STEPHEN W. MORRIS v. PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, and MEDORA SANITATION, INC.
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RENDERED:
October 3, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-1697-MR
STEPHEN W. MORRIS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN K. MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-4526
v.
PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE
COMPANY, and MEDORA SANITATION, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE:
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***
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EMBERTON, HUDDLESTON, and MILLER, Judges.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Stephen W. Morris brings this appeal from a June
4, 1996, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
We reverse and
remand.
The facts are these:
In the course of employment,
Morris was involved in an automobile accident while he was a
passenger in a sanitation truck owned by his employer, coappellee Medora Sanitation, Inc. (Medora).
As a result of the
accident, Morris suffered traumatic injuries, including the
severance of his right leg and a "closed head injury."
Medora's
workers' compensation carrier made voluntary payments of approximately $200,000.00 to Morris for medical expenses and lost wages.
On August 30, 1994, Morris filed a third-party tort
action in the Jefferson Circuit Court against the opposing
driver, one William Tedford.
Tedford was insured by Allstate
Insurance Company (Allstate) with liability coverage in the
amount of $25,000.00.
Allstate subsequently tendered its policy
limits to Morris pursuant to a settlement agreement.
At the time of the accident, the sanitation truck was
covered by a liability policy purchased by Medora and issued by
co-appellee Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (Philadelphia).
The policy included underinsured motorists (UIM) coverage
in the face amount of $100,000.00.
Seeking a declaration of
rights, Morris filed an amended complaint against Philadelphia on
March 13, 1995.
Morris alleged entitlement to the UIM benefits
as his damages exceeded the amounts recovered from both workers'
compensation and the tortfeasor.
Morris and Philadelphia filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.
On June 4, 1996, the court granted Philadelphia's
motion and dismissed Morris's amended complaint.
The court held
that the Workers' Compensation Act (Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) Chapter
342) provides Morris with an exclusive remedy and thus bars
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recovery of UIM benefits under Medora's policy.
This appeal
followed.
Morris contends that the circuit court committed
reversible error by concluding that the Act's exclusive remedy
provision (KRS 342.690) precludes recovery of UIM benefits.
The
circuit court specifically found as follows:
. . . Any underinsured benefits payment
from PIIC [Philadelphia] would still be a
payment from Medora to Morris for an injury
sustained in the course of his employment.
The clear language of KRS 342.690 does not
allow for this recovery. The workers' compensation statute preempts common law tort
claims. . . .
Morris has not shown how a suit against
Medora and PIIC [Philadelphia] for liability
insurance benefits arising from an accident
otherwise covered by workers' compensation
may be maintained when KRS 342.690 provides
that workers' compensation benefits are "in
place of all other liability of such employer
to the employee."
KRS 342.690(1) states in relevant part as follows:
If an employer secures payment of compensation as required by this chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his
legal representative, . . . and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such
employer at law . . . on account of such
injury or death [emphases added].
We believe the circuit court erred in construing KRS
342.690.
We construe the statute as providing an exclusive
remedy against the employer only when the employer is legally
liable for injuries sustained.
In the case at hand, legal
liability for injury is upon the third-party tortfeasor, Tedford,
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and not upon the employer, Medora.
This fact is pivotal.
Morris's entitlement to UIM benefits does not derive from
Medora's legal liability for his injuries.
As more succinctly
enunciated in State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Fireman's
Fund American Insurance Company, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 554, 557 (1977):
. . . payment made in performance of a contractual obligation is not a payment of "damages." Hence the liability of an insurance
company under its uninsured motorist coverage
cannot be the "legal liability for damages"
. . . [emphasis added].
We similarly view UIM coverage as contractual in nature and not
attributable to an employer's legal liability for damages.
Because Morris's entitlement to UIM benefits is not owing to
Medora's liability, we believe KRS 342.690 does not bar Morris
from recovering UIM benefits under Medora's liability insurance
policy.
Cf. Affiliated FM Insurance Companies v. Grange Mutual
Casualty Company, Ky. App., 641 S.W.2d 49 (1982) (holding that
KRS 342.690 did not bar recovery of basic reparation benefits).
We turn now to the troublesome issue of "setoff."1
The
UIM endorsement of Medora's liability policy provided for the
following setoff of workers' compensation benefits:
2.
Any amount payable for damages under this
coverage shall be reduced by:
a.
All sums paid or payable under any
workers' compensation . . . .
1
We use the term setoff to mean simply "deduction." For the
record, we note that setoff and offset are used interchangeably.
See Black's Law Dictionary 1237 (4th ed. 1968).
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Morris urges this Court to declare the above setoff
provision void as against public policy.
Conversely, Philadel-
phia argues that the setoff provision does not offend public
policy and, thus, should be enforced.
As Morris has recovered
over $200,000.00 in workers' compensation benefits and as the
face amount of UIM coverage is $100,000.00, Philadelphia asserts
that the setoff, utilized pro tanto, effectively reduces Morris's
UIM benefits to naught.
It is well established in this Commonwealth that
insurance policy provisions contrary to public policy are ineffectual and void.
See Tharp v. Security Insurance Company of New
Haven, Connecticut, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 760 (1966), and Windham v.
Cunningham, Ky. App., 902 S.W.2d 838 (1995).
We believe resolu-
tion of this issue centers upon the public policy behind UIM
coverage.
There are two generally accepted views of UIM coverage
--the narrow and the broad.
See Royal Insurance Company v. Cole,
13 Cal. App. 4th 880, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660 (1993); see also
William P. Chesser, A Motorist Is Underinsured Under Texas
Insurance Code Article 5.06-1(2)(b) Whenever His Liability
Insurance Proceeds Are Insufficient To Compensate For The Injured
Party's Actual Damages: Stracener v. United Services Automobile
Association, 777 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1989), 21 Texas Tech L. Rev.
2249 (1989-1990); and Steven P. Means, Underinsured Motorist
Coverage in Iowa: American States Insurance Co. v. Tollari, 71
Iowa L. Rev. 1569 (1986).
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Under the narrow view, UIM coverage is triggered when
and only if the tortfeasor's liability limits are less than the
insured's UIM coverage stated on the face of the policy.
UIM
coverage is always set off or reduced by the tortfeasor's liability limits, the net effect being to so reduce the UIM coverage
stated on the face of the policy.
The public policy underlying
the narrow view is to place the insured in the same financial
position as if the tortfeasor had liability limits equal to the
insured's own UIM limits.
The broad view, of course, provides greater coverage to
the insured.
Per this view, UIM coverage is "triggered" when the
insured's damages exceed the tortfeasor's liability limits. Upon
triggering, the insured is entitled, if necessary, to UIM protection to the extent of the policy's face amount of coverage.
The
public policy supporting the broad view is to provide maximal
compensation.
Prior to 1988, our UIM statute (KRS 304.39-320) specifically provided for setoff of tortfeasor's liability limits. It
stated in relevant part as follows:
Every insurer shall make available upon request to its insureds underinsured motorist
coverage, whereby subject to the terms and
conditions of such coverage the insurance
company agrees to pay its own insured for
such uncompensated damages as he may recover
on account of injury due to a motor vehicle
accident because the judgment[2] recovered
against the owner of the other vehicle ex2
In Ky. Rev. Stat. 304.39-320, the term judgment has been
liberally interpreted so as to also include "settlement." See
Coots v. Allstate Insurance Company, Ky., 853 S.W.2d 895 (1993).
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ceeds the policy limits thereon, to the extent of the policy limits on the vehicle of
the party recovering less the amount paid by
the liability insurer of the party recovered
against [emphasis added; footnote added].
This statute afforded a mandatory setoff of the tortfeasor's
liability limits against the insured's UIM limits, and was so
interpreted in LaFrange v. United Services Automobile Association, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 411 (1985).
twofold:
The setoff's effect was
(1) to activate UIM coverage only when the tortfeasor's
liability limits were less than the insured's coverage stated on
the face of the policy and (2) to diminish UIM benefits by the
amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage.
We think the above version of KRS 304.39-320 clearly
elucidated the narrow view of UIM coverage.
The statute, how-
ever, was amended in 1988, and the setoff language was deleted
therefrom.
See Coots v. Allstate Insurance Company, Ky., 853
S.W.2d 895, 900 (1993) (stating that the "1988 change in statutory language eliminated the offset problem").
The current version of KRS 304.39-320 states in relevant part as follows:
(1) Every insurer shall make available upon
request to its insureds underinsured motorist
coverage, whereby subject to the terms and
conditions of such coverage not inconsistent
with this section the insurance company
agrees to pay its own insured for such uncompensated damages as he may recover on account
of injury due to a motor vehicle accident
because the judgment recovered against the
owner of the other vehicle exceeds the liability policy limits thereon, to the extent
of the underinsurance policy limits on the
vehicle of the party recovering.
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We are of the opinion that the amended UIM statute
clearly reflects the broad view.3
The effect of eliminating the
setoff is to make available the total policy's face amount of UIM
coverage to the insured.
She is granted broad coverage.
UIM coverage is no longer activated by juxtaposing it
with the tortfeasor's liability limits and no longer are the
tortfeasor's liability limits set off pro tanto against UIM
coverage.
Indeed, recently it has been observed that:
[t]he reasonable expectation of the average
person who purchases UIM coverage is that she
will be entitled to UIM benefits if she is
struck by another driver whose liability
limits are not sufficient to satisfy her
damages [emphasis added].
3
Our construction of KRS 304.39-320 is supported by Owens v.
DeClark, 1995 WL 912492 (E.D.Ky.) (unpublished), wherein the
Court observed in footnote 3:
The Kentucky UIM statutes provide coverage where the injured party's total damages exceed the tortfeasor's liability
limits. The tortfeasor's vehicle is
considered underinsured whenever the
damages or injuries sustained by an insured exceed the limit of the tortfeasor's liability coverage. K.R.S. 304.39329 (broad UIM coverage). Some states,
notably Indiana, define UIM benefits
differently. Indiana statutes provide
coverage where the underinsured motorist
coverage exceeds the tortfeasor's liability limits. Ind. Code Ann. 27-7-5-4(c)
[emphasis added].
See also William P. Chesser, A Motorist Is Underinsured Under
Texas Insurance Code Article 5.06-1(2)(b) Whenever His Liability
Insurance Proceeds Are Insufficient To Compensate For The Injured
Party's Actual Damages: Stracener v. United Services Automobile
Association, 777 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1989), 21 Texas Tech L. Rev.
2249, 2270 (1990).
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Windham v. Cunningham, supra, at 841.
Inasmuch as this Commonwealth has adopted the broad
view of UIM coverage via the 1988 amendment to KRS 304.39-329, we
think LaFrange, supra, is no longer controlling for it was
premised upon the pre-1988 version of the UIM statute.
As the public policy of broad UIM coverage is to
provide maximal recovery for the insured, we believe it axiomatic
that an insurance carrier cannot set off pro tanto workers'
compensation benefits against the policy's face amount of UIM
coverage.
See Caberto v. National Union Fire Insurance Company,
77 Haw. 39, 881 P.2d 526 (1994) (recognizing and holding that a
majority of jurisdictions have invalidated workers' compensation
setoff clauses as violative of public policy); and Matthess v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 548 N.W.2d 562
(Iowa 1996) (holding that a workers' compensation setoff provision violated the public policy behind broad UIM coverage).
Allowance of such setoff pro tanto, as urged by Philadelphia,
would defeat the underlying purpose of UIM, which is to fully
compensate the insured up to UIM face policy limits.
We also
recognize, however, the strong public policy in this Commonwealth
against double recovery for the same elements of loss.
See
Hargett v. Dodson, Ky. App., 597 S.W.2d 151 (1979).
To accommodate both public policies, we believe the
setoff provision should be given validity by permitting the
setoff of workers' compensation benefits against the insured's
total amount of damages--not against the face amount of UIM
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coverage.
Under this approach, double recovery of identical
elements of loss would be denied.
The insured, however, would be
permitted to recover both workers' compensation benefits and UIM
benefits to the extent that the combined amount of such recovery
does not exceed the total amount of his damages.
See Matthess,
supra, and Williamson v. United States Fire Insurance Company,
442 S.E.2d 587 (S.C. 1994); cf. Poulos v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Company, 119 R.I. 409, 379 A.2d 362 (1977).
For example, let us assume that an insured has suffered
$115,000.00 in total damages.
He has UIM coverage in the face
amount of $100,000.00.
He has received $15,000.00 in workers'
compensation benefits.
The UIM endorsement contains a workers'
compensation setoff provision.
In this Commonwealth, under the
broad view, he can recover $100,000.00 under the UIM coverage-the amount representing uncompensated damages.
Uncompensated
damages are computed by simply subtracting his $15,000.00 workers' compensation benefits from his total damages ($115,000.00).
The UIM payment, along with his workers' compensation benefits,
renders him totally compensated.
Under the narrow view, which
prevailed in this Commonwealth prior to the 1988 amendment of KRS
304.39-320, he could have recovered only $85,000.00 in UIM
benefits--the difference between the workers' compensation
benefits ($15,000.00) and this UIM coverage of ($100,000.00).
This $85,000.00 UIM payment, plus the $15,000.00 workers' compensation payment, leaves him with $15,000.00 uncompensated damages.
Because of the speculative nature of future workers'
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compensation benefits and the attending difficulties of ascertaining entitlement, we reject any attempt to set off future
workers' compensation benefits.
We are of the opinion that only
the amount of workers' compensation benefits theretofore paid may
be set off.
We note State Farm, supra, which involved setting off
workers' compensation benefits against uninsured motorist coverage (UM).
Therein, the Court recognized the validity of a setoff
provision to those amounts over and above the statutorily mandated minimum UM coverage.
We believe State Farm is clearly distinguishable from
the case at hand.
The public policy behind UM, as is the policy
supporting the narrow view of UIM coverage, is to provide minimum
insurance coverage designed to place the injured party in the
same position financially as if injured by a motorist with the
mandated minimum liability coverage.
See Wine v. Globe American
Casualty Company, Ky., 917 S.W.2d 558 (1996); Preferred Risk
Mutual Insurance Company v. Oliver, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 574 (1977);
and Commonwealth Fire and Casualty Insurance Company v. Manis,
Ky. App., 549 S.W.2d 303 (1977).
Thus, setoffs do not offend the
public policy underlying UM coverage.
Conversely, as maximal
compensation is the objective of broad UIM coverage, setoffs
against the face amount of a policy's UIM coverage are offensive.
In summary, we hold that KRS 342.690 does not bar
Morris's recovery of UIM benefits under Medora's liability
policy.
We further hold that Philadelphia may not set off
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workers' compensation benefits paid to Morris against the
$100,000.00 face amount of UIM coverage, but may only set off
such benefits against Morris's total amount of damages.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR
APPELLEE/PHILADELPHIA
INDEMNITY:
Barry Willett
George George & Willett
Louisville, KY
Raymond G. Smith
Boehl Stopher & Graves
Louisville, KY
Charles H. Zimmerman, Jr.
Louisville, KY
NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEE/
MEDORA.
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