GILDA HILL v. GATEWAY REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., D/B/A MARY CHILES HOSPITAL, and JEFF BUCKLEY
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RENDERED: July 24, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 97-CA-1130-MR
GILDA HILL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-90073
GATEWAY REGIONAL HEALTH
SYSTEM, INC., D/B/A MARY
CHILES HOSPITAL, and
JEFF BUCKLEY
APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, BUCKINGHAM, and KNOX, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Gilda Hill ("Hill"), a former director of
nursing at Mary Chiles Hospital in Mt. Sterling, Kentucky,
appeals from an April 11, 1997, order of Montgomery Circuit Court
dismissing her complaint against the defendants/appellees,
Gateway Regional Health System, Inc. ("Gateway"), the corporation
which operates Mary Chiles Hospital, and Jeff Buckley
("Buckley"), the hospital's chief executive officer.
Hill
maintains that Buckley, her former supervisor, and Gateway,
through Buckley, subjected her to unlawful employment
discrimination, in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act,
KRS 344.010 et seq., by creating a sexually hostile and offensive
workplace.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Gateway
apparently on the ground that the acts about which Hill complains
could not reasonably be construed as amounting to harassment or
discrimination.
It also dismissed Hill's complaint against
Buckley individually, ruling that KRS Chapter 344 does not
provide a cause of action against non-employer individuals.
Given Hill's allegations and proffers of evidence and the state
of the law with respect to hostile environment claims, we cannot
conclude that Hill's allegations are insufficient to establish a
hostile work environment and that Gateway was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Moreover, the recent United States
Supreme Court decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 1998
WL 336322 (June 26, 1998) and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,
1998 WL 336326 (June 26, 1998) refute Gateway's claim that it
cannot possibly be liable for Buckley's harassing acts, if any,
because he was acting beyond the scope of his employment.
Thus
we reverse the judgment as to Gateway and remand for further
proceedings.
As to Buckley, the trial court's dismissal comports
with applicable law and we affirm.
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In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court
must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
Conscious of this requirement, we
consider the salient facts giving rise to Hill's complaint to
determine whether Gateway has established its right to judgment
"with such clarity that there is no room left for controversy."
807 S.W.2d at 482.
Background Facts and Proceedings in the Case
Hill began working for Mary Chiles Hospital in 1980 as
a nurse in the extended care facility.
She enjoyed her work and
performed well enough to receive a number of promotions.
By July
1993, when Jeff Buckley became the hospital's chief executive
officer, Hill had advanced to the position of director of
nursing.
She was responsible, among other things, for hiring and
supervising the hospital's nursing staff.
The conduct about which Hill complains began shortly
after Buckley arrived.
(1)In July 1993, he told Hill that he always
hired "pretty, young nurses to help recruit
young physicians." When Buckley sensed from
her expression that Hill disapproved of his
comment, he remarked, "I know you don't want
to hear it . . . but that's the way it is in
the real world." On that same day, when Hill
expressed some concern about a new supervisor
who had modeled lingerie at work, Buckley
stated, "If there is any lingerie modeled, it
will be done in the administrative area" (his
offices).
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(2)On August 2, 1993, Rita Fugate reported to
Hill that Buckley had told her that she would
have more success on a recruiting trip for
doctors if she "brought a young, attractive
woman with her." Buckley suggested Ms.
Fugate take a specific hospital employee with
her for that purpose. On that same day,
Buckley told Hill that she needed to hire an
operating room supervisor who was a "tall,
thin, blond with big breasts" because "these
type of women would stroke physicians."
(3)In the winter of 1993, after a meeting with
emergency room staff, Buckley personally related to
Hill how attractive he thought one of the nurses,
Christy Miller, looked in her jeans.
(4)On March 3, 1994, during a meeting between
Hill and Buckley to discuss hospital matters,
Buckley revealed to her that he was having an
extramarital affair. He provided very
explicit details about this affair, including
the physical fulfillment which it provided
him. He also mentioned marital problems
caused by his affair including his difficulty
in being sexually responsive to his wife.
(5)In April 1994, several employees,
including Hill, were having dinner after
attending a convention when Buckley initiated
a conversation about The Bridges of Madison
County, a book about an affair between a
photographer and a housewife. He asked each
woman at the table what she would do in
similar circumstances and discussed the book
for one and one-half to two hours.
(6)In April 1994, Buckley told Hill again how
attractive he found Christy Miller and stated
that she had "the most gorgeous blue eyes he
had ever seen."
(7)On July 23, 1994, Hill was contacted at
home by Robert Bashford, the House Supervisor
at the hospital, and was advised that one of
the floor nurses was having a private meeting
with Buckley and had deserted her patients
for approximately 45 minutes. This nurse was
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the woman with whom Buckley was reputed to be
having an affair.
(8)In the spring or summer of 1994, during a
dance held at the Mount Sterling Country
Club, Buckley danced the entire evening with
the nurse while Hill spent most of the
evening sitting with Buckley's wife, an
experience which made Hill extremely
uncomfortable.
(9)On August 1, 1994, Hill attended a masters
degree program in Minnesota. Buckley told
her before she left that there would be
"pairing off" at the training, and the first
thing he asked her about the program upon her
return was whether there had been any
"pairing off."
(10)On August 8 or 9, 1994, Mitzi Erway came
to Hill and told her that Buckley had said,
in the presence of Berna Ross (the head of
the Human Resources Department) and Erway,
that the hospital should hire "young, tall,
thin attractive women." Later in the
afternoon, Ross came to Hill and related the
same information. Both women indicated that
they were upset by Buckley's remarks.
(11)Buckley kept an open copy of the swimsuit
edition of Sports Illustrated magazine in his
office. It was lying on his desk where
people from outside the hospital, as well as
employees, could see it.
(12)Hill's secretary reported to her that an
employee who worked in the business office
had said that she (the employee) had attended
a meeting at a restaurant which Buckley also
attended. The entire evening Buckley had
stroked the employee's leg under the table
and everyone at the meeting allegedly knew
what was happening. Later that evening,
Buckley went to the employee's office and
asked her if he could spend the night with
her, because his wife's relatives were coming
to visit.
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These incidents occurred between Buckley's arrival in
July 1993 and the beginning of August 1994.
Hill claims that by
the summer of 1994 she had grown despondent in her job, had
withdrawn from her co-workers, had ceased to contribute at staff
meetings, and had resorted to avoiding Buckley whenever possible.
Although she had spoken about the situation with friends,
including the head of the Human Resources Department at the
hospital and a physician-member of Gateway's board of directors,
she was unaware of any official hospital procedure for making
discrimination complaints, and she feared retaliation if she took
her concerns directly to the board.
Her depression over this
impasse became so severe that she sought medical attention from
her family physician.
In early August 1994, two of Hill's colleagues at the
hospital told her that they had heard Buckley reiterate his plan
to hire young, attractive nurses.
Not long before, Buckley had,
in fact, after virtually no consultation with Hill, hired a new
operating room supervisor who answered that description.
Convinced that the sex-charged atmosphere at the hospital would
not abate under Buckley and that she could not and should not
have to adjust to it, at the end of August 1994 Hill resigned.
Her severance agreement required that she wait at least six
months before discussing her employment at Mary Chiles Hospital
with anyone.
She filed the instant complaint in August 1995.
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As noted, the trial court dismissed Hill's complaint
against Buckley individually on the ground that KRS Chapter 344
does not provide a cause of action against individual employees.
Although no rationale was stated for dismissing Hill's complaint
against Gateway, the trial court apparently concluded that Hill's
allegations, if proved, would not entitle her to relief.
Court reviews these determinations de novo.
This
With respect to the
dismissal of Buckley, the issue before us is whether the statute
was correctly interpreted.
See, e.g., Pari-Mutual Clerks' Local
541 v. Kentucky Jockey Club, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 801 (1977).
As for
the dismissal of Hill's claim against Gateway, we consider
whether "as a matter of law, it appears that it would be
impossible for [Hill] to produce evidence at the trial warranting
a judgment in [her] favor."
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480.
Sex Discrimination Effected by Means of a
Hostile Work Environment
KRS Chapter 344, the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, seeks
to minimize invidious discrimination in the Commonwealth by
making such discrimination unlawful in housing, education,
employment, and other fundamental transactions.
Of particular
relevance to this case, KRS 344.040 provides in pertinent part:
It is an unlawful practice for an employer:
(1) . . . to discriminate against an individual
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of the
individual's . . . sex . . . ; or
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify employees in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive an
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individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect status as an employee,
because of the individual's . . . sex . . . .
A principal purpose of the Civil Rights Act is "to
provide for execution within the state of the policies embodied
in the federal [anti-discrimination statutes]."
344.020(1)(a).
KRS
Indeed, KRS 344.040, quoted above, reiterates
language from Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, and our
Supreme Court has held that federal court decisions construing
the federal law should serve as guides for the interpretation of
our state anti-discrimination law.
Co., Inc.,
Meyers v. Chapman Printing
Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814 (1992).
In Meyers our Supreme
Court adopted the standard for sex discrimination by virtue of a
hostile work environment first articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106
S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986).
Because our Supreme Court
has not had occasion to revisit this issue, our analysis begins
with a consideration of the substantive law developed by the
federal courts.
Hill and Gateway both rely on Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, supra, and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1993), in framing their
arguments.
In Meritor Savings, the Supreme Court first
recognized a cause of action under Title VII for "hostile
environment" sexual harassment.
Harassment, the Court noted,
includes
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"'[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature.' . . . [S]uch
sexual misconduct constitutes prohibited
'sexual harassment,' whether or not it is
directly linked to the grant or denial of an
economic quid pro quo, where 'such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.'"
477 U.S. at 65, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 58-59 (quoting from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines at 29 CFR ยง
104.11(a)(1985)).
For such hostile environment harassment to be
actionable, "it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an
abusive working environment.'"
477 U.S. at 67, 91 L. Ed. 2d at
60.
The Supreme Court attempted to elaborate on this
"sufficiently severe or pervasive" standard of harm in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc..
The Court granted certiorari in that
case to resolve a conflict in the federal circuits as to whether
it was necessary to prove a serious effect on the plaintiff's
psychological well-being or other actual injury before a hostile
environment claim would be actionable.
Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated that the Meritor Savings
standard
. . . takes a middle path between making
actionable any conduct that is merely
offensive and requiring the conduct
to cause a tangible psychological injury. . . .
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough
to create an objectively hostile or abusive
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work environment--an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive--is beyond Title VII's purview.
Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively
perceive the environment to be abusive, the
conduct has not actually altered the
conditions of the victim's employment, and
there is no Title VII violation.
. . . A discriminatorily abusive work
environment, even one that does not
seriously affect employees' psychological
well-being, can and often will detract
from employees' job performance, discourage
employees from remaining on the job, or keep
them from advancing in their careers. . . .
510 U.S. at 21-22, 126 L. Ed. 2d at 302.
Adopting a totality of the circumstances approach, the
Harris Court offered a non-exhaustive list of factors to be
considered:
This is not, and by its nature cannot
be, a mathematically precise test. . . .
[W]hether an environment is "hostile" or
"abusive" can be determined only by looking
at all the circumstances. These may include
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance. The effect on the
employee's psychological well-being is, of
course, relevant to determining whether the
plaintiff actually found the environment
abusive. But while psychological harm, like
any other relevant factor, may be taken into
account, no single factor is required.
510 U.S. at 22-23, 126 L. Ed. 2d at 302-03.
Given Justice Scalia's concurrence in Harris, where he
characterized the statutory language at issue as so "inherently
vague" as to defy a clear standard of harm, it is not surprising
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that the federal courts have struggled to apply Meritor Savings
and Harris.
"Drawing the line is not always easy," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has said:
On one side lie sexual assaults; other
physical contact, whether amorous or hostile,
for which there is no consent express or
implied; uninvited sexual solicitations;
intimidating words or acts; obscene language
or gestures; pornographic pictures. . . . On
the other side lies the occasional vulgar
banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of
coarse or boorish workers. . . . It is not a
bright line, obviously, this line between a
merely unpleasant working environment on the
one hand and a hostile or deeply repugnant
one on the other. . . .
Baskerville v. Culligan Intern. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th
Cir. 1995).
In Baskerville, the offending sales manager called
Baskerville a pretty girl, made grunting noises when she entered
the room, made suggestive comments about the effect she had on
him, talked about losing control around pretty girls and
suggested that such girls should run around naked when a certain
announcement was broadcast over the public address system.
Other
conduct of a similar nature occurring over a seven-month period
led Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit to note that the man's
repartee "has the sexual charge of an Abbott and Costello movie"
and his offensive gestures "complete the impression of a man
whose sense of humor took final shape in adolescence."
at 431.
50 F.3d
With this view of the offender's actions, the Seventh
Circuit reversed a judgment in favor of Baskerville on two bases:
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no reasonable jury could find a hostile working environment and
the company took "all reasonable steps" to protect Baskerville
once she complained.
Id.
Adopting the Baskerville observation that Title VII "is
not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity," the Sixth
Circuit also reversed a judgment entered in favor of the employee
following a jury trial in Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d
822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997).
Black, a land acquisition manager for
a real estate development company, endured meetings regarding
land acquisitions in which one man, taking a pastry from a plate,
looked at her while noting his preference for "sticky buns" and
another insisted on calling land adjacent to a Hooters restaurant
"Titsville" or "Twin Peaks."
Other cited incidents included the
men's fixation on the name of a landowner which was pronounced
"bosom," a suggestion that Black had been dancing on the tables
at a biker bar and a comment about an uncooperative female county
official to the effect "Just get the broad to sign it."
Black
was also told in a private meeting with her supervisor that she
was "paid great money for a woman."
104 F.3d at 824.
After
considering the totality of the circumstances in the four-month
period between Black's arrival and her dismissal, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the environment was "merely offensive."
104 F.3d at 826.
Finally, Gateway relies on Stacy v. Shoney's
Incorporated, 955 F.Supp. 751 (E.D. Ky. 1997), a decision
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granting summary judgment in favor of the employer.
In that
case, Stacy, a married hostess/server at a restaurant, complained
about the conduct of her supervisor over a one-year period.
The
supervisor made constant comments about Stacy's appearance and
his appreciation of her attractiveness, including his willingness
to move in with her.
On several occasions, when she was not at
work, he would telephone to say he missed her, and when she was
at work he made "ssshh" sounds when she walked by him.
Finally
the supervisor approached Stacy, touched his fist to her breast
and slid her ink pen up and down in her breast pocket while
commenting that he liked the pen.
When Stacy immediately
reported this last incident, the corporation took prompt remedial
action but Stacy resigned.
The district court noted that
"[w]hether the conduct complained of rises to the level
sufficient to create a hostile work environment is a legal
question that a court may address on summary judgment motion."
955 F.Supp. at 754.
After stating the operative definition for a
hostile environment, the court considered the specific conduct at
issue in light of the federal circuit and district court cases
(including particularly Baskerville and Black) before concluding
that the supervisor's conduct "while immature, inappropriate, and
boorish, does not constitute offensive conduct actionable as
harassment."
Id.
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The most recent pronouncement on hostile environment
from the United States Supreme Court reiterates the Meritor
Savings standard as further developed in Harris and notes:
Most recently, we explained that Title VII
does not prohibit "genuine but innocuous
differences in the ways men and women
routinely interact with members of the same
sex and of the opposite sex." Oncale [v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.], 523 U.S.
. . . . A recurring point in these opinions
is that "simple teasing," . . . offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to
discriminatory changes in the "terms and
conditions of employment."
These standards for judging hostility
are sufficiently demanding to ensure that
Title VII does not become a "general civility
code." . . . Properly applied, they will
filter out complaints attacking "the ordinary
tribulations of the workplace, such as the
sporadic use of abusive language, genderrelated jokes, and occasional teasing." . . .
We have made it clear that conduct must be
extreme to amount to a change in the terms
and conditions of employment, and the Courts
of Appeals have heeded this view.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, supra, ____ U.S. at ____.
Thus
after over a decade of evolution, the hostile environment
standard can be more easily described but it still contains few,
if any, precise elements.
Gateway defends the summary judgment by insisting that
Buckley's conduct did not approach the offensiveness of the
conduct found to be legally insufficient to produce a hostile
environment in Baskerville, Black and Stacy.
In particular,
Gateway notes that none of Buckley's comments or behavior was
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directed at, or was about, Hill personally.
If that simple
limitation were part of the accepted legal parameters of a
hostile environment claim, we would have no qualms about
Gateway's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
However,
in Black the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that this factor is not a
necessary prerequisite:
While we emphasize that sex-based comments
need not be directed at a plaintiff in order
to constitute conduct violating Title VII, we
note that in this case most of the comments
were not directed at plaintiff; this fact
contributes to our conclusion that the
conduct here was not severe enough to create
an objectively hostile environment. See Cf.
Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions,
Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 541 (1st Cir. 1995)
(finding that plaintiffs' allegations were
not so severe as to create an objectively
hostile educational environment under Title
IX, in part because the sexual comments were
not directed at the plaintiffs), cert.
denied, ____ U.S. ____, 116 S. Ct. 1044, 134
L. Ed. 2d 191 (1996).
104 F.3d at 826.
Thus while relevant to the severity of the
alleged harassment, the objectionable conduct need not be
directed to the plaintiff in order to be actionable.
Similarly,
vulgar or sexually offensive language or gestures is not a
prerequisite.
The Meritor Savings definition encompasses
"unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."
91 L. Ed. 2d at 58.
477 U.S. at 65,
Vulgarity and offensive are considerations
but need not be present to constitute "conduct of a sexual
nature."
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Ultimately it is the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision
in Meyers which requires a reversal of the summary judgment
granted to Gateway.
In Meyers the specific objectionable conduct
was not addressed in great detail, but was summarized as follows:
It would unduly burden this Opinion to
outline all of the evidence in this record
which supports the inference that the
employer engaged in abusive and intimidating
conduct of a sexual nature, and the finding
of harassment of a severe or pervasive nature
causing damages as awarded. It suffices to
summarize that after Reynolds and his company
(Chapman) acquired the company where Meyers
was employed in February 1983, and continuing
through her discharge in April 1985, Reynolds
routinely conducted sales meetings where
Meyers was the only woman during which he
used language loaded with obscenity and
sexual innuendo, and included embarrassing
comments and terminology addressed directly
to Meyers. Further, on several occasions
Meyers was called to Reynolds' office in West
Virginia where conversations took place
suggesting that women in general, and Meyers
in particular, were unfit for the work.
Finally, there was testimony supporting the
inference that Reynolds' sexually demeaning
attitude towards women pervaded the whole
sales operation, in the form of gender-based
discrimination in assignments and
conversation with other employees on the job
reporting Reynolds' hostility towards women.
840 S.W.2d at 822-23.
This conduct is plainly more egregious than the conduct
alleged by Hill.
However, it is not a quantitative or
qualitative comparison with Meyers that drives our conclusion,
but rather the Supreme Court's directive in that case on the
nature of the inquiry in a hostile environment case.
After a
jury found for Meyers on her sexual harassment claim and awarded
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her damages for mental and emotional injuries "resulting from a
sexually hostile and offensive working environment," the employer
argued that our Supreme Court (which took the case on this
Court's Motion to Transfer) should review the determination of
hostile work environment de novo because it was a mixed question
of law and fact.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument:
Deciding whether the evidence presented
proves misconduct "severe or pervasive" is
not a question of law but a question of fact,
albeit a question of ultimate fact. It is
similar in nature to whether damages are
excessive. . . .whether negligence is gross
. . . .and to other complex issues with an
interpretive component such as whether the
design of a product is defective or
professional negligence has occurred.
In reviewing this issue of evidential
sufficiency the appellate court must respect
the opinion of the trial judge who heard the
evidence. It is significantly more difficult
to overrule such a finding, sustained by the
trial judge, than it would be to point out
that some simple fact, an element of proof
which need not be evaluated, is missing from
the proof. . . . We agree that deciding
whether evidence of sexual harassment rises
to the level of "severe or pervasive"
contains an interpretive component. But we
do not agree that this means we should
substitute our judgment on the issue for that
of the jury and the trial judge. The
interpretive component does not change basic
character from a question of fact to a
question of law.
840 S.W.2d at 821-22.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus in Kentucky the determination of whether conduct
is sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to alter the terms of
employment and create an abusive environment is one of "ultimate
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fact" to be made by the fact-finder.
Cf. Stacy, supra.
While in
federal courts a questionable case can be disposed of as a matter
of law, in Kentucky, under Meyers, the court must allow a
colorable claim to be heard by the jury.
This is not to say that
hostile environment claims can never be decided on a motion for
summary judgment, but Meyers, coupled with the stringent summary
judgment standard stated in Steelvest, requires the conclusion
that in Kentucky only those cases where the conduct is (1)
clearly infrequent and isolated and (2) patently "merely
offensive" can result in summary judgment for the employer for
failure to prove a hostile environment.1
This case does not fit
that description.
Hill claims that Buckley's preoccupation with sexual
matters was virtually constant and came to pervade the hospital's
work environment.
She has offered evidence of at least twelve
incidents over a thirteen-month period that led her to view the
situation as intolerable and to avoid encounters with Buckley
because of his frequent sexual references.
Other employees, Hill
maintains, also noted this change in the hospital's atmosphere,
including one co-worker who complained as she came from a meeting
1
We do not purport to state that there are no other
circumstances under which summary judgment can properly be
granted. Even where conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to produce a hostile environment, summary judgment could still be
appropriate where the employer establishes the affirmative
defense discussed infra or the evidence establishes that the
plaintiff did not subjectively perceive the environment as
hostile. Harris, supra, 510 U.S. at ____, 126 L. Ed. 2d at 302.
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with Buckley, "How come every time I go down there we have to
talk about sex."
Buckley's alleged sex-related conduct was not
infrequent or isolated, and it cannot be dismissed as "merely
offensive."
Aspects of it, such as Buckley's commentary on the
appearance of certain women and his insistence on keeping an open
Sports Illustrated swimsuit issue on his desk, might be
characterized as immature and boorish.
Even Buckley's alleged
nosiness about his co-workers sexual attitudes, as shown by the
Bridges of Madison County episode and his remarks to Hill about
"pairing up" at her University of Minnesota class, could be
regarded as indicating merely a woeful lack of sensitivity.
other conduct alleged by Hill is more troubling.
But
Buckley's
decision to subject Hill to a graphic description of his
extramarital affair and certain intimate details of his married
life arguably moves the case much closer to the hostile
environment standard.
A reasonable woman could find such conduct
so offensive and repugnant that it would affect the conditions of
her employment.
Also, the allegations that Buckley on more than
one occasion advocated hiring women who met certain physical
criteria create a special concern in light of the fact that Hill
was responsible for hiring nurses and so, presumably, would have
been expected either to participate in, or at least acquiesce in,
his personal hiring agenda.
On this last point, it appears that
Buckley did in fact hire, without consulting Hill, a young,
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attractive operating room nurse who met his criteria.
At this
stage of the case, Buckley's alleged conduct on this score simply
cannot be characterized as "merely offensive."
In summary, although obviously there is another side to
this case, and although a jury may ultimately reject Hill's
contention that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work
environment, she has alleged and offered some proof of facts
which, in their totality and interpreted favorably to her, raise
genuine issues about the pervasiveness and severity of Buckley's
misconduct.
Under the Meyers directive regarding jury resolution
of such issues, and under the Steelvest standard for summary
judgment, we are persuaded that Hill is entitled to present her
proof to a jury.
The trial court erred by denying her that
opportunity.
Gateway's Liability for Buckley's Conduct
Gateway further argues that summary judgment was proper
because it cannot be liable for acts or conduct of an employee
which was unauthorized and beyond the scope of his employment.
Gateway cites Kentucky agency law in reliance on the United
States Supreme Court's statement in Meritor Savings that employee
liability for purposes of federal sexual harassment claims should
be determined under common law principles of agency.
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The United
States Supreme Court re-examined this issue in Faragher and
Burlington Industries, supra, and concluded that "a uniform and
predictable standard must be established as a matter of federal
law."
Burlington Industries, supra, ____ U.S. at ____.
After an
exhaustive discussion of agency principles and consideration of
the objectives of the federal anti-discrimination statute, the
Supreme Court concluded that supervisors could subject their
employers to liability under the following circumstances:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability
to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor
with immediate (or successively higher)
authority over the employee. When no
tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages, subject to
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that
the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While
proof that an employer had promulgated an
antiharassment policy with complaint
procedure is not necessary in every instance
as a matter of law, the need for a stated
policy suitable to the employment
circumstances may appropriately be addressed
in any case when litigating the first element
of the defense. And while proof that an
employee failed to fulfill the corresponding
obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm
is not limited to showing an unreasonable
failure to use any complaint procedure
provided by the employer, a demonstration of
such failure will normally suffice to satisfy
the employer's burden under the second
element of the defense. No affirmative
-21-
defense is available, however, when the
supervisor's harassment culminates in a
tangible employment action, such as
discharge, demotion, or undesirable
reassignment.
Faragher, ____ U.S. at ____; Burlington Industries, ____ U.S. at
____.
(This passage appears verbatim in both decisions.)
Buckley was Hill's supervisor and thus these recent
decisions are applicable.2
Because no tangible employment action
is involved in this case, Gateway is entitled to pursue the
affirmative defense which was raised in the pleadings and has now
been more precisely defined by the Supreme Court.
The factors
relevant to this defense were not fully developed in the context
of the summary judgment motion.
At trial on remand, if a jury
finds that Buckley created a hostile environment, Gateway must
prove both factors by a preponderance of the evidence in order to
qualify for the affirmative defense and avoid liability.
Buckley's Individual Liability for His Conduct
Finally, we affirm the dismissal of Hill's complaint
against Buckley individually.
The federal anti-discrimination
statutes and KRS Chapter 344 are designed to protect workers from
invidious employment discrimination, not to create a new field of
tort law.
As Hill acknowledges, the majority of federal courts
which have addressed this issue have concluded that the federal
2
We find no reason, given our Supreme Court's statement in
Meyers, to conclude that Kentucky will not follow the vicarious
liability standard stated in Faragher and Burlington Industries.
-22-
law in this area provides only for employer liability and does
not create a cause of action against individual employees.
Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997)
(collecting cases).
Hill's contrary arguments notwithstanding,
we believe KRS Chapter 344 is similarly limited.
KRS 344.040, on
which Hill relies, makes it unlawful "for an employer" to engage
in various discriminatory employment practices.
Employment
agencies and labor organizations are likewise charged with a duty
to refrain from discrimination.
KRS 344.050 and KRS 344.060.
Nowhere in Chapter 344 has the General Assembly expressly
provided for individual liability.
Nevertheless, Hill argues
that the statutory definition of "employer," which includes
agents of the employer, and the broad purpose of the Act to
protect workers' "interest in personal dignity and freedom from
humiliation" (KRS 344.020), imply a legislative intent to provide
a cause of action against individual harassers.
We disagree.
In Wathen the Sixth Circuit addressed sexual harassment
claims under Title VII and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
Although that Court's construction of our state law is not
binding, we find the opinion persuasive.
First, the Wathen Court
noted that the inclusion of the employer's "agents" within the
statutory definition of employer is intended not to impose
liability upon the individual agents, but to describe and limit
the scope of the employer's vicarious liability.
citing Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 72.
-23-
115 F.3d at 406
Second, the Sixth
Circuit noted that Title VII limits liability to employers with
fifteen or more employees and that it was inconceivable that
Congress intended to exclude small businesses but simultaneously
allow individual liability.
Third, the Wathen Court observed
that the remedial provisions of Title VII, including
reinstatement and back pay, are remedies available only to the
employer and there are no statutory provisions providing for
damages to be paid by individuals.
Because the Kentucky statute
closely parallels its federal counterpart and Kentucky courts
have not addressed the issue of individual liability, the Wathen
Court concluded that the substantive legal analysis under Title
VII and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act should be identical.
F.3d at 403-04, n.5.
115
We agree and conclude that, for the reasons
stated in Wathen, Buckley is not subject to individual liability
under KRS Chapter 344.
This conclusion does not preclude individual liability
for workplace conduct but simply recognizes that traditional tort
law must be the basis for those claims.
See, e.g., Kroger Co. v.
Willgruber, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 61 (1996); Craft v. Rice, Ky., 671
S.W.2d 247 (1984).
Where an individual harasser's conduct rises
to the level of a recognized tort the victim of such workplace
harassment is certainly entitled to a remedy.
See, e.g., Hill v.
J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., Ky. App., 945 S.W.2d 948
(1996).
We are simply not persuaded that KRS Chapter 344 was
intended to provide a new set of standards for individual
-24-
liability in the workplace or to circumvent the ordinary
evolution of tort law in this area.
For these reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in
part the April 11, 1997, order of Montgomery Circuit Court and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE GATEWAY
REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.:
Barbara A. Kriz
Gallion, Baker & Bray, P.S.C.
Lexington, Kentucky
Alan B. Peck
White, Peck, Carrington,
McDonald & Neal, LLP
Mt. Sterling, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JEFF
BUCKLEY:
Cheryl U. Lewis
Stites & Harbison
Lexington, Kentucky
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