRS 411.184(1)(c) was
in violation of the jural rights doctrine, and therefore,
unconstitutional, the Court determined that the question of the
constitutionality of KRS 411.184(2) was not properly before it.
Thus, it refused to express an opinion as to the
constitutionality of that statute.
This would appear to leave a
question unanswered about whether a trial court should use the
factors set forth in KRS 411.186(2) in preparing jury
instructions.
One of the factors is “[t]he degree of the
defendant’s awareness of that likelihood [that serious harm would
arise from the defendant’s misconduct.]”
Id. at (2)(b).
Having
ruled that the statutory requirement in KRS 411.184(2) that a
defendant have a subjective belief was unconstitutional, it would
be inconsistent to include a factor which, in fact, includes the
defendant’s awareness.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say
that the trial court erred in abandoning the factors listed in
KRS 411.186(2) and in using the common law standard.
Price’s next issue is whether the trial court should
have instructed the jury to limit the punitive damages award to
the payoff of the land contract.
The trial court had previously
ruled that punitive damages would be limited to the payoff
amount.
The trial court and both counsel discussed how to
present the setoff scenario to the jury.
-13-
Both parties agreed
that a jury instruction on this issue would have been too
confusing.
This agreement was reiterated during a discussion
before jury instructions were given, and the trial court
specifically included the limited language in the judgment.
Price cannot now be allowed to contend that the trial court erred
in not instructing the jury that any award would only be used to
offset the land contract balance.
Furthermore, we agree with
Pritchard that there was no need to present proof of the amount
due on the land contract since the parties had agreed not to
instruct the jury on the limit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY.
Although I agree with the result reached in the
majority opinion, I cannot agree with some of the reasoning.
The
majority correctly finds that Price cannot raise the irregularity
of the jury’s first verdict on appeal because the parties agreed
to resubmit the issue to the jury following the first verdict.
I
also agree with the majority, reluctantly, that there was
sufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages
despite the absence of an award of compensatory damages.
Furthermore, I agree with the majority that the award of punitive
damages was not clearly excessive.
However, I am concerned about
the inadequacy of the jury instructions on the amount of punitive
-14-
damages.
Moreover, I cannot agree with the dicta in the majority
opinion which questions the constitutionality of KRS 411.186(2).
First, I am concerned about the inadequacy of the trial
court’s instruction to the jury regarding the amount of punitive
damages. The jury in the present case was not instructed as to
any factors to consider in calculating the amount of damages.
The instruction does not give any guidelines to determine the
amount of punitive damages. In the absence of any directive from
the trial court to consider the culpability of Price’s conduct,
the jury was left without any framework within which to calculate
the amount of punitive damages.
Nonetheless, I believe that any error with regard to
the instruction was harmless.
It is my understanding that the
trial court limited any recovery for punitive damages to an
amount equal to the balance due under the land sale contract.
The parties have apparently agreed that the balance due under the
contract is approximately $6,000.00.
Given the scope of this
Court’s review of an award of punitive damages and the facts of
this case as found by the jury, I cannot conclude that an award
of $6,000.00 in punitive damages was clearly excessive.
However, I disagree with the majority’s view that the
factors set forth in KRS 411.186(2) are inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260
(1998).
I believe that the majority’s reasoning overstates the
holding of Williams v. Wilson, and in so doing, impinges upon due
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process rights. Moreover, I believe that the jury instruction is
inadequate even under the common law standard.
Under KRS 411.184, a jury was to find by clear and
convincing evidence that a defendant acted with “fraud,
oppression, or malice” in determining whether to award punitive
damages.
In Williams v. Wilson, our Supreme Court found the
statute unconstitutional because it restricted a jural right of
recovery for wrongful death or personal injury by eliminating
recovery for punitive damages based on gross negligence, in
violation of Ky.
267-68.
Const. §§ 14, 54 and 241.
Id. 972 S.W.2d at
However, the Supreme Court specifically stated that it
was not considering the constitutionality of KRS 411.184(2), Id.
at 269, and the Court did not even address KRS 411.186.
The
majority’s discussion takes Williams v. Wilson beyond its scope.
Furthermore, I cannot agree with the underlying
proposition that the factors listed in KRS 411.186(2) violate any
jural right of recovery. Under the statutory scheme, a jury must
first consider whether to impose punitive damages.
Once the jury
determines that punitive damages are appropriate, KRS 411.186(2)
directs the jury to consider the following factors:
(a) The likelihood at the relevant time that
serious harm would arise from the defendant's
misconduct;
(b) The degree of the defendant's awareness
of that likelihood;
(c) The profitability of the misconduct to
the defendant;
(d) The duration of the misconduct and any
concealment of it by the defendant; and
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(e) Any actions by the defendant to remedy
the misconduct once it became known to the
defendant.
Williams v. Wilson merely holds that the defendant’s subjective
awareness that such conduct would result in harm is not a valid
requirement to determine whether punitive damages should be
imposed.
The factors listed in KRS 411.186, on the other hand,
are considerations in determining the amount of punitive damages.
The egregiousness of a defendant’s behavior has always been a
relevant factor in the calculation of the proper amount of
punitive damages to impose.
Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc.,
Ky., 508 S.W.2d 759, 763 (1974).
Thus, the factors listed in KRS
411.186(2) are in no way inconsistent with the common law
standard for punitive damages, and cannot be held to limit a
jural right of recovery.
Therefore, the factors listed in KRS
411.186(2) are not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Williams v. Wilson.
Consequently, while I agree with the
majority’s result affirming the award, I do not believe the
majority’s interpretation of Williams v. Wilson is compelled.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Ronald A. Newcomer
Lexington, KY
Hon. John P. Brice
Lexington, KY
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