JOHN J. FORD, as Guardian of David J. Wilson, a Minor v. HUMANA OF KENTUCKY, INC., d/b/a Humana Hospital Audubon
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RENDERED: June 19, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
97-CA-0165-MR
JOHN J. FORD, as Guardian of
David J. Wilson, a Minor
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL A. SCHNEIDER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-7513
v.
HUMANA OF KENTUCKY, INC., d/b/a
Humana Hospital Audubon
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOX, and MILLER, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
John J. Ford, as guardian of David J. Wilson
(David), a minor child, appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court in favor of Humana of Kentucky, Inc., d/b/a Humana
Hospital Audubon (Humana), resulting from a jury trial.
For the
reasons set forth hereinafter, we affirm.
On February 19, 1986, David's mother, Ruby Jo Wilson
(Ruby), was admitted into Humana while in active labor.
Ruby's
obstetrician, Dr. Robert McQuady (Dr. McQuady), was notified, and
he arrived at Humana approximately fifteen minutes after Ruby's
admission.
Dr. McQuady artificially ruptured Ruby's bag of
water, after which time fetal heartbeat irregularities were
noticed.
Dr. McQuady left Ruby shortly thereafter, and Ruby
delivered David in her bed minutes after Dr. McQuady's departure.
When David was born, no physician was present.
David was several
weeks premature and was placed in an isolette1 in Humana's
neonatal intensive care unit.
On March 13, 1986, while David was in the intensive
care unit, his temperature elevated to 102.7 degrees.
The rise
in his temperature was apparently due to a malfunction of the
isolette itself or a temperature probe used with the isolette.
Shortly after the isolette incident, David began suffering from
increased episodes of apnea and bradycardia.2
David suffers from cerebral palsy, which affects his
motor skills and causes him to suffer from mental retardation.
Suit was filed on David's behalf against Dr. McQuady and Humana,
and a three-week jury trial was held in 1996.
The jury found in
David's favor in his suit against Dr. McQuady and awarded him
damages totaling $1,640,719.
However, the jury found against
David in his suit against Humana.
Following the trial court's
denial of David's motion for a new trial, this appeal was filed.3
1
Isolettes are "environmentally controlled plastic
containers for premature infants[.]" The New Lexicon Webster's
Dictionary of the English Language, 514 (1988 ed.)
2
Apnea is defined as "[a]bsence of breathing[,]" Stedman's
Medical Dictionary, 106 (25th ed. 1990), and bradycardia is
"slowness of the heartbeat[.]" Id. at 208.
3
We will hereinafter refer to the appellant as "David,"
(continued...)
2
The first allegation of error concerns the trial
court's order excluding the testimony of Dr. Carolyn Crawford.
Dr. Crawford's deposition was taken on October 5, 1996, and again
on October 13, 1996, a few days before the trial commenced on
October 22, 1996.
Dr. Crawford testified in her deposition that
the incident with the isolette contributed to or exacerbated
David's condition.
Until the deposition of Dr. Crawford was
taken, it had not been disclosed to Humana that Dr. Crawford or
any other expert witness to be called by David had an opinion
that the isolette or temperature probe was a factor in David's
condition.
Humana made a motion in limine on October 7, 1996,
to strike Dr. Crawford's testimony on the basis that her theory
concerning the isolette incident had not been previously
disclosed.
The trial court granted Humana's motion and excluded
the testimony on the ground that it introduced a new theory into
the case without sufficient pretrial notice to the other parties.
"[T]he question of whether one party has put another at
an unfair disadvantage through pretrial nondisclosures must be
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."
v. Galbraith, Ky., 494 S.W.2d 527, 530 (1973).
Collins
As the expert
opinion of Dr. Crawford was not disclosed to Humana until a few
days before trial, we determine that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in not allowing the testimony to be
introduced into evidence due to insufficient pretrial notice.
3
(...continued)
although this action was brought by John J. Ford on David's
behalf as his guardian.
3
David also asserts in this regard that Dr. Ian Butler,
one of Dr. McQuady's expert witnesses, testified in his
deposition that a temporal relationship existed between the
isolette incident and increased episodes of apnea and
bradycardia.
David asserts that Dr. Butler's testimony should
have put Humana on notice that the isolette incident was an issue
in the case.
There is, however, a vast difference in Dr.
Butler's statements that there was a temporal relationship
between the isolette incident and David's apnea and bradycardia
and Dr. Crawford's testimony that the isolette incident
exacerbated David's brain damage.
Dr. Crawford's testimony
clearly created a new issue and theory of liability.
David also complains that the trial court was
inconsistent in its rulings by allowing experts retained by
Humana to testify inconsistently with the summary of their
expected testimony as set forth in Humana's pretrial compliance
form, while at the same time not allowing the testimony of Dr.
Crawford.
Whether Humana's experts also changed their theories
of the case is irrelevant to the issue of the admissibility of
Dr. Crawford's testimony since David admits that he did not
attempt to have those experts' testimony stricken.
Further concerning the admissibility of Dr. Crawford's
testimony, David contends that questioning of an intensive care
nurse by counsel for Dr. McQuady "opened the door" to allow the
testimony of Dr. Crawford.
After the nurse testified that apnea
and bradycardia were not unusual in premature infants, David's
4
counsel argued to the trial court that the door had been opened
such that he should be allowed to present testimony that the
isolette incident had greatly increased the frequency of David's
episodes of apnea and bradycardia.
As the isolette incident was
not an issue at trial due to insufficient pretrial notice having
been given to Humana of Dr. Crawford's opinion, we determine that
it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to keep the
issue out of the case despite the nurse's reference to apnea and
bradycardia in response to questions asked by counsel for Dr.
McQuady.
David's second argument is that the trial court erred
in disallowing rebuttal testimony by Dr. George Nichols, II.
An
expert witness on behalf of Dr. McQuady, Dr. Richard Naeye,
testified that David's brain damage was caused by an infection
present in Ruby's placenta.
David then sought to introduce the
rebuttal testimony of Dr. Nichols that the "abnormalities which
were present in Ruby Jo Wilson's placenta were not causative to
the development of cerebral palsy in David J. Wilson, Jr."
David knew several months prior to trial of Dr. Naeye's
theories and had apparently contacted Dr. Nichols in an effort to
obtain expert testimony to counteract Dr. Naeye's testimony.
David had failed, however, to list Dr. Nichols as a possible
witness on any pretrial compliance reports.
The standard of review on appeal concerning a trial
court's decision to exclude or allow rebuttal evidence is the
abuse of discretion standard.
Morrow v. Stivers, Ky. App., 836
5
S.W.2d 424, 430 (1992).
As David was aware of Dr. Naeye's
opinion several months prior to trial and yet failed to disclose
that Dr. Nichols would be an expert witness and failed to
disclose the opinion of Dr. Nichols, we find no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in not allowing Dr. Nichols to
testify as a rebuttal witness for David.
David's third argument is that the trial court erred by
refusing to give the jury his proposed instruction regarding a
decrease in his chance of recovery.
The proposed instruction
would have allowed the jury to find against Humana if it deemed
that Humana had "increased the risk of harm" to David by
"significantly decreasing" his "chances of recovery and ability
to lead a life free from cerebral palsy and developmental delays
. . . ."
The instruction actually given by the trial court
allowed the jury to find against Humana if it found that Humana
had violated its duty to "exercise that degree of care and skill
ordinarily expected of reasonable and prudent hospital employees
acting under the same or similar circumstances as those in this
case" and that such was a substantial factor in David's
condition.
David's proposed instruction and argument are based
upon Richard v. Adair Hosp. Found. Corp., Ky. App., 566 S.W.2d
791 (1978).
A close reading of that case, however, reveals that
it makes no reference to instructing the jury concerning
diminished chances of recovery.
6
Kentucky has established a preference for "bare-bones"
jury instructions which may be "fleshed out during summation."
McKinney v. Heisel, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 32, 34 (1997).
The "bare-
bones" approach is also applicable to cases involving malpractice
suits against hospitals.
133, 136 (1991).
See Rogers v. Kasdan, Ky., 612 S.W.2d
Jury instructions in these negligence-type
cases "should be couched in terms of duty" and "should not
contain an abundance of detail."
Id.
The trial court did not
err in refusing to give the jury David's proposed instruction
regarding a decrease in his chance of recovery.
David's final argument is that the trial court erred by
giving Dr. McQuady and Humana four preemptory challenges each.
Civil Rule (CR) 46.03(1) allows each opposing side to have three
peremptory challenges, "but co-parties having antagonistic
interests shall have three peremptory challenges each."
CR
47.03(2) allows for one additional peremptory challenge for each
side or antagonistic party if additional jurors are called, as
was done in this case.
The question, therefore, is whether or
not Humana's interests and Dr. McQuady's interests were
antagonistic.
The allocation of peremptory challenges "is a defined
mechanism and does not depend on the exercise of judicial
discretion."
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook, Ky.,
590 S.W.2d 875, 877 (1979).
No actual prejudice need be shown to
merit reversal if peremptory challenges are improperly allocated
as the allocation of peremptory challenges "is a substantial
7
right" which "requires reversal as a matter of law" if improperly
exercised.
Id.
Factors to be considered in determining if parties'
interests are antagonistic are whether cross-claims were filed
and whether the parties shared the same theory of the case.
Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Mem'l Hosp., Inc., Ky. App., 769
S.W.2d 56, 59 (1988).
Another factor to be considered is whether
the parties were charged with independent acts of negligence.
Mackey v. Greenview Hosp., Inc., Ky. App., 587 S.W.2d 249, 259
(1979).
See also Roberts v. Taylor, Ky., 339 S.W.2d 653 (1960),
wherein it was stated that where there are independent acts of
negligence, "the interests of the defendants are most always
antagonistic, because each may escape liability or reduce his
liability by convincing the jury that the other was solely or
primarily responsible."
Id. at 656.
Also, the determination of
whether parties' interests are antagonistic is to be made at the
time the jury is selected.
Mackey, supra, at 259.
Dr. McQuady and Humana were charged with independent
acts of negligence in this case.
David alleged that Dr. McQuady
was negligent due to the fact that he "abandoned his high-risk
patient prior to her delivery" and alleged that Humana was
negligent due to the "failure of the hospital staff to
appropriately attend the labor and delivery and their failure to
provide appropriate care after the birth . . . ."
Under David's
theory of the case, one defendant could have acted negligently
without any negligence by the other defendant.
8
As independent
acts of negligence were alleged and the parties were distinct and
separate entities, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in granting each defendant four peremptory challenges.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
9
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Larry B. Franklin
Hope K. Fitzpatrick
Louisville, KY
B. Todd Thompson
Millicent A. Tanner
Louisville, KY
10
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