VINCENT STOPHER V. HON F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION 15 AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
June 6, 1997; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-0970-OA
VINCENT STOPHER
PETITIONER
AN ORIGINAL ACTION ARISING FROM
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NO. 97-CR-0615
v.
HON F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION 15
RESPONDENT
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING WRIT
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON and KNOPF, Judges.
KNOPF, Judge:
Petitioner Vincent Stopher seeks a writ prohibiting
Judge F. Kenneth Conliffe of the Jefferson Circuit Court from
taking further action in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Vincent
Stopher, case no. 97-CR-0615, unless a record is made of all
proceedings by the court's videotape equipment.
Although the trial
judge routinely videotapes hearings, some substantive matters
concerning this Petitioner have allegedly occurred during the
motion hour dockets which are not routinely recorded.
Having
reviewed the record and pleadings of counsel, we conclude that a
writ should issue.
Because we believe the principal issues
relevant to the issuance of a writ were previously addressed
thoroughly in Judge Abramson's well-reasoned order rendered on
Petitioner's motion for intermediate relief pursuant to CR 76.36
(4), we adopt the following portions of her order before entering
our own separate finding on this CR 76.36 petition:
"Petitioner seeks an order prohibiting the Respondent
Judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court from conducting any proceeding
whatsoever in Indictment No. 97-CR-615 without utilizing the JAVS
videotape recording system with which Division 15 is equipped.
Petitioner alleges that the requested relief is required to create
a verbatim record of all proceedings in the courtroom.
"It is undisputed that the offense with which Petitioner
is charged stems from circumstances constituting an aggravating
factor under KRS 532.025(2) for which the death penalty may be
sought.
Although the aggravating factor, killing of a deputy
sheriff engaged at the time of the act in the lawful performance of
his duties, has not as yet been noticed against Petitioner, it is
not unreasonable to assume that the Commonwealth will at some point
seek the death penalty.
This likely eventuality was acknowledged
by counsel for the Commonwealth in a hearing on this motion held by
[Judge Abramson] on Wednesday, April 23, 1997.
"Soon after the indictment issued in this case,
Petitioner sought to disqualify all present and former judges of
the Jefferson Circuit and District Courts on the basis of their
acquaintance with the victim [Jefferson County Deputy Sheriff
Gregory Hans].
The Chief Judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court
passed this motion to the Respondent Judge to whom the case was
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randomly assigned.
The motion was denied.
A renewed motion to
disqualify was also denied by the Respondent Judge.
The rulings
which precipitated the proceedings in this forum stem from two
written defense motions to put all proceedings in the case,
including motion hour, on the record via the videotape recording
system installed in the courtroom.
By order entered March 31,
1997, the Respondent Judge denied the first motion on the basis
that '[a]ll proceedings are on the record, either by written order
or recorded oral proceeding.'
Petitioner maintains that he has not
yet received a written ruling on the second motion, although a copy
of an order appended to his CR 76.36 petition indicates that it was
denied on April 14, 1997, [by the Judge's notation] '[see] order
entered 3/31/97.'
"Petitioner argues that the Respondent Judge's refusal to
activate the videotape recording system constitutes an abuse of
discretion because without the verbatim record [the] equipment
would provide, a complete record of proceedings essential to review
in death penalty cases cannot be produced.
Failure to record,
Petitioner argues, denies a capital defendant a meaningful right of
appeal as guaranteed by Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution.
He asserts that 'death is different' and that every motion,
argument or proceeding in a death-eligible case should be available
to a reviewing court for assessment of whether the defendant
received a fair and impartial trial.
Petitioner maintains that a
verbatim record is the best method of providing the reviewing court
a complete record 'without substantial inconvenience to respondent
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and with minimal cost to the Court of Justice.'
"In response, the Commonwealth insists that there can be
no abuse of discretion in the Respondent's denial of the motion to
videotape all proceedings because 1) there is no legal requirement
that he do so; 2) he has already and continues to agree to
videotape all 'hearings' or substantive arguments; 3) the failure
to videotape routine matters such as the setting of hearing dates
on motion hour does not differ from the practice in some other
divisions of Jefferson Circuit Court; and 4) a complete record is
in fact being created by the motions and rulings in the written
record and the video recordings of all hearings.
Counsel posits
that although it is conceivable that videotaping all proceedings
could be considered a 'better idea' in death penalty cases, the
refusal to tape so-called inconsequential matters cannot form the
basis for a charge of abuse of discretion absent a legal duty
compelling the Respondent Judge to do so.
* * * *
"Although not directly argued in his submitted pleadings
or through argument of counsel, the affidavits appended to the
CR 76.36 motion suggest that Petitioner perceives certain comments
of the Respondent Judge to be indicative of a hostile or biased
atmosphere, specifically citing the denial of a motion to recuse
only moments after it was filed at arraignment.
In contrast, the
Commonwealth labels 'trial tactics' Petitioner's insistence upon
rearguing every motion after a ruling has been given or purposely
'goading' the Respondent Judge into remarks which, when taken out
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of context suggest bias, in an effort to manufacture an atmosphere
of hostility toward the defense setting the stage for a renewed
motion to recuse or error in the refusal to recuse on the previous
motion."
[We note that on May 6, 1997, Kentucky Supreme Court
Chief Justice Robert F. Stephens, adjudged by order that an
insufficient showing had been made to indicate that a special judge
should be appointed.]
* * * *
"Turning to the merits of the pending request, the
Supreme Court has clearly delineated the necessary prerequisites to
relief pursuant to CR 76.36 generally.
In Potter v. Eli Lilly and
Co., Ky., 926 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1996), the Court noted that a writ
of prohibition is an 'extraordinary remedy' issued:
. . . only when the court in question is
proceeding or is about to proceed outside its
jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy by
appeal, or where it is about to act
incorrectly, although it is within its
jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate
remedy by appeal or otherwise, and great
injustice and irreparable injury would result
to the petitioner if the court in question
should so act.
[See also Jones v. Hogg, Ky., 639 S.W.2d 543 (1982) and Shumaker v.
Paxton, Ky., 613 S.W.2d 130 (1981).]"
Applying the Potter criteria to the instant case, Judge
Abramson concluded that they had been satisfied through the
following analysis:
"Counsel for the Petitioner and the Commonwealth note
that determination of when to 'go on the record' and videotape or
otherwise record proceedings is a matter generally committed
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to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Consequently, the
trial court's decision must be sustained unless there is an abuse
of that discretion.
The Commonwealth argues that it is not an
abuse of discretion to decline to record routine proceedings at
motion hour or at other times where action is being taken but the
defendant is not present.
Petitioner counters that in any case
where the death penalty is an option no interaction between counsel
and the court with respect to the case is so trivial as to justify
refusing to activate the readily available video equipment.
If the
circuit court is not abusing its discretion, quite clearly there
would be no basis for a writ.
If an abuse of discretion is
present, the first factor considered in issuing a writ, i.e., the
court is acting incorrectly, is satisfied.
Our first inquiry is
thus whether the court’s decision not to record all proceedings in
the case is an abuse of discretion.
"Generally an abuse of discretion in the context of the
exercise of judicial power 'implies arbitrary action or capricious
disposition under the circumstances, at least an unreasonable and
unfair decision.'
Kentucky Nat. Park Commission v. Russell,
301 Ky. 187, 191 S.W.2d 214, 217 (1945).
In considering the
exercise of discretion in this case, the Petitioner argues that
'death is different' and the trial court’s otherwise broad
discretion must be exercised with that eventual potential penalty
foremost in mind.
Counsel for the Commonwealth argues that 'due
process is due process' and the presence of an aggravating
circumstance which could result in notice of the prosecution’s
-6-
intent to seek the death penalty is irrelevant.
In fact, due
process is a flexible concept:
Once it is determined that due process applies,
the question remains, what process is due....
[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.... [N]ot all situations
calling for procedural safeguards call for the
same kind of procedure.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 494 92 S.
Ct. 2593 (1972) (remanding 'given the absence of an adequate
record' to determine whether parole revocation hearing violated due
process).
The necessity for such a principle is perhaps best
illustrated by the rationale of the Court in Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1977):
. . . death is a different kind of punishment
from any other which may be imposed in this
country. [citations omitted.] From the point
of view of the defendant, it is different in
both its severity and its finality. From the
point of view of society, the action of the
sovereign in taking the life of one of its
citizens also differs dramatically from any
other legitimate state action. It is of vital
importance to the defendant and the community
that any decision to impose the death sentence
be, and appear to be, based on reason rather
than caprice or emotion.
403 U.S. at 357-58, (emphasis added).
"Moreover, Kentucky Rules of Court and case law expressly
recognize that cases involving the death penalty are different.
For example, in CR 75.02(2) only in those cases where the death
penalty is sought must the appellate court be supplied with a
transcript of the proceedings which includes all of the voir dire,
all of the opening and all of the closing arguments, regardless of
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objections.
Only in cases where the death penalty is sought are
the time frames for preparation of the transcript automatically
extended by rule.
CR 75.01(4).
Only in death penalty cases must
individual voir dire be conducted on certain issues as provided in
RCr 9.38.
Only in cases where the death penalty has been imposed
are appeals to this court automatically transferred to the Supreme
Court pursuant to CR 74.02(2).
Only in those cases where the death
penalty has been imposed is this court denied authority to review
RCr 11.42 petitions.
(1990).]
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, [Ky., 803 S.W.2d 573
By rule and case law, the courts of this Commonwealth
have repeatedly recognized that death penalty cases are different.
The same obvious concerns that underlie the aforementioned
distinctions cause [us] to conclude that the presence of the
potential for the death penalty is a paramount consideration in
determining whether a court has abused its discretion in the
conduct of a given case.
"With that premise in mind, the constitutional right to
appeal is compromised where the defendant faces a potential death
penalty without a true and accurate record of all proceedings
involving interaction of the court and counsel.
This is
particularly true where, as here, the trial judge has been asked to
recuse himself and declined but the potential for a renewed motion
is exceedingly high.
Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution
guarantees a defendant the right of appeal 'upon the record'
established in the lower court.
A full and complete record is
necessary to preserve and give meaning to the appeal right accorded
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in that section as is evident by reference to the requirements
imposed on an appellant seeking review.
The appellant’s obligation
includes satisfying the appellate court that the issue has been
preserved, establishing the error committed by the judge with
respect to any action or inaction and showing that the error was so
serious that substantial justice requires intervention by the
appellate courts.
See CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv); RCr 9.24 and
Commonwealth v. Messex, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 341,342 (1987).
Clearly
these tasks are made easier by a record that includes videotapes of
all matters brought before the court regardless of their seeming
triviality.
"The Commonwealth urges that while recording every single
encounter might be the better practice it is not required and the
record currently being 'created' by written order of the court
is adequate or 'good enough.'
Again this argument misses the mark.
Because the constitutional right to appeal is inevitably dependent
on a full and accurate record and the underlying case is a
potential capital murder case, there is a substantial likelihood
that the court is abusing its discretion when it declines to create
the most complete record.
This conclusion is supported by
reference to the aforementioned rules, cases and constitutional
sections and a realistic view of the consequences of allowing the
trial judge to exercise his discretion to create a seemingly 'good
enough' record.
"The record before this court currently includes two
affidavits from the Petitioner’s counsel attributing direct quotes
-9-
to the trial judge which could have potential bearing in the event
of an appeal.
In the hearing before [Judge Abramson], the
Commonwealth’s counsel took exception to the precise language of
the quotes and offered the observation that any reference to
defense counsel ['just wasting trees by the filing of all these
motions'] was made by the trial judge in exasperation after being
'goaded' by defense counsel.
A videotape of the exchange would
allow an appellate court to view and assess the encounter fully and
fairly to the protection of all concerned should it be at issue as
part of an appeal.
In the absence of a videotape, the appellate
court will be confined to affidavits which raises another troubling
factor.
If an attorney attributes an unrecorded remark,
significant to an issue such as recusal, to the trial judge and
opposing counsel does not offer an affidavit to the contrary will
the trial judge then tender an affidavit to state what he really
said?
At that juncture the judge is most likely a material witness
and SCR 4.300, Canon 3, Part C would require disqualification.
If
the judge does not tender an affidavit does he become a de facto
witness if the parties must resort to CR 75.08, the rule which
gives the trial court the power to settle all issues where 'any
difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what
occurred in the trial court...'?
If ineffective assistance of
counsel is an issue on appeal what record is there of counsel's
conduct in pretrial encounters with the court, a legitimate area of
inquiry?
"None of the foregoing concerns is purely speculative;
-10-
they are the very real consequences of proceeding without the best
possible record.
Consideration of them underscores the
inescapable fact that the interests of counsel, the trial court and
an appellate court are best served by the creation of a videotape
record which does not require resort to the vulnerable
memories of defense counsel, the prosecutor and trial judge as to
what actually occurred.
"Moreover, there is no real dispute that activation of
the videotape system involves virtually no inconvenience or
expense.
The judge simply pushes a button and creates a time log.
Other judges of the Jefferson [Circuit] Court routinely record all
proceedings in such cases or at least will do so upon request of
counsel.
Counsel for the Commonwealth do not contend that it is
burdensome and unreasonable to record but suggest that requiring it
takes away the discretion of the trial court.
Having the
discretion to do something is not sufficient rationale for doing
it.
The law requires more.
It is 'arbitrary' and 'capricious' or
'at least...unreasonable and unfair' as discussed in Kentucky Nat'l
Park Commission, [supra] to refuse to record all proceedings in a
potential death penalty case especially where renewed motions for
recusal have been filed and all encounters between the court and
counsel contain potentially relevant statements.
The presence of
videotape equipment and the ease with which a record can be created
make it all the more arbitrary and capricious to deny what is
clearly a reasonable request.
Simply stated, a court's refusal in
a potential death penalty case to make the best possible record
-11-
when the means are readily available and not inconvenient is
'unreasonable and unfair,' i.e., an abuse of discretion.
In view
of the foregoing, the substantial likelihood that the trial court
is acting incorrectly exists and the next two factors in Potter
must be considered.
"Where a petitioner has an adequate remedy by appeal, a
writ must be denied.
Potter, 926 S.W.2d at 452.
Petitioner in
this case argues persuasively that where the trial court’s error is
a failure to create the best possible record in a case potentially
involving the death penalty, an appeal is manifestly inadequate.
Proceedings in the underlying prosecution are proceeding apace and
it is quite evident that what occurs off-the-record because of a
refusal to record can never be fully recreated.
While the written
order of the trial judge will reveal disposition of a particular
motion it will not, indeed it cannot,
preceded the ruling.
possibly convey all that
The preceding interchange is sufficiently
potentially significant to an appeal and the presence and exercise
of an appeal right is wholly inadequate to remedy the situation.
The second factor in Potter is satisfied.
"The final factor for consideration as to CR 76.36 relief
generally is whether 'great injustice and irreparable injury would
result...' if the writ does not issue.
Given the aforestated
conclusions regarding the right to appeal on a complete record in a
potential death penalty case, there is a substantial likelihood
that the three-judge panel will find that injustice and irreparable
injury will occur if the trial judge is not stayed from further
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unrecorded proceedings.
* * * *
"Although it appears that the scheduled hearings will be
recorded, the recording of any other matters that would come before
the trial court, particularly in the course of a regularly
scheduled motion hour, is less certain.
Motion hour has been the
occasion for earlier disputes regarding what was said and done and
future motion hours logically carry the same potential.
It is not
necessary or appropriate to wait and see whether those proceedings
are recorded because at that juncture the injury will have already
occurred.
Under these circumstances, the Petitioner will suffer
the type of immediate and irreparable injury that justifies
[relief]."
Further support for the necessity of issuing a writ of
prohibition is found in the concluding paragraphs of Judge
Abramson's order which references federal due process concerns:
"Although this [intermediate] relief is granted based on
the abuse of discretion which results in the trial court acting
'incorrectly', [we note] the Petitioner's citation to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the
requirement that where a state authorizes an appeal it must
'provide the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal' which
includes a transcript necessary to pursue an effective appeal,
Griffin v. Illinois, 251 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 2d 891
(1956), and the right to effective assistance of counsel on a first
appeal.
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S 387, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d
-13-
821 (1985).
While these cases do not require the result reached
here they are persuasive indicators of the existence of a federal
due process issue where an adequate record is not generated by
virtue of the trial court's exercise of discretion in determining
what to record and what not to record.
Additionally, the United
States Supreme Court opinion in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S.
319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33 (1976), does provide the
framework for assessing whether any particular state procedure
constitutes a deprivation of federal due process.
While counsel
has cited no case law . . . applying the three-part test in
Matthews v. Eldridge to an analogous case, application of the test
to the facts on this petition is further support for the result
reached herein.
"In conclusion, trial judges face an increasingly heavy
caseload and must be accorded considerable latitude in handling the
multitude of matters committed to their discretion.
They are on
the front lines dealing with numerous counsel and litigants on a
daily basis and the appellate courts should very rarely intervene
to direct the trial judge's conduct.
However, this case focuses on
a matter which strikes at the very heart of the constitutional
right to appeal, the need for a complete and accurate record.
Appellate courts have a particular interest in this issue since
they are entirely dependent on the record created below.
Where
encounters containing matters potentially important on appeal are
not videotaped, it undermines the appellate court's ability to
carry out its constitutionally mandated responsibilities."
-14-
Based upon the analysis set out in the foregoing opinion,
we conclude that the trial court is acting erroneously in not
videotaping all proceedings, that an appeal is an inadequate remedy
and that irreparable injury and injustice will result if a writ of
prohibition does not issue.
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that
Judge Conliffe is hereby prohibited from conducting all further
proceedings in case no. 97-CR-0615, including any interaction at
motion hour dockets between the court and counsel regarding the
case, unless recorded by the court's videotape equipment.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: June 6, 1997
/s/ William L. Knopf
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
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PETITION FOR VINCENT STOPHER:
RESPONSE FOR JUDGE CONLIFFE:
Daniel T. Goyette
Jefferson District Public
Defender
F. Kenneth Conliffe, Judge
Jefferson Circuit Court
Louisville, Kentucky
J. David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender of
the Jefferson District Public
Defender
Louisville, Kentucky
RESPONSE FOR COMMONWEALTH AS
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST:
A.C. McKay Chauvin
Assistant Commonwealth's
Attorney
Office of the Jefferson County
Commonwealth's Attorney
Louisville, Kentucky
-16-
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