GARLAND DEAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: June 19, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
97-CA-1270-MR
GARLAND DEAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRECKINRIDGE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 89-CR-00039
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOX, and MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE.
Garland Dean (Dean) brings this pro se appeal
from an order of the Breckinridge Circuit Court entered on April
18, 1997, denying in part and granting in part his motion to
alter, amend, or vacate sentence brought pursuant to Ky. R. Crim.
Proc. (RCr) 11.42 and Ky R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 60.02.
Finding no
error by the trial court, we affirm.
In April 1990, Dean pled guilty to one count of murder
(Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 507.020) and one count of attempted murder
(KRS 506.010) involving the shooting death of his former
girlfriend and the shooting of another person.
Although the
record indicates the guilty plea was entered pursuant to a plea
agreement, the Commonwealth made no recommendation as to
sentencing.
On May 9, 1990, Dean appeared with counsel for
sentencing.
At that time, the trial court sentenced him to
fifteen years on the attempted murder offense and on the murder
offense "to the Department of Corrections for and during the
remainder of his natural life."
The court ordered the sentences
to run consecutively.
In January 1997, Dean filed a motion to amend or vacate
his sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02, and requested an
evidentiary hearing.
In the motion, he raised three issues:
1)
defense counsel was ineffective; 2) the judgment was void because
the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment for "natural life"
for murder; and, 3) the trial court improperly ordered the
attempted murder and murder sentences to run consecutively.
In
April 1997, Special Judge Thomas Castlen summarily denied the
motion as to the first two issues, but granted the motion as to
the third by ordering the sentences to run concurrently.
On
April 29, 1997, Dean filed a motion to reconsider1 again
challenging the judgment of sentence for "natural life."
On May
12, 1997, the circuit court denied the motion to reconsider and
this appeal followed.
1
The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) do not provide
for a motion to reconsider, however, such a motion may be treated
as a motion to alter, amend or vacate under CR 59.05. See
Commonwealth v. Newsome, Ky., 296 S.W.2d 703 (1956).
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The only issue on appeal involves the validity of the
sentence imposed upon the murder offense.
Dean argues that the
judgment of conviction is void ab initio because it states he is
guilty of murder and "is sentenced to the Department of
Corrections for and during the remainder of his natural life."
Dean contends that this sentence violates KRS 532.030(1), which
authorizes four possible sentences for a capital offense:
death,
a term of imprisonment for life without probation or parole for
twenty-five years, life, or a term of not less than twenty years.
Dean interprets the sentence for "natural life" as being an
illegal sentence because it is outside the alternatives
designated in KRS 532.030 and precludes the possibility of
parole.
We disagree.
While the portion of the judgment describing the
sentence for murder did not exactly mirror statutory language, we
do not believe the sentence sufficiently deviates from the
statute so as to render it illegal.
The use of the term "natural
life," rather than "life" in the judgment is a distinction
without a difference.
In construing a judgment, if there are
"'two possible interpretations of the language of the judgment,
that one will be adopted which makes it valid, in preference to
one which would make it erroneous.'"
Board of Education of
Campbellsville Independent School District v. Faulkner, Ky., 433
S.W.2d 853, 855 (1968).
It is presumed that the Court intended
the judgment would be legally correct as applied to the facts of
the case.
Id.
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In the present case, the sentence for murder can and
should be construed consistent with KRS 532.030 to have imposed a
life sentence with Dean being eligible for parole after having
served twelve years pursuant to KRS 439.3401.
Commonwealth, Ky., 844 S.W.2d 391 (1992).
See Sanders v.
Despite Dean's
protestation to the contrary, there is nothing in the judgment
clearly dealing with or limiting parole eligibility.
Indeed,
Dean admits that the Department of Corrections treated the
judgment and sentence for murder as a life sentence and
designated him as being eligible for parole in twelve years.
Consequently, Dean has suffered no prejudice because of any
ambiguity in the judgment.
Dean's reliance on Brock v. Sowders, Ky., 610 S.W.2d
591 (1980), is misplaced.
In Brock, the Court held that the
defendant was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because
Kentucky authorities were holding him in contravention of the
judgment which provided that his Kentucky sentence would run
concurrently with a previously imposed Indiana sentence.
The
Court held that the judgment would be applied even though no
state statutes authorized running a Kentucky sentence
concurrently with another state's prison term.
distinguishable.
Brock is
Therein, the Court noted that the judgment
explicitly provided for the concurrent sentences.
It also stated
that the concurrent term should apply, even though it was
unauthorized, because it was part of the plea agreement favorable
to the defendant and the government should not be allowed to
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"welsh on its bargain."
Id. at 592.
See also Hudson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 932 S.W.2d 371 (1996).
In the original motion before the circuit court, Dean
claimed the guilty plea was invalid because he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
He has abandoned this claim
on appeal by failing to address it in his appellate brief.
A
reviewing court generally will confine itself to errors set forth
in the briefs and will not search the record for errors.
Ballard
v. King, Ky., 373 S.W.2d 591 (1963); Milby v. Mears, Ky. App.,
580 S.W.2d 724 (1979).
An appellant's failure to discuss a
particular error in his brief is the same as if no brief had been
filed on that issue.
S.W.2d 708 (1975).
R. E. Gaddie, Inc. v. Price, Ky., 528
Consequently, Dean has waived appellate
review of the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the
trial court's decision is affirmed on this issue.
Stansbury v. Smith, Ky., 424 S.W.2d 571 (1968).
See, e.g.,
Moreover, given
our construction of the judgment as imposing a statutory life
sentence for murder, this is consistent with even Dean's
understanding of the plea agreement,2 so he would be unable to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Breckinridge Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
2
We note that the Commonwealth made no recommendation on
sentencing, so Dean's belief that he would receive a life
sentence from the judge is unsupported by the record.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Garland Dean, Pro Se
Burgin, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Joseph R. Johnson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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