RITA C. GELLHAUS; WINSTON L SHELTON; HAZEL W. SHELTON; LLOYD S. HALL; LAURA S. HALL; and THE ASSOCIATION OF CHENOWETH RUN ENVIRONMENTALISTS V. LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION and TRIAD DEVELOPMENT/ ALTA GLYNE INC. AND RITA C. GELLHAUS; WINSTON L SHELTON; HAZEL W. SHELTON; LLOYD S. HALL; LAURA S. HALL V. LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT; JEFFERSON COUNTY ACTING BY AND THROUGH JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF WORKS; LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION and TRIAD DEVELOPMENT/ ALTA GLYNE INC.
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RENDERED:
December 19, 1997; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-0644-MR
RITA C. GELLHAUS;
WINSTON L SHELTON;
HAZEL W. SHELTON;
LLOYD S. HALL;
LAURA S. HALL; and
THE ASSOCIATION OF
CHENOWETH RUN ENVIRONMENTALISTS
v.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-CI-002642
LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION and
TRIAD DEVELOPMENT/ ALTA GLYNE INC.
AND:
APPELLEES
NO. 96-CA-2016-MR
RITA C. GELLHAUS;
WINSTON L SHELTON;
HAZEL W. SHELTON;
LLOYD S. HALL;
LAURA S. HALL
v.
APPELLANTS
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-000926
LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY
METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT;
JEFFERSON COUNTY ACTING BY AND
THROUGH JEFFERSON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF WORKS;
LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION and
TRIAD DEVELOPMENT/ ALTA GLYNE INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
NO. 96-CA-0644-MR
AND
OPINION AFFIRMING NO. 96-CA-2016-MR
* * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI and JOHNSON, Judges.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
This consolidated appeal arises from several
rulings of the Jefferson Circuit Court concerning the proposed
Alta Glyne innovative subdivision (the subdivision).
Appellant,
Rita C. Gellhaus (Gellhaus) appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court entered February 23, 1996, granting
summary judgment in favor of appellees, Louisville & Jefferson
County Planning Commission (the Commission) and Triad
Development/Alta Glyne, Inc. (Triad).
Appellant, Winston L.
Shelton (Shelton) appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court entered on May 29, 1996, dismissing his complaint against
appellees, Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District (MSD), Jefferson County Department of Public Works
(Public Works), the Commission, and Triad.
We affirm in part and
reverse and remand in part.1
Triad is the owner of 117 acres of unimproved land
located at the intersection of Billtown Road and the Gene Snyder
Freeway in Jefferson County.
In 1992, Triad applied for approval
1
Gellhaus and Shelton own land adjacent to the proposed
subdivision. They are each a party to the other's lawsuit.
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of the Alta Glyne subdivision plan pursuant to the Innovative
Regulations of the Development Code for All of Jefferson County,
which is administered by the Commission.
On March 11, 1993, the
Commission held a public hearing on the proposed subdivision.
During the hearing, 9 people spoke in favor of the subdivision
while 23 people, most of whom were adjoining landowners, spoke in
opposition of the subdivision.
As noted by the minutes of the
meeting, the Commission took the following position at the end of
the hearing:
Whereas, the Commission finds that additional
information is necessary concerning the
Erosion Sediment Control Plan and specific
guidelines addressing this issue, approval of
the sewage treatment plant and other issues;
now, therefore, be it
Resolved, that the Louisville and Jefferson
County Planning Commission does here DEFER
action on this request until all issues have
been resolved. (emphasis added).
The minutes for the Commission's meeting on April 7,
1994, indicate that Triad submitted a soil erosion and
sedimentation control plan to MSD and the Commission on March 19,
1993.
The minutes further indicate that Triad withdrew its
application for a change in zoning for a portion of the property
from R-4 to C-N, but still sought approval for the subdivision.
The Commission once again deferred approval of the plans "in
order for [Triad] to address the issue of on-site storm water
retention."
The Commission met again on April 21, 1994.
According
to the minutes, Triad submitted a revised erosion control plan on
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April 14, 1994.
According to the revised plan, Triad agreed to
retain the first 1/2" of runoff from the subdivision site.
The
Commission resolved as follows:
That the Louisville and Jefferson County Planning Commission does
hereby APPROVE the preliminary plan for Alta Glyne...subject to
the following binding elements:
*
*
*
9. Detailed construction plans for soil
erosion and sedimentation control plan shall
be developed in accordance with the Revised
Erosion and Sediment Control Plan...and
implemented prior to any grading, site
disturbance or construction activities. The
detailed construction plans shall be
submitted to the Metropolitan Sewer District
for their review and approval.
Following the Commission's approval of the subdivision,
Gellhaus, Shelton, Lloyd D. Hall, and the Association of
Chenoweth Run Environmentalists, Inc. sought review of the
Commission's decision.
In the complaint and statement of appeal
filed with the trial court on May 20, 1994 (the Gellhaus
Complaint), Gellhaus alleged that the Commission:
(1) acted in
excess of its powers in approving the subdivision; (2) denied the
aggrieved property owners the due process right to be heard and
to confront evidence presented ex parte to the Commission
following the public hearing; and (3) made findings which were
contrary to the findings of its staff and unsupported by
substantial evidence.
On January 9, 1995, Triad filed a motion
for summary judgment with the trial court alleging that the
Commission's approval of the subdivision was neither arbitrary
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nor capricious and denying the due process violation allegations
of the Gellhaus Complaint.
On February 28, 1995, Gellhaus filed a motion with the
trial court seeking leave to file an amended or supplementary
complaint (the Gellhaus amended complaint).
The basis of the
Gellhaus amended complaint was that Triad had made various
misrepresentations to the Commission regarding residential
density, and that on October 14, 1994, Triad "reneged" on its
agreement to retain the runoff from the subdivision.
Prior to
any action on Gellhaus' motion to amend, Triad moved to strike
the Gellhaus amended complaint on March 16, 1995, on the ground
that it was a sham.
On March 28, 1995, the trial court entered an order
granting Gellhaus' motion to file the amended complaint.
The
trial court also entered an order granting Gellhaus' motion to
remand Triad's motion for summary judgment until completion of
discovery.
The order further provided that Triad could
supplement its motion for summary judgment upon completion of
discovery and that Gellhaus could file an additional response.
A hearing was held before the trial court on
September 18, 1995.
Our review of the videotape of the hearing
shows that counsel for Triad addressed three motions at the
hearing:
(1) a renewed motion to strike the amended complaint
filed on August 25, 1995; (2) a motion to compel answers to
interrogatories filed on September 18, 1995; and (3) a motion to
cut off discovery filed on August 3, 1995.
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Counsel for Gellhaus
argued that Triad had failed to produce a court-ordered
privileged document log pertaining to several documents which
counsel for Triad claimed were privileged.
At the outset of the hearing, counsel for Triad moved
to amend its motion to cut off discovery to a motion requesting a
briefing schedule.
Triad requested that the trial court order
briefing on the issue of whether a cause of action was set forth
in the Gellhaus amended complaint and that if the trial court
found that a cause of action existed, that it be permitted to
take discovery to prepare for trial.
Counsel for Triad also
requested that the trial court rule that the Gellhaus amended
complaint was a sham and that it make a determination that
Gellhaus' action was an appeal from an administrative proceeding
to be judged by the standard set forth in American Beauty Homes
Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Commission, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450 (1964).
Counsel for Gellhaus
responded by arguing that their discovery showed uncontroverted
proof that Triad was not in compliance with the binding elements
imposed by the Commission in their approval of the subdivision
and summarized their proof to the trial court.
On January 10, 1996, the trial court entered an order
granting Triad's motion to strike the Gellhaus amended complaint.
The order read in its entirety:
Defendant having moved and the Court being sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Amended and
Supplementary (sic) Complaint is hereby
STRICKEN from the record.
-6-
On February 23, 1996, the trial court entered an order
granting summary judgment in favor of Triad and the Commission.
The trial court deferred to the Commission's calculations
regarding the residential density of the subdivision and found
that the Commission acted within its authority in approving the
subdivision.
The trial court also found that Gellhaus was not
entitled to a second hearing in order to confront evidence
presented to the Commission following the public hearing on March
11, 1993.
The trial court held that the ex parte evidence
considered by the Commission did not pertain to anything that had
not been addressed at the hearing, and that pursuant to Minton v.
Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, Ky. App., 850 S.W.2d 52 (1992),
Gellhaus was not entitled to a second hearing.
The trial court
found that the Commission's findings were supported by
substantial evidence and that its approval of the subdivision was
not arbitrary.
Summary judgment was entered in favor of Triad
and the Commission and the Gellhaus complaint was dismissed with
prejudice.
On February 26, 1996, Gellhaus filed a notice of
appeal seeking review of the trial court's motion granting
summary judgment.
On February 12, 1996, Shelton filed a complaint with
the trial court seeking to challenge acts and omissions of Triad,
the Commission, MSD, and Public Works occurring after the
Commission's approval of the subdivision on April 21, 1994 (the
Shelton complaint).
The Shelton complaint alleged that:
Triad made misrepresentations to the Commission before the
(1)
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approval of the subdivision; (2) Triad repudiated its agreement
to retain storm water runoff after the subdivision was approved;
and (3) the Commission, MSD, and Public Works refused to enforce
the binding element pertaining to storm water runoff as imposed
by the Commission.
On March 26, 1996, Triad filed a motion to dismiss the
Shelton complaint alleging that the claims arose from the same
facts and cause of action adjudicated by the trial court in the
Gellhaus action.
Triad requested that the Shelton complaint be
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the doctrines of collateral
estoppel and res judicata.
on April 3, 1996.
MSD filed a similar motion to dismiss
The Commission and Public Works filed their
motion to dismiss on May 2, 1996.
The trial court entered its order on the motions to
dismiss on May 29, 1996.
In its order, the trial court
specifically stated that the dismissal of the Gellhaus amended
complaint "was based on the Court's belief that there was no
merit to the Plaintiff's assertions of fraud and
misrepresentation," and that its entry of summary judgment in the
Gellhaus action addressed the balance of the issues before the
trial court.
The trial court found that the issues raised in the
Shelton complaint were the same as the issues raised in the
Gellhaus amended complaint and that the Shelton complaint was
barred by the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
The trial court further found that MSD and Public Works were also
protected by res judicata and collateral estoppel even though
-8-
they were not parties to the Gellhaus action.
Shelton now
appeals from the dismissal of the Shelton complaint.
We will
address each party's appeal separately.
The Gellhaus Appeal
Gellhaus' first argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred by refusing to review the factual basis for the
Commission's calculation of residential density to determine if
the Commission acted in excess of its authority in approving the
subdivision.
Gellhaus points out that pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 100.193, the Jefferson Fiscal Court is
granted the power to create a zoning district map, and pursuant
to KRS 100.213 the Jefferson Fiscal Court has the power to amend
the zoning map only upon a finding that the original zoning was
inappropriate, improper, or no longer feasible due to
unanticipated changes in the area.
Additionally, the Fiscal
Court has provided as follows in Section 9.5 of the Jefferson
County Development Code pertaining to innovative subdivisions:
Innovative residential proposals developed
according to this section may not increase
the density in excess of the density
permitted in the applicable zone. Innovative
residential proposals requiring a density
variation will be subject to a zoning
amendment to another zoning classification.
Jefferson County Development Code Section 9.5(A).
According to the preliminary innovative development
plan for the subdivision submitted by Triad to the Commission on
December 30, 1992, Section 1 of the subdivision would have 52
dwelling units on 12.76 acres resulting in a residential density
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of 4.07 dwelling units per acre.
However, Gellhaus contends that
in calculating the density, Triad "tacked" onto Section 1 "open
spaces" which were in other sections in order to conceal an
actual residential density of 8 dwelling units per acre which is
almost double the permissible density.2
Gellhaus argued before
the trial court that because the Commission approved the plan
based in part on Triad's misrepresentations as to density the
approval caused a de facto change in zoning which was outside of
the Commission's authority.
However, the trial court held that
it was not its duty to recompute the findings of the Commission
and stated:
Acknowledging the expertise of the
Commission, this Court will not re-figure the
commission's math. The density requirements
for R-4 zoning are not changed by this
subdivision. Therefore, this Court finds
that the Commission had the authority
pursuant to KRS 100.273 to regulate and
approve the innovate subdivision.
On appeal, Gellhaus contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to review the factual basis of the Commission's findings
as to density.
As this Court has previously indicated, "judicial
review of administrative action is concerned with the question of
arbitrariness."
American Beauty Homes, 379 S.W.2d at 456.
In
reviewing factual decisions of an administrative body, however,
2
Gellhaus argues that Triad's use of 4.82 acres of open
space not in Section 1, 1.02 acres of space in designated
retention areas, and .39 acres of space in isolated parcels in
calculating residential density was prohibited by Sec. 9.5A.2.,
9.5A.9.a., and 9.5A.9.c. of the Development Code.
-10-
"a circuit court...is confined to the record of proceedings held
before the administrative body and is bound by the administrative
decision if it is supported by substantial evidence."
Commonwealth Transportation Cabinet Department of Vehicle
Regulation v. Cornell, Ky. App., 796 S.W.2d 591, 594 (1990).
In
reaching factual conclusions, the administrative body is given
discretion to consider all of the evidence as a whole and base
its decision on that evidence it chooses to believe.
796 S.W.2d at 594.
Cornell,
Although the reviewing court may arrive at a
different conclusion following its consideration of the evidence
in the record, "this does not deprive the agency's decision of
support by substantial evidence."
Transportation Cabinet,
Department of Highways, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Thurman, Ky.
App., 897 S.W.2d 597, 600 (1995).
Stated another way, the duty
of the circuit court on appeal of an administrative action is
merely that of review, not reinterpretation.
Jones v. Cabinet
for Human Resources, Division for Licensure and Regulations, Ky.
App., 710 S.W.2d 862, 866 (1986).
Based on our review of the record, we find that the
decision of the Commission in regard to residential density is
supported by substantial evidence.
As pointed out by Triad,
Adrian Freund [Freund], Director of the Jefferson County
Department of Planning and Management, testified at his
deposition on July 21, 1995, that the commission was not misled
as to the open space and developed space ratios as submitted in
the plan.
In a second deposition taken on August 22, 1995,
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Freund testified that Triad "is required to meet open space
requirements for the development as a whole.
little section in terms of open space."
Not to balance each
Thus, the Commission's
decision regarding the residential density of the subdivision is
supported by substantial evidence and we are thus bound by it.
The fact that Gellhaus believes that the calculations should be
performed differently does not automatically deprive the
Commission's decision of support by substantial evidence.
Thus,
the trial court did not err in refusing to recalculate the
residential density calculation.
Gellhaus also contends that the trial court erred when
it approved the Commission's refusal to allow the adjoining
property owners to confront evidence presented to the Commission
after the public hearing was held.
As noted by the trial court,
among the evidence submitted to the Commission was a letter dated
April 14, 1994, from Triad's engineer to the Commission which was
accompanied by the revised erosion and sediment control plan.
As
summarized by the trial court, most of the evidence in question
concerns the issues of on-site water retention and sewage
treatment and disposal.
Pointing to Triad's claim that its
engineers were not familiar with the 1/2" criteria, Gellhaus
argues that if they would have been given the opportunity to test
the engineer's familiarity at a second public hearing, the
Commission may have withheld approval of the subdivision.
It is well-recognized that parties to an administrative
proceeding pertaining to zoning are entitled to procedural due
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process.
Morris v. City of Catlettsburg, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 753,
755 (1969).
In order to satisfy due process, parties to a zoning
dispute are entitled to a trial type hearing including the taking
and weighing of evidence, a finding of fact based upon the
offered evidence, and conclusions supported by substantial
evidence.
City of Louisville v. McDonald, Ky., 470 S.W.2d 173,
177 (1971).
Furthermore, the evidence upon which the
administrative body bases its decision "must come as a result of
a due process hearing."
Resource Development Corp. v. Campbell
County Fiscal Court, Ky., 543 S.W.2d 225, 227 (1976).
In Resource Development, the Planning and Zoning
Commission held a public evidentiary hearing on an application
for zoning change.
Based on the evidence produced at the
hearing, the Commission recommended that the fiscal court approve
the application.
Without a hearing, the fiscal court denied the
application after reviewing not only the evidence from the
hearing before the Commission, but also numerous letters and
written protests which were received by the various members of
the fiscal court.
After noting that an administrative body must
base its decision on evidence presented at a due process hearing,
the Court stated:
since the legislative body did not conduct a
trial-type hearing, it was limited to the
evidence produced at the due process trialtype hearing held by the Planning and Zoning
Commission. The full proceeding before the
Planning and Zoning Commission was submitted
to the fiscal court, and it could have...
conducted a due process trial-type hearing of
its own...which it did not do.
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*
*
*
[T]he fiscal court was not at liberty to
consider the additional exhibits which took
the form of letters and written petitions of
protest which it received and which
appellants were not afforded the opportunity
to rebut.
Resource Development, 543 S.W.2d at 228.
See also, Kaelin v.
City of Louisville, Ky., 643 S.W.2d 590 (1983) (noting that
purpose of trial-type hearing is to allow parties opportunity to
subject all evidence to scrutiny to determine trustworthiness).
Triad relies on Minton v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson
County, Ky. App., 850 S.W.2d 52 (1993), in support of its
argument that Gellhaus was not entitled to a second public
hearing on the evidence submitted by Triad after the initial
hearing.
In Minton, an application for zoning change was
modified following a public hearing.
Minton argued that the
Planning Commission acted arbitrarily in approving the plan
because it did not hold a hearing on the modified plan.
After
noting that the plan approved by the Commission was less
intrusive than the original plan, the Court held, "[t]here is no
requirement that a new public hearing must be held any time there
is a revision."
Minton, 850 S.W.2d at 56.
Minton is easily distinguishable from the case at bar
as Minton only involved modifications to the original proposal.
While Triad, like Minton, did modify its plan in that it withdrew
its application for a zoning change, the record shows that Triad
submitted additional evidence to the Commission regarding sewage
treatment and storm water runoff control, both of which were
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hotly contested issues.
In fact, one of the documents submitted
after the hearing was the Revised Erosion and Settlement Control
Plan which was approved by the Commission.
This is not a case involving mere modifications to the
original plan.
As noted in the minutes of the public hearing,
the Commission deferred making a decision on the plan due to the
need for additional information concerning erosion and sediment
control.
Because the Commission's approval of the subdivision
was based in part on the revised erosion control plan, under
Resource Development and Kaelin, Gellhaus was denied the
opportunity to subject the additional evidence to scrutiny and
rebuttal.
See Danville-Boyle County Planning and Zoning
Commission v. Prall, Ky., 840 S.W.2d 205 (1992) (use of planning
director's report was not violative of due process when
plaintiffs were given time to study and respond to report).
Thus, the trial court erred in holding that Gellhaus was not
entitled to a second public hearing to address the additional
evidence submitted to the Commission.
Gellhaus' final argument is that the trial court erred
in striking the Gellhaus amended complaint.3
Gellhaus contends
3
Triad contends that this issue is not properly preserved
for our review because Gellhaus did not give notice of an intent
to appeal from the order striking the Gellhaus amended complaint
in the notice of appeal filed on February 26, 1996. This
argument is entirely without merit.
Although CR 73.03 requires the notice of appeal to identify the
judgment or order appealed from, CR 73.02(2) provides:
The failure of a party to file timely a
notice of appeal, cross-appeal, or motion for
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that the Gellhaus amended complaint was filed when they
discovered that Triad has "reneged" on its plan to retain runoff
water on site.
The Gellhaus amended complaint alleged that the
Commission approved the subdivision in reliance on Triad's
representations that storm water runoff would be retained on
site.
Gellhaus argues that unless the trial court considers the
allegations of fraud raised by the Gellhaus amended complaint, it
could not determine the true state of facts as they existed at
the time the subdivision was approved and therefore could not
determine if the Commission's approval was supported by
substantial evidence.
Triad filed a motion to strike the Gellhaus amended
complaint on March 16, 1995, alleging that the pleading was a
sham.
Triad renewed its motion on August 25, 1995, alleging that
discovery showed that the motion to strike was well-founded.
The
trial court held a hearing on several motions, including Triad's
discretionary review shall result in a
dismissal or denial. Failure to comply with
other rules relating to appeals or motions
for discretionary review does not affect the
validity of the appeal or motion[.]
See also, Ready v. Jamison, Ky., 705 S.W.2d 479 (1986) (adopting
policy of substantial compliance with rules of civil procedure as
provided by CR 73.03(2)).
Furthermore, in Blair v. City of Winchester, Ky. App.,
743 S.W.2d 23 (1987), this Court held that failure to name an
interlocutory order in the notice of appeal does not result in
waiver of the issue because "one can only appeal from a final
judgment and...all interlocutory orders or judgments are
"readjudicated finally" upon entry of a final judgment disposing
of all issues making it unnecessary to name any judgment in the
notice of appeal other than the final one." (citations omitted).
Blair, 743 S.W.2d at 31.
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motions to strike, on September 18, 1995.
Although counsel for
Gellhaus and Shelton allege that the purpose of this hearing was
to discuss several pending discovery issues, our review of the
videotape of the hearing shows that Triad's motions to strike
were specifically addressed and argued at that time.
In fact,
the trial court gave Gellhaus an opportunity to present evidence
in support of the Gellhaus amended complaint when it asked
counsel for Gellhaus if he had any evidence to support his claim
of fraud or misstatement on the part of Triad.
Under CR 12.06, a court may order any pleading stricken
from the record if it determines that it is a sham.
A pleading
will be deemed to be a sham when it is found to be "so palpably
and manifestly false on its face as to leave no room for doubt
thereof, and of such a character that the court on a mere
inspection may pronounce it to be indicative of bad faith in the
pleader."
Commonwealth v. Murphy, Ky., 174 S.W.2d 681, 683
(1943).
At the September hearing, the trial court informed
counsel for Gellhaus that based on the evidence produced at the
hearing, unless Gellhaus had any other evidence concerning fraud
or misstatement on the part of Triad, Triad's request for a
briefing schedule would be proper.
Additionally, Freund
testified at his deposition that he did not believe that Triad
had misled either him or the Commission.
We hold that the trial
court's decision to strike the Gellhaus amended complaint was not
an abuse of discretion.
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The Shelton Appeal
Shelton contends on appeal that the trial court erred
in holding that the Shelton complaint was barred by the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Shelton claims that the
Shelton complaint alleged claims which accrued after the
Commission's approval of the subdivision and were not part of the
Gellhaus action, that the causes of action in the Shelton
complaint were based on legal theories not raised in the Gellhaus
action, that claims were made against parties who were not
parties to the Gellhaus action, and that the Gellhaus action was
not decided on the merits.
Kentucky recognizes the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.
Louisville v. Louisville Professional
Firefighters Association, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 804, 808 (1991).
The
doctrine of res judicata precludes litigation of a cause of
action which has not, in fact, been litigated but should have
been alleged in an earlier related suit.
451 S.W.2d 417, 419 (1970).
Newman v. Newman, Ky.,
The doctrine of collateral estoppel
precludes re-litigation of an issue which has actually been
litigated and determined in a prior lawsuit.
City of Covington
v. Board of Trustees of the Policeman's and Firefighters'
Retirement Fund of the City of Covington, Ky., 903 S.W.2d 517,
521 (1995).
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel work to preclude a cause of action when there is
identity of parties, identity of causes of action, and a decision
upon the merits in the prior case.
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Newman, 451 S.W.2d at 419.
As to the allegations raised against Triad in Count V
of the Shelton complaint, Shelton argues that the trial court's
order striking the Gellhaus amended complaint was not a decision
on the merits.
We disagree.
First, in its order dismissing the Shelton complaint,
the trial court specifically stated that its order dismissing the
Gellhaus amended complaint "was based on the Court's belief that
there was no merit to the Plaintiff's assertions of fraud and
misrepresentation."
We agree that the hearing held on
September 18, 1995, was not a hearing on discovery issues only,
and that the claims in Count V were adjudicated on the merits.
Even without the assertion in the trial court's order
that the Gellhaus amended complaint was decided on its merits,
under CR 41.02(3):
Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
Rule, and any dismissal not provided for in
Rule 41, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, for want of
prosecution under Rule 77.02(2), or for
failure to join a party under Rule 19,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
Thus, unless the judgment or order of dismissal fits one of the
exceptions set forth in CR 41.02(3), the judgment will be
construed as being with prejudice unless otherwise indicated on
the face of the order.
Commonwealth v. Hicks, Ky., 869 S.W.2d
35, 38 (1994).
As to Counts I, II, III and IV of the Shelton
complaint, we agree that they were properly barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
Our decision is governed by the
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principle that a party may not split a cause of action and
attempt to try it in a piecemeal fashion.
KY., 702 S.W.2d 33, 34 (1985).
Kirchner v. Riherd,
As stated in Newman:
When a matter is in litigation, parties are
required to bring forward their whole case;
and "the plea of res judicata applies not
only to the points upon which the court was
required by the parties to form an opinion
and pronounce judgment, but to every point
which properly belonged to the subject of
litigation, and which the parties, exercising
reasonable diligence, might have brought
forward at the time. (citations omitted).
Newman, 451 S.W.2d at 419.
We agree with Triad's assertion in their brief that
during the 18 months of litigation of this matter, the property
owners/plaintiffs in the Gellhaus and Shelton actions had every
opportunity to assert what Shelton alleges are new claims against
Triad, the Commission, MSD, and Public Works.
Although Shelton
alleges that these new claims did not come to light until after
the Gellhaus action was filed, the proper way to assert those new
claims would have been a motion to amend the Gellhaus complaint
pursuant to CR 15.04.
Having considered the parties' arguments in this
matter, the orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing the
Shelton complaint and striking the Gellhaus amended complaint are
affirmed.
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting
summary judgment in favor of Triad on the Gellhaus complaint is
reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings in
conformance with this opinion.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
-20-
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART AND
WRITES A SEPARATE OPINION.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART.
I concur with the Majority Opinion in part, but I
respectfully dissent as to the affirmance of the trial court's
dismissal of Shelton's complaint.
I do not believe that the
doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable
to bar Shelton's claims.
Shelton's alleged claims that accrued
after the action taken by the Commission; the Gellhaus action was
an administrative appeal that did not involve all of the Shelton
claims or all of the same parties; and the issues raised by the
Shelton complaint were not litigated on the merits in the
Gellhaus administrative appeal.
-21-
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, TRIAD DEVELOPMENT:
Richard M. Trautwein, P.S.C.
Louisville, KY
Victor B. Maddox
Louisville, KY
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, LOUISVILLE &
JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN
SEWER DISTRICT:
John H. Dwyer
Laurence J. Zielke
Denise M. Smith
Louisville, KY
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, LOUISVILLE AND
JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING
COMMISSION:
Paul B. Whitty
County Attorney
Louisville, KY
-22-
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