COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. FINIS BART MILBY
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RENDERED:
October 17, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
96-CA-3085-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE W. M. HALL, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 96-CR-00003
v.
FINIS BART MILBY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, COMBS, and GARDNER, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky from an order by Green Circuit Court holding that
evidence relevant to the prosecution of Finis Bart Milby for
trafficking in marijuana should be suppressed under the
exclusionary rule because the evidence was obtained by an
improper search and seizure.
As a result of the suppression
order, the charges against Milby were dismissed.
After reviewing
the arguments of the parties and the applicable authorities, we
affirm.
In May 1996, Robert Mills orally agreed to rent a house
to Milby.
Milby made only one rental payment and, thereafter,
refused to make further payments or to vacate the property.
Upon
Milby's default, Mills commenced demanding that he either pay
back rent or vacate the house.
In December 1996, Mills sought
and obtained an “eviction notice” from the sheriff’s office.
precise nature of this notice is unclear from the record.
The
This
notice was subsequently served by Green County Deputy Sheriff
Mike Matney who was familiar with Milby because he had been
arrested on a prior "unrelated warrant."
vacate.
Milby still refused to
In January 1997, Mills asked the county attorney how he
could regain possession of his house and was advised that after
this period of time, he was entitled to re-enter and take
possession of the house.
The county attorney also advised Mills
that a deputy sheriff should accompany him into the house as a
witness to his actions.
On January 19, 1997, Deputy Matney accompanied Mills to
the house where Mills cut a lock on the front door so that the
two men could enter the house.
Upon entering the house, Deputy
Matney observed a marijuana plant and a bucket containing
packages of marijuana.
Deputy Matney subsequently contacted the
county attorney and obtained a search warrant.
seized in the ensuing search.
Other items were
A Green County Grand Jury indicted
Milby for possession of over eight ounces of marijuana.
Milby
filed a motion to suppress the marijuana, alleging that under
Kentucky landlord and tenant law Mills did not have an immediate
possessory interest in the house by virtue of the eviction notice
and, therefore, could not lawfully enter.
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After a hearing, the
trial court granted the suppression motion and dismissed the
charges against Milby.
This appeal followed.
The search and seizure protections of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of the
Kentucky Constitution apply only to state actions, not the
actions of private citizens.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971);
Stone v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 646 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1010, 88 S. Ct. 1259, 20 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1968).
Moreover, "a
wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private party does not
violate the Fourth Amendment and . . . such private wrongdoing
does not deprive the government of the right to use evidence that
it has acquired lawfully."
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S.
649, 656, 100 S. Ct. 2395, 65 L. Ed. 2d 410, 417 (1980).
The
initial question in this case is whether state action was
involved in Mills’ and Deputy Matney's entry into the house on
January 19, 1997.
Whether a person acted as an instrument or
agent of the state depends on "the degree of the Government's
participation in the private party's activities."
Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614, 109 S. Ct.
1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 658 (1989).
This issue is resolved by
considering the totality of the circumstances.
Id.
Of
particular concern is whether the government encouraged or
instigated the search and whether the party performing the search
was assisting the authorities or merely advancing his own
interests.
United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1242-43 (10th
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Cir. 1996); United States v. Cleaveland, 38 F.3d 1092, 1093 (9th
Cir. 1995).
A county attorney in Kentucky has a broad grant of
authority to cooperate in the enforcement of criminal and penal
laws within his judicial circuit.
See KRS 15.725.
In this case,
the landlord and deputy were acting under the direct advice of
the county attorney, who was presumably aware of Milby's arrest
on the prior warrant.
Moreover, at the suggestion of the county
attorney a deputy sheriff accompanied Mills on the search and
physically entered the premises.
Cf. United States v.
Cleaveland, supra (no state action where electric company
employee initiated and conducted search while police officer was
on standby a block away).
Although admittedly a close question,
we believe the breaking of the lock and the entering of the
rental property under these circumstances constituted state
action.
The entire sequence of events originated with the advice
of the county attorney and culminated with the active
participation of a state actor, Deputy Matney.
Considering the
totality of the circumstances, we believe there was state action.
The particular facts of this case also raise the issue
of whether entry into the house constitutes a search within
contemplation of the Fourth Amendment and Section 10 of the
Constitution of Kentucky.
The Commonwealth argues that there was
no search because Deputy Matney did not enter the house for the
purpose of searching for contraband.
The term “search” means an
infringement of "an expectation of privacy that society is
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prepared to consider reasonable."
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S.
463, 469, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370, 376 (1985).
A
“reasonable expectation of privacy” is defined in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).
An
expectation of privacy is reasonable only where (1) the
individual manifests a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search; and (2) society is willing to
recognize that subjective expectation as reasonable.
Katz, 389
U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 588.
The second
element turns on "whether the government's intrusion infringes
upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment."
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83, 104
S. Ct. 1735, 1743, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984).
The question of the
propriety of a search is determined upon the particular facts of
each case.
Estep v. Commonwealth, Ky., 663 S.W.2d 213, 215
(1983).
Under the facts of this case, the inquiry is whether
Milby had a reasonable expectation of privacy when 1) he had not
paid rent to his landlord for six months; 2) his landlord had
made repeated demands for him to either pay rent or vacate; 3) he
had been served with an “eviction notice”; and 4) he was not
residing at the rented house.
The Commonwealth argues that Milby
had no legitimate expectation of privacy.
In spite of the
foregoing factors mitigating otherwise, we believe Milby did have
a reasonable expectation of privacy.
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He had padlocked the
residence and although an eviction notice had been served, no
effort had been made to pursue the eviction.
Under Kentucky landlord-tenant law, an action of
forcible detainer is the exclusive process whereby a landlord may
evict a tenant who refuses to voluntarily relinquish possession.
See generally, Bardenwerper, 3A Kentucky Practice, § 24 (1990).
Under this process a tenant must first be notified of the action
of forcible detainer.
hearing.
KRS 383.210(1).
KRS 383.210(2).
He then is entitled to a
If a judgment is rendered in the
landlord’s favor, the district court judge may then issue a
warrant of restitution directing the sheriff or constable to put
the landlord into possession of the premises by removing the
tenant and his property if necessary.
KRS 383.245.
In the
present case, there is no claim or evidence that these procedures
were followed.
Absent compliance with these procedures, the
landlord had no authority to break the padlock on the door of the
rented house and enter the premises.
Tenants, including Milby, we believe, are entitled to
have a reasonable expectation that landlords will not act beyond
the law in entering leased premises.
Further, society is willing
to acknowledge this expectation of privacy as reasonable as
evidenced by the statutes establishing the eviction process.
In
view of this, we believe that the action was a search in that it
violated Milby's reasonable expectation of privacy.
supra.
See Katz,
The Commonwealth argues that landlord-tenant law has no
application to the issue because authority over premises to
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search does not rest upon the law of property and because
policemen are not required to be experts in the law of landlord
and tenant.
However, in consideration of the county attorney's
involvement in the entry into the house and the deputy sheriff's
familiarity with the eviction process culminating in a court
order, we do not believe this argument has merit.
All warrantless searches are deemed unreasonable unless
they fall under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
See Cook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 826 S.W.2d 329, 331 (1992).
The
burden is on the prosecution to prove that a particular
warrantless search comes under one of the recognized exceptions.
See Gallman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 578 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1979).
The
facts of this case implicate one actual exception to the warrant
requirement, consent, and a related doctrine which is not
technically an exception but nonetheless relevant, the plain view
doctrine.
Consensual searches are exempt from the Fourth
Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements.
Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854
(1973).
Under the Commonwealth's theory, Mills had apparent
authority to consent to entry into the house and the deputy in
good faith believed that the landlord had the right to give such
consent.
Because of this apparent authority, the Commonwealth
argues that the consent of the landlord was adequate to abrogate
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
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We disagree.
Consent searches are upheld where the consenting party
and the party seeking suppression have mutual use of property
based on joint access or control, "so that it is reasonable to
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit
the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed
the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to
be searched."
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7,
94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 250 n.7 (1974).
In deciding
whether the landlord had the right to consent to a search of the
house, the relevant inquiry is whether Mills could permit the
search in his own right and whether Milby had assumed the risk
that the landlord might permit a search.
See also Sanders v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 609 S.W.2d 690 (1980) (consent must be given
by one with "common authority" over premises).
In Kentucky, a
landlord's consent to an inspection cannot justify a warrantless
inspection of premises after they have become the home of a
tenant, absent consent of the tenant or an emergency.
Louisville
Bd. of Realtors v. City of Louisville, Ky. App., 634 S.W.2d 163,
166 (1982).
See also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81
S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1961).
In view of this, the
landlord had no actual authority to consent to the entry of the
home.
Moreover, we do not believe that it was reasonable for
Deputy Matney or the county attorney to believe that Mills had
apparent authority.
See generally Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990).
Both men
could be charged with knowledge of the landlord-tenant law and,
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indeed, Deputy Matney testified to his familiarity with the
process by which eviction is ordered by the court if a tenant
does not voluntarily vacate.
Thus, the search does not qualify
as a valid consent search.
In its plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
supra, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth three requirements for a
valid plain view seizure; prior justification for the officer's
presence, inadvertence of discovery, and immediate apparentness
that evidence has been found.
The justification for the
officer's presence can be a valid warrant, Coolidge, or a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
"Observation of
these limitations provides sufficient protection for the public
as guaranteed by Section 10 of the Constitution of Kentucky and
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
Commonwealth v. Johnson, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 876, 879 (1989).
More
recently, the United States Supreme Court in Horton v.
California, 596 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112
(1990), expressly rejected the inadvertence requirement and our
Supreme Court decided to "follow their lead" in Hazel v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 831, 833 (1992).
In this case, it is apparent that one requirement of
the Horton test is met.
It appears uncontested that the
marijuana was immediately recognizable as evidence.
The question
is whether there was prior justification for Deputy Matney’s
presence.
We do not believe, under the circumstances, the
presence of either the landlord or the deputy was justified.
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In
view of the proper means for eviction of a tenant and the absence
of valid consent or an emergency, Louisville Bd. of Realtors,
supra, there was no justification for the county attorney to have
advised Mills that he and Deputy Matney could properly enter the
house.
There being no justification for the advice that led to
the entering of the house, the first requirement of the Horton
test is not satisfied and the plain view doctrine is not
applicable.
Having found that there was a warrantless search and
that no recognized exception to the warrant requirement is
applicable, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Paul J. Neel, Jr.
Appellate Public Advocate
Louisville, Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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