ACCURIDE CORPORATION V. ROGER BRUCE JENKINS; ROBERT E. SPURLIN, Director of SPECIAL FUND; J. LANDON OVERFIELD, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: June 19, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
97-CA-0884-WC
ACCURIDE CORPORATION
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
CLAIM NO. WC-94-025787
V.
ROGER BRUCE JENKINS; ROBERT E. SPURLIN,
Director of SPECIAL FUND; J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
*
BEFORE:
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*
*
*
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COMBS, EMBERTON, and MILLER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Accuride Corporation petitions and the Special
Fund cross-petitions for review of a Workers' Compensation Board
(Board) opinion rendered 7 March 1997, that affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision on reopening that Roger
Bruce Jenkins was totally occupationally disabled.
Having
considered the arguments presented and reviewed the record, we
affirm.
Jenkins began working for Firestone, Accuride's
predecessor, in 1977.
In 1991, Jenkins sustained a compensable
injury for which he filed a claim.
On 26 January 1994, ALJ
Thomas Dockter rendered an opinion finding him 25% permanently
partially disabled.
ALJ Dockter carved out 5% disability for a
previous claim for injury to Jenkins's right thumb --a claim
which had been settled for a lump sum.
He also noted a previous
award of 10% occupational disability related to a hearing loss
but did not make any determination that this was a prior active
occupational disability.
The award was apportioned equally
between the employer and the Special Fund.
Jenkins continued his employment with Accuride.
However, he suffered a series of work-related injuries occurring
on 15 July 1993; on 14 June 1994; and again, on
8 May 1995.
On
17 July 1995, Jenkins filed a new Form 101, Application for
Adjustment of Claim.
On 2 October 1995, Accuride filed a motion
to reopen his 1991 claim and a motion to consolidate the
reopening with the three most recent injuries.
The claims were
ordered consolidated on 19 October 1995.
A hearing was conducted with ALJ Overfield rendering a
decision on 9 October 1996, in which he found that Jenkins had
met his burden of proving an increase in occupational disability
and awarded him benefits reflecting total permanent occupational
disability.
He confined the pre-existing active disability to
the 5% carved out by ALJ Dockter in Jenkins's original claim.
The 95% occupational disability award was apportioned equally
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between Accuride and the Special Fund, beginning 2 October 1995,
the date Jenkins's motion to reopen was filed, and continuing for
as long as Jenkins remained disabled.
On appeal, the Board
affirmed the ALJ's finding of total disability; his determination
with respect to the number of weeks that Accuride is responsible
for payment of the award; his refusal to award a credit to
Accuride in the amount of the past benefits paid pursuant to the
initial award; his refusal to grant credit to Accuride for
voluntary temporary total disability benefits paid prior to the
date of the reopening motion; and finally, his refusal to reduce
Jenkins's award based upon benefits payable for his past hearing
loss.
The standard to which we must adhere when reviewing a
decision of the Workers' Compensation Board is set forth in
Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687 (1992):
The function of further review of the
[Workers' Compensation Board] in the Court of
Appeals is to correct the Board only where
the Court perceives the Board has overlooked
or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent, or committed an error in assessing
the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice.
After reviewing the Board's opinion, the ALJ's opinion
and award, and the record, we conclude that the Board did not
assess the evidence in a manner so flagrant as to result in a
gross injustice to Accuride or the Special Fund.
Consequently,
the decision to reopen and to award total occupational disability
benefits must be affirmed.
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We also reject a related argument advanced by Accuride
(and adopted by the Special Fund) concerning the applicability of
amendments to KRS 342.125, the reopening statute, which became
effective 4 April 1994 and 12 December 1996.
These amendments
altered the standard under which a motion to reopen was -- and is
-- considered.
KRS 446.080(3) provides that "[n]o statute shall be
construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so declared."1
Generally, then, the law in effect on the date of injury fixes
the rights of the injured worker and the obligations of the
defendant regarding income benefits for that injury.
Maggard v.
International Harvester, Inc., Ky., 508 S.W.2d 777 (1974).
However, legislation has been applied to causes of action which
arose before its effective date in the absence of an express
declaration that the provision is to be so applied in those
instances where the courts have determined that the provision was
remedial or procedural in nature and that retroactive application
of the provision was consistent with the legislative intent.
Benson's Inc. v. Fields, Ky., 941 S.W.2d 473 (1997).
Accuride and the Special Fund maintain that the 1994
amendment to KRS 342.125 must be viewed in light of the "crisis"
in the workers' compensation system.
They suggest that the
emergency clause contained in the 1994 legislation indicates that
the legislature intended the amendments to be "remedial" and to
1
There is no expression by the legislature that either of
the amendments to KRS 342.125 are to be applied retroactively.
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apply retroactively.
Relying on Peabody Coal Co. v. Gossett,
Ky., 819 S.W.2d 33 (1991), they contend that the 1994 amendment
to the statute is applicable to Jenkins's reopened claim.
We
disagree.
We do not find the employer's reliance on Peabody Coal
Co. in support of its position to be persuasive.
In Peabody Coal
Co., the court held that the 1987 amended version of KRS 342.125,
permitting reopening upon a showing of change of "occupational
disability," was intended and drafted to authorize reopenings
despite the fact that there was no change in the workers'
functional disability or physical condition.2
The court
recognized that workers' compensation awards were premised upon
occupational rather than functional disability and determined
that the 1987 amendment to KRS 342.125 was remedial legislation
which was consistent with the purpose of the reopening statute.
Thus, the amendment was not viewed as a retrospective law and
could properly be applied to a claim arising before the
amendment's effective date.
The rationale for the court's
decision was supplied by a commentary found in 73 Am.Jur.2d
Statutes § 354 (1974).
The Peabody court quoted the following
passage with approval:
A retrospective law . . . is one which takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
which creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty,
2
Prior to 1987, the statute permitted reopening upon a
showing of change of "condition." In Osborne v. Johnson, Ky.,
432 S.W.2d 800 (1968), the court interpreted a "change in
condition" to mean a change in physical condition as well as a
change in occupational disability.
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or attaches a new disability, in respect to
transactions or considerations already past.
Therefore, despite the existence of some contrary
authority, remedial statutes, or statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new
or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such
rights, do not normally come within the legal
conception of a retrospective law, or the general rule
against the retrospective operation of statutes. [A]
remedial statute must be [construed retroactively] as
to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was
enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends
to past transactions, as well as to those in the
future, then it will be so applied although the statute
does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would
impair some vested right or violate some constitutional
guaranty. (Footnotes omitted).
Id.
at 36.
The 1994 amended version of KRS 342.125, however,
announced a standard requiring the claimant to prove a change in
his medical condition in order to demonstrate a change in
occupational disability sufficient to justify reopening.3
Unlike
the amendment considered in Peabody Coal Co., the 1994 amendment
to KRS 342.125, was not remedial or merely procedural
legislation.
Rather, the amendment served to change
substantively the rights and obligations of claimants and
defendants.
Retroactive application of the 1994 amendment would
thus run afoul of KRS 446.080(3), which states unequivocally:
"No statute shall be construed to be retroactive, unless
expressly so declared."
Benson's , Inc. v. Fields, Ky., 941
S.W.2d 473 (1997) and Spurlin v. Adkins, Ky., 940 S.W.2d 900
3
This standard applies to the reopening of a claim where an
award was entered pursuant to KRS 342.730(1) (c) or (d).
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(1997).4
Separate and apart from this significant issue,
however, we still would not reverse the Board's opinion on this
point.
As the Board noted, Jenkins was originally awarded
benefits for his 1991 work-related injury pursuant to KRS
342.730(1)(b).
The standard for reopening established in the
1994 amendment to KRS 342.125(1) specifically references the
sections of KRS 342.730 to which it pertains and conspicuously
omits (1)(b) from the covered portions as follows:
"in claims
where an award or order is entered pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c),
or (d), and
.
.
. upon the application of any party and a
showing of change of medical condition. . . ."
The 1994
amendment to KRS 342.125 applied only to the new additions to
§730 and not to the subsection (1)(b), under which Jenkins was
originally awarded benefits.
Moreover, we note that effective 4
April 1994, KRS 342.125(3) provided as follows:
In a reopening or review proceeding where there has
been additional permanent partial disability awarded,
the increase shall not extend the original period,
unless the combined prior disability and increased
disability exceeds fifty percent (50%), but less than
one hundred percent (100%), in which event the awarded
period shall not exceed five hundred twenty (520)
weeks, from commencement date of the original
disability previously awarded. The law in effect on
the date of the original injury controls the rights of
the parties. (Emphasis added.)
Consequently, the 1994 amendment is inapplicable by its terms.
4
We are not persuaded that the emergency clause, of itself,
contained in the legislation indicates that the amendment is
remedial. See Benson's Inc. v. Fields, Ky., 941 S.W.2d 473
(1997).
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The Board did not err in so concluding.
Next, we turn to consider the effect of the 1996
amendment to the statute upon Jenkins's reopening.
As a result
of that amendment, KRS 342.125 now provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
(1) Upon motion by any party or upon an
arbitrator's or administrative law judge's
own motion, an arbitrator or administrative
law judge may reopen and review any award or
order on any of the following grounds:
* * * *
(D)
Change of disability as shown by objective medical
evidence of worsening or improvement of
impairment due to a condition caused by the
injury since the date of the award or order.
* * * *
(3) Except for reopening solely for
determination of the compensability of
medical expenses, fraud, or conforming the
award as set forth in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2., or
for reducing a permanent total disability
award when an employee returns to work, no
claim shall be reopened more than four (4)
years following the date of the original
award or order granting or denying benefits,
or within two (2) years of such award or
order, and no party may file a motion to
reopen within two (2) years of any previous
motion to reopen by the same party.
* * * *
(8) The time limitation prescribed in this
section shall apply to all claims
irrespective of when they were incurred, or
when the award was entered, or the settlement
approved. However, claims decided prior to
the effective date of this Act may be
reopened within four (4) years of the award
or order or within four (4) years of the
effective date of this Act, whichever is
later, provided that the exceptions to
reopening established in subsections (1) and
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(3) of this section shall apply to these
claims as well.
(Emphasis added).
Accuride and the Special Fund insist that the 1996
amendment expressly directs that its provisions are to be applied
retroactively.
As a result, they maintain, Jenkins's reopening
is governed by the more stringent proof requirements of the new
statute.
Since Jenkins did not introduce "objective medical
evidence" of a worsening of his impairment before the ALJ, they
contend, the award of increased benefits must be reversed.
We do
not conclude that the statute, by its terms, is to be applied to
Jenkins's reopened claim; nor do we conclude that the 1996
amendment is remedial.
Consequently, we conclude that the Board
did not err by determining that the 1996 amendment to KRS 342.125
did not apply to this re-opening proceeding.
Accuride and the Special Fund rely upon the second
sentence of KRS 342.125(8) to support their assertion that the
legislature expressed its intention that the amendment would
apply retroactively to pending claims (including those on
appeal).
Again, this sentence provides as follows:
"[h]owever,
claims decided prior to December 12, 1996, may be reopened with
four (4) years of the award or order or within four (4) years of
December 12, 1996, whichever is later, provided that the
exceptions to reopening established in subsections (1) and (3) of
this section shall apply to these claims as well."
While this provision deals with the treatment of claims
decided prior to the effective date of the statute, we do not
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construe this language as expressing an intention that the
amendment apply to the reopening considered here.
Instead, in
our view, the language merely provides that as of the effective
date of the statute, claims decided prior to the enactment of the
statute are subject to being reopened at the latest until 12
December 2000.
Those reopened claims are also subject to the
limitations set out in subsections (1) (including the requirement
that a change in disability be shown by "objective medical
evidence" of the
of the statute.
worsening of the claimant's impairment) and (3)
At the time the amended statute took effect,
however, Jenkins's reopening claim had already been filed and
decided by the ALJ.5
Despite the employer's arguments to the
contrary, the limitations governing reopenings undertaken after
the effective date of the amendment simply do not apply to those
reopenings filed and decided prior to 12 December 1996, the
effective date of the amendment.
Additionally, we find the fact
that the ALJ's opinion and award were subsequently appealed to
the Board and that the claim was arguably still "pending" as of
the effective date of the amendment to be of no consequence.
The
amendment does not contain any language suggesting that reopening
claims filed before the effective date of the statute's
amendment, yet "pending" on appeal to the Board as of 12 December
1996, are controlled by the statute's new standard for
5
Jenkins's motion to re-open his 1991 claim was filed on 2
October 1995; the ALJ's opinion and award were entered on 9
October 1996. The statute as amended became effective 12
December 1996.
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determining a change of disability.
Finally, we cannot conclude that the amendment to KRS
342.125 is merely procedural in nature or that it operates to
effectuate a remedy such that it might be considered "remedial
legislation" exempt from the requirements of KRS 446.080(3).
To
the contrary, we conclude that a retroactive application of the
amendment would have the unconstitutional effect of divesting
Jenkins of a vested right.
Consequently, we have determined that
KRS 342.125, as amended effective 12 December 1996, should not be
given retrospective effect in this case.
While the legislature
clearly intended to alter the proof required upon reopenings
undertaken after 12 December 1996, we find no indication that it
intended to alter awards previously entered.
In its next argument, Accuride contends that the
Special Fund should be responsible for all income benefits on
reopening beyond the 212.5 weeks of liability for which Accuride
was initially responsible pursuant to the original award.
This
argument was addressed in well-reasoned fashion by the Board.
We
adopt this portion of the Board's opinion as follows:
Accuride next argues that . . . the ALJ erred in not
reducing the number of weeks the ALJ found that
Accuride must pay. The rationale for Accuride's
argument here is that in the initial Opinion and Award
rendered by ALJ Dockter in 1994, Accuride was found
responsible for paying the first 212.5 weeks of
Jenkins'[s] disability. Of course, that was because
Jenkins was found, at that time, to be only permanently
partially disabled and the ALJ applied the appropriate
provision for calculation of apportionment between an
employer and the Special Fund contained with KRS
342.120. Nevertheless, Accuride argues the fact that
Jenkins is now totally disabled, while extending the
number of weeks for which benefits are payable, should
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not be found to extend the period for which Accuride is
responsible for paying benefits.
We believe Accuride's argument in this connection is
misplaced. The employer is responsible for paying the
first part of the reopened award until it has paid the
percentage of full income benefits which is equal to
the disability resulting from the injury alone. KRS
342.120(6). In this case, that is 50% of the total
award. Since there will be a period of overlap of
benefits during the period that permanent partial
benefits are paid and the period for commencing
lifetime benefits as awarded on reopening, Jenkins may
not receive more than 95% of the award to which he is
entitled. In effect, the ALJ's award allows Accuride
to reduce its initial payments during the overlapping
period. Moreover, Accuride's argument that its
liability should be extinguished in accordance with the
initial 212.5 weeks of disability and that the Special
Fund should be responsible for all of the increased
benefits on reopening, clearly overlooks the language
of KRS 342.120(6) and (7) which mandates that the
employer pay its proportionate share of all liability.
Sovereign Coal Corporation v. Adkins, Ky. App., 690
S.W.2d 129 (1985).
We further should be mindful, as the Court noted in
Pickands Mather & Co. v. Newberg, Ky., 895 S.W.2d 3
(1995), that "although [the payment scheme set out in
KRS 342.120(6) and (7)] may result in each defendant
actually paying more or less than the assigned
percentage of liability on a given award, it does not
alter the underlying premise that each defendant is
liable for its proportionate share of a lifetime
award." The underlying principle is that when an award
is increased, such as here on reopening, Accuride, as
the employer, is required to pay its proportionate
share of any additional liability.
[In the alternative] Accuride argues that the ALJ erred
in not providing a credit to Accuride in the amount of
its past benefits paid pursuant to the initial award
against its increased responsibility pursuant to the
reopened award. However, Jenkins was not totally
disabled until that judgment was made by the ALJ and
became entitled to such benefits for total disability
only as of October 2, 1995 when his motion to reopen
was filed. Under the original award, Jenkins was
entitled to benefits for 425 weeks for the 20%
occupational disability awarded. Any benefits paid
prior to October 2, 1995 were for the prior disability.
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The only credit therefore which may be granted is
during that period when the two awards overlapped.
While Accuride argues that there is clearly a lack of
equity in the amount it may be required to pay when
compared to what the Special Fund may be required to
pay, we believe that Accuride has overlooked the fact
that the Special Fund will continue to pay its portion
of the old award pursuant to ALJ Overfield's
determination so that it will have paid the same amount
of benefits as Accuride has paid for Jenkins'[s] prior
partial disability award.
Next, Accuride argues that it should be given credit
for voluntary temporary total disability benefits that it paid
for certain periods of disability stemming from Jenkins's three
work-related injuries which were determined to be merely
exacerbations of his original injury.
We agree with the Board
that the ALJ did not err by refusing to grant credit on the
reopened award for any payments that were made prior to the date
the motion to reopen was filed.
These benefits were paid prior
to the date of the reopening motion and do not overlap the
reopened award.6
Finally, Accuride argues that the 10% award that
Jenkins received for a prior hearing loss claim should be carved
out of the current award.
Again, we agree with the Board that
the ALJ did not err in making his award.
In his Opinion and Award, ALJ Dockter noted that
Jenkins had previously received a 10% award for a hearing loss.
He made no determination, however, that the hearing loss was an
6
As the Special Fund notes, Jenkins should not have received
more than the statutory maximum and the prior permanent partial
disability payments should have been interrupted during the
periods of time that the claimant received temporary total
disability benefits.
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active prior occupational disability to be carved out of the 20%
disability award made to Jenkins for his 1991 back injury.
Similarly, there was no persuasive evidence presented to ALJ
Overfield in the reopening proceeding indicating that the past
hearing loss award was an active occupational disability
contributing to his overall total disability.
Since the ALJ
found that the only pre-existing active disability affecting
Jenkins was the 5% related to his prior thumb injury, only that
percentage can be carved out from the current award.
We decline to consider Accuride's alternative argument
that it should be given credit for any benefits that Jenkins is
receiving for his hearing loss claim.
Accuride did not address
this issue to the ALJ in its petition for reconsideration and has
not pointed to any evidence indicating that Jenkins receives
hearing loss benefits overlapping the total disability award.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Workers'
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JENKINS:
John C. Morton
Samuel J. Bach
Henderson, KY
W. Mitchell Deep
Greg L. Gager
Henderson, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SPECIAL
FUND:
Judith K. Bartholomew
Louisville, KY
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