RORY BURDETTE HUNTER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 17, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
96-CA-2716-MR
RORY BURDETTE HUNTER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-0298
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, KNOPF, and SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
Rory Burdette Hunter brings this direct appeal of
the August 13, 1996, final judgment and sentence of imprisonment
of the Fayette Circuit Court, following his conviction by a jury
for trafficking in a controlled substance, KRS 218A.1412 and
possession of drug paraphernalia, KRS 218A.500.
After reviewing
the issues raised by Hunter, the record and the applicable law,
we affirm the conviction.
In May 1996, in response to citizen complaints, the
Lexington Police Department started an investigation of alleged
drug transactions in the neighborhood of Seventh and Dakota
Streets.
As a part of the investigation, the police engaged a
confidential informant to make drug buys in the area.
On May 6,
1996, the police met with the confidential informant and
discussed the procedures for the operation that night.
The
police searched the confidential informant and his automobile
both prior to and after the transactions to confirm he had no
other drugs in his possession.
They also placed a microphone
transmitter in the confidential informant's vehicle, which
allowed them to listen contemporaneously to and record
conversations associated with the drug transactions.
At approximately 10:30 p.m., the confidential informant
drove to the area of Seventh and Dakota Streets while four (4)
police officers positioned themselves in another vehicle a block
from the area.
While on Dakota Street, the confidential
informant was approached by a black male who offered to sell him
cocaine.
The confidential informant purchased two (2) $20.00
pieces of crack cocaine from the individual with the money the
informant had received from the police.
During the transaction,
the police heard the confidential informant give a description of
the seller.
As soon as the confidential informant signalled by
verbal cue that the transaction was completed, the police drove
to the scene.
As they arrived, they saw Hunter, who fit the
description given earlier and who was only a short distance
behind the confidential informant's automobile.
was in the immediate vicinity.
No other person
The police arrested Hunter.
During a personal search, the police found a small quantity of
crack cocaine and a $20.00 bill in his coat.
crack pipe discovered very near Hunter.
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They also seized a
On April 16, 1996, the Fayette County Grand Jury
indicted Hunter on one felony count of trafficking in a
controlled substance and one misdeamenor count of possession of
drug paraphernalia.
On July 9, 1996, Hunter was tried and
convicted by a jury on both counts of the indictment.
On August
9, 1996, the circuit court found Hunter guilty of the two (2)
offenses and sentenced him to serve five (5) years in prison on
count one for trafficking in a controlled substance and twelve
(12) months in jail on count two for possession of drug
paraphernalia with the sentences to run concurrently for a total
sentence of five (5) years.
The final judgment and sentence of
imprisonment was entered on August 13, 1996.
This appeal
followed.
Hunter argues the circuit court erred by failing to
grant his motion for a mistrial and his motion for a directed
verdict.
The motion for mistrial was made during the testimony
of Detective Lawrence Weathers, who was the officer that arrested
Hunter.
Detective Weathers stated that Hunter refused to give
the police his name after the arrest.
The prosecutor asked
Detective Weathers how the police learned appellant's name.
Detective Weathers testified that he telephoned the jail
personnel after Hunter had been incarcerated to see if they knew
him "because a lot of times people at the jail come in contact
with people more than we do . . . ."
He stated that the jail
personnel did know Hunter so they had his name when Detective
Weathers telephoned the jail.
Defense counsel immediately moved
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for a mistrial arguing that this testimony created prejudice
because it implied that Hunter had been a resident of the Fayette
County Detention Center.
The Commonwealth argued before the
trial judge that the information was more probative than
prejudicial.
The trial court denied the motion without stating a
reason and the trial continued.
In Hunter's appellate brief, he contends Detective
Weather's testimony on Hunter's name touched on other potential
crimes.
He argues that while Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE)
404(b) allows evidence of other crimes or wrongs to prove
identity, the Commonwealth violated KRE 404(c), which requires
the prosecution to give reasonable pretrial notice if it intends
to introduce evidence pursuant to subdivision (b).
See
generally, Gray v. Commonwealth, Ky., 843 S.W.2d 895 (1992).
We
need not address this argument because it was not preserved for
appellate review.
Where the grounds for an objection presented
to the appellate court are different from those asserted before
the trial court, they are not properly preserved for appellate
review.
Charles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 407, 409
(1982); Daugherty v. Commonwealth, Ky., 572 S.W.2d 861, 863
(1978); Allen v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 901 S.W.2d 881, 884
(1995).
As the court stated in Kennedy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 544
S.W.2d 219, 222 (1977), "The appellants will not be permitted to
feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the
appellate court."
See also, Booth v. Commonwealth, Ky., 675
S.W.2d 856, 858 (1984).
The role of the appellate court is one
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of review, which presupposes that the trial court has had a prior
opportunity to consider the issue.
716 S.W.2d 242, 251 (1986).
Todd v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
Hunter did not present the notice
issue under KRE 404(c) to the trial court; therefore, he cannot
obtain relief in this Court on that ground.
Hunter also reasserts on appeal that Detective
Weathers' testimony was unduly prejudicial.
He maintains that a
mistrial was necessary because the jury could have believed from
Detective Weathers' testimony that Hunter had enough prior
contact with the jail for the jail personnel to know him well.
Evidence tending to show the commission of a crime other than the
one charged is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in the
case, and the possibility of prejudice to the accused is
outweighed by the probative worth and need for the evidence.
Powell v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 843 S.W.2d 908, 911 (1992);
Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 665, 674 (1990).
"Evidence of criminal conduct other than that being tried, is
admissible only if probative of an issue independent of character
or criminal disposition, and only if its probative value on that
issue outweighs the unfair prejudice with respect to character."
Bell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (1994)(quoting
Billings v. Commonwealth, Ky., 843 S.W.2d 890, 892 (1992)).
Evidence of other criminal or wrongful acts may be introduced as
an exception to the general rule excluding evidence of other
crimes to prove that an accused is a person of criminal
disposition if the evidence is offered to show motive,
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opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake.
Clark v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 793,
795 (1992); KRE 404(b).
To be admissible under any of the
exceptions, the other criminal or wrongful acts must be (1)
relevant for some purpose other than to prove criminal
predisposition, (2) sufficiently probative to warrant
introduction, and (3) the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its potential for prejudice to the accused.
Clark,,
833 S.W.2d at 795; Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 889-90; Drumm v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380 (1990).
Generally, rulings
upon admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the
trial judge and should not be reversed on appeal absent a clear
abuse of discretion.
Simpson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 889 S.W.2d
781, 783 (1994); Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 685 S.W.2d 549,
554 (1985).
More specifically, a ruling based on a proper
balancing of prejudice against probative value will not be
disturbed unless it is determined that the trial court abused its
discretion.
Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 890; Daniel v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 905 S.W.2d 76, 78 (1995).
In the case sub judice, Hunter's counsel moved for a
mistrial based on Detective Weathers' testimony.
A defendant is
entitled to a mistrial only upon a showing of "manifest necessity
for such an action or an urgent or real necessity."
Skaggs v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672, 678 (1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1130, 106 S. Ct. 1998, 90 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1986)(quoting Wiley
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 575 S.W.2d 166, 168 (1979)).
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A trial
court has discretion in deciding whether to declare a mistrial,
and its decision should not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion.
Turpin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 619, 620
(1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1058, 110 S. Ct. 1530, 108 L. Ed.
2d 769 (1990); Clay v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 867 S.W.2d 200,
204 (1994).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Detective Weathers' testimony.
In reviewing an alleged
abuse of discretion by a trial court, this court must consider
both the circumstances surrounding the introduction of the
testimony as well as the actual proof.
Ky., 821 S.W.2d 484, 487 (1991).
Ruppee v. Commonwealth,
The information concerning
Hunter's identity was relevant to connect the defendant to the
indictment and falls within an exception listed in KRE 404(b).
Hunter's main defense to the charges involved mistaken identity.
In addition, the testimony was not highly prejudicial because it
did not refer to any specific criminal act or misconduct.
The
Commonwealth elicited this testimony to provide background
information on how the police discovered Hunter's name after he
refused to voluntarily provide this information.
The prejudicial
effect did not outweigh the probative value of this evidence.
Similarly, Hunter has failed to demonstrate that the
circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to declare a
mistrial.
Detective Weathers indicated that jail personnel come
in contact with more persons than regular police officers.
He
did not state that anyone at the jail knew Hunter from a prior
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arrest or commission of another crime.
This testimony
constituted a very brief remark with substantially obscure
content.
This testimony was not substantial or prejudicial
enough to deny Hunter of a fair trial.
Hunter's second challenge concerns the trial court's
refusal to grant his motion for a directed verdict.
The standard
for granting a directed verdict at trial and for review by an
appellate court are set forth in Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816
S.W.2d 186 (1991).
It provides in relevant part:
On motion for directed verdict, the trial
court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a
directed verdict is, if under the evidence as
a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for
a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant
is entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal.
Id. at 187; See also, Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 933 S.W.2d
811, 815 (1996); Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 221
(1996); Dishman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 335, 340 (1995).
Hunter's defense to the charges consisted of mistaken
identity.
During the drug transaction, the confidential
informant stated the seller of the drugs was wearing a dark coat
and red or maroon pants.
At the trial, Hunter was wearing dark
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black pants.
Hunter argues that he was in jail from the date of
arrest until the date of the trial.
He further contends that the
Commonwealth had to establish why Hunter had black pants at trial
because the suspect's clothing was a primary means for
identifying the perpetrator of the crime.
We disagree.
The appellate standard of review is whether viewing the
evidence as a whole a reasonable juror could find the defendant
guilty.
During the trial, the confidential informant identified
Hunter as the person who sold him two (2) $20.00 pieces of crack
cocaine.
The confidential informant also identified Hunter when
he was taken back to the scene of the transaction by Officer
Vifquain.
Three (3) of the police officers involved in the
operation identified Hunter as the only person standing near the
confidential informant's automobile as they arrived on the scene.
They also stated that Hunter was wearing a black jacket and
maroon pants when he was arrested.
The witnesses' testimony was
consistent with the audiotape of the transaction, which was
admitted into evidence.
The property officer at the jail
testified that the records indicated Hunter was wearing a dark
coat and maroon pants when he entered the jail.
When the police
searched Hunter at the scene, they discovered a $20.00 bill
bearing the serial number of a bill given to the confidential
informant by police for the drug buy.
The police also found a
crack pipe at Hunter's feet when they arrested him.
Clearly, the
evidence of Hunter's guilt in this case was overwhelming.
A
trial court is authorized to direct a verdict of acquittal only
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if the prosecution produces no more than a scintilla of evidence
of guilt.
Edmonds. v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 343, 346
(1995)(citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 60 S.W.2d 3 (1983).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable
juror to find Hunter guilty.
The trial judge did not err by
denying Hunter's motion for a directed verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Herbert T. West
Lexington, KY
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Suzanne Baker Hite
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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