ROGER BROWN v. BOURBON COUNTY GOVERNMENT and DIVERSIFIED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC.
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RENDERED: December 23, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1996-CA-002132-MR
ROGER BROWN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID L. KNOX, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CI-000144
v.
BOURBON COUNTY GOVERNMENT and
DIVERSIFIED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order of the Bourbon
Circuit Court, entered July 3, 1996.
Roger Brown (Brown) argues
that the circuit court erred in granting Diversified Financial
Systems, Inc. (DFSI) and Bourbon County Government summary
judgment, dismissing Brown's counterclaims and cross-claims
against DFSI, and denying Brown summary judgment.
Brown
maintains that the court's rulings violated his civil rights and
right to due process.
We disagree with all of appellant's
contentions, and, therefore, affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are not
easily discernible.
Apparently, Mid Central Construction Inc.,
of which Brown was a shareholder, planned to construct
multifamily homes in Paris, Kentucky.
Mid Central sought
financing from Corinth Deposit National Bank (CDNB), who
suggested Mid Central seek an indemnitor.
On March 9, 1989, Fay
Sams became that indemnitor and entered into a construction note
with CDNB for $105,000.
Sams.
Apparently, Brown was an indemnitor of
Although over $60,000 was disbursed by CDNB to pay
materialmen, the vendors were not paid.
By July 1989, it was
clear to the bank that no progress on the construction project
was being made.
Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. (Lowe's) filed a
mechanic's lien in September 1989 for over $10,000.
1989, Lowe's filed suit to foreclose on the lien.
In November
The new
Corinth bank was named a defendant and cross-claimed against Sams
for breach of contract for allowing the lien by Lowe's to be
filed.
Sams cross-claimed against the bank for breach of
contract--failure to properly pay invoices presented to it.
CDNB was declared insolvent by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency on April 19, 1990, and the Federal
Depositors Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed its
receiver.
The FDIC was substituted for the bank in the case.
On
the same day, the loan, which is the subject of this case, was
sold by the receiver to the FDIC in its corporate capacity.
filed a claim for damages with the FDIC on March 6, 1991.
Sams
On
November 12, 1991, Sams invoked the guaranty of indemnity clause
against Brown, and six days later, deeded the Paris property to
Brown.
The FDIC assigned the mortgage to DFSI in October 1993.
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The procedural history is equally confusing.
On
February 27, 1991, the U.S. District Court granted the FDIC and
Lowe's summary judgment against Sams because Sams failed to
respond to the motions.
It then entered an April 3, 1991
judgment in favor of the FDIC, against Sams, for over $70,000 and
gave the FDIC a lien on the Paris property.
In June 1993, Bourbon County, by the Kentucky Secretary
of Revenue, sued, in Bourbon Circuit Court, Sams, Brown, and the
FDIC for taxes levied on the property between 1989 and 1992.
The
FDIC answered and filed a cross-claim against Sams and Brown,
asserting a superior right to the property based on the federal
court judgment.
Brown filed an answer, counterclaims, and cross-claims
against various parties, including the FDIC, Bourbon County, and
DFSI.
He claimed that Bourbon County conspired to collect taxes
with malice; that the FDIC willfully neglected and failed to sell
the construction loan commitment to Sams for a higher price than
that which they sold it to DFSI, without any notice to Sams; and
that DFSI acted in bad faith, fraudulently, and was not a holder
in due course.
DFSI moved to strike the counterclaims and cross-
claims for failure to state a claim for which relief might be
granted.
DFSI filed a third-party complaint in April 1994
against Sams and Brown, asking the court to recognize the federal
court judgment granting it (through its assignor, FDIC) a
superior lien on the property.
The FDIC moved to remove its case
to U.S. District Court in May 1994.
After the removal to federal court, Bourbon Circuit
Court ruled, on August 11, 1994, upon DFSI's outstanding motion
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and granted the motion to dismiss based on the April 3, 1991
Order of the U.S. District Court, which, the court found,
addressed the same issues raised by Brown in his counterclaims
and cross-claims.
The court denied Brown's motion to reconsider
its order.
On January 11, 1995, the federal court apparently
issued an Opinion and Order1 dismissing the FDIC as a party to
the action because the action against it, by Brown, was time
barred.
FDIC was no longer the receiver at the time Brown filed
his action.
Brown sought reconsideration of the January 11, 1995
Opinion and Order dismissing the FDIC as a party to his action.
In a July 3, 1995 Opinion and Order, the federal court made
clear:
[T]he FDIC was not dismissed as a party to
this action for the technical reason that
Brown had not filed a response to the FDIC's
motion to dismiss. Instead, the dismissal of
the FDIC from this action was based on the
merits of its motion that the claim filed
against it on March 14, 1994, by Roger Brown
was not subject to judicial review because
this claim had not been filed with the FDIC
as Receiver during the time the FDIC was
Receiver for the Corinth Deposit National
Bank. As this claim was time-barred, the
fact that Brown had filed no response to the
FDIC's motion to dismiss was irrelevant; the
FDIC was dismissed from this action because
Brown's claim against it was not timely
filed.
In the meantime, on January 23, 1995, the action had
been remanded to the Bourbon Circuit Court as a sanction for the
1
We use the word "apparently" because the January 11, 1995
Opinion and Order is not part of the record. It is the
appellant's duty to designate the record. However, because a
July 3, 1995 Opinion and Order of the federal court references
the earlier Opinion and Order, we assume that it exists.
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parties' failure to comply with an Order for Meeting and Report.
DFSI renewed its motion to dismiss Brown's claims
against it in state court in March 1995.
In May 1996, Bourbon
County moved for summary judgment and order of sale, DFSI moved
to convert its prior motion to a motion for summary judgment, and
Brown moved for summary judgment against DFSI for failure to
answer his interrogatories.
In its July 3, 1996 Order, the Bourbon Circuit Court
ruled on these motions.
The court denied Brown's motion for
summary judgment because it had dismissed Brown's counterclaims
and cross-claims on August 11, 1994, and, thus, DFSI was under no
obligation to respond to his interrogatories.
Bourbon County's motion was granted because neither
Brown nor Sams had ever appealed the decision to increase the
assessment on the property and, thus, had not exhausted their
administrative remedies.
Therefore, they were not entitled to
seek judicial review of the property valuation administrator's
decision.
In addition, the court found that Brown's counterclaim
against Bourbon failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.
As to DFSI's motion for summary judgment, the court
concluded:
[T]his Court is aware of the Order filed by
the Federal District Court on February 27,
1991 in the case of Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.
v. Midcentral Construction, Inc., et al, an
action in which Mr. and Mrs. Sams were
Defendants, which granted a Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by the FDIC. In
reading the Memoranda submitted by the FDIC
in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment
in that case, it appears that the very issues
raised in this case were in issue in that
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case. The Federal District Court's
February 27, 1991 Order cites that Mr. Sams
failed to make any response to FDIC's Motion.
In view of that, since it appears to this
Court that those issues were raised in the
context of that Federal Court action, and
since it further appears that Mr. Brown and
Mr. Sams stand in the same shoes with respect
to those issues, this Court believes that the
doctrines of res adjudicata and collateral
estoppel lead to a conclusion that those
issues have been resolved, and are precluded
from being raised in this action.
Brown's arguments are not easily decipherable.
He
clearly contests the circuit court's award of summary judgment to
DFSI on the basis of res judicata.
He argues that he was not a
party to the U.S. District Court case brought by Lowe's; he was
not in privity with Sams, who was a party thereto; Sams did not
have a full and free opportunity to present his case; and the
case was not fully and fairly litigated.
We believe the circuit court correctly found the
doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable.
Under this
principle, a person who was not a party to the former action may
assert res judicata against a party to that action so as to
preclude the relitigation of an issue determined in the prior
action.
Sedley v. City of West Buechel, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 556
(1970).
The elements essential to invoke collateral estoppel
are:
identity of issues; a final judgment on the merits;
adjudication of an issue essential to the determination of the
former case with the estopped party, who was given a full and
fair opportunity to litigate; and a prior losing litigant.
Moore
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 954 S.W.2d 317 (1997).
The initial action of the FDIC in federal court against
Sams alleged that Sams owed it over $70,000 as a matter of law
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for failure to use the disbursed loan amounts for material in the
construction project.
The certificate of service appended to the
motion for summary judgment shows that Sams' attorney was served.
Therefore, Sams had a full and fair opportunity to present his
case.
Whether he took advantage of that opportunity, and the
reason why he may have failed to do so, are irrelevant.
Moreover, the same issues raised in the prior proceeding are what
Brown is attempting to argue in the state case.
were in privity.
Sams and Brown
They share the same legal right and interest.
BTC Leasing, Inc. v. Martin, Ky. App., 685 S.W.2d 191, 198
(1984).
As such, Brown is a prior losing litigant.
Whether the prior judgment is considered a judgment on
the merits is the pivotal question.
The case of BTC Leasing
involved an original default judgment.
court applied collateral estoppel.
In the second action, the
Our Court was dubious as to
whether the default judgment constituted a judgment on the
merits:
We question whether the original judgment in
Wayne Circuit Court is sufficiently "on the
merits" so as to preclude its relitigation by
the appellant. That judgment was rendered in
default against William Burkett who by then
had completely divested himself of any
interest in the houseboat and had no dealings
whatsoever with the appellant. We would be
very reluctant to hold a judgment of such
dubious quality as binding upon the
appellant.
Id. at 197.
We believe BTC Leasing is distinguishable because in
the case sub judice, Sams had good reason to defend against the
claims of Lowe's and the FDIC.
Burkett did not, as he had
already divested himself of any interest in the property at hand.
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Sams did not invoke the indemnity clause and deed the property to
Brown until November 1991, whereas the federal court's judgment
was rendered in February 1991.
Thus, the summary judgment in
this case was less dubious than the default judgment in BTC
Leasing.
Moreover, we do not want to promote a policy which
would encourage a party not to respond to one suit and ensuing
motions so as to avoid collateral estoppel in a subsequent
action.
Consequently, we believe that the Bourbon Circuit Court
correctly invoked collateral estoppel to both preclude Brown's
claims against DFSI and to grant DFSI summary judgment.
This
determination also answers Brown's contentions that the court
should have addressed whether DFSI was a holder in due course and
that the court should have permitted the case to go to trial.
Brown also maintains the court erred in finding he
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before being
allowed to contest the tax assessment.
KRS 133.120(1) provides
that an aggrieved taxpayer may appeal to the board of assessment
appeals.
If unhappy with the board's decision, Brown would then
have to appeal to the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals.
133.120(6).
KRS
Brown did not take this mandatory administrative
route, and does not deny his failure to do so.
Since the
exhaustion of administrative remedies is dictated to prevent
premature interference with agency processes, the circuit court
was correct in granting Bourbon County summary judgment.
Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Moore, 803 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Ky. 1992).
Brown also asserts that the court erred in granting
Edward Lorenz, the attorney for CDNB and the FDIC, summary
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judgment.
Brown did not make Lorenz an appellee to his appeal.
Thus, because of Brown's failure to name a necessary party, we
need not address this argument.
CR 73.03; Braden v. Republic-
Vanguard Life Ins. Co., Ky., 657 S.W.2d 241 (1983).
Appellant also contends that the circuit court should
not have allowed removal to federal court since removal was
premature.
decide.
The issue of removal is one for the federal court to
28 U.S.C. ยง 1446.
Thus, these issues are not
reviewable.
Brown maintains that the circuit court erred in
allowing three agreed orders to be entered into record when he
had not been served with same.
The agreed orders are dated
January 4, 1994 and February 18, 1994.
of Sams' attorney.
March 14, 1994.
Each bears the signature
Brown did not file his first pleading until
As we have already stated that Sams and Brown
shared the same legal interest, we see no error on behalf of the
circuit court in allowing these orders to be made part of the
record.
Moreover, the orders allowed:
FDIC to file an answer
out of time; Van L. Sondgerath to be substituted as counsel for
FDIC; and DFSI to be substituted for the FDIC as a real party in
interest.
We do not see how Brown was prejudiced by any of these
orders.
Finally, Brown argues that the circuit court erred in
refusing to order DFSI to answer his interrogatories because the
court was going to rule in DFSI's favor on its motion for summary
judgment, thus making the interrogatories moot.
In fact, the
court denied Brown's motion for summary judgment because it had
previously dismissed his counterclaims and cross-claims on
-9-
August 11, 1994.
This was the reason DFSI was under no
obligation to respond to the interrogatories.
Thus, we find no
error in the court's ruling.
For the aforementioned reasons, the order of the
Bourbon Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
DIVERSIFIED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS,
INC.:
Roger Brown, Pro Se
Clearwater, Florida
Van L. Sondgerath
Covington, Kentucky
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