MICHAEL SWANGO APPEALS v. ROBBIN SWANGO FAIRBANK
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RENDERED: December 18, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
1997-CA-001571-MR
1997-CA-003292-MR
MICHAEL SWANGO
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEONARD L. KOPOWSKI, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CI-00238
v.
ROBBIN SWANGO FAIRBANK
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
Michael Swango (Swango) appeals two (2) orders of
the Campbell Circuit Court.
In 1997-CA-001571-MR, Swango appeals
from an order granting his former wife Robbin Swango Fairbank
(Fairbank) sole custody of their child.
In 1997-CA-003292-MR,
Swango appeals an order setting child support.
After reviewing
the record, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, we
affirm both the custody and the child support decisions.
Swango and Fairbank married in 1986.
child, Monica, born in 1987.
They had one (1)
The parties divorced in 1990, but
continued to live together intermittently.
agreement provided for joint custody.
Their separation
The child was to spend
equal time with each parent, with Swango paying Fairbank $30.00
per week in child support.
In 1992, Fairbank agreed that Monica
would primarily reside with Swango and began paying Swango child
support.
Both parties remarried.
In June 1995, Fairbank moved for sole custody.
The
domestic relations commissioner awarded Swango temporary custody
and appointed a psychologist to perform a custodial evaluation.
The commissioner held a custody hearing over four (4) days in
January 1997.
The commissioner recommended that Fairbank get
sole custody.
Swango filed objections.
By order entered May 27,
1997, the court adopted the commissioner’s report and
recommendations.
Custody Issues
In awarding sole custody to Fairbank, the court
modified the previous order of joint custody.
The court found
that Swango refused in bad faith to cooperate in the upbringing
of the child by interfering with Monica’s relationship with
Fairbank.
Swango did not appeal this ruling.
The record
supports the court’s decision to decide custody de novo.
Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer, Ky. App., 887 S.W.2d 555, 558 (1994).
Swango first argues that the commissioner mistakenly
relied on the findings of the court-appointed expert.
We
disagree.
In custody proceedings the court may seek the written
advice of professional personnel.
The advice shall be made
available to counsel upon request, and counsel may examine any
professional personnel consulted by the court.
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KRS 403.290(2).
A psychological professional's conclusions are evidence to be
considered by the courts, not dictates.
App., 830 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1992).
Chalupa v. Chalupa, Ky.
Courts cannot rely solely on
the recommendations of psychologists.
Reichle v. Reichle, Ky.,
719 S.W.2d 442, 445 (1986).
The commissioner appointed Mark Kroger to perform a
custodial evaluation.
Kroger has a master’s degree in counseling
psychology and is certified by the Kentucky State Board of
Psychological Examiners.
The commissioner recognized him as an
expert in child custody evaluations.
Kroger submitted a report
recommending that Fairbank be awarded sole custody.
He found
that Fairbank would do more to promote a relationship between
Swango and Monica than Swango would do to promote a relationship
between Fairbank and Monica.
Swango hired Dr. Peter Ganshirt to evaluate Kroger’s
methods and conclusions.
Dr. Ganshirt criticized Kroger’s
record-keeping, evaluation techniques, and his recommendation to
award custody to Fairbank.
Kroger on these points.
Swango’s attorney cross-examined
The commissioner found that the critical
issue was Swango’s interference with the relationship between
Fairbank and Monica.
The commissioner recommended, and the court
ordered, that Fairbank receive sole custody.
We find no error.
of testimony.
The commissioner heard four (4) days
There was evidence in the record, independent of
Kroger’s report, to support the commissioner’s findings and
conclusions.
The commissioner did not rely solely on Kroger’s
recommendations.
See Reichle, supra.
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Swango attacks Kroger’s
credentials and methodology.
KRS 403.290 does not set out any
minimum qualifications for experts consulted by the court.
The
court was capable of giving Kroger’s testimony the proper weight.
Swango next argues that the court’s findings of fact
are clearly erroneous.
We disagree.
Findings of fact made by a domestic relations
commissioner and adopted by the court shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR)
52.01; Reichle, supra, at 444.
Swango devotes six (6) pages of his brief to this
argument.
However, we are hard-pressed to determine which
factual findings he considers clearly erroneous.
We will address
the areas where Swango’s view of the evidence conflicts with the
court’s conclusions.
Swango suggests that Fairbank lacks
parenting skills and only wants custody so that she will not have
to pay child support.
Swango also maintains that he promoted
visitation and phone contact with Fairbank.
He says the evidence
shows Fairbank got more than her share of visitation.
We find no clear error.
Reichle, supra.
found that both parties love their daughter.
The Court
The Court did not
make findings on the parties’ respective parenting skills.
However, there was no evidence that either party was unfit.
Fairbank and Swango gave conflicting testimony about visitation.
Fairbank testified that Swango unilaterally decided when she
could visit Monica.
Swango testified that he was cooperative and
that it was Fairbank who was unreasonable.
The court found that
Swango was confrontational and controlling regarding visitation
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and phone contact with Monica.
Where there is conflicting
testimony, we must give due regard to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
CR 52.01.
The record supports the trial court’s decision.
Swango next argues that the commissioner erred by
limiting the custody hearing to events after 1992.
that the hearing was not truly de novo.
He contends
We disagree.
When modifying a previous order of joint custody the
court should decide custody anew, as if there had been no prior
custody determination.
Mennemeyer, supra, at 556; Benassi v.
Havens, Ky. App., 710 S.W.2d 867, 869 (1986).
“[A] trial court
has the power to control the course of litigation, including
control of the amount of evidence produced on a particular point.
The overall fairness of a trial is within the sound discretion of
the trial judge.”
Washington v. Goodman, Ky. App., 830 S.W.2d
398, 400 (1992) (citations omitted).
Swango attempted to introduce testimony about
Fairbank’s parenting skills while they were married and during
their separation.
objection.
The commissioner sustained Fairbank’s
He ruled that only evidence arising after the parties
divorced and agreed to joint custody was relevant.
The court
mistakenly referred to the dissolution decree as being dated
March 1, 1992.
The dissolution was entered in September, 1990.
However, the court found that in 1992 the parties agreed to
continue joint custody with Swango having primary residence.
-5-
We find no abuse of discretion.
Washington, supra.
Evidence from before 1992 had little relevance to the best
interests of Monica in 1997.
Swango also complains that the commissioner denied him
due process by limiting the presentation of his case.
We
disagree.
Again we must struggle to identify the errors of which
Swango is complaining.
Swango states that the commissioner did
not permit him to question several “crucial witnesses”: “Monica’s
school principal and teacher, a private investigator and property
manager for Fairbank.”
The court denied Swango’s request to have
a psychologist who treated Monica, Dr. Peters, testify by
conference call.
Swango also alludes to evidence that he was not
able to include in the January hearing “showing more of
Fairbank’s lact (sic) of responsibility in caring for her child.”
This evidence relates to child support, bills for Monica’s
treatment by Dr. Peters, and bills for family therapy.
Swango
argues “these issues were crucial in understanding Fairbank’s
true motivations and selfishness for money over her daughter.”
The court did not abuse its discretion.
supra.
Washington,
Swango does not explain what the first group of witnesses
had to say that was “crucial.”
He successfully introduced a
report prepared by Dr. Peters and testimony about Fairbank’s
finances.
We fail to see how disputed bills for psychological
treatment and family therapy would have persuaded the court to
grant custody to Swango.
Swango has not shown that the
commissioner prejudiced his case.
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Child Support Issues
When the court decided custody, it ordered the parties
to exchange information regarding child support.
The
commissioner held a hearing on this issue in September 1997.
He
recommended that Swango be ordered to pay $168.72 per month in
child support.
He also recommended denying Swango’s motions for
back child support and for reimbursement of certain expenses.
Swango filed objections.
By order entered January 8, 1998, the
court overruled the objections and adopted the commissioner’s
report and recommendations.
Swango argues that the court erred by failing to order
Fairbank to pay child support for periods when the child lived
with him, erred by failing to order Fairbank to pay a portion of
a psychologist bill and a counseling bill, and erred by
miscalculating Swango’s future child support.
Swango first argues that the court should have found
that Fairbank owed Swango child support for the period September
4, 1992 to May 3, 1995.
The court found that the parties had an
oral agreement that Fairbank would pay Swango $30.00 per week in
child support during this period.
Swango alleges that at the
time of the agreement he was unaware of Fairbank’s true income,
and that he was under “mental, economical, and physical
distress.”
A court will enforce an oral child support agreement
between parents if (1) it is proven with reasonable certainty,
(2) it is “fair and equitable under the circumstances," and
the "modification might reasonably have been granted, had a
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(3)
proper motion to modify been brought."
Price v. Price, Ky., 912
S.W.2d 44, 46 (1995) (quoting Whicker v. Whicker, Ky. App., 711
S.W.2d 857, 859 (1986)).
On the other hand, “child support may
be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the
filing of the motion for modification and only upon a showing of
a material change in circumstances that is substantial and
continuing.”
KRS 403.213(1).
The 1990 separation agreement called for Swango to pay
Fairbank $30.00 per week in child support.
By oral agreement,
the parties reversed the obligation when Monica began residing
with Swango in 1992.
In June 1995, although the child was living
with Swango, Fairbank moved for an order awarding her back child
support based on the 1990 separation agreement.
The commissioner
found that the parties’ 1992 modification was not unconscionable
and that Swango did not owe Fairbank arrearage.
exceptions.
Fairbank filed
Swango responded, asserting that the commissioner’s
report should be adopted in full.
In 1997, the circuit court held that Swango was not
entitled to any support for the period September 4, 1992 to May
3, 1995 because the parties had not modified the 1992 agreement
and Swango had not moved to modify support.
We find no abuse of discretion.
Unlike Price, supra,
Swango does not want the 1992 oral agreement enforced.
he wants it set aside because it was unfair.
Instead,
However, he failed
to request an increase in child support while Monica lived with
him.
He also failed to object when the commissioner approved the
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agreement in 1995.
The time for Swango to challenge the child
support agreement has passed.
Swango next argues that the court erred when it did not
award him any additional child support for the period May 3, 1995
through July 31, 1995.
We disagree.
The court granted Swango temporary custody in June
1995.
It did not order child support because the parties did not
present evidence on that issue.
Swango, through counsel,
executed an agreed order entered September 27, 1995.
set child support at $416.00 per month.
That order
It also recited:
“[t]hat the current child support arrearage of $832.00 shall be
paid in monthly payments of $208.00 until satisfied.”
Swango contends that the agreed order only addressed
the arrearage for the two (2) months preceding the entry of the
order, August and September.
He wanted the circuit court to find
additional arrearage of $104.00 per month for May through July
1995.
The agreed order states that the arrearage as of September
27, 1995, was $832.00.
If he wanted arrearage for May through
July, he should have included that in the agreed order.
Swango next argues that the court erred by refusing to
order Fairbank to pay psychological and family therapy expenses.
We disagree.
The psychologist bill arose when Monica visited
Swango’s sister, Beverly Karlson, in Florida in the summer of
1995.
Before the visit, Fairbank authorized Karlson in writing
to seek necessary medical treatment for Monica.
-9-
Without
notifying Fairbank, Karlson took Monica to Dr. Ruth Peters
because Monica intentionally banged her head.
The family therapy bill was for counseling ordered by
the commissioner.
Swango’s therapist suggested that Fairbank and
Monica attend some counseling sessions with Swango.
They did so,
and Fairbank also went to her own counselor.
The only relevant order in effect at the time of the
disputed charges was the separation agreement.
In it, the
parties agreed to share extraordinary medical expenses and to
consult with each other on matters concerning the child’s health.
The circuit court found that the psychological
treatment was not authorized medical treatment consented to by
Fairbank, and that the parties should be responsible for their
own counseling expenses.
We find no clear error.
As defined by
statute, "extraordinary medical expenses" include costs
reasonably necessary for medical services and for professional
counseling or psychiatric therapy for diagnosed medical
disorders.
KRS 403.211(8).
However, the parties had an
agreement.
The evidence supports the court’s finding that
Fairbank did not authorize or consent to Monica being treated by
Dr. Peters.
As for the counseling expenses, the custody order did
not state who should pay for it.
The court did not err by
requiring the parties to pay for their own counseling.
Swango next complains that the court calculated child
support incorrectly.
He first argues that the court should have
-10-
included a bonus as part of Fairbank’s gross income.
We agree,
but find the error harmless.
Gross income for child support purposes means actual
gross income from any source, including bonuses.
403.212(2)(b).
KRS
Fairbank’s employer paid her a bonus of $3,743.96
for 1996, ten (10%) percent of her annual salary.
Fairbank
testified that her employer gave her a bonus most years, based on
profits.
On cross-examination, she agreed that she had always
received a bonus.
The court found that “it would be speculation
as to whether Petitioner will receive a bonus for 1997.”
The
court did not include any bonus in calculating child support.
The court erred by not including Fairbank’s bonus as
part of the couple’s gross income.
Although her bonus was not a
certainty, she testified that she had received it every year.
However, increasing the combined parental income by including
Fairbank’s bonus for 1996 would not have changed Swango’s support
obligation.
Each parent’s child support obligation is a function
of their percentage of the combined parental income multiplied by
the amount in the guideline table.
KRS 403.212(3).
Using the
income figures in the record and the table in KRS 403.212, we
find that reducing Swango’s share of a higher guideline amount
results in the same monthly payments for him.
The error was
harmless.
Swango’s final child support argument is that the court
did not properly account for his preexisting child support
obligations.
We disagree.
-11-
To establish combined adjusted parental gross income,
the court deducts payments, to the extent made, for the support
of prior-born children who are not the subject of the proceeding.
KRS 403.212(2)(g)4.
Swango’s child support obligation to his
first wife included current and past support.
The circuit court
adjusted the parties’ combined gross income by subtracting only
Swango’s current support due, not the arrearage.
We find no error.
If Swango had not fallen behind on
his child support payments to his first wife, he would not have
had to pay an arrearage.
His child support obligation to Monica
should not be reduced because of his failure to support his
prior-born children.
The court applied the statute correctly.
Finally, Swango broadly charges that the court violated
his civil rights and his right to equality without
discrimination.
He requests that the case be removed from
Campbell County to Boone County because of the court’s gender
bias against him.
We disagree.
The court awarded custody to Swango’s former wife,
declined to award him child support for years during which he
never requested it, and calculated child support based on the
parties’ current income and the law.
these decisions.
We are affirming each of
Thus, we cannot find that the court
discriminated against Swango by ruling against him.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the
Campbell Circuit Court are affirmed.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
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JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART AND
FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART.
I concur with the Majority Opinion in affirming the
trial court in both appeals.
However, I respectfully dissent in
part because I would sua sponte order the Honorable Sally J.
Herald, counsel for appellant Michael Swango, to show cause why
she should not be sanctioned for her failure to comply with
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(a) and 7.02(4),
which require typewritten briefs to be in “type no smaller than
12 point.”
It is difficult to determine the type size of
counsel’s brief, but suffice it to say that this judge had to
have the appellant’s briefs enlarged by the copy machine in order
to read them.
I would assess a fine of $200.00 to be paid by
attorney Hearld unless good cause were shown.
CR 73.02(2)(c).
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sally J. Herald
Fort Thomas, Kentucky
Todd V. McMurtry
Covington, Kentucky
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