THOMAS CARTER PADGETT v. LAURA VANNOY PADGETT AND THOMAS CARTER PADGETT v. LAURA VANNOY PADGETT; MICHAEL HALLYBURTON; DONNA NICHOLS
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RENDERED:
December 31, 1997; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
95-CA-2117-MR
THOMAS CARTER PADGETT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-0444
LAURA VANNOY PADGETT
AND
APPELLEE
NO.
NO.
96-CA-1759-MR
AND
96-CA-1810-MR
THOMAS CARTER PADGETT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-0444
LAURA VANNOY PADGETT;
MICHAEL HALLYBURTON;
DONNA NICHOLS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
KNOPF, MILLER, AND SCHRODER,
KNOPF, JUDGE.
JUDGES.
This opinion addresses three (3) appeals by Thomas
Carter Padgett from orders of the Hopkins Circuit Court
addressing various aspects of his domestic relations litigation
against Laura Vannoy Padgett.
After considering the arguments
presented by the parties and the applicable authorities, we
affirm.
The parties were married in June of 1979.
Their
marriage produced two (2) children, Julie, born January 20, 1980,
and Beau, born September 20, 1984.
Laura initiated divorce
proceedings in Hopkins Circuit Court on July 29, 1992.
On August
13, 1992, Tom initiated his own divorce action in Fayette Circuit
Court.
Tom subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Hopkins
Circuit Court action arguing improper venue.
On September 2,
1996, Hopkins Circuit Court issued an order finding that it was
the proper venue to litigate the dissolution of the marriage of
the parties.
Fayette Circuit Court subsequently issued an order
transferring venue to Hopkins Circuit Court.
Extensive
litigation on a wide range of issues followed including the
relevance of the Church of Scientology to the trial court's
custody and visitation determinations.
On May 5 and 6, 1994, the special trial commissioner
held an evidentiary hearing to receive proof concerning custody
of the children, division of marital assets, assignment of
marital debt, maintenance, and attorney fees.
On July 26, 1994,
the commissioner entered his report and recommendations.
Following the filing of exceptions, on June 26, 1995, the trial
court entered an order adopting the report of the commissioner
with one exception.
The court ordered Tom to pay one-half of
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Laura's attorney fees.
Appeal 95-CA-002117 followed.
Meanwhile, litigation continued in the trial court.
On
April 9, 1996, the trial court issued an order restricting Tom's
visitation with his children and requiring that Tom have no
harassing communications with the court appointed psychologist.
On May 17, 1996, the trial court denied Tom's motion for
reconsideration of the April 9 order.
On May 22, 1996, the trial
court ordered the issuance of a bench warrant for the arrest of
Tom for contempt of the trial court's orders of December 22,
1995, and February 26, 1996.
Specifically, Tom was found in
contempt because he 1) had failed to furnish to appellee a lien
free title to the parties' Eagle automobile; 2) had failed to
deliver certain IRS forms to Laura's attorney; and 3) had failed
to pay $800.00 in fees to the court appointed psychologist.
appeals 96-CA-001759 and 96-CA-001810 followed.
The
These cases were
subsequently ordered consolidated and are to be heard with case
95-CA-002117.
CASE NO. 95-CA-2117-MR
ATTORNEY FEES
In its order of June 6, 1995, the trial court rejected
the recommendation of the commissioner that each party pay its
own legal fees and, instead, ordered that Tom pay one-half of
Laura's fees due to the "protracted litigation instigated" by
appellant.
Tom argues that the trial court abused its discretion
under KRS 403.220 by ordering him to pay attorney fees without a
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finding of disparity between the financial resources of the
parties.
KRS 403.220 provides that the trial court may, after
considering the financial resources of both parties, order a
party to pay a reasonable amount to the other party for the cost
of maintaining or defending any proceeding under KRS Chapter 403
and for attorney fees.
authorized by
An allowance of attorney fees is
KRS 403.220 only when it is supported by an
imbalance in the financial resources of the respective parties.
Sullivan v. Levin, Ky., 555 S.W.2d 261, 263 (1977);
Bishir, Ky., 698 S.W.2d 823, 826 (1985);
Bishir v.
Lampton v. Lampton,
Ky.App., 721 S.W.2d 736, 739 (1986).
For this court to review an award of attorney fees
under KRS 403.220, the attorney whose fees are to be paid must be
made a party to the appeal.
S.W.2d 652, 655 (1983).
(1973).
Dubick v. Dubick, Ky. App., 653
Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, Ky., 504 S.W.2d 699
Tom relies on Lampton v. Lampton, Ky. App., 721 S.W.2d
736 (1986), for the proposition that opposing counsel need not be
named.
While apparently, Lampton did consider an appeal of an
attorney fee award even though opposing counsel was not named as
a party to the appeal, we agree with the dissent in that case
that the issue was not properly before the court.
S.W.2d 739, J. Wilhoit dissenting.
Lampton at 721
See Wilhelm supra; Supreme
Court Rule 1.030(8)(a).
Attorneys are necessary parties to appeals under fee
shifting statutes, KRS 403.220.
Knott v. Crown Colony Farm Inc.,
Ky., 865 S.W.2d 326, 329 (1993).
The attorney must be made a
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party to the appeal whether the fee is adjudged to be paid
directly to him or is allowed to one of the parties to the
divorce and ordered to be included as a court-cost item.
v. Bryant, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 454, 455 (1965).
Tyler
This rule has been
specifically held to apply in marriage-dissolution cases under
KRS 403.220.
(1973).
Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, Ky., 504 S.W.2d 699, 701
Beaver v. Beaver, Ky. App., 551 S.W.2d 23, 25. (1977).
We are unable to review any fees assessed under KRS 403.220
because Tom did not name Laura's attorney as a party to the
appeal.
JOINT CUSTODY
Tom next argues that it was an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to use animosity between appellant and appellee
as the basis for rejecting joint custody of the parties' minor
children.
Both parties requested sole custody of the children.
Following an evidentiary hearing the commissioner recommended
that Laura be granted sole custody.
This recommendation was
subsequently accepted by the trial court.
KRS 403.270(4) provides that the court may grant joint
custody to the children's parents if it is in the best interest
of the children.
There is no preference in favor of either joint
custody or sole custody.
(1993).
Squires v. Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765
The parties are entitled to an individualized
determination of whether joint custody or sole custody serves the
best interest of the children.
Squires at 770.
In determining
whether joint custody is appropriate, the trial court must
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initially consider the factors contained in KRS 403.270(1).
Squires at 769.
Thereafter, the court should assess the
likelihood of future cooperation between the parents and their
respective levels of emotional maturity.
Id.
In deciding
whether joint custody is appropriate, the trial court must weigh
the positive and negative aspects and determine whether joint
custody is in the best interest of the child.
Squires at 768.
The trial court possesses broad discretion in determining whether
joint custody serves the child's best interest.
Squires at 770;
McNamee v. McNamee, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 816 (1968).
In the case sub judice, the record demonstrates that
the parties have had repeated, serious disputes during this
litigation.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties
admitted that they have difficulty communicating and cooperating.
Further, it is obvious that the parties cannot cooperate with
respect to the issue of the children's exposure to Scientology.
The trial court found that the parties have experienced clear
animosity during the course of this litigation and accepted the
findings of two (2) psychologists who testified that this
animosity would likely make joint custody a failure.
Great
weight must be given to the findings of the trial court
concerning custody of a child and its conclusions will not be
disturbed except where it has abused its discretion.
Watson, Ky., 434 S.W.2d 33, 35 (1968).
Watson v.
We will not substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court unless a manifest abuse
of discretion has occurred.
Smith v. Smith, Ky., 429 S.W.2d 387,
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391 (1968); Borjesson v. Borjesson, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 191, 193
(1969).
custody.
The trial court has broad discretion on matters of child
Grider v. Grider, Ky., 254 S.W.2d 714, 715 (1953).
In
view of the broad discretion accorded the trial court in
determining the best interest of the child, we cannot say that
there was an abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion
that the appellee should be awarded sole custody of the children.
VENUE
In June of 1990 the parties moved to Lexington, Fayette
County, Kentucky and owned a home there at the time these
dissolution proceedings were initiated.
In August of 1991, Tom,
a hotel manager, was transferred to Southfield Michigan, and
plans had been made for the remainder of the family to join him
there.
Laura signed her dissolution papers in Hopkins County on
July 27, 1992.
At 10:01 a.m. on July 29, 1992, Laura filed her
action for dissolution of marriage in Hopkins Circuit Court.
Laura alleges that she moved in with her mother in Madisonville,
Hopkins County, Kentucky, on July 29, 1992.
Tom alleges that
Laura did not move to Madisonville until August 9, 1992.
He
submitted affidavits, sworn to by Lexington neighbors, that Laura
did not remove her possessions from the Lexington home until
approximately August 9, 1992, and that she continued to reside
there as usual until that date.
Tom alleges that Laura did not
reside in Hopkins County at the time she filed her divorce, and,
therefore, Hopkins County cannot serve as the venue in this
proceeding.
Tom filed a divorce action in Fayette Circuit Court
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on August 13, 1992.
On September 2, 1992, the trial court issued
its order finding that appellee properly filed in Hopkins County.
The Fayette Circuit Court subsequently issued an order
transferring venue to Hopkins Circuit Court.
KRS 452.470 provides that "[a]n action for maintenance
or dissolution must be brought in the county where the husband or
wife usually resides."
Following an evidentiary hearing, in its
order of September 2, 1992, the trial court found that Hopkins
County was the county where Laura usually resided at the time she
filed her petition.
We have reviewed the record, including the
full contents of the videotapes, and are unable to locate either
a transcript or a video recording of the evidentiary hearing.
While portions of the record appear to support the position that
Laura did not usually reside in Hopkins County at the time she
filed her petition, we cannot adequately review the issue without
the testimony given at the September 1, 1992, hearing.
We are in
no position to say the circuit judge did not have ample evidence
on which to base his decision when such evidence is not available
to us.
The presumption is that the proceedings in circuit court
are regular.
Turner v. Gentry, Ky., 402 S.W.2d 104, 105 (1966).
We will not engage in gratuitous speculation based upon a silent
record.
When the complete record is not before the appellate
court, that court must assume that the omitted record supports
the decision of the trial court.
Commonwealth. v. Thompson,
Ky.,697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1985).
It is the appellant's duty,
along with the clerk, to see that the record on appeal is
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properly prepared for transmittal to this court.
Belk-Simpson
Co. v. Hill, Ky., 288 S.W.2d 369, 370 (1956); CR 75.07.
Under
these appellate standards, we assume the omitted record supports
that trial court's determination that appellee usually resided in
Hopkins County at the time she filed her petition.
The final venue issue is whether Hopkins Circuit Court
properly asserted venue over Fayette County.
If competing
petitions are filed in two (2) circuit courts, and both
technically having jurisdiction, then the doctrine of forum non
conveniens should be applied.
Law, sec. 23.4, 1988.
See 1 Petrilli, Kentucky Family
KRS 403.270 does not require venue of the
action for dissolution and maintenance to be related to the last
residence of the parties or any other factor.
Lancaster v.
Lancaster, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 116, 117 (1987).
When, as here,
the proper forum is disputed, the following factors are relevant
in determining proper venue: (1) the county of the parties'
marital residence prior to separation; (2) the usual residence of
the children, if any; (3) accessibility of witnesses and the
economy of offering proof.
Hummeldorf v. Hummeldorf, Ky.App.,
616 S.W.2d 794, 798 (1981).
In disputes over child custody,
where the issue to be determined is the best interests of the
child, the "more convenient and most interested" forum is
particularly appropriate.
130 (1981).
Shumaker v. Paxton, Ky., 613 S.W.2d
Here it is unquestionable that Laura and the
children had moved to Hopkins County and resided there when this
issue was heard and decided by the court.
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While Tom claims to
have never relinquished his Lexington domiciliary, he lived most
of the time in Michigan.
Thus three of the four affected parties
were in Hopkins County, and none of the parties resided in
Fayette County.
At the time of the venue hearing the parties had
sold their home in Fayette County and it appears that Fayette
County had been abandoned as a residence by all concerned.
In
its order of September 2, 1992, the trial court properly invoked
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in concluding that, as
between Hopkins County and Fayette County, Hopkins County was the
proper venue.
On September 9, 1992, the Fayette Circuit Court
issued an order transferring venue of this action to Hopkins
Circuit Court.
It is within the discretion of a circuit court to
decline jurisdiction when it is appropriate under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.
807 (1981).
Williams v. Williams, Ky. App., 611 S.W.2d
Such a determination will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion.
Hummeldorf at 807 (1981).
There being no
abuse of discretion, it was proper for Hopkins Circuit Court to
assume venue in this action.
SCIENTOLOGY
Laura is an active member of the Church of Scientology.
In the past, Tom has been a member, but at some point he
disassociated himself from the organization.
Tom argues that the
Church of Scientology is a "cult," and that the trial court
should consider Laura's active participation in the organization
as a relevant factor in its custody and visitation decisions.
On
occasion the children have participated in Scientology functions.
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In the course of the proceedings, the relevance of
Scientology to these proceedings was litigated and on March 17,
1994, the trial court issued an order ruling that appellee's
practice of Scientology was protected by the first amendment and
could not be considered without a showing of harm to the parties'
children.
Tom's argument on appeal is that the trial court
improperly took judicial notice that Scientology is a religion.
While Tom concedes that the trial court did not take explicit
judicial notice that Scientology is a religion, he contends that
the trial court took "apparent notice" in that it, without making
a specific finding of fact, asserted that Laura's belief in
Scientology enjoyed first amendment protection.
Tom's argument
that the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact
with respect to Scientology's status as a religion is not
preserved for appeal.
A final judgment shall not be reversed or
remanded because of the failure of the trial court to make a
finding of fact on an issue unless such failure is brought to the
attention of the trial court by a written request for a finding
on that issue.
CR 52.04.
Where appellant did not request a
finding of fact below, Rule 52.04 prohibits reversal or remand on
the ground that none was made.
S.W.2d 43 (1979).
Jones v. Jones, Ky. App., 577
Tom does not cite to his preservation of the
issue, and our review of the record failed to ascertain that a CR
52.04 request was made.
In view of this we conclude that the
issue of whether it is proper for the trial court to take
judicial notice of whether Scientology is a religion is not
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properly preserved for appeal.
However, appellant's general
objection to the trial court's failure to take Scientology into
consideration is preserved for appeal.
Appellant appears to place undue emphasis on the
significance of whether Scientology is or is not treated as a
religion for child custody purposes.
Quinn v. Franzman, Ky., 451
S.W.2d 664 (1970), addressed the issue of religion in a child
custody proceeding and endorsed the prevailing view that "courts
may consider religion as a factor in custody cases, but it will
not be given controlling weight where there are other important
considerations bearing upon the temporal welfare of the child."
Id. at 668.
The court noted that this rule is very similar to
the established rule in Kentucky that applies to all custody
cases, wherein the welfare and best interests of the children are
the paramount concerns of the courts.
Id. citing McLemore v.
McLemore, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 722 (1961); Roaden v. Roaden, Ky., 394
S.W.2d 754 (1965); Knight v. Knight, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 159.
This
rule is also consistent with the statutory requirement that
"[t]he court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian
that does not affect his relationship to the child."
KRS
403.270(3).
The trial court did not commit error in its approach to
limiting the introduction of evidence concerning Laura's
membership in the Church of Scientology.
Tom was not prohibited
from introducing evidence relating to Scientology.
The trial
court at all times remained receptive to the admission of
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evidence relating to Scientology if harm to the children could be
shown.
We believe that the trial court acted within its
discretion in establishing this criterion for limiting evidence
relating to Scientology.
See KRE 401 Et seq..
It is within the
discretion of the trial court to determine whether the probative
value of proffered evidence is substantially outweighed by undue
prejudice.
(1991);
Ford Motor Co. v. Fulkerson, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 119
Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 61, 67 (1996).
The trial court found that "there is simply no substantial or
credible evidence that Scientology has impacted the lives of
either Julie or Beau in any way."
are bound by this finding.
442 (1986).
Unless clearly erroneous we
Reichle v. Reichle, Ky., 719 S.W.2d
The court psychiatrist testified that the children
were successful and well-adjusted.
There being substantial
evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that
Scientology has not affected the children, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in limiting the admissibility of
evidence relating to Scientology.
CONSOLIDATED CASES NO. 96-CA-1759-MR & 96-CA-1810-MR
RESTRICTION OF VISITATION
In its order of April 9, 1996, the trial court
restricted Tom's visitation with his children to one weekend per
month and within a two-hour driving distance of Madisonville.
Tom alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in that it
1) restricted visitation without examining Laura's motives of
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scientological "disconnection";
2) used animosity between the
parties as a basis for restricting visitation;
3) restricted
visitation without considering the children's needs and wants;
and 4) restricted visitation without considering expert
testimony, eye witness testimony, and factual evidence.
KRS 403.320(1) provides that the non-custodial parent
"is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court
finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously
the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health."
Further, KRS 403.320(3) provides that visitation rights may be
modified if the modification would serve the best interest of the
child, "but the court shall not restrict a parent's visitation
rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger
seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional
health."
As used in the statute, the term "restrict" means to
provide the non-custodial parent with something less than
"reasonable visitation."
529, 530 (1995).
Kulas v. Kulas, Ky. App., 898 S.W.2d
The statute creates the presumption that
visitation is in the child's best interest for the obvious reason
that a child needs and deserves the affection and companionship
of both its parents.
The burden of proving that visitation would
harm the child is on the one who would deny visitation.
869
S.W.2d 55, Smith v. Smith, Ky. App., 869 S.W.2d 55, 56 (1994).
Following two (2) hearings, in its order of April 9,
1996, the trial court found that, as a result of the then
existing visitation schedule, the "children have experienced
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emotional trauma and there exists a likelihood that such trauma
will continue by the actions of [appellant] unless [the trial
court] restricts [appellant's] visitation rights."
Further, the
trial court accepted the testimony of the court appointed
psychologist, Dr. Donna Nichols, that the children were being
subjected to emotional trauma by appellant.
Lastly, the trial
court found that Tom "attempts to wreak havoc upon . . . [the]
children's relationship with . . . [appellee] and to influence at
least the parties' son, Beau Padgett, to want the . . . appellant
to be his custodial parent, all of which the court finds to be
detrimental to said children's mental and emotional well being."
The trial court's order of April 9, 1996, meets the
standards mandated by KRS 403.320 to restrict visitation.
While
the trial court does not specifically find that unrestricted
visitation with appellant "would endanger seriously" the
children, the trial court does find that the visitation has
resulted in "emotional trauma."
While the trial court could have
better observed the specific language of the statute, there is
little difference between "emotional trauma" and serious
emotional endangerment.
We cannot overturn findings of fact made
by the trial court unless clearly erroneous.
Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442 (1986).
Reichle v. Reichle,
Here the testimony of Dr. Nichols
supports the trial court's findings.
There being substantial
evidentiary support for the trial court's findings, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
restricting visitation.
Endangerment, in the form of "emotional
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trauma," was found by the trial court and that finding was
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
In view of
this, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under KRS
403.320.
COMMUNICATIONS WITH DR. NICHOLS
Tom next argues that it was an abuse of discretion for
the trial court, in its order of April 9, 1996, to order him to
stop harassing Dr. Nichols.
In its order, the trial court found
that appellant had "bombarded Dr. Donna Nichols with notes,
questionnaires, letters and drawings, all of which the court
finds to be harassment by [appellant] in an attempt to intimidate
Dr. Nichols apparently to have her recuse herself from this case
. . . ."
Tom argues that there was no motion to have the
harassment stopped, that there are no persons who witnessed that
appellant harassed Dr. Nichols, and that, if he did harass Dr.
Nichols, the trial court was not the proper venue to consider the
issue.
These arguments are unpersuasive.
A court, once having
obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental
to its constitutional grant of power, inherent power to do all
things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in
the case before it.
(1984).
Smothers v. Lewis, Ky., S.W.2d 62, 64
In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary
in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the
litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment
effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or
ancillary to the principal action. Id.
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The findings of the court are sufficient to support the
action taken.
The court specifically found that the appellant
was attempting to intimidate Dr. Nichols, apparently in an
attempt to have her recuse herself from the case.
We must defer
to the findings of the trial court unless clearly erroneous.
52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, supra.
CR
The trial court's findings not
being clearly erroneous, it was proper for it to issue the orders
enjoining appellant from harassing an important witness in the
case.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
COSTS TO APPELLANT AND BENCH WARRANT
Tom next argues that the trial court, in its order of
May 22, 1996, abused its discretion by ordering certain debts and
expenses to be paid by him.
Specifically, appellant alleges that
the trial court 1) failed to acknowledge the disparity in income
and financial resources between appellant and appellee;
2)
failed to acknowledge contractual obligations which provided for
the payment of expenses;
3) failed to require appellee to share
in visitation costs; and 4) erred by issuing a bench warrant
related to his failure to pay certain costs and expenses.
However, the May 22, 1996, order did nothing more than hold
appellant in contempt for failing to pay costs assessed in trial
court orders dated December 22, 1995, and February 26, 1996.
further ordered the issuance of a bench warrant.
It
The May 22
order did not, in and of itself, assess additional costs or debts
on appellant.
Inasmuch as the December 22, 1995, order and the
February 26, 1996, order are not designated as judgments being
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appealed from in the notice of appeal in this action, we cannot
reach the merits of the properness of the assessment of these
fees.
CR 73;
Cf. Preston v. Williamson, Ky., 483 S.W.2d 448,
450 (1972).
With respect to appellant's allegation that the trial
court abused its discretion because it issued a bench warrant in
absence of all the facts, this is unpersuasive.
Appellant does
not deny that the trial court's orders required him to pay the
psychiatrist's fees and obtain a release of the lien from his
sister.
Nor does he deny that he is not in compliance with these
orders.
His brief is, in essence, an admission that he is in
violation of the trial court's orders.
Courts have inherent
power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through
civil contempt.
(1993).
Blakeman v. Schneider, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 903, 906
It is within a trial court's discretion whether to use
its contempt power, Smith v. City of Loyall, Ky.App., 702 S.W.2d
838, 839 (1986).
The appellant clearly being in violation of
lawful orders of the trial court, we find no abuse of discretion.
FAILURE TO ORDER BILATERAL DISCLOSURE
Lastly, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
that it required him to turn over to appellee his 4056 IRS forms
while not likewise requiring appellee to do so.
In the orders
being appealed from, there is no evidence that the trial court
refused appellant's discovery request while granting the same
discovery request by appellee.
Under the civil rules, an
appellant must point out to this court the location in the record
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where favorable evidence appears.
CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv).
Stone, Ky.App., 799 S.W.2d 46 (1990).
Elwell v.
In summary, we are unaware
whether appellant even asked for "bilateral disclosure."
We will
not pass on an issue that has not been presented to the trial
court.
Department of Highways v. Williams, Ky., 317 S.W.2d 484,
484 (1958).
The judgment of the Hopkins Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
IN APPEAL NO. 95-CA-2117-MR:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
IN APPEAL NO. 95-CA-2117-MR:
Milton C. Toby
Lexington, Kentucky
Michael D. Hallyburton
Madisonville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
IN APPEAL NOS. 96-CA-1759-MR
AND 96-CA-1810-MR:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES IN
APPEAL NOS. 96-CA-1759-MR
AND 96-CA-1810-MR:
Thomas C. Padgett, Pro se
Orleans, Massachusetts
William R. Whitledge
Madisonville, Kentucky
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