DANIEL JONES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: December 18, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-000328-MR
DANIEL JONES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN ROBERT MORGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 82-CR-00003
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE: HUDDLESTON, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
Daniel Jones (Jones) appeals from an order of the
Knott Circuit Court denying his motion for relief and
modification of sentence brought pursuant to Kentucky Rule of
Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
532.070.
We affirm.
After a four (4) day trial in October 1982, a jury
found Jones guilty of murdering his ex-wife.
In December 1983,
the trial court sentenced Jones to life imprisonment consistent
with the jury’s recommendation.
Jones’ conviction was affirmed
on direct appeal by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Jones v.
Commonwealth, 84-SC-288-MR (unpublished opinion rendered February
28, 1985).
In this opinion, the court said that defense counsel
erred by failing to renew his prior motion for a directed verdict
at the close of all the evidence, but still rejected Jones’ claim
that there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict of guilt.
In April 1985, Jones filed a motion to vacate or set
aside the judgment pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
In the motion, Jones alleged that his
attorney was ineffective and he raised several other complaints
involving alleged coercion of his children and alleged defects in
the jury selection process.
On February 20, 1986, the trial
court denied the RCr 11.42 motion.
Jones filed a notice of
appeal of the order denying the motion, but the circuit court
clerk failed to notify the clerk of the Court of Appeals of the
appeal.
In August 1986, Jones filed a supplement to the RCr
11.42 motion in the circuit court that raised additional
complaints.
In December 1986, Jones filed a motion to vacate
pursuant to CR 60.02(f) in which he again alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel and sought to reinstate the grounds raised
in his original RCr 11.42 motion.
After conducting a hearing,
the trial court denied the CR 60.02 motion in September 1997.
During the hearing, Jones was advised to seek a belated appeal in
the Court of Appeals on his RCr 11.42 motion.
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In June 1988, a panel of the Court of Appeals granted
Jones’ motion for a belated appeal from the February 1986 and
September 1987 orders denying both the RCr 11.42 motion and the
CR 60.02 motion, respectively.
In July 1989, this Court issued
an unpublished opinion affirming the denial of both post-judgment
motions.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 1988-CA-000866-MR (rendered on
July 28, 1989).
In its opinion, this Court reviewed all of the
issues raised in the original RCr 11.42 motion, the supplemental
RCr 11.42 filing and the CR 60.02 motion.
This Court held that
Jones had not established ineffective assistance of counsel, the
complaint involving coercion of his children did not support a
new trial because two (2) of the children did not testify and the
third stated she did not believe Jones killed the victim.
This
Court also rejected his challenge to the venire selection process
as being without merit.
Jones’ request for discretionary review
was denied by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
On May 14, 1996, Jones filed a second motion for relief
pursuant to CR 60.02 and KRS 532.070.
After a preliminary
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion as a
successive motion and because it was untimely.
This appeal
followed.
In Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983),
the Kentucky Supreme Court established the procedure for
appellate review in criminal cases.
The court stated that the
structure for appellate review is not haphazard or overlapping.
Id. at 856.
It held that a criminal defendant must first bring a
direct appeal when available, then utilize RCr 11.42 by raising
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every error of which he should be aware, and utilize CR 60.02
only for extraordinary situations not otherwise subject to relief
by direct appeal or by way of RCr 11.42.
Id.
More recently in
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 948 S.W.2d 415, 416, cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2535, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (1997), the
Court reaffirmed the procedural requirements set out in Gross,
when it said:
A defendant who is in custody under sentence
or on probation, parole or conditional
discharge, is required to avail himself of
RCr 11.42 as to any ground of which he is
aware, or should be aware, during the period
when the remedy is available to him. Civil
Rule 60.02 is not intended merely as an
additional opportunity to relitigate the same
issues which could “reasonably have been
presented by direct appeal or RCr 11.42
proceedings.” RCr 11.42(3); Gross v.
Commonwealth, supra, at 855, 856. The
obvious purpose of this principle is to
prevent the relitigation of issues which
either were or could have been litigated in a
similar proceeding.
In addition, where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
is litigated in an RCr 11.42 proceeding, a defendant cannot raise
the issue of ineffective assistance in a subsequent RCr 11.42
motion.
See McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 70, 71,
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2536, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1035
(1997).
In the case at bar, Jones’ current CR 60.02 motion is
procedurally barred under the successive motions principle.
Jones filed two extensive post-judgment motions under RCr 11.42
and CR 60.02 that were denied on the merits by the trial court.
This Court permitted a belated appeal of the trial court’s
decision and affirmed the denial.
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Most of the issues raised in
the current appeal were rejected in either this Court’s opinion
on the previous motions or the Supreme Court’s opinion on direct
appeal.
In any event, all of the issues presented in the current
CR 60.02 motion either were or should have been raised in the
initial RCr 11.42 motion or on direct appeal.
Thus, Jones cannot
utilize CR 60.02 to circumvent established criminal appellate
procedure and obtain repeated review of issues he should have
presented earlier.
In addition to the successive motions procedural bar,
the trial court also held that Jones’ CR 60.02 motion was
untimely because it was not filed “within a reasonable time.”
As
the court stated in Gross, “what constitutes a reasonable time in
which to move to vacate a judgment under CR 60.02 is a matter
that addresses itself to the discretion of the trial court.”
S.W.2d at 858.
648
The availability of witnesses and the integrity
of the physical evidence has been compromised by the fourteen
year time span since Jones’ conviction.
The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in holding the motion was untimely.
Cf.
Gross, supra (affirming trial court decision that five year delay
in bringing CR 60.02 motion was untimely).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Knott Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel Jones, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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