ERIC BRADLEY V. STEVE BERRY, WARDEN
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RENDERED: July 10, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-2129-MR
ERIC BRADLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00254
V.
STEVE BERRY, WARDEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
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ABRAMSON, GARDNER, and GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Eric Bradley (Bradley) appeals pro se from an
August 4, 1997, order of the Oldham Circuit Court dismissing his
petition for declaratory judgment brought pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 418.040.
We affirm.
Bradley is currently an inmate at the Blackburn
Correctional Complex in Lexington, Kentucky.
On the morning of
April 8, 1997, prison officials conducted a random drug test of
several inmates.
Sergeant John Osborne procured a urine specimen
from Bradley and placed it in a temporary secure refrigerated
holding device.
Later that morning, Sergeant Wayne Moyers
removed the urine specimen and transported it to Luther Luckett
Correctional Center for analysis.
for marijuana.
The test results were positive
A few days later, Bradley was charged with
unauthorized use of drugs or intoxicants in violation of
Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) Category 4, Item 2.
On
April 25, 1997, a prison disciplinary hearing was held at which
Bradley stated he had not used marijuana and could not explain
the positive test results.
Part of the evidence reviewed by the
prison's disciplinary Adjustment Committee was a chain of custody
form designed to trace the movement of the urine specimen.
Based
on the investigative chain of custody and testing information,
the Adjustment Committee found Bradley guilty of the CPP
provision and imposed a sanction of forty-five days disciplinary
segregation and forfeiture of sixty days good time.
Upon
administrative appeal, Steve Berry, the warden, concurred with
the Adjustment Committee's decision.
On June 6, 1997, Bradley filed a petition for
declaratory judgment challenging the disciplinary action based on
the failure of Sergeant Osborn and Sergeant Moyers to complete
the chain of custody form in accordance with prison policies and
procedures by signing their names in only one of the two spaces
designated for receipt and release of the specimen.
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Bradley
asked the circuit court to order expungement of the disciplinary
report from his record and restoration of the forfeited good
time, or in the alternative, grant him a new disciplinary
hearing.
On July 3, 1997, Berry filed a motion to hold the case
in abeyance to allow the Department of Corrections to provide
Bradley with a new disciplinary hearing.
On July 8, 1997, the
Adjustment Committee at Luther Luckett conducted a second hearing
that included the same evidence used in the first hearing, but
also included affidavits from Sergeant Osborn and Sergeant Moyers
concerning their actions in handling the urine sample.
Both
officers stated that they signed their names in only one of the
two columns of the chain of custody form because each had both
received and released the specimen.
Based on the evidence, the
Adjustment Committee again found Bradley guilty of unauthorized
use of drugs and imposed the same penalty as before.
Shortly
thereafter, Berry filed a motion to dismiss the petition based on
Bradley's having received a new disciplinary hearing.
In August
1997, the trial court granted the motion thus dismissing
Bradley's petition for declaratory judgment.
This appeal
followed.
Bradley argues that his right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment was violated by the use of a defective chain
of custody form.
He contends that the prison officers were
required to sign the chain of custody form and their affidavits
could not cure the failure to follow the correct procedure.
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Bradley seeks restoration of his good time and expungement of the
disciplinary finding from his prison record.
The issue on appeal is whether the prison officials
provided an adequate remedy by conducting a second disciplinary
hearing.
The appropriate remedy for a due process violation
depends in part on whether the violation involves substantive due
process or procedural due process.
Substantive due process
involves violations of "fundamental" rights that are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,"
Paldo v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1937), or that
"shock the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172,
72 S. Ct. 205, 209, 96 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1952).
Substantive due
process does not protect individuals from government action that
is merely "incorrect or ill-advised."
See Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 350, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976);
Interport Pilots Agency, Inc. v. Sammis, 14 F.3d 133, 144 (2nd
Cir. 1994).
Substantive due process protects rights "against
certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them."
Collins v. City of Harber
Heights, 503 U.S. 123, 125, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L. Ed. 2d
261 (1992).
A violation of a substantive due process
right, for instance, is complete when it
occurs; hence, the availability vel non
of an adequate post-deprivation state
remedy is irrelevant. Because the right
is "fundamental," no amount of process
can justify its infringement. By
contrast, a procedural due process
violation is not complete "unless and
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until the state fails to provide due
process." Zinermon [v. Burch, 494 U.S.
113, 123, 110 S. Ct. 975, 983, 108 L.
Ed. 2d 100 (1990)]. In other words, the
state may cure a procedural deprivation
by providing a later procedural remedy;
only when the state refuses to provide a
process sufficient to remedy the
procedural deprivation does a
constitutional violation [occur]. . . .
McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1110, 115 S. Ct. 898, 130 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1995)
(footnote omitted).
In addition, the primary relief sought and
available for a procedural due process violation is equitable
such as a remedial hearing.
Id.
Bradley challenges the initial disciplinary action
because two prison employees failed to sign their names in the
appropriate spaces on the chain of custody form.
Bradley's
complaint necessarily implicates procedural due process, rather
than substantive due process.
The method for completing an
adequate chain of custody form involves a procedural evidentiary
issue, rather than a substantive issue.
Consequently, Bradley's
complaint is subject to post-deprivation remedies.
A procedural
due process violation may be cured by a subsequent adequate
hearing.
See United States Postal Service v. National
Association of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 778 (11th Cir.
1988).
Berry argues that the second disciplinary hearing cured
any due process violation that may have occurred in the first
hearing.
The issue then becomes whether the second disciplinary
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hearing complied with procedural due process.
In the case at
bar, Bradley relies on Byerly v. Ashley, Ky. App., 825 S.W.2d 286
(1992) for the proposition that the chain of custody form was
inadequate and thus, the disciplinary action was illegal.
Meanwhile, Berry maintains any defect in the chain of custody
form was cured by the affidavits submitted by the corrections
officers and because the affidavits were included in the second
disciplinary hearing, any procedural error was remedied.
In
Byerly, the court held that prison discipline involving
unauthorized use of drugs must be based on reliable evidence.
The court indicated that the test report linking the positive
drug results to Byerly's urine sample was not reliable because
the testing laboratory failed to fill out the chain of custody
form identifying those persons who handled the sample.
The court
stated as follows:
As it is, to punish the appellant the
authorities have relied on evidence
which is less than reliable because it
was not established with reasonable
certainty that the specimen tested was
the same as that taken from the
appellant.
Id. at 288.
Byerly does not require that every person handling
the specimen sign his name on both the received by and released
by portions of the chain of custody form.
Byerly merely requires
that a reliable chain of custody be established.
A review of the record reveals that Sergeant Osborn
signed the chain of custody form indicating that he obtained
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possession of the specimen, but he wrote "FCDC Institutional
Urine Box" in the space designated "received by."
Similarly,
Sergeant Moyers wrote "Urine Box - FCDC" in the space for
"released by" and signed his name in the space designated
"received by."
Prior to the second hearing, both corrections
officers submitted affidavits stating that they had filled out
the chain of custody form but did not sign their names in both
spaces because they were the same persons who had either
respectively, received or released the specimen.
the chain of custody was established in this case.
Unlike Byerly,
The
affidavits of the correction officers removed any ambiguity in
the original form.
The location of the specimen was accounted
for at all times, and when not in the possession of corrections
personnel, the specimen was kept in a securely locked
refrigerator.
The evidence of the chain of custody with the
supplemental affidavits presented at the second hearing clearly
was sufficiently reliable to support the finding of the
Adjustment Committee.
Even if a procedural due process violation
occurred with respect to the first hearing, any violation was
remedied by the holding of the second hearing with the additional
evidence of the affidavits by the officers.
As a result, Bradley
has not established that the disciplinary punishment he received
involved a due process violation.
Bradley's reliance on CPP 15.8 and Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed 2d 675 (1983) is likewise
unavailing.
CPP 15.8, VI (c)(4) states that each time a sample
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is released from a secure holding device, "the form shall be
signed on behalf of the holding device."
Bradley argues that
the mandatory language in CPP 15.8 created a right to have the
chain of custody form include the signature of an individual at
each step of the specimen handling process.
The mere use of the
mandatory term "shall" in CPP 15.8, VI (c)(4) did not create a
protected liberty interest in having prison officials sign each
space in the chain of custody form.
Bradley's reliance on the
mandatory language in CPP 15.8 for imposing a specific due
process procedural requirement is erroneous.
Similarly, while CPP 15.8, VI (c)(4) appears to have
been promulgated in response to the decision in Byerly, as
explained above, Byerly merely requires a reliable chain of
custody.
It does not mandate a specific method or procedure for
establishing the reliability of the test specimen.
In other
words, state law does not require signatures in every space of
the chain of custody form in all instances.
Reliability can be
established in other ways, as in this case with the affidavits of
the prison officers.
While it would certainly be preferable if
each person handling a specimen would sign his or her name on the
chain of custody form upon receipt and release, this is not
required by due process under state law.
In addition, CPP 15.8 VI (c)(4) does not create a
substantive right in the procedure described but rather merely
sets out a guideline for prison employees in documenting their
handling of specimens in order to facilitate a uniform practice.
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Even though the two prison officers may not have followed the
procedure described in the regulation, this fact alone does not
mandate vacating the disciplinary action.
Failure to follow the
procedures of the regulation allow the inmate to challenge the
reliability of the evidence, but violation of the regulation
alone does not render the disciplinary action void.
Moreover in
this particular case, the violation of the prison regulation was
harmless error.
See Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 750 (2nd
Cir. 1991) (stating harmless error analysis applies to prison
disciplinary action).
Bradley has not demonstrated any prejudice
because of the two prison officers' failure to follow the prison
regulation.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Oldham Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT - PRO SE
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Eric Bradley
Lexington, Kentucky
John T. Damron
Department of Corrections
Frankfort, Kentucky
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