A.B. CHANDLER, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND SHERIALL A. CUNNINGHAM v. JOHN J. HUGHES, HEARING OFFICER, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE; COMMISSIONER GEORGE NICHOLS, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE; AND SOUTHEASTERN UNITED MEDIGROUP, INC.
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ORDER ENTERED: September 11, 1996
TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2406-MR
A.B. CHANDLER, III, ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND SHERIALL A. CUNNINGHAM
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-01263
v.
HONORABLE JOHN J. HUGHES, HEARING
OFFICER, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
INSURANCE; COMMISSIONER GEORGE NICHOLS,
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE; AND
SOUTHEASTERN UNITED MEDIGROUP, INC.
APPELLEES
ORDER
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE, and KNOPF, Judges.
A.B. Chandler, III, Kentucky's Attorney General, on
behalf of himself and health insurance policy holders of the
Commonwealth, and Sheriall Cunningham, an affected policy holder
(appellants), appeal an order of Franklin Circuit Court denying
their petition for a writ of prohibition.1
Commissioner Nichols
of the Department of Insurance, although nominally an appellee,
has also submitted briefs and participated in oral arguments in
1
Appellants brought their petition pursuant to KRS
23A.080(2) and CR 81; they bring this appeal pursuant to Cr 76.33
and CR 76.34.
support of the appellants.
Citing Senate Bill No. 343, the
General Assembly's recent, extensive revision of laws relating to
health care and health insurance in Kentucky, these parties seek
an order prohibiting John Hughes, a hearing officer for the
Department of Insurance, from denying public access to certain
information.
For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the
order of the circuit court and remand with instructions to grant
the writ of prohibition.
This matter arises from a rate proceeding currently
before the Insurance Commission.2
Southeastern United Medigroup,
Inc. (SUMI), is seeking Commission approval to increase premium
rates for two of its health insurance products.
Because SUMI's
rate application did not include certain materials the Department
of Insurance (DOI) deemed necessary, DOI and the Attorney General
issued a discovery request for the additional information.
In
response to that request, SUMI moved for a protective order.
It
sought to prevent public disclosure of much of the requested
information on the ground that it was proprietary.
It argued
that the information was exempt from mandatory disclosure
pursuant to KRS 61.878 (the exemption provisions of the Open
Records Act (KRS 61.870 - 61.884)), which is applicable to rate
filings pursuant to KRS 304.2-150(3).
DOI and the AG contended that sections 16(2) and 16(6)
of SB 343 evince the legislature's intent to provide meaningful
2
In the Matter of: Southeastern United Medigroup, Inc.
Filing Applications Nos. 2195 and 2326.
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Rate
public access to the Commission's rate adjustment hearings.
They
argue that that intent would be frustrated were the public denied
access to the contested information and excluded from the
proceedings whenever that information was to be considered.
The hearing officer noted that all parties to the
proceeding, including intervenors, would have access to SUMI's
complete application and that the AG, in his role as consumer
advocate and representative, would necessarily be a party.
He
rejected the AG's construction of SB 343 and ruled that under KRS
13B.090(3), proprietary information necessary to an
administrative decision may be placed under an appropriate seal.
Without making specific findings of his own as to the proprietary
nature of the materials at issue, he accepted and adopted the
representations of SUMI's experts that the information SUMI
sought to protect was in fact proprietary and granted the motion
prohibiting public access to it.
The circuit court, denying appellants' petition for a
writ of prohibition, found that extraordinary relief would be
inappropriate because in its view appellants have an adequate
remedy by appeal from the Insurance Commissioner's final
decision.
This appeal followed.
Because the circuit court entertained this matter in
its capacity as a court of appeal, we review its decision anew.
We ask, as it did, whether the hearing officer is about to
proceed either outside his authority or incorrectly, and if so
whether the appellants are apt to suffer significant injury
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without an adequate remedy by appeal.
Tipton v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 239 (1989).
We agree with the hearing officer that SB 343 does
not necessarily require public disclosure of all information
filed in support of a rate change.
However, KRS 304.2-150(3),
part of the General Assembly's 1994 revision of the health
insurance laws, and sections 15 and 16 of SB 343 demonstrate the
legislature's continuing determination to create a more open
process for modifying insurance rates in Kentucky.
SB 343 in
particular sets forth a presumption that materials related to
insurance rate increases are subject to disclosure.
KRS 304.2-150(3) provides in part that rate and form
filings and information filed in support thereof "shall be open."
Despite that directive's seeming clarity, it and other changes
adopted by the General Assembly in 1994 have failed to effect
much openness in the system for adjusting insurance rates.
1996 legislation goes further.
The
SB 343 requires the Commissioner
to perform a thorough review of all recently modified health
insurance rates and allows him to order rebates of any charges he
deems excessive.
It requires him to conduct public hearings
concerning any subsequent requests for rate increases more than
three percent above the medical rate of inflation.
It
specifically mandates the involvement of the AG as a party in
rate hearings.
It authorizes the Commissioner to adopt
regulations specifying additional information that must accompany
rate filings.
And it allows the Commissioner in appropriate
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circumstances to withdraw approval for a rate and order refunds
of unreasonable charges.
SB 343 ยงยง 15-16.
We believe these statutes demonstrate a legislative
intent to protect both the substance and the appearance of
fairness in insurance rate hearings and, as a means thereto, to
provide for bona fide public participation in the process.
To
make public participation meaningful, these statutes contemplate
disclosure of rate filings in a manner likely to apprise
interested policy holders of their stake in the proceeding.
They
also contemplate public access to the information at the heart of
the rate adjustment decision.
Given this legislative concern for openness, we think
that any exceptions to public disclosure of rate filing
information must be justified by findings setting forth
compelling reasons for confidentiality.
After a thorough review
of the transcript of the hearing, we are convinced that the
evidence offered by SUMI in support of confidentiality did not
overcome the statutory presumption of openness and disclosure.
Based on the record before us, we find that it was error for the
hearing officer to characterize the materials at issue as
proprietary and entitled to confidential protection.
Hearing officer Hughes did not make clear the standard
he used to determine whether the information SUMI sought to
protect was proprietary.
Secrets Act.
Cf. KRS 365.880-900, the Uniform Trade
Nor did he sufficiently indicate how that standard
applied to SUMI's claims.
He seems instead to have relied wholly
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on conclusory representations by SUMI's witnesses.
That his
inquiry was not sufficiently searching has been indicated by
SUMI's subsequent concession before this court that ninety
percent of the information it originally sought to protect might
safely be disclosed.
Therefore, we hold that all the remaining items on the
"contested list"3 are subject to disclosure with the exception of
copies of the tax returns and the copies of year ending trial
balances (referred to as ACCOUNTING, HICI Production Items, nos.
11 and 4 respectively).
With respect to the tax returns and year
end trial balances, the appellants have filed with this Court (on
9/9/96) a notice of position withdrawing their contention that
these items should be public per se.
Should the appellants
resume their claim to these items or, in general, should they
later seek access to additional materials, such materials are to
be presumed subject to disclosure absent specific findings by the
hearing officer of a compelling need for confidential handling.
We thus conclude that hearing officer Hughes is about
to proceed incorrectly, inappropriately denying access to
information the General Assembly has deemed should be available
to policy holders and insurance consumers.
In invoking the extreme relief sought in this case, the
appellants are correct in asserting that there would be no
adequate remedy on appeal.
If the hearing officer were to base
his findings on the standard of confidentiality couched in KRS
3
Appendix A to the hearing officer's order of 8/26/96.
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61.878, rather than on the more specific standard recently
enacted as SB 343, the remedy on appeal would inevitably be
inadequate.
We are bound by the "substantial evidence" standard
of review as an appellate court--a standard which demands a high
degree of deference by the reviewing court as to the findings of
a hearing officer.
As those findings would appear regular on
their face, the erroneous basis on which they rested would not be
apparent.
For an appellate remedy to be adequate, it is critical
that this error be discovered and flushed out at the threshold
stage of the administrative proceedings.
Additionally, would-be
intervenors, who failed to realize their need to intervene
because of inadequate public disclosure of information, would
have no remedy whatsoever on appeal, their stake in the issue
having been permanently lost and rendered moot before an appeal
could be brought.
Moreover, the procedural changes called for by
SB 343 affect not only this case, but all subsequent rate filings
as well.
The orderly administration of these hearings is
dependent upon an interpretation of the new law.
Bender v.
Eaton, Ky., 343 S.W. 2d 799 (1961).
For these reasons, we reverse the order of Franklin
Circuit Court and remand to that court for issuance of a writ
prohibiting the Insurance Commission's hearing officer from
denying public access to any information submitted in support of
Southeastern United Medigroup, Inc.'s request for a rate change
except as provided herein.
The stay of the administrative
hearing imposed by this Court on September 4, 1996, is hereby
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lifted to permit the administrative process to continue in
compliance with the provisions of this Order.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED:__September 11, 1996__
\s\ Sara Combs________
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
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