PATRICIA K. ROLLINGS v. BARREN RIVER DISTRICT HEALTH DEPARTMENT
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RENDERED:
December 11, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002052-MR
PATRICIA K. ROLLINGS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN MINTON, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-00833
v.
BARREN RIVER DISTRICT
HEALTH DEPARTMENT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; ABRAMSON1 AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Patricia Rollings (Rollings) has appealed from
the judgment of the Warren Circuit Court entered on June 6, 1997,
which summarily dismissed her claims against her former employer,
the Barren River District Health Department (the Health
Department).
1
We affirm.
Judge Abramson concurred in this Opinion prior to her
departure from this Court. Release of this Opinion was delayed
through normal administrative handling.
Rollings was employed as a clerk/typist for the Health
Department from 1983 until she was discharged in May 1991.
Rollings appealed her dismissal to the Merit System Council for
Local Health Departments (the Council), which was administered by
the Cabinet for Human Resources.
211.1755.
See Kentucky Revised Statutes
After a hearing in February 1992, the Council
determined that Rollings' dismissal was predicated "upon a
mistaken fact" and that she had never "abandoned" her job.
It
ordered that she be reinstated to her former position and that
she be awarded back pay and all fringe benefits lost during the
period she was unemployed.
The Health Department did not appeal
the final order of the Council.
During the many months Rollings was not employed by the
Health Department, she applied for more than 30 jobs but was not
offered a position.
After the Council's decision became final,
she returned to her job at the Health Department.
There is no
question that she was given the back pay and other benefits to
which she was entitled.
However, she alleges that after her
return to work she began experiencing adverse working conditions.
On September 16, 1992, Rollings filed a complaint in
the Warren Circuit Court in which she alleged (1) that the Health
Department, "by its agents, servants or employees, when contacted
for a reference regarding [her] wrongfully, intentionally,
maliciously or with reckless disregard for the truth of the
matter, gave [her] such a bad recommendation that she was then
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and is now non-competitive in the local job market"; and (2),
that when she was returned to work by the Council, she was not
reinstated to her previous position but "was assigned new and
different duties from those of her previous position without
training or guidance in the performance of what amounted to a
myriad of demeaning tasks."
She also alleged that "[a]n
atmosphere of vengeful hostility was created in the work place by
[her] superiors that was intended to make [her] life at work a
misery for the purpose of inducing [her] to voluntarily quit her
job."
She further alleged that the pressure placed on her had
"exceeded her ability to tolerate" and had made her physically
ill.
She sought damages for the "tortious misconduct in falsely
reporting [her] work history and work habits to prospective
employers" and for the "loss of her ability to earn money in her
present position."
Although Rollings was employed by the Health
Department at the time she filed her complaint, she soon ceased
working for the appellee, allegedly because of the treatment she
received by her supervisors and co-workers.
On October 7, 1992, the Health Department filed a
motion to dismiss pursuant to CR 12.02(f).
It argued that
Rollings had received the back pay she was awarded and was
reinstated to the position of clerk/typist, and that her
complaints constituted new grievances which she was required to
pursue through the Council.
The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss on October 5, 1993, and stated as follows:
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If the Court accepted the reasoning
and arguments of the [Health
Department], [Rollings] would remain
forever in a circular pattern of
grievances, orders, and alleged
noncompliance with the orders, resulting
in another grievance, etc. The Court is
of the opinion that [Rollings] properly
brought this action in Circuit Court and
is entitled to pursue the action.
A year later, the Health Department learned that
Rollings had filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for
an alleged work-related stress syndrome which, according to her
Form 101, was caused by "people not being nice to her" and the
stress of answering the telephone.
The Health Department moved
to amend its answer to assert the exclusivity provisions of the
Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act as an affirmative defense and
moved for summary judgment based on that defense.
On October 19,
1994, the Warren Circuit Court dismissed Rollings' complaint
without prejudice.
Its order provided that Rollings had leave to
re-file the case without further payment of a filing fee if her
claims were rejected by the Department of Workers' Claims.
Rollings' claim for workers' compensation was rejected
by the Administrative Law Judge.
Thus, in December 1996, the
Warren Circuit Court granted Rollings' request that her case be
restored to the court's active docket.
commence on June 10, 1997.
A trial was scheduled to
In April 1997, the Health Department
again moved for summary judgment.
Although Rollings asked for
and was granted an extension of time to respond to the motion,
she did not file a response.
-4-
On June 6, 1997, the trial court entered its order
dismissing Rollings' claims.
The trial court determined that
Rollings had not exhausted her administrative remedies and was
required to return to the Council "for a determination as to
whether the [Health Department] ha[s] satisfied the August 18,
1992 administrative order by restoring Rollings to her employment
status."
The trial court also granted the Health Department's
motion for summary judgment on the defamation claim and stated as
follows:
As indicated above, counsel for
Rollings has failed to respond to the
defendants' motion, has failed to file a
pretrial compliance, and has failed to
place any direct evidence in the record
that would support Rollings' slander
claim. As a result, the Court concludes
that there is no genuine issue of
material fact supporting Rollings'
slander claim. The Court determines
that i[t] would be impossible for
Rollings to [ ] produce [any] evidence
at trial that would warrant a judgment
in her favor.
In this appeal, Rollings argues that the Warren Circuit
Court erred in its determination that she had not exhausted her
administrative remedies.
She requests that we reverse and
instruct the circuit court to enforce the order of the Council.
However, Rollings is no longer employed by the Health Department,
and does not desire to return to work there.
Thus, whether the
Health Department complied with the final order of the Council,
vis-a-vis her job assignments upon reinstatement, is a moot
issue.
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The gravamen of Rollings' claim is that, as a result of
the egregious treatment she received from her supervisors and coworkers after being reinstated to her job, she became ill and was
forced to quit her job.
It is apparent to this Court that this
is not an action to enforce the Council's order, but constitutes
additional grievances for conduct occurring after the Council's
order, over which the Council has jurisdiction.
Montgomery, Ky.App., 583 S.W.2d 87 (1979).
See Kidd v.
Rollings has not
cited a single case in which a merit employee was permitted to
assert a claim in circuit court for constructive discharge and we
know of no such authority.
Accordingly, it is our belief that
the trial court was correct in its determination that
jurisdiction over Rollings' claim for retaliatory or constructive
discharge lies in the administrative arena.
See Commonwealth,
Tourism Cabinet v. Stosberg, Ky.App., 948 S.W.2d 425 (1997).
Having reviewed the entire record, we also conclude
that the trial court did not err in summarily dismissing
Rollings' defamation claim.
In her complaint and deposition
testimony, Rollings expressed her belief that her inability to
find employment in the Bowling Green area was attributable to
negative and/or false references made by her supervisor,
Elizabeth Stone (Stone) or others employed by the Health
Department, to potential employers.
However, as is apparent from
the following testimony, Rollings could not name a single
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individual or entity to whom false or disparaging references were
given:
Q.
So is it your testimony you have
been blacklisted on all-A.
Oh, yes.
Q.
--of the doctors' offices here
in town?
A.
Yes.
Q.
How did you come to be
blacklisted?
A.
I think Elizabeth Stone out at-now it’s the, what are they calling it
now, the commission. No, it’s not even
a commission anymore. It’s for children
with special needs now. She has given
bad references on me in the past.
Q. To whom did she give a bad
reference?
A.
Well, do I have to cite where
she publicly put me down at the Western
T. I don't think I need any more than
that.
Q. Ms. Rollings, I don't mean to get
confrontational.
Mr. Robertson [Rollings' attorney]:
Just answer the questions. What he is
wanting to know is, do you know of any
employment where she has torpedoed you
by giving you a bad reference, and I
think your answer to that question is
no.
A.
No.
I don't know for sure.
Rollings insists that she has sufficient circumstantial
evidence to allow a jury to find that she was defamed by agents
of the Health Department and that summary judgment was
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improvidently granted.
The circumstantial evidence relied upon
includes proof that before she was fired in 1991, she was an
"excellent employee as evidenced by her employee evaluations" and
that she "had a quality job history."
After she was reinstated,
her employer acted "in a malicious fashion to harm [her]," and
Stone made "unsolicited slurs about her in public gatherings."2
Finally, she has proof that she was not able to find "suitable
employment in the same job market in which she has spent her
entire life."
In order to establish a claim for defamation, a
plaintiff must prove the existence of: (1) defamatory language;
(2) about the plaintiff; (3) which is published, that is
communicated in some manner; and, (4) which causes injury.
McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Company, Ky., 623
S.W.2d 882 (1981).
It is axiomatic that a plaintiff must be able
to prove that defamatory statements were communicated to someone
other than the plaintiff.
It is not sufficient that the
plaintiff suspects that someone made disparaging or derogatory
comments about her.
In the absence of any evidence that any
defamatory remarks were published, summary judgment was
appropriate.
Wyant v. SCM Corporation, Ky.App., 692 S.W.2d 814,
816 (1985).
2
The actual substance of these "slurs" is not contained
anywhere in the record. See pp 8-9, infra.
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In addition to Rollings' belief that she was defamed to
potential employers by someone at the Health Department, she also
argues that there is evidence that Stone defamed her to Joerg
Seitz (Seitz).
As the trial court set out in its judgment, there
is no evidence in the record of what Stone was alleged to have
said to Seitz about Rollings.
When asked at her deposition about
the alleged defamation, Rollings testified that she did not hear
the conversation and had no knowledge of what Stone actually
communicated to Seitz.
We agree with Rollings' argument that it is not
necessary for her to have "independent knowledge of each and
every fact of her case."
It is obviously not necessary that a
plaintiff asserting a claim for defamation to have heard the
allegedly slanderous statements first hand.
There must be, as
noted earlier, some evidence that false remarks were published or
communicated to a third person.
contends that Stone made
In the instant case, Rollings
"gratuitous slanderous remarks" and
"unsolicited slurs about her" to Seitz, who in turn telephoned
Rollings' attorney with the information.
However, the record
does not contain an affidavit prepared by either Seitz or
Rollings' attorney setting forth the actual alleged defamatory
matter.
Without any evidence of the actual comments made by
Stone to Seitz, the trial court could not in the first instance
determine whether anything Stone said qualified as defamation.
Certainly, not all "slurs" constitute defamation.
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Peters v.
Barth, 20 Ky.Law.Rep. 1934, 50 S.W. 682 (1899) (words “she is a
damned slut,” a “damned bitch,” and a “damned sow” were not
actionable).
In any event, Rollings has not asserted a claim
against Stone and admits that the allegedly slanderous slurs were
made by Stone in a social context, and not within the scope of
her employment.
Thus, even if Rollings could establish the
existence of a defamatory statement to Seitz, she does not
explain how the Health Department would be liable.
While a plaintiff is not required to prove her case in
response to a motion for summary judgment, it is incumbent upon
her to establish that a fact question does exist.
Steelvest,
Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482
(1991).
Rollings did not respond to the motion and the record
does not contain evidence that any defamatory statements were
ever published to a third person by an agent or employee of the
Health Department.
Under these circumstances, we hold that the
trial court did not err in granting the Health Department’s
motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Warren Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Douglas E. Robertson
Bowling Green, KY
Hon. Matthew J. Baker
Bowling Green, KY
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