JAMES GRAY v. SHARON GRAY
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RENDERED: December 23, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-000951-MR
JAMES GRAY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. MERRILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-FC-004045
v.
SHARON GRAY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
In this domestic relations case, James Gray
(James) disputes the division of proceeds from the sale of the
marital residence he shared with appellee, Sharon Gray (Sharon).
After considering James' argument, the record, and the law, we
affirm the trial court's order.
The parties’ decree of dissolution was entered on
October 7, 1996.
On January 12, 1996, James executed a
construction contract and purchase agreement with Welch Builders
Inc. to build a house.
The contract price was $181,500.00, and a
$10,000.00 deposit was required.
Specifically, James was to pay
$1,000.00 immediately as a good faith deposit; $2,000.00 after
the foundation was poured; $2,000.00 after the rough framing was
complete; and $5,000.00 after the closing of the marital
residence or at the closing of the contract, whichever came
first.
In the trial order of January 18, 1996, the court
stated that the parties had agreed to sell the marital residence
and split the net proceeds equally.
The court ordered James to
pay any child support arrearage out of his half of the net
proceeds, before distribution.
These sentiments were echoed in
the October 7, 1996 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decree of Dissolution, which further stated that the parties had
agreed to value their marital home at $150,000.00.
The decree
also stated in relevant part:
(14) The Respondent withdrew $15,000.00
from the Ford money market account on
March 4, 1996 which he claims was used to pay
Court ordered child support and maintenance.
However, the Court finds this distribution
was necessitated due to his $10,000.00 down
payment made January 12, 1996 on a
construction contract. See Petitioner's
Exhibit 5. The Court further finds his
obligations to pay support and maintenance
were to be out of his weekly income and not
from accumulated marital assets and this
distribution constitutes a dissipation of
marital assets. The Court awards the
Petitioner $7,500.00 out of his share of the
net proceeds from the house sale. Robinette
v. Robinette, Ky. Ct. App., 736 S.W.2d 351
(1987).
(15) The Respondent's purchase of the
property known as Lot 348, Indian Springs
Subdivision on January 12, 1996 was after the
parties['] separation using marital assets as
a down payment (See paragraph 14). This is
the acquisition of an asset during the
marriage and the Petitioner is awarded half
of the equity in this property as of the date
of this opinion. KRS 403.190; Stallings v.
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Stallings, Ky., 606 S.W.2d 163 (1980); Newman
v. Newman, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 137 (1980).
Raising six alleged errors, James filed a CR 59.05
motion to set aside the judgment.
In denying the motion, the
court amended paragraph 15 above to reflect that the equity in
the purchased property was to be determined after the deduction
of James' $10,000.00 down payment.
James argues that the court redivided his share of the
sale of the marital residence, without doing the same to
Sharon's.
He reasons that in fairness, the court should have
awarded him half of the assets Sharon received from the sale of
the marital home.
James asserts that Sharon did not contribute
to the Indian Springs property.
There does not seem to be any question that James
dissipated marital funds.
Dissipated property is that which is
spent "(1) during a period when there is a separation or
dissolution impending, and (2) where there is a clear showing of
intent to deprive one's spouse of his or her proportionate share
of the marital property."
Robinette v. Robinette, Ky. App., 736
S.W.2d 351, 354 (1987) (citing Barriger v. Barriger, Ky., 514
S.W.2d 114, 115 (1974)).
spent marital property.
James must account for improvidently
Barriger, supra.
Because James used
marital funds to make the down payment, the new property is also
marital.
Property acquired after an actual, but not a legal,
separation but before the dissolution, is marital property.
Stallings v. Stallings, Ky., 606 S.W.2d 163 (1980).
Therefore,
the court's order that James repay Sharon for half of the money
he spent on the property, and for half the equity in the
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property, as of the date of the decree, after the down payment is
deducted, is correct.
We hasten to add that James' characterization of the
court's redivision of marital property as contrary to the
parties' agreement is inaccurate.
divided according to the agreement.
The marital property was first
Thereafter, Sharon
effectively had a lien on the new property previously purchased
by James with marital property.
James also alludes to contentions regarding maintenance
and his payment of health insurance premiums.
These arguments
are not only obtuse but also have not been preserved for appeal.
Hence, we decline to address them.
CR 76.03 (7); Skaggs v. Assad
ex rel. Assad, Ky., 712 S.W.2d 947 (1986).
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Jefferson
Family Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael L. Boylan
Louisville, Kentucky
Victoria Ann Ogden
Louisville, Kentucky
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