ROBERT LEWIS SHEMWELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: December 4, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002765-MR
ROBERT LEWIS SHEMWELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARLAND W. HOWARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-000139
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Robert Lewis Shemwell (Shemwell) appeals from
a judgment and sentence entered by the Daviess Circuit Court
which imposed a ten (10) year sentence pursuant to a jury
recommendation after the jury found him guilty of rape in the
third degree (KRS 510.060) and of being a persistent felony
offender (PFO) in the second degree (KRS 532.080).
We affirm.
Shemwell was indicted by a Daviess County Grand Jury of
rape in the third degree and of being a PFO in the second degree.
The indictment alleged that Shemwell, who was twenty-five years
old at the time of the incident, engaged in sexual intercourse
with A.R., a female less than sixteen (16) years old. [A.R. was
actually fifteen (15) years old at the time of the rape].
The
indictment also alleged that Shemwell met all the criteria to be
considered a PFO II.
After a two day jury trial, Shemwell was
convicted of both offenses and the jury recommended a ten (10)
years sentence which the trial court imposed.
After the trial
court denied appellant’s motion for a new trial, this appeal
followed.
On appeal Shemwell raises three (3) issues concerning
alleged errors in this matter.
of error separately.
We will address each assignment
First, appellant contends it was error for
the trial court to refuse to permit him to question A.R.’s father
about other people he (the father) may have accused of having sex
with his daughter.
Shemwell argues that such evidence could have
shown “that A.R.’s father was an insanely jealous, religious
fanatic, who was possibly molesting his own daughter; and who at
the very least was accusing everyone in the project of having sex
with his daughter.”
The trial court refused to permit Shemwell
to pursue this line of questioning.
Appellant placed the
testimony of the victim’s father and Detective Osborne, the
investigating police officer, concerning the sought after
testimony in the record by avowal.
As to this issue, A.R.’s
father testified that when he confronted his daughter about
having sex with Shemwell, he had also heard rumors about her
having sex with other people.
this information.
He also told Detective Osborne of
Detective Osborne stated that A.R.’s father
told him of rumors A.R. was having sex with other individuals but
did not mention any names.
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The Commonwealth responds that this type of testimony is
properly excluded under KRE 412.
KRE 412 replaced KRS 510.145,
commonly referred to as the “Rape Shield Statute” in 1992.
pertinent part, KRE 412 states:
(a) Reputation or opinion.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
in a criminal prosecution under KRS Chapter
510 or for attempt or conspiracy to commit an
offense defined in KRS 510, or KRS 530.020,
reputation or opinion evidence related to the
sexual behavior of an alleged victim is not
admissible.
(b) Particular acts and other evidence.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
in a criminal prosecution under KRS Chapter
510, or KRS 530.020, or for attempt or
conspiracy to commit an offense defined in
KRS Chapter 510, evidence of a victim’s past
sexual behavior other than reputation or
opinion evidence is also not admissible,
unless such evidence is admitted in
accordance with subdivision (c) and is:
(1) Evidence of past sexual behavior with
persons other than the accused, offered by
the accused upon the issue of whether the
accused was or was not, with respect to the
alleged victim, the source of semen or
injury;
(2) Evidence of past sexual behavior with
the accused and is offered by the accused
upon the issue of whether the alleged victim
consented to the sexual behavior with respect
to which an offense is alleged; or
(3) Any other evidence directly pertaining
to the offense charged.
(c)(1) Motion to offer evidence. If the
person accused of committing an offense
described above intends to offer under
subsection (b) evidence of specific instances
of the alleged victim’s past sexual behavior,
the accused shall make a written motion to
offer such evidence not later than fifteen
(15) days before the date on which the trial
in which such evidence is to be offered is
scheduled to begin, except that the court may
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In
allow the motion to be made at a later date,
including during trial, if the court
determines either that the evidence is newly
discovered and could not have been obtained
earlier through the exercise of due diligence
or that the issue to which such evidence
relates has newly arisen in the case.
It should be noted, first, that Shemwell did not comply
with the rule [KRE 412(c)(1)] by making the necessary written
motion fifteen (15) days before the trial.
Be that as it may,
KRE 412(b)(1) specifically excludes the testimony appellant
attempts to put before the jury.
Under the guise of portraying
the victim’s father as “an insanely jealous, religious fanatic
who was possibly molesting his own daughter” of which there was
absolutely no evidence, appellant attempts to put into evidence
that which KRE 412 specifically excludes.
Recent cases have
upheld the provisions of KRE 412 and its predecessor KRS 510.145
and their intended purpose of keeping the trial focused on the
facts of the specific case and not permitting an unfair attack on
the victim.
See Hall v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 956 S.W.2d 224
(1997); Violett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 907 S.W.2d 773 (1995);
Commonwealth v. Dunn, Ky., 89 S.W.2d 492 (1995); and Billings v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 843 S.W.2d 890 (1992).
Under KRE 412 and a
long list of case law, the trial court properly excluded the
testimony Shemwell attempted to introduce.
The next issue which Shemwell presents is that he was
entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of
third-degree sexual abuse (KRS 510.130).
Appellant admits that
he did not properly preserve this issue by tendering a written
instruction of the requested instruction.
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However, we will
address the issue in order to thoroughly dispose of all issues
presented on appeal.
Appellant alleges that based upon the
evidence presented the jury could have believed that he and A.R.
had not engaged in sexual intercourse.
Appellant further
contends that the jury, had it been given an instruction of
sexual abuse in the third degree, could have convicted him of
said lesser offense.
However, that is not the standard to be
considered by the trial court.
The fact that the evidence might
support a guilty verdict on an uncharged offense that is less
serious in nature or less difficult to prove than the charged
offense does not establish that the former is a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the latter.
Commonwealth, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 268, 272 (1992).
Percy v.
Kentucky case law
requires that the trial court to instruct on every state of the
case deducible from the evidence.
See Johnson v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 875 S.W.2d 105 (1994); Covington v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 849 S.W.2d 560 (1993).
Case law further holds lesser
included offense instructions are only required to be given when,
considering the totality of the evidence, the jury might
reasonably conclude that the defendant was not guilty of the
charged offense but was guilty of the lesser offense.
See Bills
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 851 S.W.2d 466 (1993); Wombles v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 831 S.W.2d 172 (1992).
The evidence presented
to the jury in this matter would only support a conviction of
rape in the third degree.
It would have been unreasonable for
the jury to conclude that Shemwell was guilty of sexual abuse in
the third degree.
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A.R. testified that she was fifteen (15) years old and
that Shemwell knew she was fifteen.
had sexual intercourse.
She also testified that they
Witness Dewayna Barnes testified that
she observed A.R. and Shemwell on the couch with their clothes
down around their knees and thought that they were engaged in
sexual intercourse.
Witness Debbie Austin confirmed that
Shemwell knew A.R. to be only fifteen and further admitted that
A.R. told her that she and appellant had engaged in sexual
intercourse.
The victim’s father testified that his daughter,
although she had first denied the allegations, eventfully
admitted to him that she and Shemwell did engage in sexual
intercourse.
Shemwell testified on his own behalf and denied any
sexual contact with A.R.
He also confirmed that he was twenty-
five (25) years old and that he knew A.R. was only fifteen (15)
years old.
Since there was no evidence from which a jury could
conclude that appellant was guilty of sexual abuse in the third
degree as opposed to rape in the third degree, he was not
entitled to an instruction on sexual abuse.
The final issue raised by Shemwell is that he was unduly
prejudiced when Detective Osborne was permitted to state, in
effect, that the grand jury had found probable cause since it had
returned the indictment against Shemwell.
The following exchange
occurred between the Commonwealth and Detective Osborne:
Q (Attorney for Commonwealth): Now, pursuant
to your investigation, you also spoke with
Dewayna Barnes, is that correct?
A (Det. Osborne): Yes sir, I did.
Q: Again, you did not arrest Robert Shemwell
at that time?
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A: No sir, I did not.
Q: How did these charges come to before us
today?
A: I submitted this before the Grand Jury on
April 7.
Q: Of this year, 1997?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did the Grand Jury return an indictment?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Which meant they found probable cause...
[interrupting, defense counsel states,
“Judge, I object to that question. Court
overrules stating “It’s alright.” Go ahead
and answer the question”.]
A: Yes sir they did come back on the 9th.
Shemwell contends that the testimony “amounted to a declaration
by the officer that he believed the grand jury’s indictment to be
evidence of Appellant’s guilt.”
We do not agree.
Appellant cites Braden v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 600 S.W.2d
466 (1978), to support his argument.
Braden addressed this issue
as follows:
Furthermore, we do not believe the statement
to be error. This was said during opening
statement and the defense, having the last
opening statement, could have elaborated on
the remark, if they wished.
Braden, 600 S.W.2d at 468.
We do not see how the fact that a
witness made the same statement is any different and the holding
in Braden that such a statement is not error would apply also to
this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and sentence of
the Daviess Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth Shaw
Richmond, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Vickie L. Wise
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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