NUCKOLS FARM, INC. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY d/b/a BELLSOUTH MOBILITY, INC.
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RENDERED:
October 3, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2069-MR
NUCKOLS FARM, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-000201
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY
and LEXINGTON MSA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
d/b/a BELLSOUTH MOBILITY, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * *
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order of the Franklin
Circuit Court dismissing appellant's action for review of a
decision of the Public Service Commission ("the Commission") due
to lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of appellant's
failure to timely designate the record pursuant to KRS 278.420.
Upon considering appellant's argument in light of the record
herein and controlling precedent, we agree with the trial court
that subject matter jurisdiction was lost when appellant failed
to timely designate the record pursuant to KRS 278.420.
Thus, we
affirm.
Appellant, Nuckols Farm, Inc., intervened in
proceedings before appellee, the Public Service Commission, on
the application of appellee, Lexington MSA Limited Partnership,
d/b/a BellSouth Mobility, Inc. ("BellSouth"), to construct a
cellular tower near the entrance to Nuckols Farm, which is in
close proximity to the City of Midway and within the boundaries
of the Lexington/Frankfort Scenic Corridor.
Nuckols Farm raised
procedural objections, including lack of notice, and substantive
objections to the site chosen by BellSouth.
At a public hearing
before the Commission on August 31, 1995, Nuckols Farm contested
the proposed construction of the cellular tower on the site in
question.
On November 27, 1995, the Commission entered an order
granting BellSouth approval to build the cellular tower on the
site.
Subsequent to the denial of a motion for rehearing, the
Commission's decision became final on January 1, 1996.
On February 7, 1996, Nuckols Farm filed an action in
the Franklin Circuit Court for review of the Commission's
decision pursuant to KRS 278.410.
On February 26, 1996, the
Commission moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because Nuckols Farm failed to designate the record
within ten (10) days after the action was filed as required by
KRS 278.420.
Upon receipt of the motion, Nuckols Farm filed a
motion for enlargement of time within which to file a designation
of record on March 1, 1996 and filed its designation of record on
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that same date.
The motion for enlargement of time stated that
counsel for Nuckols Farm relied upon the old version of KRS
278.420 and overlooked the current version as amended in 1990,
which required that the designation of record be filed within ten
(10) days of the action's being filed.
On April 17, 1996, the
Franklin Circuit Court entered an order dismissing the action of
Nuckols Farm for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for its
failure to comply with KRS 278.420(2).
From the order dismissing
the action and the subsequent order denying Nuckols Farm's motion
to alter, amend, or vacate, Nuckols Farm now appeals.
Nuckols Farm argues that the trial court erred in
ruling that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
action because Nuckols Farm failed to comply with KRS 278.420.
Nuckols Farm maintains that KRS 278.420 does not determine
subject matter jurisdiction and that while a court does have the
discretion to deny a motion for enlargement of time to file the
designation of record and dismiss for failure to comply with the
statutory requirements of KRS 278.420, it was error to dismiss on
grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
KRS 278.420(2)
provides:
Unless an agreed statement of the record is
filed with the court, the filing party shall
designate, within ten (10) days after an
action is filed, the portions of the record
necessary to determine the issues raised in
the action. Within ten (10) days after the
service of the designation or within ten (10)
days after the court enters an order
permitting any other party to intervene in
the action, whichever occurs last, any other
party to the action may designate additional
portions for filing. The court may enlarge
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the ten (10) day period where cause is shown.
Additionally, the court may require or permit
subsequent corrections or additions to the
record.
Our Court has recently addressed this very issue in
Forest Hills Developers, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, Ky.
App., 936 S.W.2d 94 (1996), which we adjudge to be dispositive of
the case at hand.
In that case, the plaintiff failed to
designate the record and the circuit court dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, the appellant argued, as
Nuckols Farm does here, that KRS 278.420(2) is not
jurisdictional.
Relying on Frisby v. Board of Education of Boyle
County, Ky. App., 707 S.W.2d 359 (1986), the Court held that the
"failure to abide by the statutory scheme for seeking review of a
commission's order deprives the reviewing court of jurisdiction."
Forest Hills Developers, Inc., supra at 96.
The Court went on to
say, however, that even if jurisdiction is initially conferred by
KRS 278.410, which sets out the procedural requirements for the
filing of the action for review, the trial court nevertheless
acted properly in dismissing the action because the action could
not have been decided without reference to the record of the
administrative proceedings (emphasis added).
Likewise, in the instant case, whether we consider KRS
278.410 or KRS 278.420, or both statutes, to confer jurisdiction
on the circuit court, the circuit court did not err in dismissing
appellant's action.
Insofar as KRS 278.420(2) determines
jurisdiction, the court properly dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction for failure to timely designate the
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record.
If KRS 278.410 is considered to confer jurisdiction, the
court's dismissal of the action was nevertheless proper because
the action could not have been adjudicated without the record of
the administrative proceedings.
In the complaint filed by Nuckols Farms before the
circuit court, it contends that the orders of the Commission were
unlawful and unreasonable.
Specifically, it alleged that
BellSouth failed to meet its burden of proof that it provided
reasonable notice of the application and that the construction of
the cellular tower on the proposed site was necessary and
convenient to the public.
Clearly, review of the record of the
evidence presented at administrative hearing is necessary to
decide these sufficiency of evidence questions regarding whether
BellSouth met its burden of proof.
For the reasons stated above, the order of the Franklin
Circuit Court dismissing the action is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
W. Henry Graddy, IV
Versailles, Kentucky
Deborah T. Eversole
Frankfort, Kentucky
Sam G. McNamara
Frankfort, Kentucky
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