BILLY RAY WATTS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 8, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-1007-MR
BILLY RAY WATTS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLEY R. ASBURY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-53
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, GUDGEL, and JOHNSON, Judges.
GUDGEL, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the
Boyd Circuit Court after appellant entered a conditional guilty
plea to a fourth offense of driving a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol (DUI).
Appellant contends that the
trial court erred (1) by denying his motion to bifurcate the
trial proceedings, (2) by failing to dismiss the charge against
him, (3) by failing to suppress the evidence as to the blood test
results, (4) by failing to suppress statements made to the
investigating police officer, and (5) by failing to suppress the
evidence as to his three prior convictions.
We are constrained
to agree with appellant's first contention.
Hence, we vacate and
remand the court's judgment for further proceedings.
Appellant was involved in a one-vehicle accident on
June 17, 1994.
The officer who responded to the scene was
advised by witnesses that appellant was the vehicle's operator
and that he had been taken to a particular named hospital.
After
a search, the officer located appellant in the lobby of a
different hospital.
The officer observed that appellant had
glass in his hair as well as cuts and bruises, and that he
smelled of alcohol.
Appellant admitted that he was the vehicle's
operator at the time of the accident, and he agreed to a blood
test which ultimately showed that he had a blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) of .25 percent.
Appellant, who was cited but
not arrested by the officer, was subsequently indicted for
fourth-offense DUI.
He eventually entered a conditional guilty
plea to that charge, reserving "the right to appeal those issues
raised in pre-trial [sic] motions pursuant to CR [sic] 8.09."
This appeal followed.
First, appellant contends that the trial court erred by
denying his request to bifurcate the trial and to exclude from
the guilt phase any evidence as to his prior DUI convictions.
We
agree.
After appellant entered his guilty plea, the supreme
court held in Commonwealth v. Ramsey, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 526 (1996),
that evidence as to prior DUI convictions is not admissible
during the prosecution's case-in-chief in a DUI subsequent
offense prosecution.
See KRS 189A.010(1).
As we disagree with
the Commonwealth's assertion that Ramsey may not be applied
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retroactively, we are constrained to conclude that the trial
court erred by denying appellant's pretrial bifurcation motion.
Cf. Dedic v. Commonwealth, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 878 (1996); O'Bryan v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 529 (1996).
Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred by
failing to dismiss the charge against him pursuant to Pence v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 825 S.W.2d 282 (1991).
We disagree.
Relying on Pence, supra, appellant asserts that the
evidence was insufficient to show that his BAC exceeded .10
percent at the time of the accident.
In contrast to the instant
action, however, Pence was charged with DUI after he was found
sitting behind the wheel of his parked vehicle in a truck stop
parking lot.
Pence's vehicle was blocked in place by another
vehicle, and no evidence was introduced to show that the vehicle
was running, that its engine was warm, or that its ignition key
was turned on.
Further, although Pence registered .26 percent on
a breathalyzer, no evidence was adduced to show that it was more
likely that he "drove to the truck stop while intoxicated than
that he got intoxicated after his arrival," or to show whether
the initial complaint involved DUI rather than mere public
drunkenness.
Id. at 283.
Hence, the court held that the
evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Pence operated his vehicle while intoxicated.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 709 S.W.2d 847 (1986).
See also Wells v.
Here, by
contrast, appellant admitted to the investigating officer that he
was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident and that he
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did not consume any alcohol after the accident.
It follows that
there is no merit to appellant's contention that pursuant to
Pence, the evidence was so inadequate as to require the dismissal
of the charge against him.
Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred by
failing to suppress, on any one of several grounds, the evidence
as to the blood test results.
We disagree.
We are not persuaded by appellant's multiple arguments
regarding either the admissibility of "per se" evidence of
intoxication, or the admissibility of the evidence as to his BAC
level some two and one-half hours after the accident.
This is
especially true since appellant admitted that he consumed no
alcohol after the accident.
S.W.2d 78 (1996).
See Commonwealth v. Wirth, Ky., 936
However, certainly nothing would prevent
appellant from introducing evidence during a trial to prove that
the Commonwealth's evidence was unreliable.
Id.
We also are not persuaded by appellant's several
arguments as to the court's failure to grant his pretrial motion
to suppress the evidence regarding the blood test results.
The
Uniform Citation form shows that the state trooper spoke with
appellant at the hospital, and that the trooper "advised him of
implied consent and he agreed to have a blood test performed."
Although the implied consent statute may not have been applicable
at the time appellant consented because he was neither under
arrest nor in police custody, appellant certainly faced the loss
of his driver's license pursuant to KRS 189A.105 if he failed to
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consent to the requested blood test.
KRS 186.565(1).
329 (1992).
See KRS 189A.103, formerly
See also Cook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 826 S.W.2d
Given the absence of anything in the record to show
that appellant's "mental or physical condition was such that he
was unable to give his permission to allow the police to obtain a
blood sample," or that he was "confused or tricked into giving
his blood sample," we cannot say that the court erred by denying
his motion to suppress the blood test results on the ground that
the blood sample was involuntarily provided.
Cook, supra at 331.
Further, we are not persuaded by appellant's assertion
that the court erred by failing to find that the blood test
results were inadmissible because the blood sample's chain of
custody was broken by the passage of several days between its
mailing and its receipt by the testing facility.
The record
simply contains nothing to controvert the Commonwealth's
assertion that it will prove at a trial that the chain of custody
was complete and unbroken.
Thus, it is clear that the court did
not err by denying appellant's pretrial motion to suppress the
results of the blood test.
Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred by
failing to suppress the statements he made to the investigating
police officer at the hospital.
However, as appellant was not in
custody when the statements were made and the record contains
nothing to indicate either that he was pressured into speaking
with the officer or that his freedom was restricted in any way,
he was not entitled to be advised of his Miranda rights before
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making the statements.
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463
U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Brown v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 627 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
1825 (1990); Farler v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 880 S.W.2d 882
(1994).
Thus, the court did not err by failing to suppress his
statements on this ground.
Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred
by failing to suppress the evidence as to his three prior
convictions.
However, as noted by the Commonwealth and
demonstrated by the record, appellant specifically waived this
issue before entering his conditional guilty plea.
Therefore,
this issue need not be addressed further.
The court's judgment is vacated and this case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views
expressed in this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael J. Curtis
Ashland, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Courtney A. Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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