KERMIT GLENN MORRISON v. ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL; ROBERT E. SPURLIN, Acting Director of SPECIAL FUND; RONALD W. MAY, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
November 21, 1997; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-001639-WC
KERMIT GLENN MORRISON
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR A REVIEW OF A DECISION OF
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 86-WC-07645
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL; ROBERT
E. SPURLIN, Acting Director of
SPECIAL FUND; RONALD W. MAY,
Administrative Law Judge; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS and EMBERTON, Judges.
EMBERTON, JUDGE.
Kermit Glenn Morrison brings this petition for
review of the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board
affirming the ALJ's opinion on reopening to the extent it
modified his award for total occupational disability benefits and
disallowed compensation for certain chiropractic services.1
Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we affirm.
On October 23, 1989, Morrison was awarded benefits for
total occupational disability resulting from a combination of a
back injury and carpal tunnel syndrome, both of which were workrelated.
On December 14, 1994, the employer, Rockwell
International, filed a motion to reopen the award.
Rockwell
contested the payment of fees for chiropractic services and
sought modification maintaining Morrison was no longer totally
disabled.
In an opinion rendered January 2, 1996, the ALJ found
Morrison's back and upper extremity conditions had improved
resulting in a lessening of his occupational disability.
The ALJ
decreased Morrison's occupational disability from 100% to 65%,
and awarded reduced benefits (assigned 40% to Rockwell and 25% to
the Special Fund) for permanent partial occupational disability
for a period of 425 weeks commencing December 14, 1996.
Additionally, the ALJ determined chiropractic treatments were not
beneficial to Morrison and, in fact, were counterproductive.
Thus, the ALJ concluded chiropractic treatment in excess of one
visit per month was unnecessary, unreasonable, and noncompensable.
The ALJ held Rockwell was not responsible for
1
This petition is being considered with appeals #96-CA1648-WC and #96-CA-0223-WC which were consolidated by this
court's order of July 17, 1996.
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chiropractic bills incurred prior to the date of the original
award.
Rockwell was ordered to pay for chiropractic services
rendered during the period from October 23, 1989, to December 14,
1994.
Chiropractic treatment rendered thereafter was held non-
compensable to the extent that the bills represented treatment in
excess of twelve visits annually and were contested within thirty
days of receipt by the employer.
On appeal, the Board affirmed the determination that
Morrison's occupational disability had changed to 65%.
However,
the Board reversed the ALJ's opinion insofar as it held
chiropractic bills incurred prior to the original award were noncompensable.
Presently, Morrison claims there was insufficient
evidence to support the ALJ's determination that he sustained any
decrease in his occupational disability.
We disagree.
Admittedly, Rockwell had the burden to prove upon reopening that
Morrison's disability had decreased.
Allen, Ky. App., 746 S.W.2d 69 (1987).
Gro-Green Chemical Co. v.
this regard.
Rockwell succeeded in
Morrison cannot demonstrate, as he must on appeal,
that the decision lacks substantial evidentiary support.
Wolf
Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984).
We need not recite the medical evidence herein as the
Board's opinion contained a detailed review of the testimony.
is the function of the fact finder to determine the weight and
credibility of conflicting evidence.
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Caudill v. Moloney's
It
Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15 (1977).
A reviewing body may
not substitute its findings for that of the ALJ.
Company v. Mahan, Ky., 729 S.W.2d 455 (1987).
Cal Glo Coal
Determining the
extent of a claimant's occupational disability is uniquely the
function of the ALJ.
Davis v. Baker, Ky., 530 S.W.2d 378 (1978).
Based on the record in its entirety, the ALJ properly applied the
principles of Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 800 (1968), in
determining Morrison was no longer totally occupationally
disabled.
Morrison failed to demonstrate the evidence compelled
a contrary result.
(1986).
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641
The Board applied sound reasoning in its opinion
upholding the ALJ's decision on this issue.
It is clear that
Morrison wants this court to reconsider, reweigh and re-evaluate
the evidence previously considered by both the ALJ and the Board
and substitute our judgment on the issue of his occupational
disability.
We lack the authority to do so.
Apparently, Rockwell has paid the fees for chiropractic
services rendered prior to December 14, 1994, and does not
contest its responsibility for those bills.
Thus, Morrison's
argument concerning the compensability of chiropractic treatment
rendered prior to the date Rockwell filed its motion to reopen is
moot.
Moreover, the ALJ's award required Rockwell to pay
chiropractic bills incurred between October 23, 1989, and
December 14, 1994, unless the bills had not been submitted to
Rockwell thirty days prior to its motion to resolve medical fee
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disputes and they represented fees for services in excess of
twelve visits per year.
In our opinion, the Board properly
affirmed this portion of the award.
Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS)
342.020; Ausmus v. Pierce, Ky., 894 S.W.2d 631 (1995); Mitee
Enters v. Yates, Ky., 865 S.W.2d 654 (1993).
We also agree with the Board's reversal of the ALJ's
decision to the extent it denied compensation for chiropractic
fees incurred prior to the date of the original award.
Those
fees were never contested and Rockwell is obligated to pay those
bills.
KRS 342.020.
Morrison does not challenge the remainder
of the award which limited the compensability of chiropractic
treatment subsequent to December 14, 1994, to one visit per
month.
It will not be disturbed.
Ausmus, supra.
Finally, in light of the record, we are convinced
Morrison is not entitled to relief from the Board's opinion
simply because it was rendered prior to the expiration of the
time period allowed for the filing of a reply brief.
response brief was served May 8, 1996.
Rockwell's
Thus, Morrison accurately
notes the May 17, 1996, opinion of the Board was entered before
the fifteen day period established in 803 KAR 25:010 ยง 13(9)
expired.
However, we think it is significant that replies are
not mandatory and that Morrison does not maintain he even
intended to file a reply.
Moreover, Morrison has not advanced
any new theories, supplied any additional authority, or otherwise
countered the Board's brief in a manner suggesting he had any
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reply to the legal and factual arguments presented on appeal.
The fact that the opinion was entered prematurely is harmless
error since it did not result in any prejudice to Morrison.
When we review opinions of the Board, we are governed
by the standards set forth in Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly,
Ky., 827 S.W.2d 687 (1992).
Our function is "to correct the
Board only where. . .the court perceives the Board has overlooked
or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed
an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice."
Based on the record in this case, the Board
committed no error.
The opinion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen N. Calvert
Campton, Kentucky
Robert L. Swisher
Lexington, Kentucky
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