PHILLIP CRAIG STIGER APPEALS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: January 15, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
No.
1996-CA-002100-MR
1997-CA-000899-MR
PHILLIP CRAIG STIGER
V.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-1059
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, GARDNER and SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GARDNER, JUDGE.
Phillip Craig Stiger has filed two appeals from
his judgment of conviction in Jefferson Circuit Court for firstdegree wanton endangerment and from subsequent orders of the court
denying his motions for probation and shock probation.
After
carefully reviewing the record below, Stiger’s arguments and the
applicable law, this Court affirms in both appeals.
Stiger was indicted and subsequently pled guilty to a
charge of first-degree wanton endangerment. At the sentencing, the
Commonwealth recommended a three year prison sentence for wanton
endangerment and stated it would oppose probation.
Stiger’s
counsel stated that he would ask for probation and that Stiger
entered a conditional plea reserving the right to contest the
constitutionality of the new juvenile transfer statute.
On July
19, 1996, the circuit court in the judgment of conviction sentenced
Stiger to three years in prison.
The court noted that it had given
due consideration to the pre-sentence investigation report and
other factors, but concluded that probation should be denied,
because Stiger was in need of correctional treatment that could be
provided most effectively by his confinement to a correctional
institution.
On January 15, 1997, Stiger filed a motion for shock
probation.
On January 21, 1997, the circuit court denied this
motion because it was outside the time limit authorized by statute.
Stiger filed another motion for shock probation on January 23,
1997.
timely
A hearing was held, and Stiger argued that the motion was
because
pursuant
to
Kentucky
Revised
Statute
(KRS)
439.265(1), the 180 day period for filing a motion for shock
probation begins from either the incarceration in a county jail
following a defendant’s conviction and sentencing or from his
delivery to the keeper of the institution to which he has been
sentenced.
The Commonwealth maintained that the time ran from the
date of Stiger’s incarceration, thus rendering his motion for shock
probation untimely. The circuit court agreed and denied the motion
stating that it was outside the 180 day limit of KRS 439.265 as the
motion was filed on the 190th day.
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Stiger has appealed from the
court’s judgment denying him probation and from the orders denying
shock probation.
His appeals have been consolidated for our
review.
In his first appeal, Stiger argues that he was not an
adult
offender
improper.
and
that
the
circuit
court’s
sentencing
was
He specifically maintains that KRS 635.020(4) did not
purport to affect the ameliorative provisions set out in KRS
600.010.
He states that under the general principles of statutory
construction, it is clear that the concept of adult penalties does
not include prohibition of the use of ameliorative provisions set
out in KRS 600.010.
by the trial court.
We have reviewed the record and found no error
Hence, we affirm on this appeal.
KRS 635.020(4) provides:
Any other provision of KRS Chapters 610 to 645
to the contrary notwithstanding, if a child
charged with a felony in which a firearm was
used in the commission of the offense had
attained the age of fourteen (14) years at the
time of the commission of the alleged offense,
he shall be transferred to the Circuit Court
for trial as an adult if, following a
preliminary hearing, the District Court finds
probable cause to believe that the child
committed a felony, that a firearm was used in
the commission of that felony, and that the
child was fourteen (14) years of age or older
at the time of the commission of the alleged
felony. If convicted in the Circuit Court, he
shall be subject to the same penalties as an
adult offender, except that until he reaches
the age of eighteen (18) years, he shall be
confined in a secure detention facility for
juveniles or for youthful offenders, unless
released pursuant to expiration of sentence or
parole, and at age eighteen (18) he shall be
transferred to an adult facility operated by
the Department of Corrections to serve any
time remaining on his sentence.
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In Britt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 147, 149 (1998), the
Kentucky Supreme Court held, “[t]hat KRS 635.020(4) does not create
a
new
category
of
adult
offender
that
precludes
children
transferred to circuit court pursuant to it from eligibility for
the ameliorative provisions of KRS 640.040.” The 1994 amendment to
KRS 635.020(4) was intended to do nothing more than expedite the
transfer of juvenile cases involving firearms felonies.
150.
Id., at
The 1996 amendments to KRS 635.020(4) clarify the General
Assembly’s intent that every child transferred to circuit court
pursuant to KRS 635.020(4), will be transferred as a youthful
offender, thus preserving all ameliorative sentencing procedures
authorized for youthful offenders, particularly those set out in
KRS 640.030 and 640.040 to that child.
Id.
In general, a trial
court must comply with KRS 533.010 and give due consideration to
the possibility of probation after first considering the crime and
the defendant. Bell v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 566 S.W.2d 785, 787
(1978).
The trial court must include in the record a statement
sufficient to show the necessary consideration of probation.
Id.
The instant case is distinguishable from cases such as
Britt v. Commonwealth, supra, where the trial court failed to
consider probation or other ameliorative measures.
The record in
this case shows that during his guilty plea, Stiger reserved the
right to seek probation which he later did.
The record also
reveals that the circuit court did in fact consider probation but
concluded that it was not appropriate in this case given Stiger’s
past criminal activities and the nature of the wanton endangerment
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crime.
The court below sufficiently considered probation and put
its findings in the record as required by Bell v. Commonwealth,
supra.
Hence, we affirm the circuit court in Stiger’s first
appeal.
In his second appeal, Stiger contends that the trial
court erred by denying his motion for shock probation on the ground
of untimely filing.
After reviewing the clear language of the
applicable statute and the trial court’s actions, this Court
concludes that the court erred by denying Stiger’s motion on the
basis that it was untimely.
For reasons set out below, this Court
however has concluded that this issue is now moot.
KRS 439.265(1) addresses this matter and provides:
Subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 439
and Chapters 500 to 534, any Circuit Court
may, upon motion of the defendant made not
earlier than thirty (30) days nor later than
one hundred eighty (180) days after the
defendant has been incarcerated in a county
jail following his conviction and sentencing
pending delivery to the institution to which
he has been sentenced, or delivered to the
keeper of the institution to which he has been
sentenced, suspend the further execution of
the sentence and place the defendant on
probation upon terms the court determines.
Time spent on any form of release following
conviction shall not count toward time
required under this section.
In general, courts must follow the clear language of statutes. See
Lydic v. Lydic, Ky. App., 664 S.W.2d 941, 943 (1983).
“All
statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a view to
promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature.
. . .”
KRS 446.080(1).
“All words and phrases shall be construed
-5-
according to the common and approved usage of language. . . .”
446.080(4).
KRS
If a statute’s words are plain and unambiguous, the
statute must be applied to those terms without resort to any
construction or interpretation. Terhune v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
907 S.W.2d 779, 782 (1995).
The plain language of KRS 439.265(1) states that a
circuit court may consider a motion for shock probation by a
defendant which is made not earlier than thirty days nor later than
180 days after the defendant has been incarcerated in a county jail
following his conviction and sentencing pending delivery to the
institution to which he has been sentenced, or after delivery to
the keeper of the institution to which he has been sentenced.
The
circuit court in the instant case ruled that Stiger’s motion was
untimely
because
apparently
it
was
calculated
filed
the
on
time
the
from
incarcerated following his sentencing.
190th
day.
The
the
date
Stiger
court
was
The statute however gives
two alternative dates for calculating the time for filing a shock
probation motion. The record indicates that Stiger was received at
the Kentucky correctional institution on August 19, 1996.
Using
this date, his motion for shock probation was filed with the
circuit court 149 days later, thus making it timely under the
statute.
We have reviewed Commonwealth v. Gross, Ky., 936 S.W.2d
85 (1996), but find it distinguishable.
That case contains dicta
which could be construed to favor the Commonwealth’s argument, but
the Court in that case did not consider the issue at hand.
We have
uncovered no case which precisely addresses the issue now before
-6-
us. Terhune v. Commonwealth, supra, addressed the issue of whether
a motion for shock probation was filed prematurely, but clearly
noted that the time limits of KRS 439.265(1) are calculated from
one of two events: (1) when the defendant has been incarcerated in
a county jail following his conviction and sentencing pending
delivery to the institution to which he has been sentenced, or (2)
when the defendant is delivered to the keeper of the institution to
which he has been sentenced.
In
the
instant
case,
the
circuit
court
incorrectly
concluded that Stiger’s motion was not filed timely; however, based
on the facts of this case, the matter is now moot.
Because many
months have now passed since Stiger’s motion for shock probation
was filed, the circuit court has lost jurisdiction to consider the
motion.
See KRS 439.265; Commonwealth ex. rel. Hancock v. Melton,
Ky., 510 S.W.2d 250, 252 (1974).
Further, the basic purpose of the
shock probation statute is to rehabilitate a defendant by giving
him a taste of the prison system.
See Blondell v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 556 S.W.2d 682 (1977); Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 839
S.W.2d 17 (1992).
Stiger
was
In the instant case, years have passed since
convicted
probation.
This
thus
Court
nullifying
has
also
the
learned
purpose
that
of
shock
Stiger
has
subsequently been convicted of escape, thus extending his prison
sentence.
For these reasons, this Court declines to reverse or
vacate the circuit court’s order regarding shock probation.
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
Jefferson Circuit Court in both appeals.
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this
Court
affirms
the
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
J. David Niehaus
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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