CHAUNCEY JOHNSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
September 18, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1997-CA-001253-MR
CHAUNCEY JOHNSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL A. SCHNEIDER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-002264 and 96-CR-002962
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * *
BEFORE: GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment convicting
appellant, pursuant to a guilty plea, of possession of a
controlled substance and theft by unlawful taking over $300.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing the
appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.
Upon reviewing the record
and the applicable law, we adjudge appellant’s argument to be
without merit and, thus, affirm.
Appellant was indicted on separate charges of theft by
unlawful taking over $300 and possession of a controlled
substance.
Separate plea agreements were thereafter entered into
as to each charge.
As to the possession of a controlled
substance charge, the Commonwealth recommended two (2) years to
serve or five (5) years if probated.
The agreement specifically
stated that the Commonwealth did not object to releasing
appellant on his own recognizance pending sentencing, but if
appellant failed to appear at sentencing, its recommendation
would be five (5) years to serve.
The plea agreement on the
theft by unlawful taking charge recommended one (1) year to serve
or three (3) years if probated and contained the same language as
the aforementioned agreement regarding a recommendation of five
(5) years to serve if appellant failed to appear at sentencing.
On December 23, 1996, appellant entered a plea of
guilty on both charges.
During the plea, appellant was made
aware of the Commonwealth’s recommendation on both charges--three
(3) years to serve or eight (8) years probated, reserving to the
court’s discretion whether to grant probation.
The Commonwealth
specifically qualified this recommendation by verbally stating
that if appellant failed to appear at sentencing, the
recommendation would be five (5) years on each count, for a total
of ten (10) years to serve.
Appellant failed to appear at his sentencing proceeding
on February 14, 1997.
Appellant was subsequently arrested and
brought before the court for sentencing on May 6, 1997.
On
May 5,1997, appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, maintaining that he was coerced into pleading
guilty.
At the sentencing hearing, appellant argued that he
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not
feel adequately represented by his newly appointed counsel as his
former counsel had withdrawn from the case.
The court denied the
motion to withdraw appellant’s plea and imposed the ten (10) year
-2-
sentence recommended by the Commonwealth in the event appellant
did not appear at his sentencing.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred
in refusing to let him withdraw his plea when the court did not
sentence appellant in accordance with the recommendation of the
Commonwealth in the plea agreement.
Appellant cites Kennedy v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 962 S.W.2d 880 (1997) in support of his
position.
In Kennedy, supra, the Court held that under RCr 8.10,
the trial court must allow a defendant to withdraw his plea if
the court does not sentence the defendant according to the
recommendation of the Commonwealth in the plea agreement.
The instant case can be factually distinguished from
Kennedy, supra, by the fact that the court in the present case
did follow the recommendation of the Commonwealth in the plea
agreement.
In the plea agreements on both offenses, it states
that if the defendant does not appear at sentencing, the
sentencing recommendation is five (5) years to serve.
During the
plea proceeding, the Commonwealth made that fact very clear.
Appellant knew the exact consequences of his failure to appear at
sentencing and agreed to them when he pled guilty.
Accordingly,
the court did not err in refusing to allow appellant to withdraw
his plea.
Appellant next argues that his plea was not voluntarily
entered.
A guilty plea is valid if it represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice to waive the several trial-related
constitutional rights, and the record affirmatively establishes
this knowing waiver.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct.
1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
-3-
799 S.W.2d 51 (1990).
Whether a plea is voluntary is determined
from the surrounding circumstances as well as from the transcript
of the plea proceeding.
Kotas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d
445 (1978).
In reviewing appellant’s plea, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that appellant’s plea was anything but
voluntary.
During the plea proceeding, the trial court explained
all of the constitutional rights appellant was waiving by
pleading guilty, and appellant acknowledged that he understood.
Appellant stated that he had read the guilty plea, understood it,
and was entering his plea voluntarily.
The court informed
appellant three times as to the consequences of not appearing for
sentencing, and appellant explicitly stated that he understood
these consequences.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Courtney A. Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.