ALCAN FOIL PRODUCTS v. CHRIS K. PAPE; WILLIAM O. WINDCHY, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE SPECIAL FUND; HON. ZARING P. ROBERTSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
October 25, 1996; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-0382-WC
ALCAN FOIL PRODUCTS
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF A DECISION OF
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
WC-93-25085
v.
CHRIS K. PAPE; WILLIAM O. WINDCHY,
ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE SPECIAL FUND;
HON. ZARING P. ROBERTSON, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * *
BEFORE:
GARDNER, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is a petition for review of a decision of
the Workers' Compensation Board, reversing an opinion by the
Administrative Law Judge, determining that the employer was
entitled to take credit against a workers' compensation award for
payments made under a disability pension plan.
After reviewing
the facts and the applicable law, including recent decisions on
the issue, we affirm the Board's decision denying the employer credit.
Chris Pape filed a workers' compensation claim against
Alcan Foil Products ("Alcan") and the Special Fund, alleging
occupational disability from a knee injury at work.
The
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that Pape sustained a 30%
permanent partial occupational disability and apportioned
liability three-fourths to Alcan and one-fourth to the Special
Fund.
The ALJ also determined that Alcan was entitled to credit
for disability pension payments against Pape's award until Pape's
65th birthday, when Pape's pension converts to normal retirement
benefits.
The disability pension plan at issue contained no
internal offset provision, was unilaterally funded by Alcan
without monetary contribution from the employee, and required a
minimum of 10 years' service with Alcan before it vested.
In
this case, it had vested as Pape had been employed by Alcan for
almost 22 years.
Under the plan, once an employee is entitled to
receive a certain amount of benefits, the amount is not subject
to an increase or reduction except that should Pape become
medically able to return to work, he could lose his disability
pension benefits.
The ALJ ruled that under Beth-Elkhorn Corporation v.
Lucas, Ky. App., 670 S.W.2d 480 (1983), he had no choice but to
allow Alcan credit against the award.
The Workers' Compensation
Board ("Board") reversed the ALJ's decision and denied Alcan
credit based on the recent holdings in American Standard v. Boyd,
Ky., 873 S.W.2d 822 (1994) and GAF Corp. v. Barnes, Ky., 906
2
S.W.2d 353 (1995), which did not become final until after the
ALJ's opinion was rendered.
The employer has the burden of proving entitlement to
credit against a workers' compensation award.
Ephraim McDowell
Regional Medical Center v. Grigsby, Ky. App., 862 S.W.2d 331
(1993).
To meet this burden, the employer must prove several
relevant factors, including, but not limited to, unilateral
funding of the plan by the employer, the duration and conditions
of coverage under the plan and whether the plan contains its own
internal offset provisions.
American Standard v. Boyd, supra;
Eastern Coal Corporation v. Mullins, Ky. App., 845 S.W.2d 27
(1993).
recovery.
The purpose of the credit is to avoid duplicate
Gatliff Coal Company v. Evans, Ky., 896 S.W.2d 608
(1995), quoting American Standard v. Boyd, supra at 823.
Since the disability pension plan in the present case
was unilaterally funded and did not contain its own internal
offset provisions, it would seem that Alcan should be entitled to
credit under the dictates of American Standard, supra and BethElkhorn Corp. v. Lucas, supra.
("Even if the disability plan in
question does not expressly provide, benefits will be integrated
when possible."
Elkhorn, supra.)
American Standard, supra at 824, citing BethHowever, it has been recently held that if the
disability plan is a product of the collective bargaining
process, it may properly be presumed to be a bargained-for
benefit which would be in addition to workers' compensation
3
benefits and, thus, not duplicative of workers' compensation
benefits.
GAF Corp. v. Barnes, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 353 (1995).
In the case at bar, the evidence as to whether or not
the disability pension plan at issue was the result of collective
bargaining was conflicting.
The ALJ was persuaded by the
evidence presented by Pape that the disability pension plan was a
benefit negotiated by the employee bargaining unit.
The ALJ, as fact-finder, has the sole authority to
judge the weight, credibility, substance and inference to be
drawn from the evidence.
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt,
Ky., 695 S.W.2d 418 (1985); Kentucky Carbon Corporation v.
Dotson, Ky. App., 573 S.W.2d 368 (1978).
Since the employer had
the burden of proof in this case, the question on appeal to the
Board was whether the evidence before the ALJ was so
overwhelming, upon consideration of the record as a whole, as to
compel a finding in the employer's favor.
Wolf Creek Collieries
v. Crum, Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984); Snawder v. Stice, Ky.
App., 576 S.W.2d 276 (1979); Howard D. Sturgill & Sons v.
Fairchild, Ky. App., 647 S.W.2d 796 (1983).
The Court of
Appeals' function in reviewing the opinions of the Workers'
Compensation Board is "[t]o correct the Board only where the
Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice."
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88
(1992).
4
In reviewing the record, we cannot say that the
evidence before the ALJ compelled a different finding as to the
disability plan's being a product of collective bargaining.
Based on that finding, the Board properly reversed the ALJ on the
conclusion of law to be drawn therefrom in its application of the
aforementioned recent case law.
For the reasons stated above, the opinion of the
Workers' Compensation Board is affirmed.
GARDNER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY BY SEPARATE
OPINION.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT.
I concur with
the result reached by the Majority Opinion but choose to write
separately.
I do not believe this case turns on whether or not
Pape was subject to a collective bargaining agreement.
Instead,
I believe the failure of the employer to include an offset
provision in the disability plan is the determining factor.
See
American Standard v. Boyd, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 822, 823 (1994).
I am
of the opinion that the language in GAF Corporation v. Barnes,
Ky., 906 S.W.2d 353 (1995), concerning a collective bargaining
agreement is merely the recognition of an obvious fact; i.e.,
employers and employees negotiate contracts with the purpose of
compensating workers for their labor which is desired by the
employer.
I do not read Barnes as holding the converse to be
true--that a benefit which is not union-negotiated is the result
5
of employer largess.
To so rule would be a total denial of
economic reality.
The employer expresses great consternation over the
Board's ruling which does not allow it to offset the payments
under the disability plan against workers' compensation benefits.
I suggest that the recent cases of Conkwright v. Rockwell
International, Ky. App., 920 S.W.2d 90 (1996); and Wayne Supply
Company v. Dugger, Ky. App., 918 S.W.2d 234 (1996), may be of
some help in understanding this question.
However, I continue to
hold the belief set forth in my separate concurring opinion in
Conkwright, supra at 92.
The Supreme Court should take further
action to clarify this area of the law.
6
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CHRIS K.
PAPE:
William A. Miller, Sr.
C. Patrick Fulton
Louisville, Kentucky
J. L. Richardson, IV
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, SPECIAL
FUND:
Judith K. Bartholomew
Louisville, Kentucky
7
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.