HENRY BOSTON HARRIS, JR. V. CLARA STEWART, LEON BOSTON, ARNOLD CASSADY, IRENE CASSADY, PEGGY SAUNDERS, ROY SAUNDERS, CARRIE LEE ZAHN, CURTIS R. ZAHN, LLOYD BOSTON, FRANCES BOSTON, RUNELL PARKE, JAMES S. PARKE, MARCELLA LOVE, ADRIE L. LOVE, LINDA E. HUIZENGA, and CARY L. HUIZENGA
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RENDERED:
March 6, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
96-CA-2457-MR
HENRY BOSTON HARRIS, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM METCALFE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BENJAMIN L. DICKINSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-0117
V.
CLARA STEWART, LEON BOSTON, ARNOLD CASSADY,
IRENE CASSADY, PEGGY SAUNDERS, ROY SAUNDERS,
CARRIE LEE ZAHN, CURTIS R. ZAHN, LLOYD BOSTON,
FRANCES BOSTON, RUNELL PARKE, JAMES S. PARKE,
MARCELLA LOVE, ADRIE L. LOVE, LINDA E.
HUIZENGA, and CARY L. HUIZENGA
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
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COMBS, DYCHE, and MILLER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Henry Boston Harris, Jr., appeals from a judgment
of the Metcalfe Circuit Court entered July 3, 1996, that
determined that he was not the heir of Henry Boston.
Harris also
appeals the denial of his subsequent motion for a new trial.
affirm.
We
Henry Boston died intestate on May 22, 1992.
Lloyd
Boston, Henry Boston's nephew, was appointed administrator of the
estate on August 26, 1992.
On September 26, 1992, the
administrator petitioned the Metcalfe District Court to authorize
the sale of real property owned by Henry Boston.1
Thereafter, on December 3, 1992, a complaint was filed
in the circuit court seeking an adjudication that Henry Boston
Harris, Jr., was the sole heir and putative child of Henry
Boston.
Boston's heirs-at-law, including his surviving siblings
and several nieces and nephews, were named defendants in the
action.
Following a period of discovery, Harris filed a motion
for summary judgment.
The motion was ultimately denied and the
matter proceeded to trial.
After considering the evidence, a
jury found that Harris was not the heir of Henry Boston.
On appeal, Harris raises three issues.
First, he
contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant his
motion for summary judgment.
Next, having argued that KRS
391.105 (governing the rights of a person born out of wedlock to
participate in intestate succession) is unconstitutional, he
maintains that the court erred in upholding that statute.
Finally, Harris maintains that the trial court erred by failing
1
On October 27, 1992, a petition to adjudicate the person or
persons entitled to the real property passing by intestate
succession was filed in the Metcalfe District Court on behalf of
Henry Boston Harris, Jr.
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to grant a new trial due to juror misconduct.
We shall consider
each of these allegations of error in turn.
Harris argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion for summary judgment.
In support, he emphasizes that the
only issue of fact submitted to the jury -- whether Henry Boston
Harris, Jr., was born to Henry Boston -- was the subject of a
specific written request for admission to which the defendants
filed neither a timely objection nor a response.
We disagree.
A proper request for admissions is often an effective
tool in pretrial practice and procedure.2
Once a party has been
served with a request for admissions, that request cannot simply
be ignored with impunity.
Pursuant to CR 36.01, the failure of a
party to respond to such a request means that the party admits
the truth of the allegations asserted.
See, Commonwealth of Ky.
Dep't. of Highways v. Compton, Ky., 387 S.W.2d 314 (1964).
Furthermore, any matter admitted under the rule is held to be
conclusively established unless the trial court permits the
withdrawal or amendment of the admissions.
CR 36.02.
Thus, an
inattentive party served with a request for admissions may run
2
CR 36.01(2) provides in part as follows:
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be
separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless,
within 30 days after service of the request, or within
such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the
party requesting the admission a written answer or
objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party
or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the
time, a defendant shall not be required to serve
answers or objections before the expiration of 45 days
after service of the summons upon him.
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the risk of having judgment entered against him based upon the
failure to respond.
(1995).
See, Lewis v. Kenady, Ky., 894 S.W.2d 619
Pursuant to the rule, however, the trial court retains
wide discretion to permit a party's response to a request for
admissions to be filed outside the 30 or 45-day time limit
delineated by the rule.
Turning to the facts before us, we note that along with
the complaint filed in December 1992, each of the defendants
below was individually served with Harris's request for
admissions.
While in their collective answer the defendants
denied that Harris was the heir of Henry Boston, no specific
responses to the requests for admissions were filed -- nor were
objections lodged.
On March 15, 1993, Harris filed his motion
for summary judgment and scheduled it to be heard on March 29,
1993.
In his memorandum, Harris pointed specifically to the
failure of the defendants to respond to the request for
admissions.
Appellees' brief notes that counsel for appellant
never furnished to counsel for appellees a copy of the requests
for admissions propounded to his clients.
On March 26, 1993, the defendants filed an extensive
response to the motion, arguing that the issue of whether Harris
was the heir of Henry Boston had been denied in the answer and
had been vigorously contested throughout discovery.
The trial
court summarily denied Harris's motion.
On January 16, 1996, Harris renewed his motion for
summary judgment, again referring to the failure of the
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defendants to respond to the request for admissions.3
On January
30, 1996, the defendants below finally filed a response to the
request for admissions.
And, on February 5, 1996, the trial
While acourtodenied Harris's renewed motionmforisummary judgment.due, it
resp nse to
quest f r ad iss ons was lon over
is clear from a review of the record that the trial court
permitted the defendants to file their response out of time.
It
was within the court's sound discretion do to so, and the
resulting decision to deny the motion for summary judgment cannot
be reversed on this basis.
Despite the obvious tardiness of the
defendants in responding to the request for admissions, we note
that Harris has not argued that the delay in securing the
responses resulted in any prejudice to the presentation of his
case.
Next, Harris argues that the trial court erred by
failing to conclude that KRS 391.105 is unconstitutional.
Again,
we disagree.
3
The appellees argued below that their timely filed answer
constituted a sufficient response to Harris's request for
admissions. The trial court held otherwise and ordered that the
requests for admissions were to be answered separately. Without
citing any authority for the proposition, the appellees continue
to insist on appeal that the answer alone was an adequate
response to Harris's requests.
CR 36 makes no exception to the requirement that responses
or objections must be made to proper requests for admissions.
Furthermore, a party's answer to a complaint serves a function
completely apart from his response to a request for admissions.
And, the consequences of failing to respond appropriately to the
complaint and to a request for admissions are quite different.
A party who fails to admit the truth of any matter as requested
under CR 36, for example, risks being ordered to pay the opposing
party's litigation expenses if that matter is subsequently proved
at trial. CR 37.03.
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KRS 391.105(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
For the purpose of intestate succession, if a
relationship of parent and child must be established to
determine succession by, through, or from a person, a
person born out of wedlock is a child of the natural
mother. That person is also a child of the natural
father if:
* * * *
(b) In determining the right of the child or its
descendants to inherit from or through the father:
* * * *
(2) There has been an adjudication of
paternity after the death of the father based upon
clear and convincing proof . . . .
Harris maintains that the proof requirement set out at
KRS 391.105(b)(2) is unconstitutional.
Given the facts of this
case, he contends, the Commonwealth has no "compelling state
interest" sufficient to justify imposing a greater burden of
proof of paternity upon an individual born out of wedlock.
He
argues that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 3 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
At the threshold of every review of the statutes
enacted by the General Assembly is a presumption of
constitutional validity.
and prerogative.
validity."
(1994).
"[T]he legislature has wide latitude
With this also comes the presumption of
Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 878 S.W.2d 801, 802
The appellant's assertion that this statute violates
equal protection guarantees has been addressed several times.
The standard has been stated as follows:
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Our General Assembly, under the Equal Protection
Clause, has great latitude to enact legislation that
may appear to affect similarly situated people
differently. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 963, 102
S.Ct. at 2843. Legislative distinctions between
persons, under traditional equal protection analysis,
must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
end. Id.; Chapman v. Eastern Coal Corp., Ky., 519
S.W.2d 390 (1975). Under this test, statutorily
created classifications will be held invalid when these
classifications are totally unrelated to the state's
purpose in their enactment, and when there is no other
conceivable purpose for their continued viability.
Clements v. Fashing, supra, Id., citing McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs., 394 U.S. 802, 808-809, 89
S.Ct. 1404, 1408-1409, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969); Kentucky
Association of Chiropractors, Inc. v. Jefferson County
Medical Society, Ky., 549 S.W.2d 817 (1977).
Chapman v. Gorman, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 232, 239-240 (1992); see also,
Commonwealth v. Wasson, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 487 (1992).
In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766, 97 S.Ct. 1459,
1463, 52 L.Ed.2d 31, 37 (1977), the Supreme Court wrote as
follows:
In weighing the constitutional sufficiency of [the
justifications for the statute] we are guided by our
previous decisions involving equal protection
challenges to laws discriminating on the basis of
illegitimacy. [Footnote omitted.] "[T]his Court
requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification
bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose." Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164, 172, 31 L.Ed.2d 768, 92 S.Ct. 1400 (1972).
As applied to inheritance statutes, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the State may apply "a more demanding standard"
for illegitimate children who seek to inherit from their father's
estate in order to promote the efficient administration of a
decedent's estate and to avoid spurious claims arising out of
paternity actions.
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518,
58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978).
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It is true that KRS 391.105(b)(2) places special
burdens on those born out of wedlock.
However, in view of the
fact that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
there are important state interests which can justify treating
legitimate and illegitimate children differently, Harris has
failed to bear his burden of proof that the statute is
unconstitutional.
We find that the provisions of the statute
bear a rational and substantial relationship to the furtherance
of a legitimate state purpose.4
There are significant problems associated with proving
paternity where, as here, the putative father is deceased.
In
view of these problems, KRS 391.105(b)(2) was enacted by the
legislature with the aim of insuring the orderly disposition of
property at death and assuring the dependability of titles to
property passing through intestacy.
The requirements of the
statute, including the burden of establishing a posthumous claim
of paternity through clear and convincing evidence, does not
amount to an insurmountable barrier preventing those born out of
wedlock from sharing in the father's estate.
Instead, the
statutory provision under attack serves to protect the integrity
of decedents' estates and the citizens of the Commonwealth.
4
The
It should be noted that "[a] higher level of scrutiny must
be applied under the Equal Protection Clause, when challenged
statutes burden 'suspect classes' of persons or what is deemed a
constitutional 'fundamental right.'" (Citation omitted).
Chapman v. Gorman, 839 S.W.2d at 240. In this case, pursuant to
constitutional analysis, the statute does not burden a "suspect
class" nor a "fundamental constitutional right."
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provision is substantially related to legitimate state interests
and does not violate equal protection guarantees.
Harris also attacks KRS 391.105(b)(2) as being
violative of the separation of powers doctrine emanating from
Sections 27, 28, and 116 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Because
the statute makes reference to the burden of proof, Harris
contends, the
legislature's enactment runs afoul of the Kentucky
Supreme Court's authority to prescribe "rules of practice and
procedure for the Court of Justice."
We disagree.
Standards of proof governing civil and criminal cases
are routinely established by statute.
It is within the
legislature's power to enact such provisions.
Constitutional Law ยง 851 (1979).
16A
Am.Jur.2d
We do not believe that the
requirement that a posthumous claim of paternity be established
by clear and convincing evidence encroaches upon the Supreme
Court's exclusive authority to dictate rules of practice and
procedure; nor does the Supreme Court itself.
Indeed, this very
statutory requirement that posthumous paternity claims be proven
by "clear and convincing" proof appears to emanate from the
Kentucky Supreme Court's holding in Fykes v. Clark, Ky., 635
S.W.2d 316 (1982), which pre-dated the current statute by nearly
six years.
Because the legislature had failed to revise the
former intestacy statute (held invalid in Pendleton v. Pendleton,
Ky., 560 S.W.2d 538 (1977)), the Supreme Court was forced to set
forth a new standard of proof to determine the inheritance rights
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of an illegitimate child whose father died intestate in Fykes.5
In 1988, the General Assembly incorporated the Fykes holding into
statute, enacting the current version of KRS 391.105(b)(2) (the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard of Fykes).
In view of
this history, we cannot conclude that the legislature exceeded
its authority in enacting the provision nor that it impliedly
usurped the authority of the Supreme Court.
We have read the record very carefully and are
cognizant of the vast amount of testimony presented to the jury.
Many witnesses were called to give extensive testimony concerning
Harris's paternity.
Witnesses for appellant were most convincing
on behalf of Harris.
However, numerous witnesses for appellees
presented highly contradictory testimony.
Whether the "clear and
convincing" standard was met was a task to be determined by the
jury, which certainly had ample evidence upon which to base its
verdict.
We cannot find that the jury clearly erred in its
determination so as to compel entry of judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
Finally, Harris maintains that the trial court erred by
failing to grant a new trial due to juror misconduct.
agree.
We do not
Harris claims that he is entitled to a new trial on the
grounds that a juror, William Clayton Neal, engaged in misconduct
by failing to make full disclosure during voir dire.
5
Had Neal
The Fykes Court noted that clear and convincing does not
necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there
is proof of a probative and substantial nature carrying the
weight of evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily prudentminded people. 635 S.W.2d at 318.
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responded appropriately to questions addressed to the panel on
voir dire, Harris contends, he (Neal) would have used a
peremptory strike to eliminate him from the jury.
Harris charges
that juror Neal failed to acknowledge having had a deed prepared
for him by Herb Sparks, the defendants' attorney.
He also argues
that Neal was required to disclose the fact that his wife worked
for Metcalfe County Nursing Home where Sparks served on the Board
of Directors.
Accompanying Harris's motion were supporting
affidavits, which were countered by a memorandum and affidavits
submitted by the defendants' attorney.
Upon considering the
matter, the trial court rendered its findings of fact and
conclusions, which are not clearly erroneous and do not reveal an
abuse of discretion.
As the Supreme Court has recently noted:
We can hardly conceive of a circumstance in which
greater deference should be granted to the findings of
the trial court . . . . The trial judge was immersed
in the case and it would be utterly extraordinary for
an appellate court to disregard his view as to
questions of candor and impartiality of a juror.
Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 243, 246 (1996), citing
Riley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 271 S.W.2d 882 (1954).
The judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas W. Davis
Glasgow, KY
Herbert B. Sparks
Edmonton, KY
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