HEATHER ALVEY; and LINDA J. REID, MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND OF CHRISTOPHER REID, A MINOR V. DESTOCK #14, INC. D/B/A APPLEBEE'S NEIGHBORHOOD GRILL & BAR AND DESTOCK #14, INC. D/B/A APPLEBEE'S NEIGHBORHOOD GRILL & BAR V. JAMES LOGSDON
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RENDERED:
November 26, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-001603-MR
HEATHER ALVEY; and
LINDA J. REID, MOTHER
AND NEXT FRIEND OF CHRISTOPHER
REID, A MINOR
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES R. DANIELS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00364
DESTOCK #14, INC. D/B/A
APPLEBEE'S NEIGHBORHOOD GRILL & BAR
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 96-CA-001635-MR
DESTOCK #14, INC. D/B/A
APPLEBEE'S NEIGHBORHOOD GRILL & BAR
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES R. DANIELS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00364
JAMES LOGSDON
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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WILHOIT, CHIEF JUDGE;1 GUIDUGLI and JOHNSON, Judges.
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
This is a consolidated appeal in which Heather
Alvey (Alvey) and Linda J. Reid (Reid), mother and next friend of
Christopher Reid, appeal from a May 2, 1996 summary judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court in favor of Destock #14, Inc., doing
business as Applebee's Neighborhood Grill & Bar (Applebee's) that
dismissed
Alvey's
and
Reid's
complaint
against
Applebee's.
Applebee's has also appealed from a December 27, 1995 summary
judgment which dismissed its cross-claim of indemnity against James
Logsdon (Logsdon).
We reverse and remand in both appeals.
This case involves personal injury claims arising from an
automobile accident caused by Logsdon, who was driving his vehicle
while
under
the
influence
of
alcohol.
Logsdon
testified
by
deposition that on June 9, 1994, he spent approximately two and
one-half (2 1/2) hours at Applebee's in Paducah, McCracken County,
Kentucky, and consumed approximately four to six beers ten to
twelve ounces in size.
Logsdon contended that when he left
Applebee's at approximately 9:30 p.m. he was not impaired.
He
drove less than a mile to another grill and bar, Ruby Tuesday's,
and stayed there for approximately twenty minutes, consuming only
one non-alcoholic O'Doul's. Logsdon then drove a few hundred yards
to a Steak & Shake restaurant and purchased a hamburger and drink
at the drive-through window.
Logsdon exited the Steak & Shake
parking lot, approached a stop light, and reached over to the
passenger seat to retrieve his sandwich when he rear-ended a car
1
Chief Judge Wilhoit concurred in this Opinion prior to his
retirement effective November 15, 1997. Release of this Opinion
was delayed by normal administrative handling.
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driven by Christopher Reid.
vehicle.
Alvey was a passenger in the Reid
Police arrived at the scene of the accident and Logsdon
was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.
A breath
analyzer reading taken that evening indicated a blood alcohol level
of 0.235%.
The accident occurred approximately forty-five minutes
after Logsdon left Applebee's.
Alvey and Reid brought suit against both Logsdon and
Applebee's alleging that Logsdon was negligent in operating his
automobile while intoxicated and that Applebee's negligently served
Logsdon intoxicating beverages when he was already intoxicated.
Applebee's filed a cross-claim for indemnity and/or contribution
against Logsdon. Logsdon settled with Alvey and Reid for an amount
less than Logsdon's liability policy limits and was released by
Alvey and Reid from further liability.
The circuit court entered
an order dismissing Alvey's and Reid's claims against Logsdon on
July 25, 1995.
On November 30, 1995, Logsdon moved the trial court for
summary judgment against Applebee's on Applebee's cross-claim for
contribution and/or indemnity. Citing case law on apportionment of
liability, Logsdon argued that a tortfeasor can only be held liable
for his share of fault--no more, no less--and that Applebee's had
no claim for indemnity or contribution against him.
See Kevin
Tucker & Associates, Inc. v. Scott & Ritter, Inc., Ky.App., 842
S.W.2d 873 (1992); and Dix & Associates Pipeline Contractors, Inc.
v. Key, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 24 (1990).
The circuit court entered
summary judgment for Logsdon on December 27, 1995.
judgment was not made final and appealable.
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This summary
On April 15, 1996, Applebee's moved for summary judgment
against Alvey and Reid.
Applebee's argued that since Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 413.241 (Kentucky's Dram Shop Liability Act,
hereafter
referred
to
as
"the
Dram
Shop
Act")
provides
that
Logsdon's negligence was the proximate cause of all damages arising
from the accident, Logsdon was primarily liable for Alvey's and
Reid's damages and their release of Logsdon also released Applebee's of any liability. The circuit court entered summary judgment
on May 2, 1996, dismissing Alvey's and Reid's claims against
Applebee's.
Alvey and Reid appealed from the May 2, 1996 summary
judgment and Applebee's appealed from the December 27, 1995 summary
judgment.
The two appeals have been consolidated.
Since there is no genuine issue as to the material facts
of this case, we must determine whether the moving parties were
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03.
Kentucky Rules of
There is no requirement that this
Court defer to the trial court since factual findings are not in
issue.
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996), and
Keeton v. City of Ashland, Ky.App., 883 S.W.2d 894, 896 (1994).
This is a case of first impression dealing with the Dram
Shop Act, KRS 413.241, which states as follows:
(1)
The general assembly finds and declares that the consumption of intoxicating
beverages, rather than the serving, furnishing
or sale of such beverages, is the proximate
cause of any injury, including death and
property damage, inflicted by an intoxicated
person upon himself or another person.
(2) Any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, no person holding a permit under KRS
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243.010, 243.030, 243.040, 243.050, nor any
agent, servant, or employee of such a person,
who sells or serves intoxicating beverages to
a person over the age for the lawful purchase
thereof, shall be liable to such person or to
any other person or to the estate, successors,
or survivors of either for any injury suffered
off the premises including but not limited to
wrongful death and property damage, because of
the intoxication of the person to whom the
intoxicating beverages were sold or served,
unless a reasonable person under the same or
similar circumstances should know that the
person served is already intoxicated at the
time of serving.
(3) The intoxicated person shall be primarily liable with respect to injuries suffered by third persons.
(4) The limitation of liability provided
by this section shall not apply to any person
who causes or contributes to the consumption
of alcoholic beverages by force or by falsely
representing that a beverage contains no
alcohol.
(5) This section shall not apply to civil
actions filed prior to July 15, 1988.
The
Dram
Shop
Act
was
enacted
in
1988
in
apparent
response to Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736
S.W.2d 328 (1987).
Claywell involved the question of "whether and
under what circumstances one may recover damages against a dram
shop
furnishing
intoxicating
liquor
to
a
person
actually
or
apparently under the influence of alcoholic beverages, who, because
of his intoxicated condition, subsequently injures a third party."
Id. at 329.
The Supreme Court answered the question in the
affirmative and stated:
We hold simply that the standard expressed in
the statute [KRS 244.080], the violation of
which could result in a criminal sanction
against a licensee, is misconduct of a nature
which will result in civil liability under the
negligence principle, as a failure to exercise
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reasonable care, when the evidence establishes
circumstances from which a jury could reasonably infer that the subsequent accident was
within the scope of the foreseeable risk.
*
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By enacting KRS 244.080 the General Assembly
has defined a standard of conduct against
which negligence can and should be measured,
and liability should be imposed where, from
the circumstances of the violation, subsequent
injury is reasonably foreseeable.
*
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*
This means that where there is evidence from
which it can be reasonably inferred that the
tavern keeper knows or should know that he is
serving "a person actually or apparently under
the influence of alcoholic beverages (KRS
244.080(2))" and that there is a reasonable
likelihood that upon leaving the tavern that
person will operate a motor vehicle, the
elements necessary to establish a negligence
action are proved.
Id. at 334.
In Claywell the Supreme Court was critical of jurisdictions that had not recognized common law dram shop liability or
enacted a Dram Shop Act.
The Supreme Court stated that "[o]nly a
handful still cling to the indefensible notion that a dram shop has
no liability for subsequent injury caused by intoxicating liquor
where the circumstances support a common law negligence action."
Id. at 332.
Claywell was followed shortly by the enactment of
legislation that limited its application.
Our research has revealed a variety of approaches to this
issue by the various states' Dram Shop Acts.
Some states by
legislation have recognized common law dram shop liability and
others have restricted such claims.
Louisiana appears to be the
only other state that has adopted a provision similar to KRS
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413.241(3) that provides that the intoxicated person is primarily
liable.
Louisiana Revised Statutes (La.R.S.) 9:2800.1 D. states:
"The insurer of the intoxicated person shall be primarily liable
with respect to injuries suffered by third persons."2
Alvey and Reid argue that KRS 413.241(2) establishes a
claim against Applebee's and that Applebee's liability for its
negligence should be apportioned pursuant to Hilen v. Hays, Ky.,
673 S.W.2d 713 (1984), and Dix & Associates v. Key, supra.
Alvey
and Reid also argue that their release of claims against Logsdon
was not a release of claims against Applebee's.
The issues raised
by Alvey and Reid require us to consider the applicability of KRS
411.182,
which
provides
in
pertinent
part
in
Section
(1)
as
follows:
"In all tort actions . . . involving fault of more than
one party to the action, . . . the court . . . shall instruct the
jury to . . . [apportion fault] to each claimant, defendant, thirdparty defendant, and person who has been released from liability.
. . ."
KRS 411.182(4) provides that a release discharges "that
person from all liability for contribution, but it shall not be
considered to discharge any other persons liable upon the same
claim unless it so provides."
Applebee's argues that pursuant to KRS 413.241(1) Logsdon
is the proximate cause of Alvey's and Reid's damages and that
pursuant to KRS 413.241(3) Logsdon is primarily liable for those
damages.
Applebee's position is that any liability that it has
2
Section A. of that statute is almost identical to KRS
413.241(1) and likewise declares the consumption of intoxicating
beverages to be the proximate cause of an injury inflicted by an
intoxicated person.
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under KRS 413.241(3) for negligently serving alcohol to Logsdon is
secondary to Logsdon's liability.
Section 1 of KRS 413.241 states the General Assembly's
finding "that the consumption of intoxicating beverages, rather
than the serving, furnishing or sale of such beverages, is the
proximate cause of any injury . . . inflicted by an intoxicated
person. . . ."
This statute is an attempt to legislatively
establish causation, when generally, the question of proximate
cause is left for the jury.
McCoy v. Carter, Ky., 323 S.W.2d 210,
215 (1959); and Clardy v. Robinson, Ky., 284 S.W.2d 651, 654
(1955).
In Section (2) of KRS 413.241, the Legislature further
mandated that regardless of any other provision of law a seller or
server of intoxicating beverages shall not be liable for damages
caused by an intoxicated person, "unless a reasonable person under
the same or similar circumstances should know that the person
served is already intoxicated at the time of serving."
"Interpretation of statutes is a matter of law, White v.
McAllister, Ky., 443 S.W.2d 541, 542 (1969), and a proper judicial
function, Masonic Widows and Orphans Home and Infirmary v. City of
Louisville, 309 Ky. 532, 544, 217 S.W.2d 815, 822 (1949)."
v. City of Ashland, Ky.App., 883 S.W.2d 894, 896 (1994).
Keeton
"We have
a duty to accord to words of a statute their literal meaning unless
to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion.
Department of Revenue v. Greyhound Corp., Ky., 321 S.W.2d 60
(1959)."
Bailey v. Reeves, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1984).
"As
with any case involving statutory interpretation, our duty is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.
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We are not at liberty to add or subtract from the legislative
enactment nor discover meaning not reasonably ascertainable from
the language used.
S.W.2d 247 (1962)."
Gateway Construction Co. v. Wallbaum, Ky., 356
Beckham v. Board of Education of Jefferson
County, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 575, 577 (1994).
"'[A] Statute should be
construed, if possible, so that no part of it is meaningless or
ineffectual.'"
Keeton, supra at 896, quoting Brooks v. Meyers,
Ky., 279 S.W.2d 764, 766 (1955).
In order for us to interpret KRS 413.241, we must first
understand the statute's use of the term "primarily liable."
The
terms "primary liability" and "secondary liability" have different
meanings depending upon their usage.3
We believe, as indicated by
the use of the term "proximate cause" in KRS 413.241, that the
Legislature intended the term "primary liability" to have its
meaning that is associated with tort law and not its meaning that
is associated with insurance law.
helpful
in
understanding
the
The following discussion is
different
meanings
of
"primary
liability."
Generally, a party who is guilty of only
passive or secondary negligence may recover
indemnity against the person primarily responsible or actively negligent. The mere failure
to discover an unsafe or dangerous condition
created by a joint tortfeasor constitutes
passive negligence which will not bar indemnity against the active tortfeasor whose
primary negligence created the dangerous
condition. In addition, the negligence of a
buyer in failing to discover and correct
latent defects in the brakes of a truck does
not make the buyer and seller joint tortfea3
Our discussion of common law concepts is intended for the
sole purpose of giving effect to the meaning of the statute. This
discussion should not be used to alter the common law.
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sors, nor does it defeat the buyer's right to
recover indemnity from the seller.
41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 29 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
See Brown
Hotel Company v. Pittsburgh Fuel Company, 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d
165 (1949). See also Radcliff Homes, Inc. v. Jackson, Ky.App., 766
S.W.2d 63 (1989); Eichberger v. Reid, Ky., 728 S.W.2d 533 (1987);
and 73 Am.Jur.2d Subrogation § 39 (1974).
By comparison, when
"primary liability" is used in regard to insurance coverage it
denotes which insurance carrier must pay first, with the carrier
that is secondarily liable paying only if there is an excess amount
to pay.
See Omni Insurance Co. v. Coates, Ky.App., 939 S.W.2d 879
(1997); Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Haddix, Ky.App.,
927 S.W.2d 843 (1996); and Brown v. Atlanta Casualty Co., Ky.App.,
875 S.W.2d 103 (1994).
A situation, such as the case at bar, where the acts of
a single tortfeasor alone would not have been sufficient to cause
the damage has been referred to as "concurrent negligence."
[W]here the acts by the tortfeasors would not
have been sufficient by themselves to cause
any of the injury, the large majority of
jurisdictions have imposed joint and several
liability.
Typical situations under this
category are the "collision cases" where the
individual act of a tortfeasor, in and of
itself, would not have caused the accident.
H. Wesley Williams, III, Tort "Reform" in Mississippi:
Modifica-
tion of Joint and Several Liability and the Adoption of Comparative
Contribution, 13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 133, 141-142 (1992) (footnote
omitted).
The following example from Gulf Refining Company v.
Ferrell, 147 So. 476 (Miss. 1933), illustrates this point.
Tatum, superintendent of a filling station,
instructed Ferrell, his employee, to paint
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"Don't Park" signs in the street in front of
the property. Tatum assured Ferrell that he
would watch for any oncoming cars.
Ferrell
was struck by a car and was given no prior
warning by Tatum or the driver of the vehicle.
The court stated the following:
"It is too
well settled in our jurisprudence to need
citation of authorities that the concurring
negligence of two or more persons proximately
contributing to an injury does not constitute
independent causes. . . . The negligence of
[the driver] was a proximate contributing
cause, and, together with the negligence of
the master in not warning the servant of the
imminent danger, contributed to the result.
Useless each without the other."
13 Miss. C. L. Rev. at 142 quoting Ferrell (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, Applebee's alleged negligence in serving Logsdon would
not have harmed Alvey and Reid if Logsdon had not driven his car;
and Logsdon's driving would not have harmed Alvey and Reid if
Logsdon had not been intoxicated.
Thus, we hold that KRS 413.241 provides (1) that the
server of intoxicating beverages has a legal duty to the person
injured by the intoxicated person if "a reasonable person under the
same or similar circumstances should know that the person served is
already intoxicated at the time of serving"; (2) that if the
conditions in (1) are met, the injured person has a tort claim
against both the intoxicated person and the server; and (3) that
the server has the right of indemnity against the intoxicated
person. Under this interpretation of KRS 413.241, all parts of the
statute have meaning and its application is reasonable since the
intoxicated person has primary liability for the tort, and the
negligent server has secondary liability. While a negligent server
retains the right of indemnity against the intoxicated person, the
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negligent server runs the risk of not being able to recover against
an intoxicated person that is judgment-proof.
On remand, Alvey and Reid shall be allowed to proceed to
trial against Applebee's on their tort claim for damages.
Any
award that Alvey and Reid receive shall have credited against it
the amount of Alvey's and Reid's settlement with Logsdon.
Alvey
and Reid shall be entitled to a judgment against Applebee's to the
extent that the amount of any damages awarded to them exceeds their
settlement with Logsdon.
To the extent that Applebee's is liable
to Alvey and Reid, Applebee's shall have the right of indemnity
against Logsdon.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgments of the
trial court are reversed and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR
AND REID:
APPELLANTS,
ALVEY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, LOGSDON:
Hon. E. Frederick Straub, Jr.
WHITLOW, ROBERTS, HOUSTON &
STRAUB
Paducah, KY
Hon. James W. Owens
Hon. Donald R. Green, Jr.
JAMES W. OWENS, CHARTERED
Paducah, KY
BRIEFS FOR
APPELLANTS/APPELLEES,
APPLEBEE'S:
ORAL ARGUMENTS
LOGSDON:
FOR
APPELLEE,
Hon. Richard C. Roberts
Paducah, KY
Hon. Daniel S. Stratemeyer
Paducah, KY
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR APPELLANTS,
ALVEY AND REID:
Hon. James W. Owens
Paducah, KY
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
APPELLANTS/APPELLEES,
APPLEBEE'S:
Hon. Daniel S. Stratemeyer
Paducah, KY
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