ROBERT H. BUCK, JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 2, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
1997-CA-000292-MR
ROBERT H. BUCK, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES E. KELLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 88-CR-0130
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GARDNER and GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GARDNER, JUDGE.
Robert Buck (Buck) appeals from an opinion and
order of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on January 28, 1997,
denying his motion to correct the final judgment.
Finding no
error, we affirm.
In March, 1988, the Fayette County Grand Jury indicted
Buck on one count of first-degree robbery, and one count of being
a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO II).
On
March 16, 1988, the parties attended a pretrial conference at which
the Commonwealth extended a plea offer. According to the offer, in
return for a guilty plea, the Commonwealth would dismiss the PFO II
count, dismiss another indictment plus an unindicted charge of
second-degree burglary, and recommend a sentence of fifteen years
on the first-degree robbery count. On March 17, 1988, the pretrial
order signed by the circuit court judge was entered.
At the bottom
of the pretrial order, the Commonwealth's plea offer was set out.
On March 18, 1988, Buck entered a guilty plea to firstdegree
robbery
pursuant
to
the
plea
agreement
with
the
Commonwealth. Consistent with the plea agreement, the Commonwealth
moved to dismiss the PFO II count, agreed to dismiss another
indictment
and
another
unindicted
charge,
and
recommended
a
sentence of fifteen years for the first-degree robbery offense. At
that time, the trial judge accepted the guilty plea but withheld
sentencing
pending
investigation report.
preparation
and
review
of
a
presentence
On April 15, 1988, Buck appeared before the
court with his attorney for sentencing.
The trial judge granted
the motion to dismiss the PFO II count but did not follow the
Commonwealth's recommendation on the sentencing term and instead
sentenced Buck to serve twenty years in prison for first-degree
robbery.
In June 1989, Buck filed a "Motion to Correct Final
Judgment" asking the court to "correct" the final judgment by
reducing the sentence from twenty years to fifteen years based on
the terms of the plea agreement.
The trial court appointed an
attorney to represent Buck on the motion.
In July 1989, the trial
court denied Buck's motion noting that Buck was advised at the
guilty plea hearing both orally and in writing that the trial court
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was
not
bound
by
the
Commonwealth's
recommended
fifteen-year
sentence, and that the court could impose a twenty-year sentence.
On July 20, 1989, counsel filed a notice of appeal challenging the
denial of the motion, and a motion to withdraw as counsel, which
was granted.
In October 1989, the Fayette Circuit Court Clerk
mailed to Buck a copy of the notice of certification of record on
appeal that also noted that appointment of counsel on appeal had
been denied.
This appeal was not perfected.
In January 1990, Buck filed a motion to vacate, set aside
or correct judgment of sentence pursuant to Kentucky Rule of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
Buck again asked the trial court
to amend the judgment to a fifteen-year sentence based on the plea
agreement with the Commonwealth.
Buck argued that the pretrial
order of March 16, 1988, constituted an acceptance of the plea
agreement by the court, which required the trial judge to impose
the fifteen-year sentence.
The trial court appointed an attorney
to represent Buck in the RCr 11.42 proceeding.
The Commonwealth
filed a response arguing that Buck had exhausted his opportunity
for
post-conviction
relief
through
his
first
motion.
The
Commonwealth indicated that the new motion was merely a duplicate
RCr 11.42 motion.
In February 1990, the trial court denied the
second motion as a successive RCr 11.42 motion prohibited by RCr
11.42(3).
The court noted that the second motion raised no new
issues that could not have been raised in the first motion.
Counsel filed a notice of appeal in July 1989, but the appeal was
dismissed in August 1990 for failure to perfect the appeal.
In December 1990, Buck filed a third motion entitled
"Motion to Correct Judgment," again asking the trial judge to
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reduce his sentence to fifteen years based on the plea agreement
with the Commonwealth.
On December 19, 1990, the trial court
summarily dismissed the motion.
In April 1995, Buck filed a motion asking the trial court
to amend the judgment to have his twenty-year prison sentence run
concurrently with a previous five year sentence from another
conviction in Anderson County.
The court summarily denied this
motion.
In September 1995, Buck filed an extensive "Motion to
Correct and Modify Judgment and Sentence."
Buck again asked the
trial judge to amend the judgment by reducing the sentence to
fifteen years.
Buck argued that the pretrial conference order
constituted a binding agreement with the court to comply with the
terms of the plea agreement.
He maintained that the court's
failure to comply with the sentencing term of the plea agreement
violated
due
process
and
equal
protection.
The
trial
court
appointed an attorney to represent Buck and treated the motion as
filed pursuant to RCr 11.42.
In March 1996, the trial court denied
the motion as a duplicate RCr 11.42 motion.
The court noted that
the grounds for this motion were similar to those of three prior
motions.
Counsel filed an appeal of the trial court order and was
allowed to withdraw as counsel.
In October 1996, the appeal was
dismissed for failure to perfect.
In January 1997, Buck filed another "Motion to Correct
Final Judgment," which is the subject of the current appeal.
Although the motion cited no specific procedural rule, Buck sought
relief based on "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect." This
language appears in Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02(a).
-4-
However, the grounds for the motion again involved the trial
judge's failure to follow the sentencing term of the plea agreement
and the pretrial conference order. The trial court again appointed
an attorney to represent Buck.
The trial court denied the motion
as a successive motion under RCr 11.42, again noting that it raised
no new issues.
Counsel has filed a notice of appeal and an
appellate brief, thereby perfecting the current appeal.
In Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983), the
Kentucky Supreme Court set out the procedure for challenging a
criminal conviction, and stated that the structure for attacking a
final judgment is not haphazard or overlapping. Id. at 856.
A
defendant must first bring a direct appeal when available and state
every ground of error of which he or his counsel was reasonably
aware.
Id. at 857.
Next, a defendant in custody or on probation
or parole must utilize RCr 11.42 to raise errors of which he is
aware
or
should
available.
be
aware
during
the
period
this
remedy
is
Id.
Final disposition of that [RCr 11.42] motion,
or waiver of the opportunity to make it, shall
conclude all issues that reasonably could have
been presented in that proceeding.
The
language of RCr 11.42 forecloses the defendant
from raising any question under CR 60.02 which
are 'issues that could reasonably have been
presented' by RCr 11.42 proceedings.
Id.
(quoting
RCr
11.42(3)).
CR
60.02
is
for
"extraordinary
situations not available by direct appeal and not available under
RCr 11.42."
Id. at 856.
See also Commonwealth v. Gross, Ky., 936
S.W.2d 85, 88 (1997) (CR 60.02 intended to correct errors in
judgments
not
available
by
appeal
or
discovered after rendition of judgment).
-5-
otherwise
which
were
In addition, the rule prohibiting successive RCr 11.42
motions
is
well
established
in
case
law.
In
Caudill
v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 182 (1966), the court affirmed the
denial of a second RCr 11.42 motion.
It stated:
The grounds he now relies upon were
previously presented to and rejected by
the circuit court. Neither our Rules of
Criminal Procedure nor our case law
provides for a second assault to be made
upon the judgment of conviction.
RCr
11.42; Jennings v. Commonwealth, Ky., 400
S.W.2d 233; Tipton v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
398 S.W.2d 493. The proper procedure for
Caudill to have followed was the timely
filing of an appeal to this court from
the original judgment denying the relief
he sought under his first RCr 11.42
motion.
Id. at 182.
See also Satterly v. Commonwealth, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 144
(1969).
In Burton v. Tartar, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 168, 169 (1964), the
court held that an attempt by the petitioner to bring a second RCr
11.42 motion on the same grounds that had been rejected in an
earlier
RCr
11.42
motion
should
be
denied
as
an
attempt
at
"trifling with the court." See also Shepherd v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
477 S.W.2d 798 (1972) (fourth RCr 11.42 motion dismissed for
failure to demonstrate reason why grounds for motion were not
raised
in
earlier
motions).
A
major
purpose
of
the
rule
prohibiting successive or duplicative RCr 11.42 motions is to
promote
efficient
utilization
of
court
resources
by
imposing
finality and requiring comprehensiveness for post-trial motions.
As the court stated in Bell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 772,
772-73 (1965), "[e]very person charged with a crime is entitled to
at least one fair and impartial trial, but it is absolutely absurd
-6-
to take the time of the courts with continuous filing and refiling
of motions for the same relief under the same proceedings."
See
also Warner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 398 S.W.2d 490, 490, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 885, 87 S. Ct. 178, 17 L. Ed.
2d 112 (1966)
("subsection (3) of RCr 11.42 was intended to protect courts
against the abuse and vexation of successive proceedings to vacate
the same judgment. . . ."); Hampton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 454
S.W.2d
672
(1970)
(the
courts
have
more
to
do
than
occupy
themselves with successive "reruns" of RCr 11.42 motions).
Moreover, failure to receive a decision on the merits on
appeal from denial of an earlier RCr 11.42 motion does not preclude
dismissal of a subsequent motion.
In Szabo v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
458 S.W.2d 167 (1970), the Court held that a petitioner who
abandons the appeal of his initial RCr 11.42 motion is not entitled
to relief on a second RCr 11.42 motion even though there has never
been an appellate post-conviction review on the merits of his
initial motion.
232
(1974)
See also Lycans v. Commonwealth, Ky., 511 S.W.2d
(when
appeal
is
not
perfected
or
is
dismissed,
petitioner is not permitted to file a subsequent RCr 11.42 motion).
In the case at bar, Buck filed numerous post-judgment
motions seeking a reduction in his sentence.
Generally, entry of
a guilty plea waives the right to directly appeal the conviction.1
1
A defendant waives the right to challenge by appeal all
nonjurisdictional defenses to the conviction. See, e.g., Bush v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1986); United States v.
Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 416 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Easton, 937 F.2d 160, 161 (6th Cir. 1991). Absent a conditional
plea under RCr 8.09, a defendant waives the right to bring a
direct appeal of the guilty plea, except for jurisdictional
defects. See Hughes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 99 (1994);
Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 663 S.W.2d 216 (1985); Ferguson v.
(continued...)
-7-
During the guilty plea hearing, Buck specifically waived his right
to appeal. Thus, the trial court correctly addressed the merits of
Buck's initial motion because a direct appeal was unavailable.2
The trial court also properly treated Buck's initial four motions
as post-judgment collateral appeals under RCr 11.42.
Even if the
latest motion filed in January 1997 was treated as a CR 60.02
motion, it would not be cognizable because the issue raised in that
motion could be and was raised in the prior RCr 11.42 motions.
Gross, supra.
See
The record clearly reveals that Buck filed four
post-judgment (RCr 11.42) motions raising the same issue involving
the twenty-year sentence and based on the same grounds involving
the effect of the plea agreement and the pretrial conference order.
Buck's failure to perfect the appeal on the initial motion does not
prevent application of the successive motion rule.
As a result,
the trial court did not err in denying the January 1997 motion on
procedural grounds as a successive motion.
In addition, Buck's substantive complaint is without
merit.
During the guilty plea hearing in March 1988, the trial
court fully informed Buck of his constitutional rights under Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969).
More importantly, the trial judge twice specifically told Buck that
1
(...continued)
United States, 699 F.2d 1071 (11th Cir. 1983).
2
While Hughes supra and Sanders, supra recognize a right to
bring a direct appeal from an unconditional guilty plea on the
issue of sentencing, these cases involved the jurisdictional
statutory authority of the trial court to impose the particular
sentence. In the current case, the twenty year sentence imposed
by the trial court was within the statutory sentencing range, and
Buck's argument relies solely on the plea agreement.
-8-
the court was not bound by the Commonwealth's recommendation on
sentencing, and that he could sentence Buck to twenty years.
responded that he understood.
Buck
At the sentencing hearing in April
1988, Buck voiced no objection when the trial court indicated it
was rejecting the Commonwealth's recommendation on sentencing and
was imposing the maximum twenty-year sentence. Buck made no motion
to withdraw his guilty plea at the sentencing hearing.
In Couch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 712 (1975), the
court held that a defendant had no right to withdraw his guilty
plea
simply
because
the
trial
judge
did
Commonwealth's recommendation on sentencing.
not
follow
the
The court indicated
that under RCr 8.10, the trial judge had discretion not to allow
withdrawal of the guilty plea where the defendant had not been
misled on the possible sentence the court could impose.
In Murphy
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 551 S.W.2d 838 (1977), the court held
that the trial court was not required to afford the defendant an
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea because the judge did not
follow the Commonwealth's sentence recommendation. As in our case,
Murphy did not move to withdraw his guilty plea at the sentencing
hearing, but the court still applied the reasoning expressed in
Couch.
Similarly, in Carwile v. Smith, 874 F.2d 382 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943, 110 S. Ct. 346, 107 L. Ed. 2d 334
(1989), the Sixth Circuit held that the due process clause did not
require the trial court to give a defendant an opportunity to
withdraw a guilty plea merely because the trial judge failed to
follow the Commonwealth's recommendation and imposed a harsher
sentence.
The above cases were decided under the prior version of
-9-
RCr 8.10,3 which was in effect when Buck entered his guilty plea
and was sentenced. While the legal landscape may have changed with
the adoption of the current version of RCr 8.10 in August 1989,4
the trial court's conduct was proper under the law at the time of
the sentencing.
Buck
contends
that
even
under
Couch
and
the
law
applicable at the time, he is entitled to relief because he was
misled to believe the trial judge would follow the Commonwealth's
recommendation.
He argues that the pretrial conference order
constituted a judicial approval of the Commonwealth's sentencing
recommendation. We disagree. The pretrial conference order merely
sets out the terms of the Commonwealth's plea offer.
There is no
evidence, other than Buck's subjective allegation, that the trial
court was either explicitly or implicitly obligating itself to the
terms of the plea agreement between Buck and the Commonwealth. The
trial judge's statements at the plea hearing informing Buck that he
was not bound by the Commonwealth's sentencing recommendation
contradict Buck's position. The record indicates that Buck was not
misled about the trial court's ability to impose the twenty-year
sentence.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the
initial motion to correct the judgment based on the merits.
See
3
Rule 8.10. Withdrawal of plea. - At any time before
judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but
mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty
substituted. (Amended June 29, 1983, effective January 1, 1985.)
4
In Kennedy v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 962 S.W.2d 880
(1997), this Court recently held that RCr 8.10 requires the trial
court to provide a defendant an opportunity to withdraw his
guilty plea if the judge rejects the plea agreement including the
recommended sentence.
-10-
Franklin
v.
Commonwealth,
305
Ky.
111,
203
S.W.2d
2
(1947)
(defendant not entitled to withdraw guilty plea especially after
sentence
pronounced
merely
because
court
did
not
follow
Commonwealth's sentence recommendation).
For the above stated reasons, we affirm the order of the
Fayette Circuit Court.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas L. Conn
Lexington, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Amy F. Howard
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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