CARLOS WAYNE ALVEY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 3, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
96-CA-2681-MR
CARLOS WAYNE ALVEY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KEN COREY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CR-1431
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GARDNER, COMBS, and ABRAMSON, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Carlos Wayne Alvey appeals an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court denying his Motion to Correct Judgment
pursuant to CR 60.02.
Alvey alleges that his probation was
revoked contrary to the provisions of KRS 533.040(3).
After
reviewing the record and considering the arguments of the parties
as well as the applicability of KRS 533.060(2), we affirm.
On October 13, 1990, Alvey forcibly entered the
apartment of Terri L. Brown.
Upon gaining entrance, he assaulted
Ms. Brown and ransacked her apartment.
As a result of the
assault, Ms. Brown was left permanently blind in her left eye.
On January 7, 1994, Alvey pled guilty to various charges related
to this incident pursuant to indictment 93-CR-1341.
Alvey was
sentenced to five years for third-degree burglary; five years for
first-degree assault under extreme emotional disturbance; and
ninety days for third-degree criminal mischief, to be served
concurrently with the two five-year sentences, for a total of ten
years.
However, rendition of sentence was withheld and Alvey was
placed on probation subject to his compliance with the conditions
set forth in the trial court's January 12, 1994 order.
On July
27, 1995, Alvey was arrested for burglary, forced entry, and
receiving stolen property.
On September 5, 1996, the Division of
Probation and Parole issued a report recommending revocation of
Alvey’s parole.
Parole violations alleged were Alvey's 1)
failure to report his July arrest within 72 hours; 2) failure of
an August 15, 1995, drug screening; and 3) failure to pay courtordered restitution to Ms. Brown.
On September 6, 1995, the
trial court issued a warrant for Alvey's arrest for parole
violations and on September 13, 1995, the Commonwealth filed a
motion requesting the revocation of his parole.
On September 25,
1995, Alvey was arrested pursuant to the probation violation
warrant.
On November 8, 1995, in conjunction with his July 1995
arrest, Alvey pled guilty to four counts of second-degree
burglary and one count of receiving stolen property.
conviction was pursuant to indictment 95-CR-2248.
This
On December 10
he was sentenced to ten years on each burglary count, to be
served concurrently, and two years on the receiving stolen
property count, for a total of twelve years.
On February 16,
1996, the trial court issued an order revoking Alvey’s probation
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in case 93-CR-1431.
The order further specified that the total
ten-year sentence in 93-CR-1431 was to run consecutively with the
total twelve-year sentence in 95-CR-2248.
On June 18, 1996, Alvey filed a motion to correct
judgment pursuant to CR 60.02 alleging that the sentence imposed
for his conviction in case 95-CR-2248 must, pursuant to KRS
533.040(3), be run concurrently with his sentence in 93-CR-1431
because the Department of Corrections failed to revoke his
probation within 90 days after becoming aware of the grounds for
revocation in 93-CR-1431.
On September 5, 1996, the trial court
issued its order denying the motion stating that, “[t]he
defendant’s revocation was based upon the conviction for new
offenses, not for the arrest for those offenses.”
This appeal
followed.
Alvey argues that the trial court was required,
pursuant to KRS 533.040(3), to run his sentence in 93-CR-1431
concurrently with his sentence in 95-CR-2248.
KRS 533.040(3)
provides as follows:
A sentence of probation or conditional
discharge shall run concurrently with any
federal or state jail, prison, or parole term
for another offense to which the defendant is
or becomes subject during the period, unless
the sentence of probation or conditional
discharge is revoked. The revocation shall
take place prior to parole under or
expiration of the sentence of imprisonment or
within ninety (90) days after the grounds for
revocation come to the attention of the
Department of Corrections, whichever occurs
first.
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According to Alvey, since the grounds for probation
revocation came to the attention of the Department of Corrections
(DOC) on September 25, 1995, the date of his arrest for violation
of probation, DOC had to revoke his probation within ninety days
of that date, or the reinstated sentence would have to run
concurrently with any other prison term.
Alvey argues that his
September 25, 1995 arrest triggered the ninety-day clock because,
“if a detainer is placed on the defendant by Probation and Parole
at anytime prior to the revocation hearing, . . . this would be
notice to [DOC] and this prosecutorial decision (notice that they
are treating the allegations as having substance) would commence
the ninety-day period for revocation.”
Myers v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 836 S.W.2d 431, 433 (1992).
Because his probation was
not revoked until February 16, 1996, well beyond the ninety-day
statutory limit, Alvey insists the statute mandates concurrent
sentencing.
See also Kiser v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d
432 (1992).
The Commonwealth argues that the foregoing aspect of
Myers was overruled in Sutherland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 910
S.W.2d 235 (1995).
While Sutherland did overrule Myers “to the
extent it conflicts with this opinion,” Sutherland, 910 S.W.2d at
237, we do not believe the Myers language cited by Alvey was
overruled.
Sutherland recognizes that “it is the Legislature
which provided the 90-day time limitation within KRS 533.040(3).
The statute provides that any revocation of probation (which
occurs outside of the 90-day period) is to be run concurrently
with any other offense.
If this time frame is deemed to be too
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short, it is up to the General Assembly to make a change.”
Sutherland, 910 S.W.2d at 237.
More specifically, Sutherland
does not contradict that portion of Myers which holds that the
clock begins to tick if a detainer is placed on the probated
party.
In denying Alvey’s CR 60.02 motion, the trial court
reasoned that parole in 93-CR-1431 was revoked because of the
conviction in 95-CR-2248 and not because of Alvey’s arrest.
Under this theory (advanced by the Commonwealth and incorporated
by reference in the court's order), because sentencing was not
until December 10, 1995,1 the February 16, 1996 revocation was
within the ninety-day mandate of KRS 533.040(3).
with the reasoning of the trial court.
We disagree
Pursuant to Myers, we
believe the ninety-day limit began to run on September 25, 1995.
However, the trial court's error was harmless because, as
explained below, the court reached the correct conclusion, i.e.,
that the sentences should not run concurrently.
It is well-
settled that a correct decision will not be disturbed merely
because it was based upon incorrect grounds.
Haddad v.
Louisville Gas and Electric Company, Ky., 449 S.W.2d 916 (1969).
Richmond v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District, Ky. App., 572 S.W.2d 601, 603 (1977).
The controlling authority on this appeal is Brewer v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 922 S.W.2d 380 (1996).
1
Addressing the
It's unclear why, under this theory, the sentencing date rather than the date the plea was
entered (November 8, 1995) should trigger the 90-day clock.
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conflict between KRS 533.040 and 533.060(2), Brewer held that
since KRS 533.040 was enacted in 1974, while KRS 533.060 was
enacted in 1976, statutory construction principles dictate that
the latter controls.
Brewer, 922 S.W.2d at 382.
KRS 533.060(2)
provides:
When a person has been convicted of a felony
and is committed to a correctional detention
facility and released on parole or has been
released by the court on probation, shock
probation, or conditional discharge, and is
convicted or enters a plea of guilty to a
felony committed while on parole, probation,
shock probation, or conditional discharge,
the person shall not be eligible for
probation, shock probation, or conditional
discharge and the period of confinement for
that felony shall not run concurrently with
any other sentence.
(emphasis added).
Under the holding of Brewer the emphasized language of
KRS 533.060(2) supersedes any relief that might have been
available to Alvey under KRS 533.040(3).
Under the facts sub
judice Alvey 1) was a person convicted of a felony; 2) who had
been released by the trial court on probation; and 3) who
subsequently entered a plea of guilty to a felony committed while
on probation.
KRS 533.060(2) clearly and unambiguously requires
that Alvey’s second sentence (the twelve-year sentence in 95-CR2248) not run concurrently with his first sentence (the initially
probated ten-year sentence in 93-CR-1431). See also Commonwealth
v. Hunt, Ky. App., 619 S.W.2d 733 (1981).
Thus, the circuit
court's denial of Alvey's CR 60.02 motion is correct, although
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for a reason not advanced by the Commonwealth or considered by
the circuit court.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court denying Alvey's Motion to Correct
Judgment Pursuant to CR 60.02.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT - PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Carlos Wayne Alvey
West Liberty, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
J. Kirk Ogrosky
Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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