LESLIE DILLARD OLDHAM, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
December 19, 1997; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2997-MR
LESLIE DILLARD OLDHAM, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-00754
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
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DYCHE, MILLER, and SCHRODER, Judges.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Leslie Dillard Oldham, Jr. (appellant), brings
this appeal from an October 29, 1996 judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court.
We affirm.
The facts are these:
On May 30, 1996, the Lexington
Metro Police Department enlisted the aid of a confidential
informant, Robert Wilson, to make a controlled drug buy.
Wilson
"cruised" certain areas until he was approached by appellant and
one other male.
Appellant entered Wilson's vehicle, and Wilson
expressed interest in purchasing a "$40.00 piece" of crack
cocaine.
Appellant then instructed Wilson to drive them to
another location where the cocaine could be obtained.
Upon
arrival, appellant left the car and returned shortly with the
contraband.
According to Wilson's testimony, appellant handed
him the drugs, and, in return, he gave appellant $40.00.
Appel-
lant testified, however, that he received no money for the drugs.
Appellant was indicted upon one count of trafficking in
a controlled substance in the first degree (Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS)
218A.1412).
On September 30, 1996, a jury trial ensued, and,
subsequently, appellant was found guilty.
He was sentenced to
five years' imprisonment, but the term of imprisonment was
probated for a period of five years.
This appeal followed.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by refusing
to instruct the jury on the lesser charges of first-degree
criminal attempt to traffick in a controlled substance (KRS
506.010, KRS 218A. 1412) and criminal facilitation of same (KRS
506.080).
He contends such errors were prejudicial because
conviction upon either charge would have resulted in lesser
punishment.
We disagree.
It is well established that a court must instruct upon
the whole law of the case.
706 S.W.2d 434 (1986).
Callison v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.
"Where there is sufficient evidence to
support a reasonable inference concerning the ultimate fact in a
case, the issue should be submitted to the jury with appropriate
instructions."
Id. at 436.
We first address the circuit court's refusal to
instruct on criminal attempt.
Appellant specifically asserts
that the jury could have reasonably inferred that he did not
traffick in a controlled substance, but rather could have reason-
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ably inferred that he was guilty only of criminal attempt.
In
support thereof, he points to his testimony that he accepted no
money in exchange for the cocaine.
This argument fails because
the crime of trafficking is not predicated upon receipt of money
in exchange for a controlled substance.
KRS 218A.010(24) defines trafficking as:
to manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell,
transfer, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a controlled substance [emphasis added].
Transfer is defined as the disposition "of a controlled substance
to another person without consideration and not in furtherance of
commercial distribution."
KRS 218A.010(25).
Both appellant and
Wilson testified that the delivery of the crack cocaine to the
appellant was completed.
Consequently, we are of the opinion
that the trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing
to render an instruction upon criminal attempt.
We next address the trial court's refusal to instruct
on criminal facilitation to traffick in a controlled substance.
In Luttrell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 75, 79 (1977), the
Court characterized "criminal facilitation" as follows:
[The defendant] would be guilty of criminal
facilitation if he furnished [another] with
the means of committing a crime knowing that
he would use it to commit a crime but without
intention to promote or contribute to its
fruition.
The Court, in Perdue v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 148, 160
(1996), further explained that "[f]acilitation reflects the
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mental state of one who is 'wholly indifferent' to the actual
completion of the crime [emphasis added]."
The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that appellant
was not wholly indifferent to whether Wilson obtained the crack
cocaine.
Appellant testified that he was caught "red handed" and
that he was going to get high with Wilson.
If appellant's
testimony is to be given credence, his interest was in the
sharing of drugs with Wilson.
Conversely, if Wilson's testimony
is to be believed, appellant's interest was that of monetary
compensation.
Either way, appellant's conduct and testimony
demonstrate that he was not indifferent to the transaction.
In
sum, we perceive no error by the trial court in refusing to
instruct the jury on criminal facilitation.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
circuit court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sally Wasielewski
Lexington, KY
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Courtney A. Jones
Assistant Att'y Gen'l
Frankfort, KY
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