JANETTA BORST AND GEORGE BORST, III v. CITY OF ASHLAND, KENTUCKY; KENNETH ADAMS, Individually and in his official capacity as Police Officer; CHUCK LEADINGHAM, Individually and in his official capacity as Police Officer; WILLIAM SEARY, Individually and in his official capacity as Police Officer; RUDY DUNNIGAN, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Ashland;and WILLIAM FISHER, JR., in his official capacity as City Manager
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December 11, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
1997-CA-001166-MR
JANETTA BORST AND
GEORGE BORST, III
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-000741
CITY OF ASHLAND, KENTUCKY;
KENNETH ADAMS, Individually
and in his official capacity
as Police Officer;
CHUCK LEADINGHAM, Individually
and in his official capacity
as Police Officer;
WILLIAM SEARY, Individually
and in his official capacity
as Police Officer;
RUDY DUNNIGAN, in his
official capacity as
Mayor of the City of Ashland;
and WILLIAM FISHER, JR., in
his official capacity as
City Manager
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND GARDNER, Judges.
APPELLEES
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
Janetta Borst and George Borst, III, appeal
from an order of the Boyd Circuit Court which granted summary
judgment to the City of Ashland (the City), three police officers
of the City, the mayor of the City, and the city manager.
Finding no error, we affirm.
In July 1993, a young boy was chased by a vicious dog
while riding his bicycle in the City.
The boy jumped off his
bike and onto a parked truck, and his bicycle continued rolling
until it crashed into a car parked behind the truck.
Judy Adams,
wife of the appellee, Officer Kenneth Adams, was exiting the car
with her infant child at the time of the incident.
After the dog
was chased off by bystanders, Judy Adams called the police.
Officer Chuck Leadingham responded to Judy Adams’ call.
After speaking to the witnesses, Officer Leadingham proceeded to
the Borst residence, which was apparently located in the general
direction in which the vicious dog had gone.
Officer Leadingham
encountered Mrs. Borst and informed her of the incident involving
the boy and the dog.
Mrs. Borst first told Officer Leadingham
that the dog he was describing matched the description of her
dog, but when she was informed as to why the officer was looking
for the dog, she told the officer that she only fed the dog
occasionally.
Officer Leadingham then attempted to speak further
with both Mr. and Mrs. Borst, but they refused to continue to
discuss the matter and departed for a social event.
Following the Borsts’ departure, Officer Leadingham
remained in the area to complete his investigation.
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Officer
Adams arrived on the scene and remained long enough to ensure
that Officer Leadingham was filling out the correct forms.
As
Officer Leadingham searched for the dog, he observed a large dog
through a fence surrounding the Borsts’ backyard.
He then
separately led each witness to the rear of the residence,
whereupon each identified the dog in the Borsts’ backyard as
being the dog that had chased the young boy on the bicycle.
After consulting with his supervisor, Officer
Leadingham decided to seek a warrant charging Mrs. Borst with
harboring a vicious animal in violation of a City ordinance.
As
the incident occurred on a Saturday, the warrant could not be
obtained until the following Monday.
On the day after the
incident (Sunday), Officer Adams called the Borst residence and
asked to speak with Mr. Borst.
When Mrs. Borst informed the
officer that her husband was not home, the officer asked her if
her insurance would pay for the damage done to his wife’s car.
Mrs. Borst stated emphatically that she was not responsible for
the damage and terminated the conversation.
On the following Monday, Officer Leadingham went to the
office of County Attorney Jerry Vincent (Vincent) and requested a
warrant for the arrest of Mrs. Borst for violating the City
ordinance prohibiting the harboring of a vicious animal.
The
basis for the warrant was City Ordinance 133-1990, and Leadingham
provided Vincent with a copy of that ordinance in accordance with
the standard procedure for such actions.
However, Leadingham
failed to follow standard procedure by not providing Vincent a
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copy of the penalty section of the ordinance.
After discussing
the matter with Officer Leadingham, Vincent chose to seek an
arrest warrant for Mrs. Borst and instructed his office to
prepare the warrant for the signature of the district judge.
Officer Leadingham then took the warrant prepared by
Vincent’s office to the district judge, who signed the warrant
after handwriting a notation on the warrant that the offense was
a Class A misdemeanor.
It was subsequently learned that City
Ordinance 133-1990 had been repealed and replaced by City
Ordinance 95-1992.
Furthermore, a violation of the new ordinance
was not a Class A misdemeanor but was only a violation for which
an arrest warrant was not proper.
Leadingham and another officer proceeded to the Borst
residence the following morning to arrest Mrs. Borst.
Mrs. Borst
was eventually taken into custody and transported to the county
jail, where she remained for two to three hours before being
released on her own recognizance.
Vincent later offered to dismiss the charge against
Mrs. Borst if she would stipulate that there was probable cause
for her arrest.
She refused the offer, but an agreed order was
later entered under which the charge against Mrs. Borst was
“filed away” and stricken from the docket.
The order also
provided that the Commonwealth agreed not to reinstate the charge
in the future.
Mrs. Borst subsequently filed a civil suit in a federal
district court against the City, Officer Adams, Officer
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Leadingham, and Chief of Police Ron McBride, alleging violations
of her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereafter § 1983) and
alleging state law claims for false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, and conspiracy and harassment.
Following discovery, the defendants in that suit moved for
summary judgment, and the motion was referred to a magistrate for
a decision.
The magistrate issued a lengthy order recommending
that the federal claims be dismissed and that the court refuse to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.
These
recommendations were adopted by the U.S. District Court, and Mrs.
Borst’s federal claims were dismissed with prejudice.
Her state
law claims were dismissed without prejudice to her right to
refile the claims in state court.
Mrs. Borst then brought this action in the Boyd Circuit
Court.
The defendants enumerated in her complaint were the City,
Officer Adams, Officer Leadingham, Officer William Seary,1 Mayor
Rudy Dunnigan,2 and City Manager William Fisher.3
Mr. Borst was
also added as a plaintiff.
After the appellees moved for summary judgment based on
the findings of the U.S. District Court, the trial court granted
1
The Borsts allege that Officer Seary issued Mrs. Borst a
speeding ticket for which she was acquitted.
2
Mayor Dunnigan was apparently named as a defendant because
he did not respond to the Borsts’ complaints in a manner
satisfactory to them.
3
City Manager Fisher was apparently named as a defendant
because he also did not respond to the Borsts’ complaints in a
manner satisfactory to them.
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the summary judgment motion on grounds including res judicata,
collateral estoppel, and the expiration of the statute of
limitations.
The Borsts then filed the appeal sub judice.
The standard for granting summary judgment has been set
forth as follows:
A movant should not succeed in a motion for
summary judgment unless the right to judgment
is shown with such clarity that there is no
room left for controversy and it appears
impossible for a nonmoving party to produce
evidence at trial warranting judgment in his
favor. Summary judgment is to be cautiously
granted and should not be used as a
substitute for trial or merely for the sake
of efficiency or expediency. . . . The
motion for summary judgment must convince the
circuit court from evidence in the record of
the nonexistence of a genuine issue of
material fact.
Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (1992), citing
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476 (1991).
Furthermore, “[t]he standard of review on
appeal of a summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly
found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact
and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
As factual findings are not at issue, a trial court’s decision to
grant summary judgment is entitled to no deference on appeal.
Id.
Several different legal theories and causes of action are
involved in this appeal, and we will examine each of them
separately herein.
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The first issue is whether the statute of limitations
had expired as to any of the appellees.
actions to be brought within one year.
KRS 413.140 governs
That statute provides in
pertinent part as follows:
(1) The following actions shall be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause
of action accrued:
(a) An action for an injury to the person
of the plaintiff, or of her husband, his
wife, [etc.] . . . .
. . . .
(c) An action for malicious prosecution,
conspiracy, arrest, [etc.] . . . .
The events leading up to the Borsts’ suit occurred in July and
August, 1993.
Mrs. Borst’s federal suit was filed in July 1994
and dismissed in May 1996.
Her state claim was then filed in
August 1996.
Mrs. Borst’s claims against the City, Officer Adams,
and Officer Leadingham were not time barred.
KRS 413.270 allows
a plaintiff ninety days to refile an action in a proper court if
the court in which the action was previously filed determines
that it has no jurisdiction over the action.
Her state action
was timely filed as to those defendant parties who were also
defendants in the federal action, as the federal court refused to
exercise jurisdiction over her state claims on May 7, 1996, and
she filed her complaint in state court on August 5, 1996.
The
claims against the three who were not defendants in the federal
action (Seary, Dunnigan, and Fisher) were barred by the one-year
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statute of limitations, with the exception of the claim for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress which carries a
five-year statute of limitations.
S.W.2d 247, 251 (1984).4
See Craft v. Rice, Ky., 671
Also, as Mr. Borst was not a party-
plaintiff in Mrs. Borst’s federal action, his claims against all
appellees are barred by the expiration of the statute of
limitations, with the exception of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.
The appellees argue that the Borsts’ complaint is
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel due to the actions
of the federal court.
This argument rests upon the proposition
that, although Mrs. Borst’s state law claims were not expressly
decided by the federal court, the federal court made findings on
those claims which were essential to its judgment on her federal
claims.
On the other hand, the Borsts argue that res judicata
and collateral estoppel do not apply because the federal court
expressly refused to exercise jurisdiction over Mrs. Borst’s
state law claims.
The Borsts’ complaint appears to allege that they are
entitled to damages under § 1983.
The federal court dismissed
Mrs. Borst’s § 1983 claims with prejudice.
A federal court
judgment is “entitled to full faith and credit in the state
courts.”
Waddell v. Stevenson, Ky. App., 683 S.W.2d 955, 958
4
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in Kentucky are governed by the
one-year statute of limitations found in KRS 413.140. Collard v.
Kentucky Board of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1990). Thus,
any claims on these grounds are also time barred.
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(1984).
Therefore, any § 1983 claims raised by the Borsts in
their state law claims are barred by res judicata.
A more difficult question exists as to whether the
state law claims raised by the Borsts are barred by res judicata
or collateral estoppel.
The federal court expressly reserved
Mrs. Borst’s right to refile her state law claims in state court;
however, he also adopted the report of the magistrate.
The
magistrate’s report contains a detailed and lengthy analysis of
Mrs. Borst’s state law claims in the process of making ultimate
findings on her federal claims.
As we have determined, as set
forth below, that the summary judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed for other reasons, we decline to address this issue.
We now turn to the Borsts’ state law claims.
The Borsts’ complaint alleges a cause of action for
malicious prosecution.
The six elements that must be proved to
sustain an action for malicious prosecution in Kentucky are as
follows:
(1) the institution or continuation of
original judicial proceedings, either civil
or criminal, or of administrative or
disciplinary proceedings, (2) by, or at the
instance, of the plaintiff, (3) the
termination of such proceedings in
defendant’s favor, (4) malice in the
institution of such proceeding, (5) want or
lack of probable cause for the proceeding,
and (6) the suffering of damage as a result
of the proceeding.
Raine v. Drasin, Ky., 621 S.W.2d 895, 899 (1981).
There must be
strict compliance with these elements, id., as malicious
prosecution actions are “not generally favored.”
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Kirk v. Marcum,
Ky. App., 713 S.W.2d 481, 483 (1986).
The Borsts’ claim does not
meet all of these elements.
The Borsts cannot meet the element of want or lack of
probable cause for the proceeding.
Officer Leadingham sought a
warrant against Mrs. Borst based on her admission that she
sometimes fed a dog matching the description of the vicious dog
in question and based on three eyewitnesses’ identifications of
the dog in the Borsts’ enclosed backyard as being the dog in
question.
The trial court properly determined that probable
cause existed as a matter of law.5
The malicious prosecution
must fail for this reason alone.6
The malicious prosecution claim should also fail due to
the fact that the charges were filed against Mrs. Borst based
upon the advice of counsel--County Attorney Vincent.
Advice of
counsel is a “complete” defense to a malicious prosecution
claim.7
Mayes v. Watt, Ky., 387 S.W.2d 872, 873 (1964).
5
Probable cause is generally an issue to be decided by the
court, Prewitt v. Sexton, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 891, 894 (1989), if the
facts are not greatly disputed.
6
The fact that Officer Leadingham gave Vincent a superseded
ordinance without the penalty section would not diminish the fact
that he had probable cause to prosecute Mrs. Borst for harboring
a vicious animal. The prosecution itself was based upon probable
cause, although the manner in which the prosecution was
undertaken (i.e., the arrest warrant) was improper.
7
Advice of counsel is a defense to a malicious prosecution
claim because advice of counsel is the equivalent of a “form of
probable cause,” Flynn v. Songer, Ky., 399 S.W.2d 491, 495
(1966), thereby negating one of the elements required to prove
malicious prosecution--the absence of probable cause.
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The advice of counsel defense is available, however,
only “upon a full and fair disclosure of all material facts to
the attorney advising prosecution.”
S.W.2d 846, 847 (1957).
Reid v. True, Ky., 302
It is uncontroverted that Officer
Leadingham sought the arrest warrant based upon an expired
ordinance for which an arrest was improper.
an issue of material fact.
the relevant law.
However, that is not
Rather, Vincent was not advised of
In short, the advice of counsel defense is
applicable to the Borsts’ malicious prosecution claim herein, and
it fails for this additional reason.
The Borsts’ complaint also alleges false imprisonment.8
In order to succeed on a false imprisonment claim, the arrest or
imprisonment must be conducted without legal authority.
See Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell, Ky. App., 877 S.W.2d 616, 617
(1994) (holding that in order to recover on a false imprisonment
claim, a plaintiff must “establish that he was detained and that
the detention was unlawful”).
In the case sub judice, Mrs.
Borst’s arrest and imprisonment were based upon a facially valid
arrest warrant.
lies.
In such a case, no action for false imprisonment
See Roberts v. Thomas, 135 Ky. 63, 65, 121 S.W. 961
(1909).
The Borsts’ complaint also alleges a cause of action
for abuse of process.
Abuse of process is defined as “the
8
There is no distinction between false arrest and false
imprisonment in cases involving police officers. LexingtonFayette Urban County Government v. Middleton, Ky. App., 555
S.W.2d 613, 619 (1977).
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irregular or wrongful employment of a judicial proceeding.”
Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, Ky. App., 598 S.W.2d 765,
766 (1980).
The “essential elements” of an abuse of process
claim are “(1) an ulterior purpose and (2) a wilful act in the
use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the
proceeding.”
Id.
Stated differently, “[s]ome definite act or
threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective
not legitimate in the use of the process is required and there is
no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry
out the process to its authorized conclusion even though with bad
intentions.”
(1998).
Simpson v. Laytart, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 392, 394-95
Abuse of process is generally a type of extortion.
Id.
at 395, quoting W. Prosser, Torts § 121 (4th ed. 1971) at 856.
While the Borsts contend that the appellees were
motivated in prosecuting Mrs. Borst by their intention to force a
financial settlement from the Borsts for damages done to Officer
Adams’ car, there is no evidence in the record that any of the
appellees used the criminal proceedings against Mrs. Borst in an
attempt to gain an improper advantage or benefit from her.
The
Borsts are unable to cite evidence of any specific actions taken
by the appellees during the course of the judicial proceedings
against Mrs. Borst that were “not proper in the regular conduct
of the proceeding.”
Robinson, supra at 766.
A party opposing a
summary judgment motion must present “at least some affirmative
evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material
fact requiring trial.”
Hubble, supra at 171.
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The Borsts’ complaint also alleges a cause of action
for conspiracy.
It is difficult to glean from the record the
underlying basis for this claim.
As the Borsts point out in
their brief, no evidence was adduced via discovery on this issue
prior to the trial court’s summary judgment order.
In order to defeat a summary judgment motion, the
Borsts were required to present some affirmative proof that a
genuine issue of material fact existed.
See Hubble, supra.
The
fact that no discovery has occurred on this issue in state court
is not dispositive, as extensive discovery was taken in the
federal action and as the Borsts have not informed this court of
what evidence they could adduce in discovery which would further
their claim.
In response to the appellees’ summary judgment motion
before the trial court, the Borsts merely stated that “there are
sufficient facts involving the claim of Mrs. Borst to submit to a
jury.”
It is unclear, however, what facts the Borsts are relying
upon to support their conspiracy claim.
The Borsts believe that
they are victims of a conspiracy to harass them due to their
failure to voluntarily pay for the damage to Officer Adams’ car.
However, there is nothing in the record to support that belief,
and a mere “belief” is not evidence and does not create a
material fact issue sufficient to withstand a summary judgment
motion.
Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v. Seitz, Ky., 796 S.W.2d 1, 3
(1990).
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The Borsts’ complaint alleges a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
This claim is not
discussed to any extent in the parties’ briefs.
The elements
necessary to sustain a cause of action for this tort are:
(1) the wrongdoer’s conduct must be
intentional or reckless;
(2) the conduct must be outrageous and
intolerable in that it offends against the
generally accepted standards of decency and
morality;
(3) there must be a causal connection
between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the
emotional distress; and
(4)
the emotional distress must be severe.
Seitz, supra at 2-3.
The Borsts assert that they suffered emotional distress
due to Mrs. Borst’s arrest and prosecution and the subsequent
“harassment” which they received from the appellees.
However,
they have not specified any acts by the appellees which are “so
extreme in degree . . . as to go beyond all possible bonds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community.”
Seitz, supra at 3, quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment d (1965).
Thus, both
Mr. and Mrs. Borst’s emotional distress claims must fail.
Finally, the Borsts’ complaint alleges arbitrary
conduct.
Arbitrary conduct is defined as “[w]hatever is contrary
to democratic ideals, customs and maxims” or “whatever is
essentially unjust and unequal or exceeds the reasonable and
legitimate interests of the people.”
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Kentucky Milk Mktg. v.
Kroger Co., Ky., 691 S.W.2d 893, 899 (1985).
While the Borsts
have claimed that the appellees acted in an arbitrary manner,
they have not specified the alleged arbitrary acts.
Presumably,
they are arguing some type of selective or unequal enforcement of
the law against them based upon the traffic citations, etc.,
which they have been issued.
Unequal enforcement of the law is
prohibited by § 2 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Id.
However,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the officers
acted with any conscious malice or intent to harass when issuing
the citations in question.
The Borsts may believe that the
officers had such a motive, but mere belief does not constitute
affirmative evidence sufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion.
Seitz, supra at 3.
The summary judgment of the Boyd Circuit Court in favor
of the appellees is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Gordon J. Dill
Ashland, KY
John I. Hanbury
Ashland, KY
Richard W. Martin, III
Ashland, KY
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