WILLARD CUMMINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 31, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-3044-MR
WILLARD CUMMINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL J. VENTERS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-00004
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment convicting
appellant of first-degree robbery.
Upon reviewing appellant's
arguments, the record herein and the applicable law, we affirm.
The evidence established that on November 26, 1995,
appellant, Willard Cummins, arrived at Ralph's Food Mart with his
friends, McClayne Troxtell, Phillip Greer and Eddie Adams.
Troxtell was driving as they pulled into the food mart to talk to
Chris Adams.
Appellant jumped out of the red Geo Tracker and
entered Ralph's Food Mart wearing a toboggan and holding a knife.
The time was approximately 5:10 - 5:15 p.m. and Andrea Ridner,
the cashier, had two register drawers open as she was doing the
"countdown" to get ready for the 6:00 p.m. shift.
Appellant
brandished the knife and threatened to cut Ridner if she didn't
give him the money from the registers.
Appellant put the money
into a plastic bag and then quickly ran out the front door of the
food mart.
Ridner then called her manager and 911 to report the
robbery.
After appellant exited the food mart, Chris Adams
chased after him.
At some point, appellant turned around to face
his pursuer, threw the money down and ran away.
Chris Adams
returned to the food mart with the money.
Shortly thereafter, the police arrived at Ralph's Food
Mart to investigate the robbery.
Sam Catron, the Pulaski County
Sheriff, brought in a canine to track appellant's scent.
The
canine tracked appellant's scent to a dental office parking lot
which was directly across the street from appellant's residence.
On January 23, 1996, appellant was indicted on one
count of first-degree robbery.
Pursuant to a jury trial on
October 2, 1996, appellant was found guilty of first-degree
robbery and was sentenced to ten (10) years' imprisonment.
This
appeal followed.
Appellant's first assignment of error is with regard to
a remark made by a prospective juror in response to a question on
voir dire, which appellant maintains tainted the jury panel.
During voir dire, the following exchange occurred between the
court and the prospective juror in question, Marcus Baker:
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THE COURT
And how have you - in what way were you
acquainted or are you acquainted with Mr.
Cummins?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR BAKER
Through work.
THE COURT
Through work?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR BAKER
Yes.
THE COURT
Do you all work at the same place or does
he . . .
PROSPECTIVE JUROR BAKER
He did.
THE COURT
Okay. How long has it been since you've
worked in the same place with him?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR BAKER
It was about a month or two before he done
this, I'd say.
THE COURT
About a month or two before this came up?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR BAKER
Yeah.
THE COURT
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Were you friends or acquaintances with him
during that time?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR BAKER
Yeah, we was good friends.
Baker was dismissed for cause.
Thereafter, appellant
moved for a mistrial contending that Baker's comment that
appellant had worked with Baker "about a month or two before he
done this" raised the idea in the jury's mind that appellant had
talked to Baker and had told Baker he had committed the robbery.
The court offered to give an admonition, but appellant's counsel
declined the offer, stating he felt that would just make things
worse.
The court then denied the motion for mistrial, reasoning
that he could give a direct admonition that would cure any taint
and that the jury would be indirectly admonished when they are
instructed to only consider the evidence presented at trial.
A mistrial should be granted only where manifest,
urgent or real necessity for such action is shown.
Skaggs v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672 (1985), cert. denied by 476
U.S. 1130, 106 S. Ct. 1998, 90 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1986).
A trial
court has discretion in deciding whether or not to grant a
mistrial and its decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse
of that discretion.
Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 662 S.W.2d
483 (1983).
In the present case, appellant's counsel refused the
court's offer of an admonition as a matter of trial strategy
because he did not want further attention to be drawn to the
comment.
That decision was certainly appellant's prerogative.
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See Hall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 228 (1991), overruled
on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Ramsey, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 526
(1996).
However, we believe that such an admonition in this case
could have minimized any possible prejudice from the prospective
juror's utterance.
Thus, appellant cannot now complain that he
was prejudiced by the comment.
Stoker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 828
S.W.2d 619 (1992).
In any event, we do not see that the remark in
question, although in no way favorable to appellant, rose to the
level that it warranted a mistrial.
In reviewing the record, we
see that the court immediately attempted to rephrase the remark
for the prospective juror by stating, "About a month or two
before this came up?"
(Emphasis added.)
We believe this helped
to clarify the statement and minimize any prejudice.
As the
trial court also noted in denying the motion for mistrial, the
jurors were given the standard instruction that they must only
consider the evidence presented at trial.
There is nothing in
the record to suggest that they did otherwise.
Accordingly, the
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
mistrial.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred when
it failed to grant appellant's motion to strike another juror for
cause when there was evidence that said juror was biased.
During
voir dire, the prospective juror in question, Michael Simpson,
explained that he had been a victim of a theft and of an
attempted burglary.
He further stated that he had some bitter
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feelings and "wasn't a hundred percent sure he could be
unbiased."
The following exchange then occurred between the
court and Mr. Simpson:
THE COURT: Well, the question is would you
be able to separate your feelings about the
people who committed those offenses and judge
the evidence in this case.
PROSPECTIVE
just wanted
some bitter
I'd like to
know.
JUROR SIMPSON: I think I can. I
to bring it all out. I've got
feelings that lay back in there.
think I could keep them down, you
THE COURT: Well, it would be your duty as a
juror to consider only the evidence that's
presented, and obviously, you know, everybody
is opposed to crime or should be.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR SIMPSON:
I'll do my best.
THE COURT: That's why robbery is illegal.
But you have to be able to separate that
opposition to crime from the question of
whether Mr. Cummins committed this particular
offense or whether he didn't commit it. As
you say, it may pose a special burden to you
because you have feelings about being robbed
or being burglarized. I don't remember what
your experience exactly was, but are your
feelings about that so strong that it would
prevent you from . . .
PROSPECTIVE JUROR SIMPSON: I believe I can
make it. You know, I'll work hard and make a
decision and pay a lot of attention. I just
wanted to make everybody aware that it had
happened to me in the past.
Simpson then went on to say that the crimes of which he was a
victim happened long enough ago that he didn't really think about
them anymore.
When appellant's counsel asked Simpson if his
problem was strong, Simpson responded:
No, it's not. It wouldn't be a problem or
anything. Like I say, I'll give it a hundred
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percent of my attention. I just wanted
everybody to be aware of it, that it happened
to me and everything. I believe I can
separate it.
The trial court is allowed considerable discretion in
excusing prospective jurors.
S.W.2d 486 (1995).
Harman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 898
In reviewing the record, we cannot say the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike juror
Simpson for cause.
The court impressed upon the juror the need
to be able to separate his feelings regarding the crime of which
he was a victim from those regarding the crime in the case at
hand.
The juror ultimately indicated that he could so separate
those feelings.
Nevertheless, any possible error attributable to
the failure to strike Simpson was harmless since Simpson was
eventually struck from the panel with one of appellant's
peremptory challenges.
Appellant's final argument is that the trial court
erred when it overruled appellant's objection to a certain
statement made by the Commonwealth in its closing argument.
During the trial, Sheriff Sam Catron testified that his police
dog followed a scent from outside the crime scene to the parking
lot of a dental office which was directly across the street from
appellant's residence, where appellant allegedly fled after
committing the robbery.
During the Commonwealth's closing, the
prosecutor stated that the robber came out of the store and was
tracked directly to his house.
Appellant objected on grounds
that it was a misstatement of fact as the Sheriff had testified
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that the scent was lost at the dental office parking lot across
the street from appellant's house, and not at appellant's house.
The prosecution should confine its argument to the
facts and evidence and reasonable inferences which can be derived
therefrom.
(1991).
Caretenders, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 83
An appellate review of alleged prosecutorial misconduct
must center on the overall fairness of the entire trial.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219 (1996).
Partin
"In order to
justify reversal, the misconduct of the prosecutor must be so
serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair."
Partin, supra at 224, citing Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F. 2d
247 (6th Cir. 1979).
We do not view the statement of the prosecutor in
question as rising to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.
While it may have been a slight exaggeration to say that the
trail ended at appellant's house rather than at the parking lot
directly across the street from appellant's house, the jury heard
the actual evidence on which the comment was based.
Thus, the
slight misstatement was not so serious as to render the entire
trial fundamentally unfair.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Pulaski Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth Shaw
Richmond, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Courtney A. Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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