JOHN A. HUMPHRESS V. MARY L. SMITH
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RENDERED:
November 7, 1997; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-000430-MR
JOHN A. HUMPHRESS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM M. HALL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-000122
V.
MARY L. SMITH
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUDGEL and HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE.
John A. Humphress, III, appeals from an order
of the Taylor Circuit Court granting sole custody of his son to the
child's mother, Mary L. Smith, and requiring him to pay $138.50 per
month in child support.
Humphress argues that the trial court
clearly erred by failing to grant joint custody and by imputing a
minimum wage for purposes of child support.
We disagree and thus
affirm.
After a brief relationship between Smith and Humphress,
Smith became pregnant.
1995.
a
She gave birth to a son, Henry, on June 12,
The couple parted ways months before the birth.
paternity
action
in
Taylor
District
Court
in
Smith filed
April,
1996.
Humphress filed this action seeking joint custody the same month.
Taylor Circuit Court granted temporary custody to Smith, ordered
Humphress
to
pay
$60.00
per
month
in
child
support
and
set
visitation.
The domestic relations commissioner held a hearing and
found that sole custody in favor of Smith would be in the best
interest of the child.
He also recommended that Humphress be
ordered to pay $138.50 per month in child support, by imputing a
minimum wage to the self-employed Humphress.
exceptions.
Humphress filed
In an order entered January 21, 1997, the circuit
court overruled the exceptions and adopted the commissioner's
report in its entirety.
On appeal, Humphress maintains that the circuit court
abused
its
discretion
by
granting
Smith
sole
custody
imputing the minimum wage in calculating child support.
and
by
Humphress
argues that the evidence and the law favor joint custody.
He also
believes that he should have been required to pay only $60.00 per
month, the minimum established by the child support guidelines,
because his fledgling business was operating at a loss.
The overriding consideration in any custody determination
is the best interest of the child.
Squires v. Squires, Ky., 854
S.W.2d 765, 768 (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 403.270.
This
standard applies equally when the child is born out of wedlock.
Basham v. Wilkins, Ky. App., 851 S.W.2d 491, 493 (1993).
Facts
found by a domestic relations commissioner and adopted by the court
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
Ky. R. Civ. Proc.
(CR) 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1986).
2
The commissioner heard testimony from the parties, and,
by deposition, the parties' relatives.
The record reveals a
tangled tapestry of fractured friendships, forbidden romance and
out-of-wedlock births.
Humphress and Smith are life-long acquain-
tances, and one-time lovers.
Their fathers were once partners in
a
in
screen
printing
business
Campbellsville.
The
business
partners had a falling out, and Thad Smith, Mary Smith's father,
eventually started a competing company, Green River Printing.
Humphress worked for his father, John Humphress, II.
They, too,
had a falling out, and the younger Humphress went to work for his
father's rival, Thad Smith, in the fall of 1994.
Green River Printing was a family business.
employed his wife Theresa and his daughter Mary.
Thad Smith
Humphress, who
had recently learned that his former girlfriend, Melinda Bishop,
was expecting his child, began a relationship with his boss's
daughter.
Although
their
romance
stirred
the
same
parental
reactions as Shakespeare's tragic couple, it was not so enduring.
Humphress and Smith soon parted company, and Smith learned that
she, too, was pregnant by Humphress.
together, the news drove them apart.
Instead of drawing them
Humphress and Smith, both
still working for Smith's father, did not speak to one another for
the
duration
of
her
returned to Bishop.
pregnancy.
Spurned
by
Smith,
Humphress
Humphress' and Smith's working relationship
ended when Mary's mother, Theresa, asked Humphress to leave,
ostensibly because he was devoting too much time to his home screen
printing operation.
3
Humphress made some efforts to be an active participant
in both his young sons' lives.
He made a few voluntary child
support payments to Smith, and the parties arranged for sporadic
visitation.
By all accounts, Humphress' and Smith's relationship
was riddled with animosity, made worse, no doubt, by the fact that
Humphress was living with Bishop and his other child.
After
leaving Green River Printing, Humphress worked in his own screen
printing business full-time.
He testified he was unable to work
for any other local screen printing company, since one was run by
his father, and the others by disgruntled former employees of his
father.
Humphress' business operated at a loss, both at start-up
and at the time of the hearing.
discontinued
his
child
support
According to Humphress, he
payments
after
exhausting
his
savings from his former employment.
To
determine
the
appropriateness
of
joint
custody,
Squires, supra, directs courts first to consider the factors under
KRS 403.270(1).
Additionally, a trial court should assess the
likelihood of future cooperation between the parents.
Emotional
maturity and willingness to rationally participate in decisions
affecting the upbringing of the child are relevant considerations.
Id. at 769.
The Squires Court specifically declined to adopt a
preference for joint custody.
Id.
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it
found no future prospect for cooperation.
The parties were never
married, never lived together, and the birth of their child drove
them further apart.
Their largely hostile relationship did not
4
bode well for joint custody, and we do not fault the circuit court
for rejecting that as a possibility.
Having ruled out joint custody, the court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding sole custody to Smith.
There is
substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that
this arrangement is in the best interest of the child.
Humphress
complains about the court's characterization of his complicated
love life, his choice to start his own business and his motivations
for filing this custody action.
We find no clear error in any of
the court's findings.
Humphress next argues that the trial court clearly erred
by imputing income to him to set child support.
The child support
guidelines in KRS 403.212 serve as a rebuttable presumption for the
establishment of the amount of child support.
KRS 403.212(4)(d)
permits a court to calculate child support based on potential
income, if it finds a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. The final clause of that section, effective July 15, 1996,
provides:
"[a] court may find a parent to be voluntarily unem-
ployed or underemployed without finding that the parent intended to
avoid or reduce the child support obligation."
Humphress asserts that imputation of income requires a
showing that "the parent purposely terminated or changed employment
with intent to interfere with child support obligations and lower
them," citing McKinney v. McKinney, Ky. App., 813 S.W.2d 828
(1991).
In
McKinney,
this
Court
emphasized
the
inequity
of
applying KRS 403.212(2)(d) to someone whose "employment situation
-5-
changes because of circumstances beyond his control or is reasonable in light of all the circumstances," and interpreted the
statute to include a bad faith requirement.
Id. at 829.
The
circuit court inferred bad faith on Humphress' part because he
found Humphress' decision to remain self-employed at a loss with
two young children to support unreasonable and not due to circumstances beyond his control.
KRS 403.212(d), as amended, refutes Humphress' argument.
Even if McKinney's bad faith requirement applies, substantial
evidence supports the circuit court's conclusion that Humphress is
voluntarily
underemployed.
Based
upon
his
work
history
and
employment potential, the court did not abuse its discretion by
imputing a minimum wage to Humphress.
The circuit court committed no clear errors, and its
decision is supported by the record.
Reichle, supra.
For the
foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-6-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen B. Humphress
Theodore H. Lavit
THEODORE H. LAVIT
& ASSOC., P.S.C.
Lebanon, Kentucky
Shelly S. Miller
MILLER, MILLER & MILLER, PLC
Campbellsville, Kentucky
-7-
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