RANDY LEE MCDOWELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: June 26, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2653-MR
RANDY LEE MCDOWELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00056
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge, ABRAMSON, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Randy Lee McDowell appeals from a conviction
for criminal attempt to commit first-degree assault and a
resulting ten-year sentence.
McDowell claims that he was denied
due process when the trial court erroneously (1) failed to
instruct the jury on all lesser included offenses supported by
the evidence at trial; (2) failed to instruct on every essential
element of the offense; and (3) violated his right to be free
from double jeopardy by holding a trial for attempted murder
following his guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI),
both of which constitute the same offense.
The Commonwealth
counters that McDowell is not entitled to relief because he did
not preserve the claims for appellate review.
In his brief filed
with the court, McDowell acknowledges that the grounds for his
appeal were not preserved in the trial court but contends that
review is appropriate pursuant to RCr 10.26.
Having reviewed the
evidence presented at the trial and the applicable law, we
reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
On May 11, 1996, Office Bill Hensley of the Ashland
Police Department was on bike patrol in front of the Ashland
Hotel when he heard tires squealing.
He rode to the back of the
parking lot where he saw McDowell driving a white Camaro with its
headlights off.
McDowell was speeding up to the back of a van
several times as the van was leaving the parking lot.
McDowell
then turned the Camaro in the direction of Hensley, who told him
twice to stop.
Hensley told McDowell to stop a third time but
McDowell gunned the engine and his car lurched forward about two
car lengths.
As Hensley pedalled his bike away from the Camaro,
the Camaro hit the bike's back tire, spinning the bike and
knocking it and Hensley to the ground.
Hensley, uninjured,
jumped up and arrested McDowell for wanton endangerment and DUI
third offense.
McDowell pled guilty to the DUI charge in Boyd District
Court.
The Boyd County Grand Jury indicted him on one count of
attempted murder.
At the September 4, 1996 trial, Hensley
testified that he believed that McDowell had intentionally tried
to run him down with his car.
The trial court instructed the
jury on criminal attempt to commit murder and criminal attempt to
commit first-degree assault.
The record does not reflect that
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the trial court considered instructing the jury on other offenses
or that McDowell's counsel requested jury instructions on lesser
included offenses.
After the jury had deliberated less than one hour, the
jury asked the trial court whether there was a lesser offense
than attempted first-degree assault of which they could convict
McDowell.
After the trial court told the jury they had only
three options - not guilty, attempted murder and attempted firstdegree assault, they found McDowell guilty of attempted assault.
Following the penalty phase of the trial, the trial court
followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced McDowell to a
ten-year prison term.
McDowell first asserts that he was denied due process
when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on all lesser
included offenses supported by the evidence at trial.
Although
this issue was not properly preserved for appellate review under
RCr 9.54(2), McDowell contends that the trial committed
substantial error by failing to instruct the jury on other
offenses.
RCr 10.26 states:
A palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.
In Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996), the
Kentucky Supreme Court stated the process for deciding whether
palpable error has occurred:
"upon consideration of the whole
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case, the reviewing court must conclude that a substantial
possibility exists that the result would have been different in
order to grant relief."
We believe that palpable error occurred in this case
when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on offenses
which were raised by the evidence.
See Carpenter v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 771 S.W.2d 822 (1989).
The evidence supported
a jury instruction for the offense of criminal attempt to commit
second-degree assault.
Hensley testified that when he made eye
contact with McDowell and on the basis of McDowell's actions, he
believed that McDowell was intending to run him over.
KRS
508.020(1)(b) defines one type of second-degree assault as
intentionally causing physical injury to another person with a
dangerous instrument.
"A vehicle may be used in such a manner as
to constitute a dangerous instrument."
Wyatt v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 832 (1987).
Hensley testified that McDowell was driving his Camaro
at about ten miles per hour at the time the Camaro struck the
rear of Hensley's bike.
From this testimony, it is reasonable to
infer that McDowell did not intend to run Hensley over, but
instead intended to inflict some physical injury, though not
serious physical injury, upon Hensley.
If the proof at a new
trial is substantially the same as it was at McDowell's first
trial, an instruction for attempted second-degree assault will be
necessary.
Additional proof may also necessitate instructing the
jury on other lesser attempted assault offenses.
Two other events support our conclusion that it was
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palpable error for the court to fail to include an instruction
for a lesser included offense.
Hensley arrested McDowell for DUI
and wanton endangerment at the scene of the collision.
Hensley's
initial assessment of the situation thus was to charge a less
serious offense.
In addition, the jury asked the trial court
whether it could convict McDowell of a lesser offense than
attempted assault in the first degree.
The jury itself
apparently believed that the charges submitted to it were more
serious than the proof warranted.
McDowell's second argument is that the trial court
violated his due process rights when it failed to instruct the
jury on every essential element of attempted first-degree
assault.
Specifically, he argues that the instruction failed to
require that the jury find that McDowell intentionally attempted
to cause serious physical injury to Hensley by means of a
dangerous instrument.
The Commonwealth concedes and we agree
that an instruction on criminal attempt to commit first-degree
assault must include the use of a dangerous instrument as an
element of the offense.
On remand, any instructions on first-
degree assault should be drafted accordingly.
McDowell's final argument is that double jeopardy
principles precluded the Commonwealth from prosecuting him for
attempted murder after he pled guilty to DUI third offense in
Boyd District Court.
Although this issue too was not preserved,
we can address the merits of the double jeopardy claim.
Sherley
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 558 S.W.2d 615 (1977).
In Polk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 231, 233
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(1984) the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the rule in Kentucky
governing the prosecution for multiple offenses:
In Kentucky, the rules governing the
prosecution for multiple offenses has been
codified in KRS 505.020. Sections 1(a) and
(2)(a) & (b) state that when a "single course
of conduct" establishes the commission of
more than one offense, a defendant may not be
convicted of more than one of the offenses if
"one offense is included in the other." An
offense is so included when it is established
by proof of the "same or less than all the
facts" required to establish the commission
of the offenses charged.
This statute is simply a codification of
the rule laid down in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 306 (1932). In that case the Supreme
Court held that:
[t]he applicable rule is that where
the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or
only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the
other does not. Id. at 304, 52 S.
Ct. at 182.
In Polk the defendants were convicted of both first-degree
burglary and first-degree assault.
The Court concluded that
convictions for both crimes were proper when the evidence
disclosed "additional facts" comprising a second crime committed
"after perpetrating" the first crime.
The Supreme Court noted
that to hold otherwise in such situations would insure that the
perpetrator "would have a free ride to commit other crimes . . .
because the second crime would have merged into the first."
In this case, Hensley testified that when he first
persuaded McDowell to stop his car, which preceded the bike
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Id.
bumping incident, he realized that McDowell was not in control of
his vehicle.
Thus, Hensley was aware that McDowell had committed
DUI even before McDowell gunned the engine and lurched his car at
Hensley.
The offense of DUI had occurred prior to Hensley being
knocked from his bike.
The activity in the parking lot was a
continuing course of conduct by McDowell and he can be held
responsible for each criminal act committed there.
Commonwealth, Ky., 922 S.W.2d 371 (1996).
Baker v.
Double jeopardy does
not preclude a retrial of these events.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the September 20,
1996 Judgment of Boyd Circuit Court and remand for a new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Shepherdsville, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Dina Abby Jones
Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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