CARL CURTIS HUFFINES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 3, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NOS. 96-CA-1495-MR and 96-CA-2358-MR
CARL CURTIS HUFFINES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL A. SCHNEIDER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CR-3555
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, KNOPF, and MILLER, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
This is a consolidated appeal by Carl Curtis
Huffines, who appeals the trial court's denial of his CR 60.02
motion as well as his RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his sentence.
On April 29, 1994, Huffines was convicted of attempted rape in
the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree as a result
of his conduct on September 26, 1992.
On June 6, 1994, the trial
court entered a judgment of conviction on only the attempted rape
charge and sentenced Huffines to a seven-year prison term.
Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we affirm.
Huffines appealed his 1994 conviction, arguing that the
trial court erred when it (1) failed to direct a verdict of
acquittal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, which
allegedly contained numerous inconsistencies, contradictions and
improbabilities; (2) refused to instruct the jury on a lesser
included offense; and (3) failed to correct the allegedly
inconsistent findings of the jury.
On March 22, 1996, this Court
affirmed Huffines's conviction.
On April 28, 1995, Huffines filed a motion for relief
from the judgment of conviction pursuant to CR 60.02(e) and (f).
In the motion, Huffines reiterated the contention made by him on
direct appeal, arguing that the jury's verdict finding him guilty
of attempted rape in the first degree and sexual abuse in the
first degree were inconsistent.
The trial court overruled
Huffines's CR 60.02 motion on February 26, 1996.
Huffines did
not appeal the trial court's ruling.
On April 24, 1996, Huffines filed a motion for a new
trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to CR
60.02 (d), (e), and (f) and CR 61.02.
In the motion, Huffines
again reiterated a contention made by him on direct appeal,
contending that the trial court erred when it denied his motion
at trial for a directed verdict of acquittal.
He claimed that
(1) the inconsistencies, improbabilities and contradictions in
the trial proof were perjurious; and (2) the trial court's denial
of his directed verdict motion constituted palpable error,
entitling him to a new trial based upon his claim of newly
discovered evidence.
The trial court overruled Huffines's second
CR 60.02 motion on May 8, 1996.
Case No. 96-CA-1495-MR is an
appeal from the trial court's denial of that motion.
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On April 2, 1996, Huffines filed an RCr 11.42 motion to
vacate and set aside the judgment of conviction and the sentence.
In his motion, Huffines argued that he was entitled to have his
conviction set aside because his trial attorney provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
The gist of
his motion is that his trial counsel failed to sufficiently
identify impeachment and other evidence in order to challenge the
credibility of the Commonwealth's case against him.
On May 6,
1996, Huffines again filed an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate and set
aside his judgment of conviction and sentence.
That RCr 11.42
motion argued the same grounds as the prior motion, and was
essentially an amended version of Huffines's April 2, 1996 RCr
11.42 motion.
The trial court overruled Huffines's RCr 11.42
motion on May 24, 1996.
Case No. 96-CA-2358-MR is Huffines's
appeal from the trial court's denial of the RCr 11.42 motion.
Case No. 96-CR-1495-MR
Huffines filed two post-judgment CR 60.02 motions.
The
trial court summarily denied the first motion which revisited a
ground already resolved by Huffines's direct appeal.
did not appeal that ruling.
Huffines
The trial court also denied
Huffines's second CR 60.02 motion which substantively repeated an
issue from the direct appeal, i.e., that the trial court erred by
denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
His
repetitious motion added two features unasserted in either his
direct appeal or his first CR 60.02 motion: (1) he was entitled
to a new trial under CR 60.02 on the basis of newly discovered
evidence; and (2) the trial court's denial of his directed
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verdict motion constituted palpable error under CR 61.02.
Initially, we note that Huffines's April 24, 1996 CR
60.02 motion was not filed within the CR 60.02 one-year period
following the June 6, 1994 judgment.
In addition, several
prerequisites for a successful motion based upon newly discovered
evidence are lacking here.
First, when a motion for relief based
upon newly discovered evidence is filed, it is incumbent upon the
defendant and counsel to submit affidavits showing that the
allegedly newly discovered evidence could not have been
discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence.
Spradlin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 473 S.W.2d 818 (1971).
motion contained no affidavits.
See
Huffines's
Second, the motion must indicate
that the alleged evidence was unavailable at trial but became
available after the trial.
Third, the motion should also
indicate how the new evidence would have changed the outcome of
the trial if it had been available.
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
803 S.W.2d 573 (1990), cert. denied 502 U.S. 844, 112 S. Ct. 140,
116 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1991).
Again, Huffines's motion is deficient.
Indeed, nowhere in his motion does he even identify the nature of
the newly discovered evidence.
Huffines's motion leaves the
impression that he added the reference to "newly discovered
evidence" merely to provide a basis for renewal of his earlier,
overruled CR 60.02 motion.
The trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it overruled Huffines's second CR 60.02 motion.
See Gibbs v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 723 S.W.2d 871 (1986).
In his motion, Huffines also claimed that the trial
court's failure to grant his trial motion for a directed verdict
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constituted palpable error, per CR 61.02.
argument.
We reject that
CR 61.02 restates RCr 10.26, declaring that on a
motion for a new trial or on appeal a court can consider errors
affecting the substantial rights of a party.
Courts invoke
palpable error when issues were insufficiently raised or
preserved for review.
In this case, the propriety of the denial
of Huffines's directed verdict motion was preserved for review
and considered by this Court on direct appeal but was rejected on
the merits.
Therefore, Huffines's allegation of palpable error
in his second CR 60.02 motion is misplaced.
Case No. 96-CR-2358-MR
Huffines filed two RCr 11.42 motions, five weeks apart,
which argued essentially the same grounds for relief.
He
asserted that his judgment of conviction should be set aside and
vacated due to the constitutional deprivation of his right to the
effective assistance of counsel at trial.
In particular, he
contended that his trial counsel violated the United States
Supreme Court standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) for review
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Under the federal
constitutional standard, the reviewing court must find: (1) an
error in counsel's performance; and (2) prejudice resulting from
the error affecting the outcome of the proceedings, i.e., a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional
conduct, the result would have been different.
Kentucky adopted
the Strickland standard in Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d
37 (1985), cert. denied 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed.
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2d 724 (1986).
We need not reach the merits of Huffines's ineffective
assistance claim.
Kentucky.
Successive RCr 11.42 motions are forbidden in
Commonwealth v. Ivey, Ky., 599 S.W.2d 456 (1980).
Huffines's RCr 11.42 motion was properly dismissed as a de facto
successive motion.
It argued essentially the same credibility
grounds as he had claimed in his earlier CR 60.02 motion, which
in turn (as noted previously) had argued the same grounds which
he had raised in his direct appeal.
The only distinction between
the two motions is that the RCr 11.42 motion alleges that the
proof's inconsistencies, contradictions and improbabilities were
caused by trial counsel's alleged failure to (1) impeach the
victim on several issues; (2) properly argue other facts; (3) ask
questions about certain subjects; and (4) call a prosecution
witness to testify.
The RCr 11.42 motion alleged that the inconsistencies,
contradictions and improbabilities of the evidence at trial were
caused by trial counsel's aforementioned inadequate performance.
Even if Huffines's RCr 11.42 motion did not constitute a
prohibited successive motion, the trial court still properly
dismissed the motion because the alleged deficiencies related to
counsel's strategic decisions regarding how to present his
client's case.
The Strickland Court stated that a reviewing
court "must indulge in the strong presumption" that counsel's
strategy and tactics were "within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance."
466 U.S. at 689.
The Kentucky Supreme
Court has specifically recognized that a "reasonable trial
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tactic" cannot satisfy the first prong of Strickland.
v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d at 40.
See Gall
Given Huffines's motion, the
trial court did not err in denying Huffines a hearing on his
allegation that his trial counsel was ineffective.
The order of Jefferson Circuit Court denying Huffines's
RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Paula Fitzgerald
Louisville, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Karen Quinn
Assistant Attorney
General
Frankfort, KY
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