JOHN W. SANDRIDGE V. ANGELA SUE SANDRIDGE
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RENDERED:
September 12, 1997; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2236-MR
JOHN W. SANDRIDGE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-001070
V.
ANGELA SUE SANDRIDGE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI, and MILLER, Judges.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
John W. Sandridge, acting pro se, appeals a July
11, 1996, order of the Kenton Circuit Court denying his motion to
modify child support brought pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 403.213.
We affirm.
The parties were divorced in October 1993 pursuant to
an Indiana state dissolution decree.
According to the decree,
Angela was awarded custody of the couple's son, Michael, who was
born in November 1990, and John was to pay monthly child support
of $450.
Angela and Michael lived in Kentucky until October
1994, when John was awarded temporary custody of the child by
agreed order.
At that time, John had remarried, lived in
Maryland, and was in military service with the Air Force.
In April 1995, John filed a petition for modification
of child custody and child support in the Maryland Circuit Court.
In August 1995, Angela filed a motion in Kenton Circuit Court for
determination of jurisdiction and temporary custody. John moved
to dismiss Angela's motion arguing Maryland was the more
appropriate forum.
By agreement with the Maryland court, Judge
Douglas Stephens conducted a hearing on jurisdiction and held
that Kentucky was the more appropriate forum, but reserved the
issues of custody and child support for mediation.
On September 29, 1995, an Agreed Order on custody,
visitation and child support was entered.
The parties agreed to
joint legal custody of their son, with Angela retaining physical
possession and John having liberal visitation.
The order also
provided that John pay child support of $450 per month, except
that this amount would be reduced temporarily to $300 from
October to December 1995.
The order also stated the parties
would not seek modification of the child support amount for two
years.
On May 23, 1996, Angela moved for modification of the
summer visitation provision of the September 1995 Agreed Order,
and to hold John in contempt for failure to pay the full monthly
child support.
On June 21, 1996, John moved to modify the child
support obligation based on a substantial and continuing change
in his income and the absence of day care expenses for the child.
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After conducting a hearing on June 24, 1996, the circuit court
issued an order on July 11, 1996, denying John's motion to modify
child support, but refusing to hold him in contempt.
This appeal
followed.
John contends that the circuit court erred by failing
to find a substantial change in his income to support a reduction
in his child support payments.
He also challenges the circuit
court's holding that he was obligated to pay the full $450 per
month despite the absence of actual child care expenses.
John
admitted that he unilaterally reduced his child support payments
to $300 for the period of January 1996 to June 1996 because
Michael was not attending day care.
He argues that he attempted
to resolve the dispute over the child support informally with
Angela, but he was unsuccessful.
John argues the child support
amount in the September 1995 agreement was based on his estimate
that he would be earning at least $30,000 per year, but, in fact,
he was only earning half that amount.
It is well settled that the parties to a dissolution of
marriage may enter into a separation agreement regarding issues
of custody, visitation and support of children.
Giacalone v.
Giacalone, Ky. App., 876 S.W.2d 616, 618 (1994); KRS 403.180.
The terms of the agreement are enforceable as contract terms and
by all remedies available for enforcement of a judgment.
KRS
403.180(5).
A divorce decree approved by the court generally may
preclude or limit modification consistent with the settlement
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agreement, except for terms concerning custody, visitation or
child support.
KRS 403.180.
The provisions of a divorce decree
dealing with child support may be modified only as to
installments accruing subsequent to the filing of a motion for
modification and only upon a showing of a material change in
circumstances that is substantial and continuing.
403.213(1).
KRS
A court may recognize the parents' oral agreement to
modification of child support, but the agreement must be proven
with reasonable certainty and the court must find that the
agreement is fair and equitable under the circumstances.
Price
v. Price, Ky., 912 S.W.2d 44, 46 (1995); Whicker v. Whicker, Ky.
App., 711 S.W.2d 857, 859 (1986).
Additionally, the proven oral
agreement will be enforced only if the modification might
reasonably have been granted, had a proper motion to modify been
brought.
Price, 912 S.W.2d at 46.
John argues the circuit court erred by finding him
liable for child support arrearages.
He contends that he was
obligated to pay only $300 per month, rather than $450 per month
because the agreed upon latter amount included $150 for day care
expenses that were not actually incurred between January and June
1996.
The September 1995 Agreed Order stated in relevant part as
follows:
The child support obligation of the
respondent shall remain at $450.00 per month,
and includes liability for basic support and
day care; however, the respondent's support
obligation shall be reduced to $300.00 per
month from October 1, 1995 to December 31,
1995, due to the fact that petitioner's day
care needs will be less during the period.
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On January 1, 1996, the child support
obligation shall return to $450 per month.
The parties will maintain this as the base
amount for a period of no less than two
years, before any modification is sought.
John indicated that Angela complained about his failure
to pay the full $450 starting in January.
The parties discussed
a possible adjustment to the amount but could reach no consensus.
John testified that he believed he did not have to pay the full
amount when no actual day care expenses were incurred.
Angela
testified that she agreed to the temporary reduction to $300 per
month between October 1, 1995 and December 31, 1995 because John
was having financial problems.
She indicated that the agreement
was intended to require a set amount of $450 per month after
January 1, 1996, regardless of whether Michael was placed in an
outside day care facility.
The trial court held that the
agreement was sufficiently definite to require a fixed amount for
child support of $450.
After review of the record, we agree with the circuit
court that the language of the Agreed Order is unambiguous and
imposes a fixed obligation on John to pay $450 per month child
support.
In fact, the Agreed Order does not designate $150 of
the $450 be attributed to day care expenses.
The agreement
clearly does not authorize John to automatically reduce the child
support payments because of a variation in actual day care
expenses.
Moreover, a parent may not unilaterally modify a child
support order.
See Price v. Price, supra.
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Consequently, we hold
that the September 1995 Agreed Order should be construed to
require John to pay $450 monthly child support.
John also argues that the circuit court erred by
failing to reduce his child support obligation because there was
a material change in his circumstances.
He maintains that at the
time he agreed to pay $450 child support, he expected to earn in
excess of $30,000.
He states that the circuit court failed
properly to appreciate his recent career change from employment
with a steady income in the Air Force to a fluctuating income as
a self-employed real-estate agent.
In the case sub judice, the parties agreed to fix the
child support payments at $450 per month.
In addition, John
agreed not to seek a modification in the child support amount for
a period of two years.
Although KRS 403.180(6) generally
prescribes restraints on modification of child support in divorce
decrees based on settlement agreements, John's waiver of his
ability to seek modification is valid under the criteria
delineated in Giacalone.
John has not challenged the voluntary
and knowing nature of the September 1995 Agreed Order.
represented by counsel at the time.
He was
There is no evidence of
fraud or overreaching by Angela in reaching this agreement.
The
trial court held that John was bound by the Agreed Order both as
to the amount of the child support and the limitation on his
seeking modification of the child support amount.
We believe the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modify
the child support amount.
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For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Kenton
County Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John W. Sandridge
Millersville, Maryland
Joel K. Jensen
Covington, Kentucky
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