THEODORE HUNT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: November 25, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
1997-CA-000725-MR
THEODORE HUNT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE T. STEVEN BLAND, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-000218
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, and KNOPF, Judges.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
The appellant, Theodore Hunt, appeals from his
conviction and sentence on two (2) counts of trafficking in
marijuana, less than eight (8) ounces, second offense.
Finding
no error, we affirm.
On July 25, 1996, Hunt was indicted on two (2) counts
of trafficking in marijuana, less than eight (8) ounces, second
offense, a Class D felony.
KRS 218A.1421.
The charges arose out
of two (2) incidents, on January 13, 1996 and January 24, 1996,
respectively, when Hunt sold one-quarter ounce of marijuana to a
police informant, Thomas Frame.
Frame testified at the trial,
and an audio tape recording of the transactions was played for
the jury.
Hunt testified in his own behalf.
Hunt disputed
Frame’s testimony, stating that it was the informant who tried to
sell the marijuana to him.
counts.
The jury found Hunt guilty on both
The trial court imposed the jury’s sentence, and also
followed the jury’s recommendation that the sentences run
consecutively for a total of ten (10) years.
The trial court
subsequently denied Hunt’s motions for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or for a new trial.
This appeal followed.
Hunt raises six (6) issues on appeal.
First: Hunt
argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for an
instruction on the lesser included offense of possession of
marijuana.
We disagree.
A person is guilty of trafficking in
marijuana when he knowingly and unlawfully traffics in marijuana.
KRS 218A.1421(1).
“Traffic” means to manufacture, distribute,
dispense, sell, transfer, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, dispense or sell a controlled substance.
218A.010(25).
KRS
Trafficking requires proof of intent to
distribute, dispense, or sell marijuana.
In contrast, the
possession offense requires only possession of marijuana.
KRS
218A.1422.
Possession of marijuana could be a lesser included
offense to the charge of trafficking in marijuana, depending upon
the evidence.
Whether there is sufficient evidence at trial to
entitle a defendant to the misdemeanor instruction is a question
of law to be decided by the court.
When the prosecution produces
some evidence warranting an inference of a finding of a lesser
degree of the charged offense, the court should instruct on the
-2-
lesser degree.
(1991).
Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 488, 491
In the case before us, there was no evidence that Hunt
merely possessed marijuana in January 1996.1
Rather, the sole
issue before the jury concerned whether Hunt sold marijuana to
Frame.
Therefore, we find that Hunt was not entitled to an
instruction on the lesser charge of possession of marijuana.
Second: Hunt contends that his sentence is excessive
and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
KRS 532.110 allows
the trial court to determine, in its discretion, whether multiple
sentences should run concurrently or consecutively, except that
“the aggregate of consecutive sentences shall not exceed in
maximum length the longest extended term which would be
authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime for
which any of the sentences is imposed.”
KRS 532.110(1)(c).
The
Commentary to this section explains:
The third exception, in subsection (1)(c)
places an upper limit on the maximum term of
imprisonment that can be imposed through
consecutive indeterminate terms. This
subsection establishes a maximum for
accumulated indeterminate terms that is
equivalent to the maximum term that can be
imposed on a persistent felony offender under
KRS 532.080. For example, if an offender
stands convicted of three offenses, the
greatest of which is a Class B felony, his
consecutive sentences when accumulated could
equal an indeterminate term which has a
maximum of life imprisonment. But if the
greatest of his offenses is a Class C felony,
his consecutive sentences when accumulated
1
Hunt notes that marijuana was found in the house during a
search of the house in July 1996. However, the marijuana found
at that time did not serve as the basis for this (or any)
indictment against Hunt. Indeed, Hunt complains below that the
trial court erred in allowing testimony of the results of the
July 1996 search.
-3-
could equal an indeterminate term having a
maximum of no more than twenty years.
In the present case, Hunt was convicted of two (2)
Class D felonies, each punishable by no less than one (1) year,
nor greater than five (5) years.
KRS 532.060(2)(d).
The maximum
sentence that Hunt received of ten (10) years was within the
statutory maximum for consecutive indeterminate terms of twenty
(20) years.
KRS 532.080 (6)(b).
Consequently, Hunt’s
consecutive sentences do not violate the terms of KRS
532.110(1)(c).
Milner v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 655 S.W.2d 31
(1983).
Hunt also argues that his ten (10) year sentence
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Cruel and unusual
punishment is "punishment which shocks the general conscience and
violates the principle of fundamental fairness."
Cutrer v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 697 S.W.2d 156, 158 (1985).
The factors
to be weighed in making a determination of whether a punishment
is disproportionate are set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983);
accord, Collett v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 686 S.W.2d 822 (1984), which are: (1) the
gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty; (2) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction;
and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions.
Covington v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 849
S.W.2d 560, 563 (1992).
This Court is not referred to any evidence supporting
the elements necessary to find that the sentence was
unconstitutionally disproportionate.
-4-
Consequently, we cannot
find that the jury or the trial court abused its discretion in
directing that Hunt’s sentences be served consecutively.
Third: Hunt contends that the trial court improperly
excluded evidence of Frame’s prior convictions.
During cross-
examination, defense counsel attempted to ask Frame about a
number of misdemeanor charges for possession of marijuana.
The
trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection, holding that
the questions were improper under KRE 609.
Counsel also
questioned Frame about whether he had ever carried a handgun.
Frame stated that he had occasionally carried several different
handguns but that he had sold them.
Defense counsel then
attempted to bring up the fact that Frame had been forced to
forfeit eleven (11) handguns to the Kentucky State Police as a
result of a felony charge for carrying a concealed deadly weapon.
The charge was dismissed after the forfeiture.
Hunt argued that
Frame’s misstatement reflected on his credibility.
The trial
court excluded the line of questioning, also pursuant to KRE 609.
We find no error in the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings.
In both cases, defense counsel attempted to question
Frame on matters excluded by KRE 609.
Neither misdemeanor
convictions nor dismissed felony charges may be admitted to
impeach a witnesses’ credibility.
Furthermore, whatever marginal
probative value these facts may have for other reasons were
strongly outweighed by their potential for unfair prejudice or
confusion of the issues.
KRE 403.
Fourth: Hunt argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by not excluding audio tapes due to poor quality, and
by allowing Frame to testify as to tape’s content.
-5-
The parties
agree that the audio tape was of poor quality.
was not included in the record on appeal.
However, the tape
The trial court
listened to the tapes in chambers and determined they were not
wholly inaudible or unintelligible.
Without the tapes, we cannot
dispute the trial court’s conclusion.
Nor was it error to allow Frame to testify as to what
occurred during the transactions.
Contrary to the assertions in
Hunt’s brief, Frame did not attempt to interpret inaudible
portions of the tape.
Rather, he testified as to what he
witnessed during the transactions.
There was no attempt to
interpret the inaudible portions of the tape for the jury.
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 540-41 (1988).
Fifth: Hunt argues that the trial court erred by
allowing testimony of marijuana found in a home. During crossexamination of Detective Gibbs, defense counsel asked about a
lock box taken at the time of Hunt’s arrest.
Detective Gibbs
testified that he served Hunt with an arrest warrant on July 26,
1996, at the house owned by Hunt’s girlfriend, Karen Patterson.
At that time, a drug-sniffing dog indicated the presence of
marijuana in a lock box found among Hunt’s possessions.
A
subsequent search of the box revealed no drugs of any kind. The
Commonwealth objected, noting that search also led to drug
charges against Patterson.
The Commonwealth took the position
that the line of questioning was not relevant to the transactions
occurring in January 1996.
The trial court overruled the
objection. (9-1-97 VCR 14, 2/10/97, 13:55).
Some time later in the cross-examination, defense
counsel returned to the matter of the lock box, asking if the dog
-6-
“hit” on anything else in the house.
“We didn’t need the dog inside.
residence.”
Detective Gibbs answered,
We seized marijuana from that
Defense counsel immediately objected, arguing that
the evidence of the drugs seized in the house prejudiced Hunt’s
defense.
The trial court overruled this objection, concluding
that defense counsel had opened the line of inquiry.
Defense
counsel then asked Detective Gibbs about the charges against
Patterson.
(9-1-97 VCR 14, 2/10/97, 14:20-22).
While this was a close call, we cannot say that the
trial court erred in overruling the objection.
Strictly
speaking, Detective Gibbs probably overstepped the bounds of the
question in discussing the marijuana found in the house.
Defense
counsel only asked if the drug dog found anything else.
However,
in raising the issue of the July 1996 search, counsel was
treading dangerously close to the matter of the drugs found in
the house and the arrest of Karen Patterson.
Moreover, defense
counsel’s question regarding whether the drug-sniffing dog “hit”
on anything else in the house could reasonably be interpreted as
a broader inquiry regarding the results of the search.
While
Hunt may have been entitled to an admonition had one been
requested, we find no error in the admission of Detective Gibbs’
testimony.
Sixth, and lastly: Hunt contends that the Commonwealth
failed to prove the chain of custody of the evidence.
We decline
to address this argument because Hunt fails to demonstrate where
the error, if any, was preserved for our review.
76.12(4)(c)(iv).
-7-
CR
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and the
sentence imposed by the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Phyllis K. Lonneman
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.