CARL E. YORK v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 15, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-000555-MR
CARL E. YORK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA HYLTON ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00137
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
*
BEFORE:
*
*
*
*
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, Judges.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Carl E. York (York) appeals from the final
judgment and sentence of imprisonment entered by the Madison
Circuit Court on February 20, 1996, based upon his conditional
guilty plea.1
York pleaded guilty to trafficking in a controlled
substance (cocaine) in the first degree in violation of Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412, trafficking in a controlled
substance
(Valium)
in
the
third
degree
in
violation
of
KRS
218A.1414, trafficking in marijuana in violation of KRS 218A.1421
and possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of KRS 218A.500.
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
York’s guilty plea was conditioned upon his right to appeal the
trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
Having reviewed
the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial
court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and
its ruling is correct as a matter of law.
Thus, we affirm.
York was indicted on December 14, 1995, on the charges to
which he pleaded guilty.
He filed a motion to suppress evidence
seized from his home and all incriminating statements which he gave
following the seizure.
York specifically (1) challenged the
legality of the entry of the police into his home; (2) challenged
the legality of the position the deputy occupied in his home when
he found the marijuana in plain view; and (3) claimed the police
entered the home under a pretext for the purpose of conducting a
warrantless search.
The trial court conducted a suppression
hearing on January 4, 1996, and denied York’s motion.
Ray Creech (Creech) testified that on November 30, 1995,
he went to the Madison County Sheriff's office to obtain assistance
in retrieving some property from the house in which York lived.
Creech testified that he had moved out of the house at the same
time York had moved into the house and that he had unknowingly
taken a pair of York's sunglasses.
After York noticed that the
sunglasses were missing, he moved Creech's remaining property
inside the house to hold as security until Creech returned the
sunglasses.
Creech testified that he had never had any problem
with York but he requested police assistance to avoid any possible
problem.
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Deputy Bruce Thomas (Deputy Thomas) testified that he was
assigned to accompany Creech.
Deputy Thomas stated that the
sheriff told him that York's landlord had stated that an unusual
number of people visited York's house and that York had refused to
allow the landlord to enter the house.
The sheriff told Deputy
Thomas that he suspected illegal activity.
Deputy Thomas and
Deputy Roger Portwood (Deputy Portwood) accompanied Creech to
York's residence.
When they arrived at approximately 5:30 p.m. it
was almost dark, but no lights were on in the house or on the
porch.
Deputy Thomas knocked on the front door several times
before York answered the door.
The testimony differs regarding the entry of the police
into York's home and the precise location where Creech gave York
the
sunglasses.
testified
that
Deputy
York
told
Thomas,
them
Deputy
they
Portwood
could
enter;
and
Creech
while
York
testified that he did not give them permission to enter the house,
but that they nonetheless entered.
Deputy Thomas, Deputy Portwood
and Creech testified that Creech handed York the sunglasses after
they were in the living room, whereas York testified that Creech
handed him the sunglasses at the threshold of the door.
Both York
and Creech testified that York then told Creech that the sunglasses
were all he had wanted and that he would return Creech's property.
The testimony also differs regarding where the deputies
were standing when York gave Creech his property.
York and Creech
testified that York went into a room adjacent to the living room.
Creech testified that the officers remained in the living room with
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him while York retrieved the property.
Creech stated that the
adjacent room was “really cluttered” and that York got the carpet
dye machine out and rolled it to him.
York testified that he went
to the room to retrieve the equipment and noticed after he picked
up the equipment and turned to leave that the deputies were
standing in the doorway of the adjacent room.
Deputy Thomas
testified that York held open a curtain hung over the doorway to
the adjacent room and that he (Deputy Thomas) entered the room and
helped
York
retrieve
the
machine.
Creech,
York,
and
Deputy
Portwood stated that York came into the living room and handed
Creech the equipment and handed Deputy Portwood some cords or
hoses.
York, Creech, and Deputy Portwood testified that the
deputies were in the center of the living room when Creech left
with his equipment.
The testimony also differs regarding when Deputy Thomas
went into the kitchen where the marijuana was found. Deputy Thomas
testified that while he was in the living room he asked York if he
had any other property belonging to Creech, and York stated that
there was additional property in the utility room.
The utility
room was located on one end of the kitchen and the kitchen was
located down three steep steps at the rear of the living room.
Deputy Thomas stated that he was already standing in the living
room at the top of the steps and he merely turned and went down the
steps into the kitchen before York.
He said he shined his
flashlight on the ceiling to illuminate the steps. Standing at the
bottom of the steps, he noticed a clear plastic bag containing
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green leaves on the kitchen countertop directly in front of him.
He suspected that the bag contained marijuana and asked York what
was in the bag.
York did not answer.
Deputy Thomas arrested York,
advised him of his Miranda2 rights, searched York’s person and
found a bag of cocaine, several pocket knives, and a large amount
of cash.
Deputy Thomas admitted that the only expressed permission
York gave to the deputies, prior to the discovery of the marijuana,
was permission to enter the house.
Deputy Thomas stated that he
believed he was implicitly invited into the adjacent room based
upon
York
holding
open
the
curtain.
Deputy
Thomas
made
no
statement about being invited, expressly or implicitly, into the
kitchen.
Deputy Thomas contended that he stepped into the kitchen
to get out of York’s way so York could retrieve the other property
and that he shined the flashlight so he could see where he was
walking.
York testified that when Deputy Thomas asked him about
other
property
he
replied
that
there
was
one
more
piece
of
equipment in the utility room and that he would get the equipment.
York stated that he went down the darkened steps, turned left and
walked through the darkened kitchen to the utility room door.
He
testified that as he turned on the utility room light, he heard a
noise and turned to see Deputy Thomas at the other end of the
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966).
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kitchen looking around with his flashlight.
Deputy Thomas had
found a bag of marijuana on the kitchen countertop.
Deputy Portwood testified that he took some cords or
hoses from York in the living room and helped Creech carry the
equipment.
He testified that when he took the cords and hoses from
York, Deputy Thomas was in the middle of the living room and that
Deputy Thomas was standing in the middle of the living room when
Deputy Thomas asked York if any property remained. Deputy Portwood
claimed that York told them that the remaining property was in a
room downstairs and that Deputy Thomas went down the steps before
York. He testified that York followed Deputy Thomas down the steps
and that he followed York down the steps.
He did not see the
marijuana in the kitchen until it was pointed out by Deputy Thomas.
After
York
was
arrested,
he
voluntarily
signed
a
handwritten note and a prepared written form granting the police
permission to search his house.
The deputies found additional
marijuana, cocaine, marijuana seeds, drug paraphernalia, over 300
Valium tablets, knives, guns, and more than $2500 in cash.
At the suppression hearing, York contended that the
"plain view" exception to warrantless searches did not apply to
this search because Deputy Thomas did not have permission to be in
the kitchen when he saw the marijuana.
He pointed out that Deputy
Thomas never even asserted that York gave him permission to enter
the kitchen.
York also claimed that the "search" was based upon a
pretext since the sheriff told Deputy Thomas to accompany Creech
because he had received reports of illegal activity at York's home;
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and that his latter written consents were invalid because they were
tainted by the illegal seizure.
The Commonwealth’s position was that the deputies were in
York’s home for a legitimate and lawful purpose and with York’s
permission.
The Commonwealth contended that York’s actions of
allowing the deputies to accompany him from room to room and to
assist him in removing the property, and his holding of the curtain
for Deputy Thomas, constituted his implied consent for the deputies
to be in the kitchen where the marijuana was in plain view.
The
Commonwealth further argued that under the circumstances it was
reasonable for the deputies to accompany York into the darkened
kitchen, since he might have come out armed and shot someone.
The trial court denied York's motion to suppress and made
the following oral findings and conclusions: The deputies' actions
in being at York's house were a "legitimate effort to resolve a
property dispute between private citizens." Creech's testimony was
the most helpful since he was the only truly disinterested party.
The testimony of Deputy Portwood and Deputy Thomas had no real
distinctions.
Based
upon
Creech's
testimony,
deputies permission to enter the house.
York
gave
the
York's action of handing
the hose to Deputy Portwood showed York's consent for the deputies
to be a part of the enterprise of returning the property.
It was
proper for Deputy Thomas to use a flashlight to illuminate the dark
room.
The bag of marijuana lying openly on the counter was readily
discernable.
pretext.
The deputies' entry into the kitchen was not under a
Both subsequent grants of written consent by York were
-7-
clearly consensual.
The trial court’s summation was that York
consented to the initial police entry; there was a "plain view"
search; and the subsequent searches were consensual.
York entered
a conditional guilty plea and received a five-year prison sentence
on the cocaine trafficking conviction, two twelve-month sentences
on each of the misdemeanor trafficking convictions and a thirty-day
sentence on the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction.
This
appeal followed.
We must begin our legal analysis with a brief discussion
concerning our standard of review.
trial
court's
findings
of
fact
evidence they are conclusive.
RCr 9.78 provides that if the
are
supported
by
substantial
When the findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence, as they are herein, we must then
determine "'whether the rule of law as applied to the established
facts is or is not violated.'"
Ornelas v. United States, ___ U.S.
___, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) citing PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289, n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1791,
n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982).3
See Clay v. Commonwealth, Ky., 818
S.W.2d 264, 265 (1991); Hayes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 948,
952 (1983); and Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 426, 433
(1982).
3
Many commentators have written extensively about the standard
of review for a constitutional issue being a mixed fact-law
question.
See LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.7(c) (3rd ed.,
1996).
While Kentucky's appellate courts have never fully
expounded upon this issue, a thorough discussion can be found in
Ornelas, supra, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10
L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); and United States v. McConney, supra.
-8-
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath
or
affirmation,
and
particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.[4]
The underlying constitutional principle is that "[at] the very core
[of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion."
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81
S.Ct. 679, 682, 5 L.Ed.2d 734, 739 (1961).
A person's reasonable
expectation of privacy is particularly relevant and we are not
unmindful that the highest level of constitutional protection is
afforded a person's home.
Furthermore, "[e]vidence that is either
the direct or indirect product of illegal police action must be
suppressed as 'fruit of the poisonous tree.'"
Churchwell v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 843 S.W.2d 336 (1992) citing Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441,
445 (1963).
The "plain view" doctrine is an exception to the warrant
requirement.
It allows a police officer to seize any item without
a warrant if the officer (1) sees the object in plain view (2) from
a position he legally occupied, and (3) the evidentiary value of
4
Section Ten of the Kentucky Constitution provides no greater
protection than the federal Fourth Amendment.
LaFollette v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 915 S.W.2d 747, 748 (1996).
-9-
the item in proving a crime is immediately apparent.
Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112,
123 (1990).
See also Hazel v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 831,
833 (1992).
It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment if an object
is seized without each of the three requirements of the "plain
view" doctrine being met.
Horton, 496 U.S. at 133-134.
"[T]he
seizure of an object in plain view does not involve an intrusion on
privacy.
If
the
interest
in
privacy
has
been
invaded,
the
violation must have occurred before the object came into plain
view. . . ."
Id. at 141 (footnote omitted).
In this case, the dispositive issue is whether the deputy
was legally in the kitchen when he viewed the marijuana.
Since the
deputy relied on York's consent for him to be in a lawful position
to view the marijuana, the government has the burden to establish
the existence of effective consent.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 236 (1983);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221-222, 93 S.Ct. 2041,
2045, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 859 (1973); and Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 548-549, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 802 (1968).
While
"there
circumstances"
will
and
be
endless
"there
is
variations
[no]
in
the
litmus-paper
facts
and
test"
for
determining consent, Royer, 460 U.S. at 506, "[n]either is it
disputed that where the validity of a search rests on consent, the
State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was
obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden
-10-
that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of
lawful authority."
Id. at 497.
We hold that the trial court’s findings of fact that
Deputy Thomas was given expressed permission by York to enter the
house and implied permission to enter the kitchen are supported by
substantial evidence and that the trial court’s conclusions that
the plain view doctrine was applicable to the discovery of the
marijuana is proper as a matter of law.
The judgment of the
Madison Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Kim Brooks
Covington, KY
Hon. A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Hon. Amy F. Howard
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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