RHONDA SKAGGS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
February 20, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-3367-MR
RHONDA SKAGGS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM E. McANULTY, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-848
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; GUIDUGLI and SCHRODER, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order entered by
the Jefferson Circuit Court.
Appellant Rhonda Skaggs was
sentenced to probation and ordered to pay restitution as a
condition of probation in connection with her conviction for
theft by unlawful taking.
On appeal, appellant contends that the
court erred by ordering her to pay restitution in the amount of
$2,700.
We disagree.
Hence, we affirm.
On December 7, 1995, Skaggs visited the apartment of
John Shelly ostensibly for the purpose of having her hair styled.
Shelly observed Skaggs rummaging through dresser drawers during
the course of the visit.
Later, Shelly drove Skaggs home and
observed two packages of his brand of cigarettes fall out of her
sleeve.
After he returned home Shelly found that cash, two
wedding bands, a gold medallion and chain, prescription drugs and
cigarettes were missing.
He reported the theft to police.
That
evening a police officer took a report and the next day Shelly
obtained a warrant charging Skaggs with theft.
After obtaining
the warrant, Shelly discovered that two bolo ties and another
ring were also missing.
Once again, Shelly called police but
they did not elect to make a supplemental report.
On April 10, 1996, Skaggs was indicted for burglary,
theft, and knowingly receiving stolen property.
The
Commonwealth's bill of particulars stated that "[w]hen the
Prosecuting witness got home he discovered numerous items had
been stolen:
$50 in cash, an 18kt. Gold St. Christopher
Medallion and chain, three rings, two bolo ties, prescription
medicine and the cigarettes he had seen fall out of the
defendant's sleeve."
The Commonwealth's failure to produce the
supplemental incident report was a contested matter during the
trial court proceedings.
Skaggs entered into a plea agreement on
July 16, 1996, whereby she agreed to plead guilty to the theft
charge with the remaining charges to be dismissed.
As a
condition of receiving probation, she agreed to make restitution
to Shelly.
The Commonwealth disclosed to Skaggs on July 25, 1996,
that the police failed to write a supplemental report listing the
bolo ties and third missing ring.
On August 28, 1996, an
evidentiary hearing was conducted to ascertain the amount which
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would be paid as restitution.
During the hearing, it was
determined that the two wedding bands had been found at a pawn
shop and Skaggs denied that she stole the two bolo ties and a
certain ring.
Thus, the parties' positions regarding the amount
which should be paid as restitution are as follows:
Item
Appellant
Cash
Medallion
& Chain
Bolo Ties
Ring
$
50.00
700.00
-0-0_________
$ 750.00
Appellee
$
50.00
1,000.00
850.00
800.00
_________
$2,700.00
On October 25, 1996, the trial court entered a final order fixing
restitution at $2,700.
This appeal followed.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by ordering
her to pay restitution in the amount of $2,700 rather than $750.
We disagree.
KRS 533.030(3) states that if, as here, a sentence to
conditional discharge is imposed in a case in which the victim of
the crime has sustained monetary damage, then restitution shall
be ordered.
Appellant argues, however, that since she did not
specifically admit or specifically plead guilty to taking the two
bolo ties and the ring, she cannot be required to pay restitution
as to these two items.
We cannot agree.
The statute expressly uses the mandatory language
"restitution shall be ordered in the full amount of the damages,"
but not to exceed $100,000.
The statute does grant the trial
court discretion to order a defendant "to make restitution by
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working for or on behalf of the victim."
However, if monetary
restitution is ordered, it must be "in the full amount of the
damages."
Here, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing and
found that appellant did steal the bolo ties and ring.
Based
upon the testimony adduced at the hearing, we cannot say that the
court's findings in this vein are clearly erroneous.
CR 52.01;
Commonwealth v. Fint, Ky., 940 S.W.2d 896, 898 (1997).
Hence,
they may not be disturbed.
We further note that appellant's reliance upon Hughey
v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408
(1990), and United States v. Wainwright, 938 F.2d 1096 (10th Cir.
1991), is misplaced.
These federal cases interpret the
restitution provisions of the Federal Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579 and 3580
(recodified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3664).
The Supreme Court held in Hughey that the VWPA confined
the amount of restitution to the "loss caused by the specific
conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction."
U.S. at 413.
495
In Hughey, the defendant was indicted inter alia on
three counts of unauthorized use of a credit card.
In exchange
for the government's dismissal of the remaining counts, Hughey
pled guilty on the count which charged him with knowingly using
an unauthorized MBank Mastercard issued to Hershey Godfrey.
The
losses sustained as a result of the card's use amounted to
$10,412.
However, the trial court ordered Hughey to make
restitution of $90,431 covering all losses sustained by MBank as
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a result of Hughey's fraudulent use of not only the Godfrey card,
but also 20 other cards he had stolen from other MBank
cardholders.
The Supreme Court reversed the order because Hughey
had pled guilty to only the charge that he had fraudulently used
Godfrey's credit card and, hence, ordering restitution for losses
stemming from the use of other cards was improper.
We note that
soon after Hughey was rendered, the VWPA was amended to allow a
court to "order restitution in any criminal case to the extent
agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement."
18 U.S.C.
§3663(a)(3); see United States v. Guardino, 972 F.2d 682, 687
(6th Cir. 1992).
Unlike the situation in Hughey involving multiple theft
offenses, here there was but one theft offense rather than many
separate and unrelated offenses.
Thus, Hughey is clearly
distinguishable from the instant action.
For similar reasons
Wainwright, supra, which applies Hughey, is also distinguishable
on its facts.
Thus, neither of the federal cases relied upon by
appellant support her position.
The court's judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel T. Goyette
Jefferson District Public
Defender
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Bruce P. Hackett
Deputy Jefferson District
Public Defender
Louisville, KY
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