THOMAS SHANE KINSER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
March 27, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
96-CA-3388-MR
THOMAS SHANE KINSER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN D. MINTON, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 94-CR-045 AND 94-CR-075
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
The Warren Circuit Court denied Thomas Kinser's
motion for RCr 11.42/CR 60.02 relief.
We affirm.
On December 18, 1995, appellant filed an RCr 11.42/CR
60.02 motion with supporting memorandum.
The court appointed
counsel to represent the appellant, ordering that counsel "may"
supplement the motion within 60 days.
On January 24, 1996,
Kinser's attorney filed a supplement to the motion in compliance
with the court's order, stating that he could not supplement
Kinser's motion for post-conviction relief and moving the court
to appoint substitute counsel as Kinser believed that there was a
conflict of interest.
On February 29, 1996, appellant's counsel
refiled his motion to appoint substitute counsel.
The trial
court overruled the appellant's motion to substitute counsel on
March 5, 1996.
On March 18, 1996, Kinser, pro se, filed an
objection to the court's denial of substitute counsel.
The trial
court reconsidered and granted the motion on April 5, 1996, and
appointed Steven Chase Todd.
On April 15, 1996, the newly appointed attorney filed a
statement that he could add nothing further to Kinser's pro se
motion.
On September 11, 1996, appellant, pro se, filed a motion
to supplement and to argue issues on his RCr 11.42 motion.
The
trial court entered an order on October 16, 1996, overruling
appellant's motion to modify sentence.
On October 28, appellant
made a motion for reconsideration and included new arguments
which had not been part of his original RCr 11.42 motion.
trial court overruled the motion on November 6, 1996.
The
On
November 18, 1996, the defendant filed a timely appeal.
Appellant argues on appeal that he should have been
allowed to supplement his RCr 11.42/CR 60.02 motion, pro se.
Supreme Court of Kentucky recently discussed this issue in
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 926 S.W.2d 667, 670 (1996):
In recognition of the need for both speed
and specificity, we hold that an RCr 11.42
motion must be filed in an expeditious manner
and is subject to amendment, if appropriate,
with leave of court. Due to the unquestioned
right of defendants to have their contentions
decided by a court, "leave [to amend] shall
be freely given when justice so requires."
CR 15.01.
Kentucky cases interpreting CR 15.01 as it relates to the
amendment of civil complaints have held that the standard of
-2-
The
review is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
See
Commonwealth, Fayette County ex rel. Geary v. Kentucky Central
Life Insurance Co., Ky., 746 S.W.2d 565, 566 (1987).
The trial court in this case appointed counsel on two
separate occasions at appellant's request and on each occasion
allowed counsel to supplement the pro se motion of Kinser.
Both
counsel for Kinser attempted to comply with the court's order but
were unable to add any new light to the pro se motion for
collateral relief.
The appellant in his original motion stated
an issue that he wanted to present and amply supported that issue
with a four-page memorandum of law.
However, even if we were to consider the issue advanced
in appellant's supplemental motion, his argument would fail.
In
essence, appellant sought to bring to light his belief that one
of the crimes for which he was charged and convicted constituted
a lesser-included offense of another crime for which he was also
sentenced -- resulting in his argument of double jeopardy.
However, this argument is without substantive merit as appellant
had entered a valid guilty plea, thereby waiving any right to
raise this issue as a defense thereafter.
Under these
circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by not allowing Kinser, pro se, to supplement his RCr
11.42/CR 60.02 motion.
We affirm the Warren Circuit Court order denying
appellant RCr 11.42/CR 60.02 relief.
-3-
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I respectfully dissent.
Unfortunately, the Majority Opinion has accepted an argument that
is often misapplied by the Commonwealth.
Centers v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 799 S.W.2d 51, 55 (1990), is often
incorrectly cited by the Commonwealth for the rule of law that a
movant cannot raise a substantive issue relating to a defense to
a charge because he has waived all defenses upon his plea of
guilty.
Such an argument begs the question of a movant's
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel under RCr 11.42.
While Kinser's argument that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise a double jeopardy defense should
be extreme enough to make this point, I will use an even more
extreme example to hopefully make the point even more clear.
Suppose a movant has pleaded guilty and accepted a life sentence
upon the advice of his counsel that he is likely to receive the
death penalty if convicted, but in fact, the movant was not even
subject to the death penalty.
Further, suppose there is strong
evidence that counsel and the judge had taken a bribe from the
movant's enemy.
Obviously, a movant who could prove these
atrocities would receive RCr 11.42 relief.
It would not matter
that the movant had pleaded guilty and waived all defenses
because his plea would be constitutionally impaired.
It would
not be a knowing and intelligent plea under Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and the
-4-
assistance rendered by his counsel would not meet the Sixth
Amendment requirements under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
While Kinser is not
alleging such outrageous, his legal argument is the same--since
his counsel failed to raise a double jeopardy defense, he was
ineffective and the plea does not pass constitutional muster.
I
am not expressing an opinion as to the double jeopardy argument,
but Kinser should get his day in court on the question of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
-5-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas Shane Kinser
Wheelwright, KY
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Joseph R. Johnson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.