JEMOND RAYNARD GROVES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: December 4, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
1996-CA-001837-MR
1997-CA-000183-MR
JEMOND RAYNARD GROVES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-000953
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
APPEAL NUMBER 1996-CA-001837-MR
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
VACATING ORDER IN APPEAL NUMBER 1997-CA-000183-MR
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BEFORE: ABRAMSON1, MILLER, and SCHRODER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE: Jemond Raynard Groves (Groves) brings Appeal
Number 1996-CA-001837-MR from a June 17, 1996 judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court which adjudged him guilty of one count
first-degree robbery.
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Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 515.020.
Judge Abramson concurred in this opinion prior to leaving
the Court on November 22, 1998.
Groves brings Appeal Number 1997-CA-000183-MR from a January 10,
1997 order of the Jefferson Circuit Court which denied him shock
probation.
KRS 439.265.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand with directions the judgment in Appeal Number 1996-CA001837-MR; we vacate the order in Appeal Number 1997-CA-000183MR.
Groves, a juvenile at sentencing, raises several issues
in Appeal Number 1996-CA-001837-MR: (1) whether the 1994
amendments to the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code (codified as KRS
Chapters 600 - 645) unconstitutionally prescribe circuit court
jurisdiction in violation of the Kentucky Constitution §§ 112(5)
and 113(6); (2) whether KRS 635.020(4) and KRS 640.010(2) are
irreconcilable; and (3) whether Groves was eligible for
consideration of probation pursuant to the sentencing guidelines
of KRS Chapter 640.
Groves's first argument was resolved by the Supreme
Court of Kentucky in Commonwealth v. Halsell, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 552
(1996).
Therein, the Court held that the 1994 amendments to the
Unified Juvenile Code, making all juveniles fourteen years of age
or older subject to trial in the circuit court as adult
offenders, were constitutional:
Having reviewed KRS 635.020 in its entirety,
we find that subsection (4) is within the
Kentucky General Assembly's constitutional
power to limit the jurisdiction of the
district court under Kentucky Constitution
Section 113(6). Following a determination of
reasonable cause to believe a child over the
age of 14 has been charged with a felony in
which a firearm was used in the commission of
the offense, KRS 635.020(4) operates to limit
the jurisdiction of the district court to act
further. By operation of Section 112(5) of
the Kentucky Constitution, the circuit court
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then becomes vested with jurisdiction as to
that particular class of offenders.
Id. at 555.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has also resolved
Groves's second argument that KRS 635.020(4) and KRS 640.010(2)
are irreconcilable.
In Halsell, 934 S.W.2d at 556, the Court
stated:
[W]e find that the provisions of KRS
640.010(2) can be harmonized with KRS
635.020(4). Whether it is determined at a
preliminary hearing described in KRS
640.010(2) or prior to an adjudicatory
hearing as described in KRS 635.020(1), once
the district court has reasonable cause to
believe that a child before the court has
committed a firearm felony as described in
subsection (4) of KRS 635.020, jurisdiction
vests in the circuit court, the provisions of
KRS 640.010(2)(b) and (c) to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Groves's third argument is that he should have been
eligible for probation under KRS 640.040(4).
The Commonwealth
contends that Groves is ineligible for probation.
Groves and the
Commonwealth entered into an agreement whereby Groves waived
indictment and arraignment.
The Commonwealth recommended a ten-
year sentence and maintained that probation was statutorily
prohibited.
The circuit court rejected Groves's request for
probation as being statutorily barred and as being otherwise
unmeritorious.
Groves reserved the right to appeal the denial of
probation.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Britt v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 965 S.W.2d 147, 150 (1998), held that
. . . juveniles transferred to circuit court
pursuant to the 1994 version of KRS
635.020(4) are to be considered “youthful
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offenders” eligible for the ameliorative
sentencing provisions of KRS Chapter 640.
While the circuit court considered and rejected Groves's motion
for probation on the merits, the circuit court record indicates
that probation was also denied as statutorily barred.
We believe
Groves should receive a full and serious consideration for
probation on the merits rather than a summary consideration
thereof only after a determination that probation was statutorily
impermissible.
As such, Groves should be re-sentenced in
accordance with KRS Chapter 640.
In Appeal Number 1997-CA-000183-MR, Groves contends
that the circuit court erred by denying him shock probation.
Based upon our decision that the circuit court must re-sentence
Groves according to the precepts of KRS Chapter 640, we believe
this issue is rendered moot.
Should Groves be denied probation
at re-sentencing, he may then file a motion for shock probation.
Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court order denying Groves's
shock probation.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in Appeal
Number 1996-CA-001837-MR is affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded with directions to re-sentence Groves pursuant to
the provisions of KRS Chapter 640.
The order in Appeal Number 1997-CA-000183-MR is
vacated.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
J. David Niehaus
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Vickie L. Wise
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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