PAMELA BOWMAN and REDA TURNER v. SERV-AIR, INC. and GARY CHRISTIAN
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RENDERED: June 12, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
96-CA-002872-MR
PAMELA BOWMAN and REDA TURNER
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00611
v.
SERV-AIR, INC. and GARY CHRISTIAN
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE:
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DYCHE, KNOPF and JOHNSON, Judges.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Pamela Bowman (Bowman) and Reda Turner (Turner)
have appealed from the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court
entered on October 3, 1996, which summarily dismissed their
claims against their former employer, Serv-Air, Inc. (Serv-Air),
for damages for employment discrimination and retaliation
pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 344 et seq.
We
reverse and remand.
Bowman and Turner had worked for Serv-Air for six and
nine years respectively, when on February 16, 1994, they left
their employment and never returned.
They filed a complaint in
the Fayette Circuit Court on February 28, 1994, naming both Serv-
Air and their immediate supervisor, Gary Christian (Christian),
as defendants.1
They alleged that they were constructively
discharged by Serv-Air, that they had been discriminated against
in the terms and conditions of their employment based on their
sex, that "Christian's comments and actions created a hostile
working environment," and that "[t]he actions of the Defendants
created an intolerable work atmosphere of sexual harassment."
They further alleged that as a result of the violations of their
civil rights, they suffered and experienced "humiliation,
embarrassment and emotional distress."
In addition to actual and
punitive damages, they also sought reinstatement to their
positions at Serv-Air.
In August 1994, Bowman and Turner filed claims with the
Workers' Compensation Board (the Board).
Although the record of
those proceedings is not contained in the record on appeal, it is
apparent from the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
and the Board's opinions in Serv-Air's appeals, that the injuries
complained of in that forum arose from the same conduct
complained of in the instant action.
In the judgment from which
this appeal is taken, the trial court observed that the ALJ's and
the Board's opinions "reflect careful consideration of the same
evidence of sexual discrimination the Plaintiffs would now use to
obtain compensation for the same injury, emotional distress, for
1
The appellants have not challenged the propriety of the
trial court's order dismissing Christian as a defendant.
-2-
which they have already been compensated by Workers'
Compensation."
Indeed, Bowman and Turner received a small amount of
compensation as a result of their claims before the Board.
Bowman was awarded temporary total disability benefits from
February 17, 1994, until December 19, 1994, but she received no
award for permanent occupational disability.
The same ALJ heard
Turner's claim and, in addition to temporary total disability
benefits for the same period, determined that Turner had a
permanent occupational disability of 50%.2
He determined that
Turner had an active personality disorder that was exacerbated
"to the point that [Turner] could no longer function effectively
in the work place" due to "harassment or discriminatory
treatment” at work.
Serv-Air, relying on KRS 342.610(4), argued before the
Board that Bowman and Turner had waived any right to compensation
benefits when they filed this lawsuit in circuit court.
The
Board rejected this argument and held that the claims of Bowman
and Turner did “not involve an assertion of intentional injury
which would require election under KRS 342.610(4). . . ."
Further, relying on Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., Ky.,
840 S.W.2d 814 (1992), the Board determined that the workers'
compensation statutory scheme would not preclude "a claim for
2
Because the ALJ determined that three-fourths of the
occupational disability was active prior to the events which
generated the workers’ compensation claim, Turner was awarded
benefits for a 12.5% disability which amounted to $39.00 per week
for 425 weeks.
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work-related occupational disability caused by mental emotional
injury even assuming the civil action in circuit court asserts
employment discrimination."
Serv-Air did not seek further
appellate review of the Board's decision.3
On April 16, 1996, after the Board's opinions that
affirmed the ALJ's decisions were rendered, Serv-Air moved for
summary judgment in the instant action arguing that (1) the
"rules regarding the election of remedies under KRS 342 [ ]
preclude recovery under KRS 344 for an injury previously remedied
under KRS 342" and, (2) Bowman and Turner had failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish a viable claim under KRS 344.
The trial court agreed with Serv-Air's first argument, but
declined to address the merits of the second.4
In dismissing the
complaint, the trial court reasoned as follows:
While the Kentucky Civil Rights Act as
interpreted by Meyers may preserve an
injury for redress under the Civil
Rights Act despite a recovery under
3
Serv-Air states in its brief that it settled the workers'
compensation claim with Bowman and Turner. However, there is
nothing in the record to indicate that settlements occurred, or,
if so, what the terms of the settlements were.
4
Serv-Air contends that should this Court determine that the
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint under the election
of remedies doctrine, we should uphold its ruling on the basis
that Bowman and Turner have not made a "threshold showing of
actionable sexual harassment." "Claims of discriminatory
workplace harassment are rarely summarily dismissed where there
is any colorable evidence of such harassment." Kirkwood v.
Courier-Journal, Ky. App., 858 S.W.2d 194, 198 (1993). As noted
earlier herein, the trial court specifically declined to address
the merits of Serv-Air's arguments in this regard. We believe it
inappropriate for this Court to attempt to sift through the
evidence and determine whether "colorable evidence" exists when
the trial court has not yet done so.
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Workers' Compensation for another injury
arising from the same circumstances, it
does not give the litigant two bites at
the apple for the same injury. The
Court finds that election of remedies
bars the prosecution of this action.
Bowman and Turner argue in this appeal that the common
law doctrine concerning election of remedies should not be
applied as a bar to their recovery for the personal indignities
and other injuries they suffered due to the gender-based
discrimination they endured at Serv-Air.
We agree that the trial
court erred in summarily dismissing their complaint.
In Meyers supra, our Supreme Court made it clear that
claims for employment discrimination were not precluded by KRS
342.690, the exclusivity provision of our workers' compensation
scheme.
840 S.W.2d at 819.
The Court specifically held:
[T]he workers' compensation statute
preempts only common law tort claims and
does not preempt a statutory civil
rights claim. This Court must presume
that the General Assembly knew of the
Workers' Compensation Law preemption
doctrine when it created a private cause
of action for "actual damages" caused by
discrimination in the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act, and that it intended to
create an independent cause of action
notwithstanding that the two statutes
might provide alternative sources of
statutory relief in those cases where
the mental emotional injury inflicted
causes work-related occupational
disability.
Id.
As Meyers implicitly recognized, KRS 344 is designed to
compensate for work-related evils that clearly fall outside the
scope of our workers' compensation scheme.
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Thus, there is no
conflict between the two statutes, no need to choose between
giving full effect to either, and no need to invoke the election
of remedies doctrine.
That doctrine was described in Speck v.
Bowling, Ky. App., 892 S.W.2d 309 (1995), as follows: “‘The
doctrine of election of remedies is predicated on inconsistency
of remedies.
The test of inconsistency is whether the remedies
proceed from opposite and irreconcilable claims of right and must
be so inconsistent that a party could not logically assume to
follow one without renouncing the other.’” Id. at 311 (citation
omitted).
See also McNeal v. Armour and Co., Ky. App., 660
S.W.2d 957, 959 (1983), and Kirkwood, 858 S.W.2d at 197 (election
of remedies specifically determined inappropriate to deny
employee right to maintain KRS 344 civil rights action while
simultaneously pursuing grievance against employer under union
contract).
The fact that the damages may overlap does not
detract from the fact that the rights emanating under both KRS
342 and 344 are "independent" and not inconsistent.
at 819.
Meyers supra
Further, there is nothing in KRS 344 which would
restrict Bowman's or Turner's pursuit of these rights merely
because they sought workers' compensation benefits.
See e.g.,
McNeal, 660 S.W.2d at 959.
Meyers does indicate in dicta that the doctrine "might
preclude" a recovery under KRS 344 for the "same" injury where an
employee has been "previously compensated under the Workers'
Compensation Law."
840 S.W.2d at 819. Bowman and Turner agree
that to the extent they have been compensated for lost wages and
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medical expenses, they may not receive further compensation in
this action.5
However, they are seeking damages for intangible
injuries such as the loss of personal dignity, loss of selfesteem, embarrassment and humiliation.
Clearly, these injuries
are not the "same" injuries for which Bowman and Turner were
compensated before the Board even though the injuries may have
arisen from the same wrongful conduct.
Finally, Serv-Air argues that the waiver provisions of
KRS 342.610(4) and the holding in Zurich American Insurance
Company v. Brierly, Ky., 936 S.W.2d 561 (1996), require the
dismissal of Bowman's and Turner's complaint.
KRS 342.610(4) is
an exception to the exclusivity provisions of the workers'
compensation scheme which allows a claimant to pursue common law
tort actions for intentionally caused injuries.
We agree with
the Board that this statute has no application in the context of
civil rights violations arising in the work place.
Indeed, we
are confident that if this statute had any application to
injuries resulting from employment discrimination, our Supreme
Court would have discussed that application in Meyers.
In any
event, since this action was filed prior to any proceeding before
the Board, a plain reading of the statute would compel a
5
Serv-Air’s contention that Bowman and Turner will receive
double recovery for their injuries is simply not justified. Any
sums awarded by the jury for elements of damage for which the
appellants have been partially or totally compensated, i.e.,
medical expenses or lost wages, can easily be reduced by ServAir’s post-verdict motion for a credit or set-off. See Russell
v. Able, Ky. App., 931 S.W.2d 460 (1996); Old Republic Insurance
Company v. Ashley, Ky. App., 722 S.W.2d 55 (1986); and KRS
342.700.
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determination that Bowman and Turner, by first filing an action
in circuit court, waived any right to workers' compensation
benefits.
In fact, Serv-Air made that very argument before the
Board which resolved the issue against the employer.
Serv-Air's
failure to seek appellate review of the Board's determination has
resulted in the waiver of any error in this regard.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court
is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING.
I fully agree with the
majority's conclusion that the doctrine of election of remedies
does not bar Bowman and Turner from pursuing a sexual harassment
action after they have recovered under their workers'
compensation claims.
Claims brought under the Workers'
Compensation Act involve different factual and legal issues from
those brought pursuant to KRS Chapter 344.
Although some of the
evidence may be the same in both actions, the claims are
distinct, and therefore not exclusive.
I write separately to address the issue of damages.
In
the workers' compensation actions, Bowman and Turner each
recovered medical expenses incurred for psychiatric injuries and
depression caused by their work environment.
The ALJ also
awarded income benefits based upon their temporary total
disability from February 17, 1994 through December 19, 1994.
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Potentially, these items may overlap with those recovered in a
sexual harassment judgment.
Clearly, Bowman and Turner are not entitled to a double
recovery for those items of damages.
Yet at the same time, the
workers' compensation awards were based upon entirely different
factors than a sexual harassment judgment would be.
damages must be to make the plaintiff whole.
The focus of
Great American
Insurance Companies v. Witt, Ky. App., No. 96-CA-3423 (February
13, 1998) (finality endorsement granted April 29, 1998).
Consequently, should the issue of liability be submitted to jury,
the instructions on the issue of damages must be specific.
First, the trial court must determine whether any
damages sought by Bowman and Turner in their sexual harassment
claims were awarded in the workers' compensation action.
Further, Serv-Air must request separate instructions for each
item of damages.
Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., Ky., 840
S.W.2d 814, 818 (1992).
Lastly, the trial court must determine
how those items covered by the workers' compensation award should
be presented to the jury.
If the evidence shows that Bowman and Turner were
entirely compensated in the workers' compensation action for an
item of damages (i.e.; past medical expenses), then that item
should be excluded from the jury instructions.
However, if the
evidence shows that they were not compensated, or only partially
compensated for certain damages, (i.e.; lost wages), then those
items should be presented to the jury.
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Serv-Air may be entitled
to set-off or to subrogation for damages recovered in the sexual
harassment claim which it previously paid in the workers'
compensation claim.
In any event, upon remand the parties and
the trial court should pay close attention to how the issue of
damages is presented to the jury to prevent a double recovery.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I am unable to agree with the judgment
of the majority of the Court, and
although I think it useless and
undesirable, as a rule, to express
dissent, I feel bound to do so in this
case and to give my reasons for it.
Northern Securities Company v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, 400 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
The actions complained of by appellants were
undoubtedly intentional, and are imputed to appellee through
operation of law.
KRS 342.610(4) provides that, in the case of
injuries caused to employees "through the deliberate intention"
of the employer, the employee
may take under this chapter [the
Workers' Compensation Act], or in lieu
thereof, have a cause of action at law
against the employer as if this chapter
had not been passed, for such damage so
sustained by the employee. . . . If a
claim is made for the payment of
compensation or any other benefit
provided by this chapter, all rights to
sue the employer for damages on account
of such injury. . . shall be waived as
to all persons.
(Emphasis added.)
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Such is the law applicable to this case.
"The section
of the statute gives the injured employee. . . an election as to
the form in which to proceed.
It does not afford an opportunity
to proceed in both forms and elect the judgment or award that is
most beneficial."
Zurich American Insurance Company v. Brierly,
Ky., 936 S.W.2d 561, 562 (1996).
Appellants admittedly accepted the benefits of their
Workers' Compensation claims; they may not now attempt to recover
a more beneficial judgment in the civil action.
I would affirm
the trial court, exercising the proper judicial function, rather
than intruding upon the General Assembly's domain as the majority
has done.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Hon. David R. Marshall
Lexington, KY
Hon. Debra H. Dawahare
Lexington, KY
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