MELISSA VERST v. JOHN VERST
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RENDERED:
December 31, 1997; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-3225-MR
MELISSA VERST
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEONARD KOPOWSKI, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-01105
v.
JOHN VERST
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE: ABRAMSON, GARDNER, and JOHNSON, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Melissa Verst appeals an order of the Campbell
Circuit Court entered on November 14, 1996, which adopted the
Domestic Relations Commissioner's (DRC) report granting John
Verst's motion to modify custody and awarding him sole custody of
the parties' children.
Finding no error, we affirm.
The parties were married in November 1984.
During the
marriage, they had two children, Lindsey, born in April 1985, and
Jonathan, born in October 1989.
On September 29, 1992, John
Verst filed a petition for divorce.
After a contentious divorce
proceeding, the parties submitted a Separation Agreement
providing for joint legal custody with primary physical residence
of the children being with Melissa who retained ownership of the
marital residence.
The circuit court issued a Decree of
Dissolution of Marriage on August 20, 1993, that approved and
incorporated the Separation Agreement.
In March 1994, Melissa filed a motion seeking a court
order requiring John to undergo counseling as a condition of
continued visitation.
The circuit court referred the issue to
Roy Kiessling for evaluation and mediation.
Kiessling prepared
an evaluation report recommending that the visitation schedule be
restructured, but there be no court-ordered counseling.
On February 1, 1996, John filed a motion seeking sole
custody of the children.
In a supporting affidavit, he alleged
various deficiencies in Melissa's care.
The circuit court again
appointed Roy Kiessling to conduct an evaluation and make a
recommendation.
Kiessling submitted a custody evaluation report
recommending continuation of joint custody but that the primary
physical residence of the children be changed to John.
In May
1996, the circuit court referred the issue of custody to the DRC
for an evidentiary hearing.
After conducting a three-day
hearing, the DRC issued a report on October 8, 1996, recommending
that the motion to modify custody be granted and that John be
awarded sole custody.
Melissa filed exceptions to the DRC's
report, and John filed a response to the objections.
On November
14, 1996, the circuit court issued an order overruling the
objections and adopting the report and recommendations of the
DRC.
This appeal followed.
As a general rule, a trial court has broad discretion
in determining the best interest of children when awarding child
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custody.
Squires v. Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765 (1993).
In
reviewing a child custody determination, the standard of review
is whether the factual findings of the trial court are clearly
erroneous.
CR 52.01.
Reichle v. Reichle, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1986);
The fact findings of the DRC, to the extent they are
adopted by the trial judge, are given the same weight in applying
the clearly erroneous standard.
Greater Cincinnati Marine
Service, Inc. v. City of Ludlow, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 427, 429 (1980).
In addition, a trial court's decision on modification of custody
should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
v. Dudgeon, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 159, 160 (1970).
Dudgeon
Abuse of discretion
in relation to the exercise of judicial power implies "arbitrary
action or capricious disposition under the circumstances, at
least an unreasonable and unfair decision."
Kentucky National
Park Commission v. Russell, 301 Ky. 187, 191 S.W.2d 214, 217
(1945).
An award of joint custody, as initially ordered by the
trial court in this action, is the functional equivalent of no
award at all because both parents continue to share equal
decision-making authority concerning major areas of their
children's upbringing, with neither parent being designated the
primary custodian.
Aton v. Aton, Ky. App., 911 S.W.2d 612, 615
(1995); Benassi v. Havens, Ky. App., 710 S.W.2d 867 (1986).
If,
in response to a request to modify joint custody, the court
determines that joint custody should be reevaluated, the court
must proceed pursuant to KRS 403.270(1) as though it were
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determining custody for the first time.
Benassi, 710 S.W.2d at
869; Erdman v. Clements, Ky. App., 780 S.W.2d 635, 637 (1989).
KRS 403.270 provides that custody should be determined in
accordance with the best interest of the child, and sets out
several relevant factors including the wishes of the parents and
the child, and the interrelationship of the child with the
parents and siblings.
KRS 403.270(1).
Melissa raises two issues:
(1) whether the court erred
by concluding that transfer of the physical residence of the
children was in their best interests and, (2) whether the court
erred in deciding John should have sole custody.
Melissa argues
the circuit court's decision to transfer residence of the
children was based on its acceptance of several factual errors
found in Roy Kiessling's evaluation report.
First, we note that
in her appellate brief Melissa, without citation to the record,
refers to testimony given by two witnesses at the hearing before
the DRC that allegedly conflicts with the evaluator's report.
John disputes the alleged testimony.
In fact, there is no
transcript, audio tape, or videotape of the hearing in the
record.
See CR 75.01 (requiring appellant to designate
untranscribed proceedings for inclusion in record on appeal).
CR
76.12(4)(c)(iii) clearly requires "ample references to the
specific pages of the record, or tape and digital counter number
in the case of untranscribed tape-recordings, supporting each of
the statements narrated in the summary."
Kentucky courts have
repeatedly held that the Court of Appeals should not consider
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facts or matters stated in a party's brief that do not appear in
the record.
See, e.g., American Druggists' Ins. Co. v. Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky. App., 687
S.W.2d 555, 557 (1985).
Thus, we will consider only the facts
that appear in the record.
The record reveals that the trial court considered the
factors listed in KRS 403.270.
The DRC found that Lindsey had
expressed a desire to live with her father in statements to both
Kiessling and her school counselor.
Both Melissa and John
indicated to Kiessling that Lindsey had expressed a wish to live
with her father.
The evaluation report also states that the
children were relaxed in both homes and that Lindsey had adjusted
well to being with her stepsisters and stepmother.
Both John and
his new wife testified at the hearing that the children get along
well with their stepmother.
Meanwhile, Lindsey confided to her
school counselor that she was uncomfortable around her mother's
boyfriends and she was concerned about her mother's behavior with
her boyfriends.
The DRC found that these situations were
detrimental to the children.
In addition, Lindsey and Jonathan
are very close and Lindsey wanted them to stay together.
Both
parents expressed a strong desire to have the children live with
them.
The major factor relied on by the DRC in making his
recommendation involved Melissa's work schedule and her attention
to the care of the children.
Melissa admitted that her night-
time work schedule required her to have either her boarder, a
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boyfriend, a neighbor or a relative care for the children in her
absence.
Melissa acknowledged having had several boyfriends and
babysitters since the divorce.
Her work schedule further
resulted in Lindsey having to wake and assist Jonathan in
preparing for school.
Melissa also admitted that on a few
occasions, the children were at home unattended.
Lindsey
commented to her school counselor that she rarely saw her mother
during the week and that her mother was often sleeping when they
were under her care.
The DRC found that based on the testimony of all the
witnesses, Melissa's work schedule was detrimental to the wellbeing of the children.
Roy Kiessling also found that Melissa's
work schedule necessitated numerous live-in baby-sitters and
limited her availability to the children.
Melissa argues that
these findings gave undue weight to her prior work schedule which
was temporary and that her new schedule allows more personal
supervision and contact with the children.
John asserts that
Melissa's new schedule is only an attempt to influence the
custody determination.
The DRC found that Melissa is more
concerned with arranging a schedule to fit her lifestyle than
arranging a work schedule where she will be available to care for
the children.
John purchased a new home after his remarriage in
January 1995.
He currently works a regular five-day schedule
between 8:30 a.m and 4:30 p.m. while his new wife stays at home
with their young son and her two children from a prior marriage.
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During the hearing, John presented evidence that he had
repeatedly extended his normal visitation with Lindsey and
Jonathan by keeping them at his home with the approval of
Melissa.
In fact, in 1995, the children stayed with John
approximately 219 full days and 19 half-days.
Roy Kiessling
opined that John's home offered a more stable environment.
The
DRC made factual findings that John could provide a more
structured environment with a regular schedule, and he
recommended that the primary physical residence of the children
should be with John.
The DRC's factual findings with respect to
the factors identified in KRS 403.270 and the home environment of
the respective parties are not clearly erroneous because they are
supported by the record.
Indeed the DRC actually concluded that
the more stringent standard of serious endangerment as expressed
in KRS 403.340 was satisfied and justified granting John's motion
to modify custody.
As discussed earlier, the best interest
standard of KRS 403.270 is the appropriate standard because the
parties had joint custody under the original arrangement.
A
trial court's decision as to the primary residence of the
children should not be overturned where there is sufficient
evidence to support the decision.
See Aton v. Aton, supra.
Given the DRC's factual findings, we believe the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that a transfer of the
physical residence of Lindsey and Jonathan would be in their best
interests.
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Melissa's second complaint concerns the adjustment of
custody to sole custody in favor of John, rather than joint
custody with the children's primary physical residence being with
John.
In Squires v. Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765 (1993), the
Kentucky Supreme Court discussed the various factors relevant to
determining sole and joint custody.
The Court declined to adopt
a preference for joint custody by emphasizing that the overriding
factor is the best interests of the child.
Our Supreme Court
indicated that there was no significant difference between the
analysis for granting sole or joint custody, and that the trial
court must choose between the two based on a reasonable belief
that the positive aspects of a given choice outweigh the negative
aspects.
Id. at 768.
The analysis begins with the factors
outlined in KRS 403.270(1).
The ability of the parties to cooperate is crucial to
joint custody since it implicates a more co-equal participation
between the parents than does sole custody.
Nevertheless, the
Squires court held that absolute cooperation and goodwill is not
required for joint custody:
"By cooperation we mean willingness
to rationally participate in decisions affecting the upbringing
of the child."
Id. at 769.
A trial court may not modify a joint
custody arrangement absent an allegation by a party and a finding
by the court that there has been an inability or bad faith
refusal of one or both of the parties to cooperate.
See
Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer, Ky. App., 887 S.W.2d 555, 558 (1994).
In the case sub judice, Melissa argues the circuit court erred by
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granting John sole custody based on her alleged lack of
cooperation.
The DRC found that the parties' divorce was hotly
contested and the relationship between them had not improved.
He
found the parties' interactions were argumentative, with John
being verbally abusive and Melissa's attitude being "not
helpful."
The DRC made an explicit factual finding that Melissa
had demonstrated an inability or refusal to communicate and
cooperate with John.
We believe these factual findings are not
clearly erroneous.
As previously noted, shortly after the divorce, Melissa
filed a motion seeking to require John to undergo counselling as
a condition of visitation.
At that time, both parties alleged
that the other party was interfering with his or her relationship
with the children.
The evaluation report indicated that the
parties exhibited an inability to communicate effectively, and
Melissa frequently changed the children's visitation schedule
with John, which caused problems.
In addition, Melissa filed a
motion for a child support increase based on additional child
care expenses associated with payment of a night-time babysitter.
In February 1995, John filed a motion to hold Melissa in contempt
for failure to comply with the personal property division in the
divorce decree.
The parties also have had persistent disputes
over visitation and the extent of care necessary for the
children.
The record does not support Melissa's allegation that
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John was totally responsible for the lack of communication and
cooperation between the parties.
Melissa's apparent lack of emotional maturity was an
element contributing to the parties' disputes over visitation and
supervision of the children.
As the court in Stinnett v.
Stinnett, Ky.App., 915 S.W.2d 324 (1996) recognized, the lack of
cooperation factor relevant to the modification of joint custody
may be met in a wide variety of ways ranging from mere visitation
disputes to child neglect or abuse.
Based on the record as a
whole, the DRC's factual finding on the parties' inability or
refusal to cooperate is not clearly erroneous.
In view of the
factual findings involving the factors identified in KRS 403.270,
and the lack of cooperation between the parties, we cannot say
the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that sole
custody, rather than joint custody was more appropriate in this
instance.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Campbell Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Larry Hicks
Crestview Hills, Kentucky
Steven J. Franzen
Newport, Kentucky
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